Sunggimawan Tjoeng v. Eric H. Holder Jr. , 414 F. App'x 45 ( 2011 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FEB 03 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
SUNGGIMAWAN TJOENG; et al., No. 08-72616
Petitioners, Agency Nos. A098-903-629
A098-903-630
v. A098-903-631
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 14, 2010**
San Francisco, California
Before: HUG, SKOPIL, and BEEZER, Circuit Judges.
Sunggimawan Tjoeng (“Tjoeng”)1 is a citizen of Indonesia who claims to
have been persecuted based on his ethnic-Chinese Christian identity. He seeks
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1
Tjoeng’s wife and son also seek relief from removal as derivative riders on
Tjioeng’s application.
asylum, withholding of removal and/or protection under the United Nations
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The immigration judge (“IJ”) believed
Tjoeng’s story that he had suffered ethnic and religious discrimination. But the IJ
concluded that Tjoeng had not established that he was eligible for any form of
relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) summarily affirmed this
determination.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny Tjoeng’s
petition for review of the BIA’s decision.
The facts are known to the parties; we do not repeat them.
I
Because the BIA summarily adopted the IJ’s decision, we review the
decision of the IJ. Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2005) (en
banc). Whether an immigrant has established a well-grounded fear of future
persecution is heavily fact dependent. We may only overturn the IJ’s decision if
“the evidence not only supports but compels the conclusion that the . . . decision
was incorrect.” Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
II
2
The IJ’s decision that Tjoeng was ineligible for asylum is supported by
substantial evidence. Persecution is “an extreme concept, marked by the infliction
of suffering or harm . . . in a way regarded as offensive.” Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d
1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). It “does not include mere discrimination, as offensive as it may be.”
Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Tjoeng has not established that he was persecuted in the past. Childhood
experiences of “discriminatory mistreatment” combined with isolated, minor
incidents of physical assault do not always compel a finding of past persecution.
Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2009). Nor does the simple
fact that an individual might be more comfortable practicing his religion in the
United States than he would be in his home nation. Cf. id.; Gomez v. Gonzales,
429 F.3d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 2005).
While Tjoeng was called derogatory names as a child, he was never
physically harmed. In 1998 Tjoeng did suffer minor injuries in the one incident of
physical violence that can be firmly tied to his ethnicity or religion, but they did
not require medical attention. Tjoeng points to no incidents where his religious
practice was disrupted and freely admits that the Indonesian government has
3
employed its armed forces to protect his right to practice Christianity. These facts
simply do not compel a finding of past persecution.
Similarly, Tjeong has failed to establish an objectively well-founded fear of
future persecution. As an ethnic-Chinese Christian, Tjoeng is a member of a
broadly disfavored group in Indonesian society. Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1063,
1066-67. But alone this it is not sufficient to prove an objectively well-founded
fear of future persecution. Tjoeng must also show sufficient evidence that he will
be individually targeted to establish a 10% chance of being persecuted in
Indonesia. Id. at 1064. To meet this burden, Tjoeng cannot rely solely on
discrimination common to all ethnic-Chinese Christians. Lolong, 484 F.3d at
1180.
Tjoeng’s childhood experiences of discrimination and ongoing discomfort in
practicing Christianity do not separate him from other members of this disfavored
group. Tjoeng was assaulted in a 1998 anti-Chinese riot.2 But given that Tjoeng
continued to live in Indonesia for six years without further incident, the IJ was
hardly compelled to conclude that local Indonesians were targeting Tjoeng.
III
2
Tjoeng was also involved in an altercation in 2001. However, this incident
does nothing to show that Tjoeng was targeted on account of his race or religion.
Even Tjoeng admits that he caused the traffic accident that precipitated the fight.
4
Tjoeng has also failed to show that he is eligible for withholding of removal.
The standard for withholding of removal is more stringent than the standard
governing asylum. Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 888-89 (9th Cir. 2001).
Because Tjoeng failed to show that he was eligible for asylum, by definition he
failed to show that he was eligible for withholding of removal. See Farah v.
Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
IV
Under Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) Tjeong has waived his CAT claim by not
addressing it in the argument section of his brief. Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94
F.3d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1996).
DENIED.
5