Hannah Lagsit v. Int'l Coffee & Tea, LLC ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 23 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HANNAH A. LAGSIT, No. 19-55143
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00307-GW-SS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AND TEA
LLC, AKA Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 15, 2019**
Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Hannah A. Lagsit appeals pro se from the district court’s orders denying her
motion to vacate, and granting defendant’s motion to confirm, an arbitration
award. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Johnson v. Gruma Corp., 614 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2010) (confirmation of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
arbitration award); Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007)
(denial of motion to vacate arbitration award). We affirm.
The district court properly denied Lagsit’s motion to vacate the arbitration
award because Lagsit failed to establish any of the limited grounds on which an
arbitration award may be vacated under § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act. See
Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth the
limited grounds on which courts may vacate an arbitration award); see also Bosack
v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1104 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Neither erroneous legal
conclusions nor unsubstantiated factual findings justify federal court review of an
arbitral award under the statute[.]” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because there were no grounds for vacating the arbitration award, and the
award was not modified or corrected, the district court properly granted
defendant’s motion to confirm the arbitration award. See Biller v. Toyota Motor
Corp., 668 F.3d 655, 663 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[I]f a party seeks a judicial order
confirming an arbitration award, the court must grant such an order unless the
award is vacated, modified, or corrected[.]” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lagsit’s motion to
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deem facts admitted because the parties’ arbitration agreement provided that the
arbitrator shall decide all disputes regarding discovery. See Asea, Inc. v. S. Pac.
Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1245, 1246-48 (9th Cir. 1981) (setting forth standard
of review); see also United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc.,
484 U.S. 29, 39 (1987) (“The parties bargained for arbitration to settle disputes and
were free to set the procedural rules for arbitrators to follow if they chose.”); Sw.
Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Drywall Dynamics, Inc., 823 F.3d 524, 531 (9th
Cir. 2016) (“Once a matter is submitted to arbitration, procedural questions which
grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are presumptively not for
the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide.” (emphasis, citation, and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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