United States v. Denard Neal , 776 F.3d 645 ( 2015 )


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  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                No. 12-10454
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                       1:11-cr-00297-
    LJO-1
    DENARD DARNELL NEAL, AKA
    Denard Darnell of the Family Neal,
    Defendant-Appellant.        OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    October 6, 2014—San Francisco, California
    Filed January 12, 2015
    Before: Sandra S. Ikuta, N. Randy Smith,
    and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge N.R. Smith
    2                    UNITED STATES V. NEAL
    SUMMARY*
    Criminal Law
    The panel affirmed a conviction and sentence for fourteen
    counts of attempting to file false liens and encumbrances
    against the real or personal property of officers and
    employees of the United States Penitentiary, Atwater, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1521
    .
    The panel held that the prohibition in § 1521 is triggered
    by the filing, attempting to file, or conspiring to file a false or
    fictitious lien, without regard to the validity or existence of
    the collateral identified in the document; and that on plain
    error review, the conviction was supported by sufficient
    evidence.
    The panel held that the district court did not commit plain
    error in failing to hold a competency hearing sua sponte
    before allowing the defendant to represent himself at all
    stages of the proceedings.
    The panel held that the district court did not commit plain
    error in applying a two-level enhancement pursuant to
    U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) for multiple liens against multiple
    victims; and that because the § 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) enhancement
    and the grouping guideline, U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, serve distinct
    purposes, the Sentencing Commission authorized and
    intended the cumulative application of both provisions.
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    UNITED STATES V. NEAL                       3
    The panel held that the district court did not plainly err in
    imposing the sentence, despite the fact that the presentence
    report inaccurately described the length of the defendant’s
    prior sentences.
    COUNSEL
    John Paul Balazs (argued), Sacramento, California, for
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Jared C. Dolan (argued) and Michael G. Tierney, Assistant
    United States Attorneys, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff-
    Appellee.
    OPINION
    N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
    A defendant violates 
    18 U.S.C. § 1521
     when the
    defendant files, attempts to file, or conspires to file a false
    document of the sort regularly used to create liens or
    encumbrances against the real or personal property of a
    United States officer or employee. The prohibition is
    triggered by filing, attempting to file, or conspiring to file a
    false or fictitious lien, whether or not the described collateral
    sought to be liened or encumbered in the document is in fact
    real or personal property.
    Additionally, we find the district court did not commit
    plain error in (a) allowing Defendant-Appellant Denard Neal
    to represent himself throughout these proceedings;
    (b) applying the two-level enhancement described in United
    4                     UNITED STATES V. NEAL
    States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”)
    § 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) to Neal’s sentence; and (c) imposing 87-
    months’ imprisonment on each of the fourteen counts (to be
    served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to any
    unserved prior term of imprisonment), though the presentence
    report inaccurately described the length of Neal’s prior
    sentences.
    A. Background
    In 2010, Neal was serving a sentence for armed robbery
    in the United States Penitentiary, Atwater (“USP-Atwater”)
    in Merced County. While processing another prisoner for
    release from the penitentiary, USP-Atwater guards discovered
    a package that Neal had given the prisoner to mail for Neal
    once released. Upon inspecting Neal’s package, the guards
    discovered various handwritten documents. Four of the
    documents were titled “Security Agreement Commercial
    Lien,” identifying Neal as the secured party and fourteen
    USP-Atwater employees as debtors.             Each Security
    Agreement was accompanied by a standardized Uniform
    Commercial Code (“UCC”) Financing Statement (“UCC-1”).1
    The Security Agreements and UCC-1 Financing Statements
    (“Lien Documents”) indicated that the identified USP-
    Atwater employees owed Neal amounts ranging from five
    thousand to forty-five million dollars, arising from their
    alleged criminal activities that caused Neal harm. Each Lien
    Document listed collateral for the lien as the employee’s
    “oath of offices and all collateral related to the bonds that
    1
    A UCC-1 financing statement is a standardized legal form filed by a
    creditor giving notice of an interest in the personal property of a debtor (a
    person who owes a debt to the creditor as typically specified in the
    agreement creating the debt).
    UNITED STATES V. NEAL                      5
    support, endorse the oath of offices.” According to the Lien
    Documents, the “liens were to remain in place for 100 years,”
    or until Neal was paid in full.
    Included with the Lien Documents was a cover letter from
    Neal to his mother. In the letter, Neal asked his mother to
    type the documents. Neal also gave his mother step-by-step
    instructions for correctly filing the documents with the
    California Secretary of State and the County Recorder in
    Merced County on his behalf. Neal advised his mother that
    the “value of each oath of office [could] be found in the
    Security Agreement and matching UCC-1.” Neal wanted his
    mother to act quickly. Once the documents were filed, Neal
    wanted to “present the documents to the Department of
    Justice and get [the USP-Atwater employees] fired.”
    Lastly, a letter addressed to Deputy Assistant Attorney
    General Daniel Koffsky was included in the packet. The
    letter claimed to provide “Actual and Constructive Notice”
    that Neal had “filed and registered the enclosed government
    officials[’] Oath of Offices with the [California] Secretary of
    State.”
    After discovering Neal’s Lien Documents, the FBI
    interviewed Neal about his attempt to file liens against the
    USP-Atwater employees. In the interview, Neal affirmed he
    wrote the documents. Neal told the agent the fourteen USP-
    Atwater employees had committed crimes against him.
    Because of their crimes, Neal concluded the employees
    should be fired and should also monetarily compensate him.
    As a result of the information obtained in the interview and
    in Neal’s packet, Neal was charged with fourteen counts of
    attempting to file false liens and encumbrances against the
    6                  UNITED STATES V. NEAL
    real or personal property of fourteen officers and employees
    of USP-Atwater, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1521
    .
    At Neal’s arraignment and plea hearing, Neal informed
    the court that he wanted to represent himself. In response, the
    court immediately conducted a Faretta hearing. The court
    informed Neal of: (1) the nature of the charges against him;
    (2) the possible penalties; and (3) the dangers and
    disadvantages of self-representation. During the hearing,
    Neal frequently engaged in lengthy back-and-forth dialogue
    in response to the court’s questions. Neal affirmed that he
    understood the charges against him and the possible penalties.
    Neal also respectfully disagreed with the court’s
    admonishment that Neal would be better off represented by
    counsel. Neal reasoned he was better off without a lawyer,
    because lawyers did not have a very high success rate. Neal
    also stated that no one “fights for yourself like you do.”
    Neal’s adamant desire to represent himself did not diminish
    during the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
    court found Neal wanted to represent himself and that Neal
    had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
    Before trial, Neal filed numerous motions. In many of
    Neal’s filings, Neal disputed the court’s jurisdiction, asserting
    the “United States [was] a corporation.” The court denied
    most of Neal’s motions as frivolous and nonsensical.
    At trial, Neal’s Lien Documents were presented as
    exhibits and entered into evidence. Neal did not dispute that
    he created and attempted to file the Lien Documents. Instead,
    Neal argued his liens were not criminal, because USP-
    Atwater employees had engaged in various criminal activities
    causing him personal harm and losses. Neal also argued his
    liens did not violate the statute, because the collateral he
    UNITED STATES V. NEAL                        7
    identified (oath of offices and all collateral related to the
    bonds that support or endorse the oath of offices) was owned
    by the American people, not a USP-Atwater employee. Neal
    even encouraged the jury to look at the Lien Documents,
    stating the jury would agree the documents “[do] not mention
    any real property.” Neal argued that his Lien Documents
    “plac[ed] a value on the oath of office, not on the debtor.”
    Neal encouraged the jury to ignore the government’s expert
    witness “[b]ecause [the expert] couldn’t read or understand”
    his Lien Documents. Neal argued the real reason he was
    being prosecuted was “because [he] came up with a concept
    to remove government officials from their office when they
    commit criminal activity,” not for “fil[ing] liens against
    government officials.”
    The government argued Neal’s Lien Documents were
    precisely the type of documents prohibited by the statute.
    The government explained Neal’s documents were of the sort
    regularly used to create liens and encumbrances against
    property. According to the government, Neal’s motivation
    was retaliation. Neal’s Lien Documents accused the
    employees of engaging in a litany of criminal actions
    (trespass, theft, fraud, “aiding and abetting, and numerous
    criminal torts, acts constituting treason and sedition against
    the Life, Liberty, private property, birthright and happiness of
    our Master Secured Party/Creditor Denard-Darnell Neal”),
    allegedly resulting in personal harm to Neal. In the Lien
    Documents, Neal also claimed each USP-Atwater employee
    admitted committing the various criminal offenses against
    him while they were employed at USP-Atwater. “I
    [USP-Atwater employee] do freely admit and affirm without
    reservation . . . [regarding] the above state acts . . . [I] acted
    with intent . . . [and] did commit . . . criminal acts . . . .”
    Further, the liens declared that each USP-Atwater employee
    8                 UNITED STATES V. NEAL
    agreed to the imposition of Neal’s liens. “I [USP Atwater
    employee] . . . accept and agree that this . . . Common Law
    Lien is Binding Upon ALL OATH OF OFFICES AND ALL
    COLLATERAL RELATED TO THE BONDS THAT
    SUPPORT, ENDORSE THE OATH OF OFFICES.”
    As shown in Neal’s Lien Documents, Neal’s collateral
    was not limited to the employee’s oath of office. The
    collateral also included all bonds that supported and endorsed
    the oaths of office. The government’s expert witness testified
    that, despite the falsity and technical deficiencies of Neal’s
    documents, they would likely be accepted and filed. Once
    filed, the alleged debtors would bear the burden of proving
    the documents false and having the liens removed.
    After the two-day jury trial, Neal was convicted on all
    fourteen counts. The district court sentenced Neal to 87-
    months’ imprisonment on each of the fourteen counts, to be
    served concurrently with each other but consecutively to any
    prior, undischarged term of imprisonment. Neal filed a
    timely appeal.
    Neal appeals (1) the sufficiency of the evidence. Neal
    argues the evidence was insufficient to support his
    conviction, because the collateral he identified (oath of
    offices and all collateral related to the bonds that support or
    endorse the oath of offices) is not the real or personal
    property of a federal officer or employee. Neal appeals
    (2) his waiver of counsel, claiming he was incompetent. Neal
    argues it was error for the court to allow him to represent
    himself throughout the proceedings without holding a
    competency hearing. Neal also appeals (3) his sentence.
    Neal argues the application of a two-level, multiple-lien
    enhancement to his sentence resulted in impermissible double
    UNITED STATES V. NEAL                        9
    counting. Finally, Neal appeals (4) the length of his sentence.
    Neal argues the district court may have imposed a different
    sentence if his presentence report had correctly reported the
    length of his previous sentences.
    B. Discussion
    1. On plain error review, Neal’s conviction was
    supported by sufficient evidence.
    Neal argues that there was insufficient evidence to
    support his conviction. Specifically, Neal argues there was
    no evidence that the collateral he attempted to attach (oath of
    offices and all collateral related to the bonds that support or
    endorse the oath of offices) was real or personal property of
    a federal employee as required by the statute. Neal does not
    argue what type of property his collateral is; he simply insists
    that it is not real or personal property. Generally, we would
    review Neal’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
    under the standard announced in Jackson v. Virginia,
    determining “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the [government], any rational trier of fact
    could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
    a reasonable doubt.” 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979) (emphasis in
    original). However, our task here is further complicated by
    Neal’s failure to raise the issue in the district court, requiring
    us to review only for plain error or to prevent a manifest
    miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Kuball, 
    976 F.2d 529
    , 531 (9th Cir. 1992).
    To succeed on plain error review, Neal “must show (1) an
    error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and
    (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
    reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Zalapa,
    10                 UNITED STATES V. NEAL
    
    509 F.3d 1060
    , 1064 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
    omitted). “Reversal of a criminal conviction on the basis of
    plain error is an exceptional remedy . . . .” United States v.
    Bustillo, 
    789 F.2d 1364
    , 1367 (9th Cir. 1986). There was no
    error in this case, much less plain error or a miscarriage of
    justice. Even under Jackson’s less deferential standard of
    review, there was sufficient evidence to sustain Neal’s
    conviction.
    Because Neal’s argument regarding the insufficiency of
    the evidence challenges whether the collateral identified in
    his liens was real or personal property, we must look to the
    text of the statute to determine the meaning of “real or
    personal property.” See United States v. Thompson, 
    728 F.3d 1011
    , 1015 (9th Cir. 2013) (when a sufficiency argument
    hinges on the interpretation of a statute, we review the district
    court’s statutory interpretation de novo). Specifically, we
    must review the portion of the statute criminalizing the filing
    of, the attempted filing, or the conspiring to file “any false
    lien or encumbrance against the real or personal property” of
    a federal employee.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1521
     provides:
    Whoever files, attempts to file, or conspires to
    file, in any public record or in any private
    record which is generally available to the
    public, any false lien or encumbrance against
    the real or personal property of [a U.S. officer
    or employee], on account of the performance
    of official duties by that individual, knowing
    or having reason to know that such lien or
    encumbrance is false or contains any
    materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
    UNITED STATES V. NEAL                    11
    statement or representation, shall be fined
    under this title or imprisoned for not more
    than 10 years, or both.
    When interpreting a statute, we are guided by the
    fundamental canons of statutory construction and begin with
    the statutory text. See BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States,
    
    541 U.S. 176
    , 183 (2004). We interpret statutory terms in
    accordance with their ordinary meaning, unless the statute
    clearly expresses an intention to the contrary. United States
    v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 
    489 U.S. 235
    , 242 (1989). We must
    “interpret [the] statut[e] as a whole, giving effect to each
    word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in
    a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute
    inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.” Boise Cascade
    Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 
    942 F.2d 1427
    , 1432 (9th Cir. 1991).
    Additionally, “[p]articular phrases must be construed in light
    of the overall purpose and structure of the whole statutory
    scheme.” United States v. Lewis, 
    67 F.3d 225
    , 228–29 (9th
    Cir. 1995).
    This statute does not define the terms “real or personal
    property” as used in the statute. Nor does chapter 73 of title
    18—in which § 1521 is located—include a definition section
    for these terms. Similarly, there is no guiding preamble,
    recital, or purpose clause. The statute’s title and heading
    simply signal that the statute punishes retaliation against
    federal employees. However, we are able to determine the
    meaning of the terms “real or personal property,” by
    examining the terms in the context of the surrounding text
    and examining the statute’s scheme and overall purpose.
    The statute’s overall scheme and purpose seeks to prevent
    false filing of liens or encumbrances intended to harm a
    12                UNITED STATES V. NEAL
    federal employee. The statute focuses on preventing a
    specific type of harm. The text of the statute prohibits all
    persons from using false financial filings to harm and
    intimidate federal employees.               The foreseeable
    circumstances, determining who may cause the harm and how
    the harm results, are numerous and varied and seem of
    limited (if any) importance in the statute.
    The statute’s surrounding text also assists in interpreting
    the meaning of “real and personal property” as used in
    § 1521. The statute’s repetition of the indefinite determiner
    “any” signals an intended broad and expansive application of
    the statute. See United States v. Gonzales, 
    520 U.S. 1
    , 5
    (1997) (noting the word “any” has expansive meaning, “one
    or some indiscriminately of whatever kind”). In § 1521, the
    word “any” modifies where an individual is prohibited from
    filing—in any public record or in any private record (which
    is generally available to the public). See 
    18 U.S.C. § 1521
    .
    “Any” also modifies what is prohibited. The statute prohibits
    the filing of any false liens or encumbrances. 
    Id.
     The statute
    does not attempt to identify all possible offending documents.
    
    Id.
     Rather, the statute prohibits documents of the sort used to
    create liens or encumbrances. The focus is on preventing the
    harm such documents may cause, rather than focusing on the
    actual documents.
    We also note that the conduct prohibited by the statute is
    not confined to completed acts. Rather than requiring that the
    false lien or encumbrance actually be filed in order to violate
    the statute, the statute’s prohibition is triggered by filing,
    attempting to file, or conspiring to file a false lien or
    encumbrance. See 
    id.
     Because the statute can be violated
    without completed conduct, the harm the statute protects
    UNITED STATES V. NEAL                               13
    against arises from the nature of the documents to be filed,
    not the validity of the documents.
    Further, the statute lacks any reference either to technical
    filing requirements in the statute or to a filer’s understanding
    of technical requirements therein. Again, validity is not a
    prerequisite for violation. Indeed, the statute criminalizes the
    filing of, the attempting to file, or the conspiring to file false
    liens or encumbrances, not false valid liens or encumbrances.
    
    Id.
     Validity inquiries examine inter alia, the sufficiency of
    the information found in the documents (e.g., correctness and
    completeness of the debtor’s name and address), the timing
    of the filing, the manner of the filing, the correctness of the
    listed collateral or its legal description and the sufficiency of
    supporting documents. The statute makes such validity
    inquiries irrelevant.
    Not only are such validity inquiries irrelevant to
    determining whether the statute has been violated, they often
    have little or no impact on whether such documents can or
    will be filed by the filing authorities. The California
    Commercial Code, following the UCC, grants little authority
    to filing offices to refuse to accept fraudulent or invalid
    filings.2 See 
    Cal. Com. Code §§ 9516
    (b), 9520(a). Indeed,
    the filing office is not authorized to determine whether the
    information in a filing is (or could be) legitimate or valid. 
    Id.
    § 9516, Editors’ Note 3. Therefore, the terms “real and
    personal property” are not intended to limit the scope of the
    2
    See UCC § 9-520(a) & cmt. 2; 
    Cal. Com. Code § 9516
    . Generally, the
    bases for rejection are limited to the document missing some requisite
    information (e.g., debtor’s name), the record not being communicated in
    a manner (e.g., written rather than electronic) that the filing office accepts,
    or filer failing to tender the required filing fee.
    14                    UNITED STATES V. NEAL
    statute, but rather to indicate the class of documents
    prohibited by the statute. The statute prohibits the filing of,
    the attempting to file, or the conspiring to file documents of
    the sort that could create false liens and encumbrances against
    federal employees. The prohibition is triggered by the type
    of document and resulting harm without regard to the validity
    or existence of the identified collateral in such documents.
    Neal’s focus on collateral is misplaced, because the collateral
    he listed in his Lien Documents is not relevant to whether he
    violated the statute.
    Our reading of the statute is consistent with the general
    legislative policy behind the enactment of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1521
    .
    “Since 2004, there [was] a nationwide increase in the number
    of filings by prison inmates of unsubstantiated liens and
    [UCC] financing statements against state or federal officials
    involved with their incarceration.” Jones v. Caruso, 
    569 F.3d 258
    , 261 (6th Cir. 2009). Section 1521 was enacted in
    response to the increasing vulnerability of federal employees
    as part of the Court Security Improvement Act of 2007.3 It
    intends to penalize individuals who seek to intimidate and
    harass federal employees and officers by filing, attempting to
    file or conspiring to file false liens or encumbrances. See
    H.R. Rep. 110-218 (2007).
    The Eighth Circuit took an analogous view of real or
    personal property in the first appellate case to interpret
    § 1521. See United States v. Reed, 
    668 F.3d 978
    , 984–85 (8th
    Cir. 2012). Similar to Neal, the defendant in Reed argued that
    “the government failed to prove a violation of § 1521 because
    [the UCC-1 financing statement] did not . . . [indicate] any
    property of [a federal employee] as collateral.” Id. at 984
    3
    Pub. L. 110–177, § 201(a), 
    121 Stat. 2534
    , 2535–36 (2008).
    UNITED STATES V. NEAL                      15
    (quotation marks omitted). The Reed court acknowledged
    that Reed’s documents were technically deficient, and his
    “lengthy” and “incoherent” description of collateral in the
    filings would not have succeeded in perfecting a priority
    claim under UCC law. 
    Id.
     However, the court stated
    technical deficiencies were not a defense. 
    Id.
     The Reed court
    affirmed that “[t]he prohibition in 
    18 U.S.C. § 1521
     is
    triggered by the filing of a false or fictitious lien, whether or
    not it effectively impairs the government official’s property
    rights and interests.” 
    Id.
     at 984–85. “Indeed, legal
    insufficiency is in the nature of the false, fictitious, and
    fraudulent liens and encumbrances that Congress intended to
    proscribe.” 
    Id. at 985
    .
    We now consider Neal’s argument that there was
    insufficient evidence to support his conviction under § 1521
    in light of our interpretation of the terms “real and personal
    property” in that statute as referring to documents of the sort
    that could create false liens and encumbrances against federal
    employees.
    Similar to Reed’s jury, Neal’s jury was presented with
    undisputed evidence that Neal created and attempted to file
    standard lien documents bearing common lien language—
    documents of the sort regularly used to create liens and
    encumbrances against real or personal property. Neal’s Lien
    Documents clearly identified individual debtors and their
    corresponding debts. There was no ambiguity as to who
    owed the debt and why the obligation was being asserted.
    Contrary to Neal’s assertion, the collateral listed was not
    limited to each employee’s oath of office. Neal also
    attempted to attach all bonds that supported and endorsed the
    oaths of office.
    16                   UNITED STATES V. NEAL
    Evidence was also presented indicating that false,
    technically deficient, financial documents are routinely
    accepted by filing offices without regard to the document’s
    accuracy or legitimacy. Once a false lien is filed, the alleged
    debtor bears the burden of proving the lien’s falsity and
    having it removed.4 Evidence demonstrated documents
    similar to Neal’s can encumber property, cloud title, and
    cause significant harm to innocent persons alleged to be
    debtors.
    The government also presented the letter Neal wrote to
    his mother. Neal gave his mother step-by-step instructions
    for filing the Lien Documents on his behalf. Neal also told
    his mother that if he was able to register the “[s]taff[’s] oath
    of offices” under his name, “the [DOJ] will fire them.” It was
    reasonable for the jury to infer from this evidence that Neal
    believed if he acquired rights in an employee’s oath of office,
    he could demand payment of the false debt if the employee
    did not want to risk being fired. In other words, it was
    reasonable for the jury to infer that Neal intended to file
    documents of the sort that could create false liens and
    encumbrances against federal employees.
    There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to
    find Neal knowingly attempted to file false documents,
    intending to harass the USP-Atwater employees on account
    of their performance of official duties. Congress enacted
    § 1521 precisely to prevent this type of conduct. Therefore,
    the jury’s conviction of Neal for violating § 1521 was not
    plainly erroneous.
    4
    See 
    Cal. Com. Code § 9518
    .
    UNITED STATES V. NEAL                             17
    2. The district court did not commit plain error in
    failing to hold a competency hearing sua sponte
    before allowing Neal to represent himself at all
    stages of the proceedings.
    Neal argues the district court erred in failing to order a
    competency hearing sua sponte before allowing him to waive
    counsel and represent himself at all stages of his proceedings.
    We review a district court’s failure to sua sponte order a
    competency hearing for plain error. United States v. Dreyer,
    
    705 F.3d 951
    , 960 (9th Cir. 2013). “Failing to sua sponte
    hold a competency hearing is plain error only if ‘the evidence
    of incompetence was such that a reasonable judge would be
    expected to experience a genuine doubt respecting the
    defendant’s competence.’” United States v. Garza, 
    751 F.3d 1130
    , 1134 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Dreyer, 705 F.3d at 961).
    Relevant evidence includes medical history, the defendant’s
    behavior in and out of court, and the connection between the
    defendant’s serious mental disease or defect and some failure
    by the defendant to understand the proceedings, assist in his
    own defense, or carry out the basic tasks needed to present his
    own defense without the help of counsel. See id. at 1134–35.
    Absent such evidence, a district court does not plainly err in
    failing to sua sponte hold a hearing to determine the
    defendant’s competence to stand trial, see id., or to represent
    himself at trial and sentencing, see Godinez v. Moran,
    
    509 U.S. 389
    , 399–402 (1993).5
    5
    We note that once a district court holds such a hearing, it may
    determine that the defendant is not competent to represent himself at trial,
    even if the defendant would be sufficiently competent to stand trial. See
    Indiana v. Edwards, 
    554 U.S. 164
    , 178 (2008).
    18                     UNITED STATES V. NEAL
    A. The medical evidence presented to the district
    court was insufficient to cause a reasonable
    judge to experience genuine doubt as to Neal’s
    competency to represent himself.
    A defendant must present “strong” medical evidence of a
    serious mental disease or defect before a genuine doubt about
    competency will arise. Garza, 751 F.3d at 1135. Even then,
    it would not be error for the court to fail to hold a competency
    hearing unless the defendant also established a causal
    connection between the mental disease or defect and his
    inability to understand the proceedings.6 Id at 1136. “Where
    the defendant’s mental problem—even if severe—has no
    discernible impact on the proceedings, we have not found
    substantial evidence.” Id.7 “Even a mentally deranged
    defendant is out of luck if there is no indication that he failed
    to understand or assist in his criminal proceedings.” Id.8
    “And even if that same defendant did fail to understand or
    assist in his proceedings, he would still be out of luck unless
    his mental impairment caused the failure.” Id.
    6
    See, e.g., Davis v. Woodford, 
    384 F.3d 628
    , 645–46 (9th Cir. 2004);
    Boag v. Raines, 
    769 F.2d 1341
    , 1343–44 (9th Cir. 1985); Steinsvik v.
    Vinzant, 
    640 F.2d 949
    , 952–54 (9th Cir. 1981); Sailer v. Gunn, 
    548 F.2d 271
    , 274–75 (9th Cir. 1977).
    7
    See also Davis, 
    384 F.3d at
    645–46; Steinsvik, 
    640 F.2d at
    952–54.
    8
    See also Bassett v. McCarthy, 
    549 F.2d 616
    , 617, 619–21 (9th Cir.
    1977) (concluding that no genuine doubt as to competency existed even
    though defendant was deemed schizophrenic, declared insane by two
    government psychiatrists prior to trial and refused to cooperate with his
    counsel at trial, because prior to the crime, defendant was a socially
    capable, average college student).
    UNITED STATES V. NEAL                     19
    Neal relies on his presentence report to show he suffered
    from a severe mental disease or defect. However, Neal’s
    presentence report does not contain sufficient medical
    evidence to raise a genuine doubt as to Neal’s competency.
    The report referred to Neal’s suicide attempts twenty-two
    years previous. According to the report, around the time of
    the suicide attempts, Neal believed psychiatrists were
    attempting to medicate him. However, there are no details
    about a diagnosis or medications prescribed. The report
    noted that, even when counseling was required as part of
    Neal’s previous parole, the counselor stated therapy was not
    recommended.
    According to the presentence report, Neal had reported a
    deterioration in his current mental health, because he realized
    “people don’t follow the truth in his eyes,” and that the court
    had taken a “bias[ed]” position in his case. As a result, Neal
    had requested therapy to help him deal with the “conflicts in
    what he described as a flawed system.” Neal’s request for
    therapy, to help him deal with his disillusionment with the
    judicial system, was not sufficient to create serious doubt as
    to his competency. “Certainly the mere fact that psychiatric
    help was felt to be desirable . . . cannot be said to create a
    bona fide doubt of [Neal’s] capacity to participate
    intelligently in the proceedings facing him.” Sailer, 
    548 F.2d at 275
    . “To hold otherwise would reflect disparagingly” on
    those who are clearly competent, yet require some therapeutic
    assistance. 
    Id.
     We find the record lacks substantial medical
    evidence that would lead a reasonable judge to harbor a
    genuine doubt about Neal’s competency.
    20                  UNITED STATES V. NEAL
    B. Neal’s conduct in and out of court did not
    create genuine doubt as to his competency.
    Neal argues that, if we find the medical evidence he now
    emphasizes is insufficient to raise a genuine doubt as to his
    competency during the proceedings, we should find his
    courtroom conduct and his many “nonsensical” filings
    containing “rambling statements” and “irrational arguments”
    should have raised serious doubt as to his competency. In the
    past, we have found that if medical evidence fails to establish
    the existence of a mental disease or defect, bizarre or erratic
    behavior—especially in court—may raise a genuine doubt as
    to a defendant’s competency. See Garza, 751 F.3d at
    1135–36.9 However, competency will not be questioned
    when a defendant merely displays rude, uncooperative and
    sometimes wacky behavior. See United States v. Johnson,
    
    610 F.3d 1138
    , 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding no doubt
    concerning competency when defendant’s courtroom
    behavior was uncooperative and eccentric, but not
    significantly disruptive or defiant). Likewise, voluminous
    filings of nonsensical pleadings do not create per se serious
    doubt about competency. See 
    id.
    Reviewing the record, Neal did not manifest any
    observable signs of incompetency during his proceedings
    such that a reasonable judge would experience genuine doubt
    about his competency. The record showed that, during his
    Faretta hearing, Neal consistently responded to the court’s
    inquiries in a coherent and respectful manner. Neal informed
    the court that he was a high school graduate with some
    college education. Neal stated he had studied some law on
    9
    See also McMurtrey v. Ryan, 
    539 F.3d 1112
    , 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2008);
    Chavez v. United States, 
    656 F.2d 512
    , 519 (9th Cir. 1981).
    UNITED STATES V. NEAL                          21
    his own, including the applicable rules of procedure and
    evidence. Neal even debated the efficacy of trained attorneys
    after the judge stated Neal would be better off represented by
    trained counsel. Neal informed the court he believed “the
    disadvantage of not being trained in the law acts as an
    advantage because those who [are] trained in the law [do] not
    seem to be effective.”
    Similarly, during trial and sentencing, the record does not
    include evidence that Neal manifested such conduct. Neal
    was responsive and rational at trial and participated
    effectively when he chose to do so. Neal made opening
    statements, closing arguments, and cross-examined witnesses
    with a fair degree of skill—even rephrasing his questions in
    response to a sustained objection. Neal also generally
    followed courtroom rules and protocol.
    It is not disputed that Neal made numerous comments and
    filed a variety of documents disputing jurisdiction and other
    “nonsensical” issues (e.g., “[the] United States is a
    corporation. . . . as a corporation it cannot interact with
    human beings; “the sale of bonds based on Petitioners [sic]
    conviction by the court creates a financial conflict of
    interest”.). However, Neal also professed a “sovereign
    citizen” belief system.10 His comments and conduct were
    indicative of that belief, not a lack of competence. Neal
    cannot now use those beliefs as an expression of
    incompetency. “In the absence of any mental illness or
    uncontrollable behavior, [Neal] had the right to present [his]
    unorthodox defenses and argue [his] theories to the bitter
    end.” See Johnson, 
    610 F.3d at 1147
    .
    10
    See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 
    405 F. Supp. 2d 602
    , 603–06
    (D. Md. 2005) (describing the “sovereign citizen” belief system).
    22                UNITED STATES V. NEAL
    C. Neal’s Faretta waiver was valid.
    Neal claims that his waiver of counsel in his Faretta
    hearing was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. We
    review whether a Faretta waiver satisfied these requirements
    de novo, even where the defendant failed to raise the issue of
    the validity of the Faretta waiver to the district court. United
    States v. Erskine, 
    355 F.3d 1161
    , 1166–67 (9th Cir. 2004).
    Although no specific colloquy is required, we have held a
    waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent if the defendant
    was informed and understands (a) “the nature of the charges
    against him,” (b) “the possible penalties,” and (c) “the
    dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” United
    States v. Balough, 
    820 F.2d 1485
    , 1487–88 (9th Cir. 1987).
    Neal’s Faretta waiver was voluntary, knowing, and
    intelligent. Prior to Neal’s arraignment and plea hearing,
    Neal informed his appointed counsel he wished to represent
    himself. Neal renewed the request at his arraignment and
    plea hearing. In response to Neal’s request, the court
    immediately conducted a Faretta hearing.
    At the Faretta hearing, the court clearly explained the
    charges and possible penalties to Neal. The court also
    explained the specific allegations to Neal. The court
    informed Neal that each offense was punishable by a
    maximum of 10 years in prison and/or a fine of $250,000.
    The court, in an effort to convey the seriousness of the
    charges, told Neal that his sentence could be 140 years if the
    court decided to run the sentences consecutively. The court
    also engaged in a lengthy discussion about sentencing,
    sentencing guidelines, and factors used by a court when
    sentencing. Neal consistently assured the court that he
    UNITED STATES V. NEAL                            23
    understood what he was being told and that he did not have
    any questions.
    The record also established that the court spent a
    significant amount of time warning Neal about the dangers
    and disadvantages of self-representation. Neal was advised
    that, if he chose to represent himself, he was going to be held
    to the same rules of evidence and the same rules of procedure
    as if an attorney was representing him. The court discussed
    the rules of evidence and criminal procedure, explaining that
    the rules can prove critical in a case. Although Neal indicated
    he was knowledgeable about the rules, the court still
    cautioned that the rules were often complicated and difficult,
    even for lawyers. The court also explained that trial was
    difficult. Neal was informed he would be on his own and the
    court could not advise or help him. The court advised Neal
    it was unwise to represent himself and that he would be better
    off being represented by a trained attorney.11
    However, Neal was insistent in his desire to represent
    himself. Neal assured the court he had no questions and that
    he understood the pitfalls of representing himself. When the
    court finally asked Neal, in light of the penalty if he was
    11
    Continuing to caution Neal, the judge stated that if he were “charged
    with a crime, I would want an attorney to represent me.” The judge
    continued, “I’m just telling you personally that I would want someone to
    represent me because when you have something personal at stake,
    sometimes you lose sight of the strategic details and other things when
    you’re too personally involved. So although I would have long
    discussions with my attorney and give my attorney my opinions and try
    and guide them in what I thought were important things, I would be
    represented by an attorney if I were charged with a crime. And in my
    opinion I think that you’d be better served by having a trained attorney to
    represent you.”
    24                 UNITED STATES V. NEAL
    found guilty, whether he still wished to represent himself and
    give up his right to be represented by counsel, Neal
    responded “absolutely.”
    After review, the record does not evidence that Neal
    failed to understand the nature of the charges against him, the
    possible penalties, or the dangers and disadvantages of
    self-representation. Neal clearly endorsed the “sovereign
    citizen” ideology. Neal’s request to represent himself could
    not be denied solely because he adhered to such beliefs. The
    right to represent oneself, like the right to counsel, is secured
    by the Constitution. See Faretta v. California, 
    422 U.S. 806
    ,
    814–15 (1975). “[F]orcing a lawyer upon an unwilling
    defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he
    truly wants to do so.” 
    Id. at 817
    . The choice must be
    honored even when it is ultimately to the defendant’s own
    detriment. 
    Id. at 834
    . The evidence demonstrates that Neal
    knew exactly what he was doing and made the choice to
    represent himself with eyes open. See 
    Id. at 835
    .
    3. The district court’s application of the Sentencing
    Guidelines was not plainly erroneous.
    Neal argues that the court should not have applied the
    two-level, multiple lien enhancement under USSG
    § 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) (“Offense Specific Guideline”) to his
    sentence. Instead, he argues, the Offense Specific Guideline
    only allows application of the multiple lien enhancement
    when there are multiple offenses against the same victim. In
    Neal’s circumstance, while he was convicted of fourteen
    offenses, each offense involved a different victim.
    Neal also argues that, even if the Offense Specific
    Guideline enhancement applied, it was error for the court to
    UNITED STATES V. NEAL                      25
    apply it here. He argues its application results in
    impermissible double counting. The fourteen offenses were
    previously accounted for when the district court increased
    Neal’s base offense level by five points under USSG § 3D1.4
    (“Multiple Count Grouping Guideline”). Therefore, Neal
    argues, the fourteen offenses were double counted when the
    court also added the multiple lien enhancement under the
    Offense Specific Guideline.
    We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of
    the United States Sentencing Guidelines. United States v.
    Johansson, 
    249 F.3d 848
    , 858 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Neal
    did not raise this objection in the district court, we review the
    district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines for
    plain error. United States v. Hammons, 
    558 F.3d 1100
    , 1103
    (9th Cir. 2009).
    A. It was not plain error to apply the two-level
    enhancement to Neal’s sentence for multiple
    liens against multiple victims.
    USSG § 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) specifically addresses sentencing
    for harms associated with violations of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1521
    . It
    was added to the USSG after 
    18 U.S.C. § 1521
     was enacted
    in 2007. See USSG app. C amend 718 (2007). The plain
    language of the subsection provides for a two-level
    enhancement “[i]f the defendant is convicted under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1521
     and the offense involved more than two false liens or
    encumbrances.” See USSG § 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) (emphasis
    added).
    Neal contends the court should not have applied the
    enhancement, because he was convicted of fourteen offenses
    and each offense only involved one lien. Neal explains that
    26                UNITED STATES V. NEAL
    each of the fourteen liens he attempted to file was charged as
    a separate count and a separate violation of § 1521.
    Therefore, he was ultimately charged with fourteen separate
    offenses. Each offense represented one lien—each offense
    did not involve more than two false liens or encumbrances.
    Neal has misinterpreted § 2A6.1(b)(2)(B). To clarify
    when the two-level multiple lien enhancement is applicable,
    we look to the application notes. See United States v.
    Hernandez-Sandoval, 
    211 F.3d 1115
    , 1117 n.3 (9th Cir.
    2000) (“In general, the application notes are binding on the
    courts in their construction of the Sentencing Guidelines”).
    Application Note (1) provides:
    Scope of Conduct to Be Considered.—In
    determining whether subsections (b)(1),
    (b)(2), and (b)(3) apply, the court shall
    consider conduct that occurred prior to or
    during the offense; however, conduct that
    occurred prior to the offense must be
    substantially and directly connected to the
    offense, under the facts of the case taken as a
    whole. For example, if the defendant engaged
    in several acts of mailing threatening letters to
    the same victim over a period of years
    (including acts that occurred prior to the
    offense), then for purposes of determining
    whether subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3)
    apply, the court shall consider only those prior
    acts of threatening the victim that have a
    substantial and direct connection to the
    offense.
    UNITED STATES V. NEAL                           27
    USSG § 2A6.1 cmt. n.1(emphasis added). In determining
    whether to apply the enhancement, Note (1) requires a
    sentencing court to consider conduct occurring during the
    offense. Note (1) also requires a sentencing court to consider
    prior conduct, but only if the prior conduct was substantially
    and directly connected to the offense. Note (1) does not
    specify any number of victims to whom the conduct must
    occur. Note (1) merely cautions a court to only consider
    conduct that is substantially and directly connected to the
    offense. We agree that the example in Note (1) clearly
    indicates multiple offenses against the same victim is conduct
    that a court must consider. However, because it is only an
    example, it does not preclude a court from applying the
    enhancement for multiple offenses against different victims.
    Note (1) only requires that a sentencing court consider
    conduct occurring during the offense and conduct that
    occurred prior to the offense that is substantially and directly
    related to the offense.
    In short, because Note (1) requires a sentencing court to
    consider conduct occurring prior to and during the offense,
    and does not expressly preclude a court from considering
    other charged offenses aimed at different victims, it was not
    plain error for the district court to conclude that Neal’s
    offense (placing a lien on a victim) “involved” the false liens
    placed on other victims that occurred prior to and during the
    offense conduct. Therefore, on plain error review, we cannot
    say the court committed error when it concluded that Neal’s
    offense made him eligible for an enhancement under USSG
    § 2A6.1(b)(2).12
    12
    The question of whether we would have reached the same conclusion
    if we were deciding the question in the first instance is not before us.
    28                 UNITED STATES V. NEAL
    B. It was not plain error for the district court to
    apply multiple enhancements to Neal’s
    sentence.
    “As a general rule, it is appropriate for a court to consider
    all applicable Guidelines provisions in calculating the
    guidelines range for an offense. In particular, the Sentencing
    Guidelines contemplate that courts will apply all applicable
    specific offense characteristics to enhance the base offense
    level.” United States v. Smith, 
    719 F.3d 1120
    , 1123 (9th Cir.
    2013); see also USSG § 1B1.1(a)(2).
    We infer that the Sentencing Commission would not
    intend us to apply a Guideline provision that “would increase
    a defendant’s punishment on account of a kind of harm that
    has already been fully accounted for by application of another
    part of the Guidelines.” Smith, 719 F.3d at 1124 (internal
    quotation marks omitted). However, “when each invocation
    of the behavior serves a unique purpose under the Guidelines,
    we conclude that the Commission authorized and intended the
    cumulative application of both provisions.” Id. (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    On plain error review, we cannot say the district court
    committed error when determining Neal’s sentence. The
    district court applied upward enhancements under the
    Multiple Count Grouping Guideline § 3D1.4 and under the
    Offense Specific Guideline § 2A6.1(b)(2)(B). Because the
    enhancements serve distinct purposes, we conclude that the
    Commission “authorized and intended” the cumulative
    application of both provisions. See Smith, 719 F.3d at 1124.
    UNITED STATES V. NEAL                    29
    i. Multiple Count Grouping Guideline § 3D1.4
    Section § 3D1.4 provides for upward enhancements when
    a defendant commits multiple offenses. Because Neal was
    convicted of fourteen offenses, Neal’s base offense level was
    increased by five points. Section § 3D1.4 accomplishes the
    Guidelines’ overall objective of providing “incremental
    punishment for a defendant who is convicted of multiple
    offenses.” See United States v. Watts, 
    519 U.S. 148
    , 154
    (1997).
    ii. Offense Specific Guideline § 2A6.1(b)(2)(B).
    On the other hand, the enhancement under
    Section 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) serves a distinct purpose from the
    purpose of Section 3D1.4. The Offense Specific Guideline
    § 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) enhancement accounts for “the additional
    time and resources required to remove multiple false liens or
    encumbrances,” rather than accounting for incremental
    punishment for multiple offenses. See USSG app. C amend.
    718 (2007). The Comments to the Amendment enacting
    § 2A6.1(b)(2)(B) provide:
    [T]he amendment expands the scope of the
    two-level enhancement at subsection (b)(2) to
    apply if the defendant is convicted under
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1521
     and the offense involved
    more than two false liens or encumbrances,
    and also provides an upward departure
    provision that may apply if the offense
    involved substantially more than two false
    liens or encumbrances against the real or
    personal property of the same victim. These
    modifications reflect the additional time and
    30                UNITED STATES V. NEAL
    resources required to remove multiple false
    liens or encumbrances.
    
    Id.
     (emphasis added). According to the Comments, the
    § 2A6.1(b)(2) enhancement may be imposed for one of two
    reasons (only one of which Neal challenges). The
    enhancement focuses on the number of false liens or
    encumbrances, not the number of victims.
    Additionally, § 2A6.1 Application Note (4)(B)
    specifically allows for an upward departure if the offense
    involved multiple liens and multiple victims. Note (4)(B)
    provides:
    (B) Multiple Threats, False Liens or
    Encumbrances, or Victims; Pecuniary
    H a r m . — If t h e o f f e n s e i n v o l v e d
    (i) substantially more than two threatening
    communications to the same victim, (ii) a
    prolonged period of making harassing
    communications to the same victim,
    (iii) substantially more than two false liens or
    encumbrances against the real or personal
    property of the same victim, (iv) multiple
    victims, or (v) substantial pecuniary harm to a
    victim, an upward departure may be
    warranted.
    USSG § 2A6.1 cmt. n.4(b) (emphasis added).
    On plain error review, we cannot say the district court
    committed error in applying multiple enhancements to Neal’s
    sentence.
    UNITED STATES V. NEAL                      31
    4. The district court did not plainly err in imposing
    Neal’s sentence, despite Neal’s presentence report
    incorrectly listing the lengths of his previous
    sentences.
    Neal argues that the district court imposed a longer
    sentence than it otherwise would have imposed, because his
    presentence report incorrectly reported the lengths of his
    previous sentences. Neal’s previous convictions were listed
    in the criminal history section of his presentence report. The
    presentence report indicated Neal was convicted of eight
    separate counts related to a bank robbery. Each count was
    listed separately along with its corresponding sentence (in
    months). However, the presentence report did not include a
    total number of months of imprisonment for the eight related
    counts.
    Neal argues that, if the months of imprisonment listed in
    the presentence report for the eight counts related to the bank
    robbery had been totaled, that total would show the report had
    incorrectly listed the length of the individual sentences. We
    agree that, if the individual sentences listed in the presentence
    report had been totaled, the total would have been 425
    months of incarceration, even though Neal was actually
    sentenced to a total of 665 months of incarceration for the
    related counts. However, we find no evidence to substantiate
    Neal’s argument that, “[i]f the court had known” his previous
    sentence was 665 months instead of 425 months as indicated
    in the presentence report, “there was a reasonable probability
    that the court would have imposed a lesser [current]
    sentence.” Neal is correct, his presentence report did not
    indicate the correct total number of months of imprisonment
    for his previous sentences. However, Neal has provided no
    evidence to indicate that the probation office used the length
    32                UNITED STATES V. NEAL
    of his previous sentences (correct or incorrect) at all, in its
    Sentencing Guidelines calculation. Nor is there evidence that
    the lengths of Neal’s previous sentences were used for the
    probation office’s within-Guidelines recommendation for
    Neal’s current sentence.
    Similarly, there is no evidence to indicate the court used
    Neal’s previous sentences when determining the current
    sentence. The district court sentenced Neal in accordance
    with the Guidelines. According to USSG § 5G1.3(a) “[i]f the
    instant offense was committed while the defendant was
    serving a term of imprisonment . . . the sentence for the
    instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the
    undischarged term of imprisonment.” (Emphasis added).
    When sentencing Neal, the district court ordered that “[a]ny
    sentence imposed is to be served consecutively, however, to
    any undischarged term of imprisonment which the defendant
    is currently serving.” (Emphasis added). Because the district
    court neither miscalculated Neal’s sentence nor relied on
    erroneous information in calculating his sentence, we
    conclude that the sentence imposed was not plainly
    erroneous.
    For the foregoing reasons, Neal’s conviction and sentence
    are AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-10454

Citation Numbers: 776 F.3d 645, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 460, 2015 WL 136392

Judges: Ikuta, Smith, Murguia

Filed Date: 1/12/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (24)

Faretta v. California , 95 S. Ct. 2525 ( 1975 )

United States v. Gonzales , 117 S. Ct. 1032 ( 1997 )

United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc. , 109 S. Ct. 1026 ( 1989 )

boise-cascade-corporation-pope-talbot-inc-james-river-ii-inc-v , 942 F.2d 1427 ( 1991 )

United States of America,plaintiff-Appellee v. Carlos ... , 211 F.3d 1115 ( 2000 )

Jackson v. Virginia , 99 S. Ct. 2781 ( 1979 )

United States v. Johnson , 610 F.3d 1138 ( 2010 )

United States v. Floyd Balough , 820 F.2d 1485 ( 1987 )

Kenneth Sailer v. J. B. Gunn , 548 F.2d 271 ( 1977 )

Donald Gene Boag v. Robert Raines , 769 F.2d 1341 ( 1985 )

United States v. Alvin R. Bustillo , 789 F.2d 1364 ( 1986 )

McMurtrey v. Ryan , 539 F.3d 1112 ( 2008 )

United States v. Erik D. Erskine , 355 F.3d 1161 ( 2004 )

Ruben Portillo Chavez v. United States , 656 F.2d 512 ( 1981 )

United States v. Mitchell , 405 F. Supp. 2d 602 ( 2005 )

Larry David Davis v. Jeanne S. Woodford, Warden, of ... , 384 F.3d 628 ( 2004 )

United States v. Watts , 117 S. Ct. 633 ( 1997 )

United States v. Zalapa , 509 F.3d 1060 ( 2007 )

Godinez v. Moran , 113 S. Ct. 2680 ( 1993 )

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry ... , 67 F.3d 225 ( 1995 )

View All Authorities »