United States v. Iris Rodriguez ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 5 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 18-10389
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
4:17-cr-01301-JAS-BGM-1
v.
IRIS RODRIGUEZ, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
James Alan Soto, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 2, 2019
San Francisco, California
Before: FERNANDEZ and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and CHOE-GROVES,** Judge.
Iris Rodriguez was seized and searched at an interior immigration
checkpoint in Arizona. That search resulted in the discovery of methamphetamine
for which Rodriguez was later indicted. Rodriguez moved to suppress the
methamphetamine on the ground that she did not voluntarily consent to the search.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Jennifer Choe-Groves, Judge for the United States
Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge for a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”). At the evidentiary hearing on her motion, Rodriguez
and Border Patrol Agent Vanessa Salcedo testified. Agent Salcedo interviewed
and searched Rodriguez. In his R&R, the magistrate judge credited Agent
Salcedo’s testimony over Rodriguez’s and recommended that the district court
deny the motion.
The district court, however, declined to follow the magistrate judge’s
recommendation and granted Rodriguez’s motion. The government then filed an
interlocutory appeal of the district court’s order under 18 U.S.C. § 3731. On
appeal, the government raises two arguments: (1) the court procedurally erred
when in failed to hold a de novo evidentiary hearing before implicitly rejecting the
magistrate judge’s credibility findings; and (2) the district court applied the wrong
legal standard for assessing the voluntariness of Rodriguez’s consent to the search.
We agree with the government’s first argument and therefore do not address the
second.
The Due Process Clause prevents a district court from rejecting a magistrate
judge’s credibility determinations that favor the defendant unless the court first
conducts a de novo evidentiary hearing. United States v. Ridgway, 300 F.3d 1153,
1156–57 (9th Cir. 2002). But, because the government has no due process rights,
the Constitution does not mandate a “symmetrical” rule for cases where the district
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court rejects a magistrate judge’s credibility findings favorable to the government.
United States v. Thoms, 684 F.3d 893, 902 (9th Cir. 2012). Instead, we have
invoked our “supervisory authority” to adopt a “narrower rule” specifying that a
district court abuses its discretion when it rejects a magistrate judge’s credibility
findings that favor the government, unless those findings had no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis. Id. at 903. Because the magistrate judge made credibility
determinations in the government’s favor, our analysis is guided by Thoms.
Here, the district court made at least one factual finding inconsistent with the
magistrate judge’s credibility findings. The magistrate judge found that Agent
Salcedo credibly testified that she twice obtained Rodriguez’s consent before
conducting the search of her person.
The district court, however, found Agent Salcedo’s characterization of her
interaction with Rodriguez “to be a strained reading of the interaction” and
declined to characterize the exchange “as unequivocal consent.” The district
court’s characterization of the exchange constituted an implicit rejection of the
magistrate judge’s crediting of Agent Salcedo’s testimony. Although the district
court could have reasonably rejected Agent Salcedo’s testimony, it could have
done so only after conducting an evidentiary hearing of its own. Id. at 896. In
failing to hold a hearing, we agree with the government that the district court
procedurally erred.
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For the above reasons, the district court’s suppression order is vacated and
the matter is remanded for further consideration. “That consideration on remand,
we presume, will include a de novo hearing before the district judge, but we leave
it to the district court to determine the scope of that hearing.” Id. at 906.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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