Troy Coachman v. Seattle Auto Management ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 11 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TROY COACHMAN, No. 18-35881
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00187-RSM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SEATTLE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC.,
DBA Mercedes Benz of Seattle; AL
MONJAZEB,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 7, 2019
Seattle, Washington
Before: GOULD and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and PRESNELL,** District
Judge.
Seattle Auto Management, Inc. and Al Monjazeb appeal the district court’s
denial of their Rule 59 Motion for remittitur or new trial. We have jurisdiction
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Gregory A. Presnell, United States District Judge for
the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
The appellants first argue that the appellee’s closing argument violated the
court’s in limine ruling with respect to the appellant’s financial condition. Because
the appellants failed to object at trial to the alleged misconduct, reversal is improper
unless there was “plain or fundamental” error. Settlegoode v. Portland Pub. Sch.,
371 F.3d 503, 517 (9th Cir. 2004). “Plain error review requires: (1) an error; (2) that
the error be plain or obvious; (3) that the error have been prejudicial or affect
substantial rights; and (4) that review be necessary to prevent a miscarriage of
justice.” Id. While making the closing argument at issue, counsel used Coachman’s
value to the appellants as an analog for his personal loss. While that comparison may
have been inapt, there is no indication that it was prejudicial or affected substantial
rights. The district court did not commit plain or fundamental error in denying the
motion for a new trial.
The appellants also argue that the ratio between the noneconomic and
economic compensatory damages renders $4,697,248 in noneconomic damages
excessive. However, Washington law does not limit compensatory damages based
on the ratio between economic and noneconomic damages. Indeed, we will not
disturb the jury’s verdict “unless it is outside the range of substantial evidence in the
record, or shocks the conscience of the court, or appears to have been arrived at as
the result of passion or prejudice.” Bunch v. King Cty. Dep’t of Youth Servs., 116
2 18-35881
P.3d 381, 389 (Wash. 2005) (quoting Bingaman v. Grays Harbor Cmty. Hosp., 699
P.2d 1230, 1233 (Wash. 1985)). The appellants chose not to address damages during
their closing argument, and there is support in the record for the size of the damages
award; we find no persuasive reason to disturb the jury’s verdict.
AFFIRMED.
3 18-35881