Rafik Suleymanyan v. William Barr ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                          FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    DEC 18 2019
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    RAFIK SULEYMANYAN,                              No.   16-70354
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A075-671-142
    v.
    ORDER
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    Before: RAWLINSON, BENNETT, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
    The last sentence on page 3 of the memorandum disposition filed on
    September 20, 2019, is amended to read as follows: We therefore vacate and
    remand to the Board for further proceedings to determine whether, when crediting
    Suleymanyan’s declaration as true, he has established a prima facie case and
    materially changed country conditions. With this amendment, the panel has voted
    to deny Respondent’s Petition for Panel Rehearing.
    Respondent’s Petition for Panel Rehearing, filed November 1, 2019, is
    DENIED.
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DEC 18 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    RAFIK SULEYMANYAN,                               No.   16-70354
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A075-671-142
    v.
    AMENDED MEMORANDUM*
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted September 9, 2019
    Pasadena, California
    Before: RAWLINSON, BENNETT, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
    Rafik Suleymanyan (Suleymanyan), a native and citizen of Armenia, seeks
    review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denying his
    motion to reopen immigration proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §
    1252, and review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See
    Salim v. Lynch, 
    831 F.3d 1133
    , 1137 (9th Cir. 2016).
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    The Board must “credit evidence supporting a motion to reopen unless that
    evidence is inherently unbelievable.” Shouchen Yang v. Lynch, 
    822 F.3d 504
    , 508
    (9th Cir. 2016) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, the Board
    may not require submission of corroborative evidence while reviewing a motion to
    reopen. See Malty v. Ashcroft, 
    381 F.3d 942
    , 946-47 (9th Cir. 2004). As the Board
    made no determination that Suleymanyan’s declaration was “inherently
    unbelievable,” the Board was required to credit the declaration as true.1 Shouchen
    
    Yang, 822 F.3d at 508
    . By failing to credit Suleymanyan’s declaration as true, and
    by requiring corroborative evidence, the Board abused its discretion. See id.; see
    also 
    Malty, 381 F.3d at 946-47
    .
    An error resulting from the Board’s abuse of discretion is harmless if no
    prejudice results from the error. See Kumar v. Gonzales, 
    439 F.3d 520
    , 523-24
    (9th Cir. 2006). In other words, if Suleymanyan would not be entitled to relief
    even if his declaration were credited as true, the Board’s error in failing to credit
    the declaration as true would be rendered harmless. See 
    id. However, in
    this case,
    1
    The prior adverse credibility determination was improperly used by
    the Board to discredit Suleymanyan’s declaration, particularly as the adverse
    credibility determination related to matters other than those toward which the
    adverse credibility determination was directed. See Toufighi v. Mukasey, 
    538 F.3d 988
    , 995 n.13 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n alien may use a motion to reopen to present
    newly available material evidence that challenges the original factual conclusions
    drawn by the IJ. . . .”) (citation omitted).
    2
    the Board failed to make an alternative finding that, even crediting the declaration
    as true, Suleymanyan was unable to establish a prima facie case for relief. See
    Najmabadi v. Holder, 
    597 F.3d 983
    , 986 (9th Cir. 2010). We therefore vacate and
    remand to the Board for further proceedings to determine whether, when crediting
    Suleymanyan’s declaration as true, he has established a prima facie case and
    materially changed country conditions.2 See I.N.S. v. Ventura, 
    537 U.S. 12
    , 16
    (2002) (requiring remand if additional inquiry is needed).
    VACATED and REMANDED.
    2
    We express no opinion as to the outcome of the Board’s subsequent
    review.
    3