Yuanxiang Zhang v. Bing's Restaurant, Inc. ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAY 31 2019
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    YUANXIANG ZHANG; CANWEN                          No.   17-35596
    ZHANG; LIQIONG DENG,
    D.C. No. 3:13-cv-00838-MO
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    BING’S RESTAURANT, INC., an Oregon
    domestic business corporation,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    and
    PAUL JOE; SUE JOE,
    Defendants.
    YUANXIANG ZHANG; CANWEN                          No.   17-35600
    ZHANG; LIQIONG DENG,
    D.C. No. 3:13-cv-00838-MO
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    BING’S RESTAURANT, INC., an Oregon
    domestic business corporation,
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Defendant-Appellee,
    and
    PAUL JOE; SUE JOE,
    Defendants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 15, 2019**
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: N.R. SMITH, WATFORD, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
    Bing’s Restaurant Inc. (“the Restaurant”) appeals the district court’s denial
    of its two motions to set aside the entry of default against it. YuanXiang Zhang,
    Canwen Zhang, and Liqiong Deng (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appeal the district
    court’s sua sponte dismissal of their claims against individuals Paul Joe and Sue
    Joe (“the Joes”)—against whom default had also been entered. We have
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and remand.
    1.     Plaintiffs moved for entry of default against the Restaurant for its failure to
    be represented by counsel. Plaintiffs separately moved for entry of default against
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2
    the Restaurant and the Joes (collectively, “Defendants”) as a sanction for their
    failure to respond to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests. The district court granted both
    motions in a docket entry without explanation or analysis, and the clerk of court
    entered default against all Defendants.
    The Restaurant moved to set aside the entry of default for its failure to be
    represented by counsel, arguing that good cause existed under Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 55(c). Separately, all Defendants moved to set aside the entry of
    default for their discovery violations, arguing both good cause under Rule 55(c)
    and that the entry of default was an inappropriate sanction. The district court found
    Defendants culpable for the discovery violations and denied both motions.
    Although the district court purported to deny the motion to set aside the
    entry of default for the Restaurant’s failure to be represented by counsel, it did not
    directly address that motion nor did it find the Restaurant culpable for its failure to
    be represented. Thus, it is not clear whether the district court meaningfully
    reviewed that motion to set aside or on what basis that motion was denied.
    Additionally, the district court did not address whether the entry of default
    was an appropriate sanction for Defendants’ discovery violations. Before imposing
    3
    the extreme sanction of default, the district court must consider certain factors.1
    The district court did not address the factors before it granted Plaintiffs’ motion
    and entered default as a sanction, nor did it address the factors when it denied the
    motion to set aside the entry of default on that basis.
    Because the district court denied the motions to set aside the entry of default
    without addressing the Restaurant’s arguments, we vacate the denial and remand.
    2.    The district court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims against the Joes. A
    district court may not sua sponte dismiss a plaintiff’s claims without providing the
    plaintiff an opportunity to respond, “unless the plaintiff[] cannot possibly win
    relief.” Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 
    864 F.2d 635
    , 637-38 (9th Cir. 1988)
    (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Thus, the district court must take
    the well-pleaded factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to
    determine whether she could possibly win relief. Cf. Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ.
    Ass’n, 
    629 F.3d 992
    , 998 (9th Cir. 2010).
    Despite having entered default against the Joes, the district court sua sponte
    dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against them by determining that Plaintiffs failed to
    1
    These factors include: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of
    litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice to the
    party seeking sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their
    merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Wanderer v. Johnston,
    
    910 F.2d 652
    , 656 (9th Cir. 1990) (alteration and citation omitted).
    4
    establish individual liability. In reaching that conclusion, the district court
    disregarded well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, which allege that the Joes
    exercised economic and managerial control over the Restaurant and thus were
    individually liable as employers. Those allegations support a claim against the Joes
    on which Plaintiffs could possibly win relief. Thus, we vacate the district court’s
    dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims and remand for further proceedings.
    VACATED and REMANDED.
    The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
    5
    FILED
    MAY 31 2019
    Zhang v. Bing’s Restaurant, Inc., No. 17-35596, 17-35600                 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    R. Nelson, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting from the result in part:
    I concur in the majority’s decision to vacate the district court’s sua sponte
    dismissal of Defendants Paul Joe and Sue Joe from the action and to remand
    because the district court abused its discretion in denying, without analysis, the
    Restaurant’s motion to set aside the default judgment for failure to be represented
    by counsel. I write separately, however, because I believe the district court abused
    its discretion in entering default as a discovery sanction and the entry of default
    was procedurally improper in the first instance.
    First, as the majority recognizes, a district court must weigh certain factors
    before imposing the “extreme sanction of dismissal or default” for discovery
    violations. Wanderer v. Johnston, 
    910 F.2d 652
    , 656 (9th Cir. 1990). The district
    court must consider: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of
    litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice to the
    party seeking sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their
    merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” 
    Id. (citation and
    internal
    brackets omitted). Notably, we have held that “[w]hile a district court need not
    make explicit findings regarding each of these factors, if it does not, the appellate
    court must review the record independently to determine whether the sanction was
    an abuse of discretion.” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    1
    Applying these factors, I find that the district court abused its discretion in
    entering default as a discovery sanction. “The first two of these factors favor the
    imposition of sanctions in most cases, while the fourth cuts against a default or
    dismissal sanction. Thus the key factors are prejudice and availability of lesser
    sanctions.” 
    Id. Here, however,
    it is not even clear that the public’s interest in
    expeditious resolution of litigation was best served by entry of default given the
    parties were actively engaged in settlement discussions and Defendants had
    requested an extension of the discovery deadlines to further pursue settlement.
    While hindsight is 20/20, allowing the parties to pursue settlement may have
    avoided the roughly five years of litigation resulting from the district court’s entry
    of default.
    The two “key” factors also weigh in favor of Defendants. As the district
    court found, Plaintiffs would not be meaningfully prejudiced by allowing this case
    to proceed on its merits. Moreover, the availability of less drastic sanctions weighs
    strongly in favor of Defendants. “[W]e have held that the district court abuses its
    discretion if it imposes a dismissal sanction without first considering the impact of
    the sanction and the adequacy of less drastic sanctions.” U.S. for Use & Ben. of
    Wiltec Guam, Inc. v. Kahaluu Const. Co., 
    857 F.2d 600
    , 604 (9th Cir. 1988)
    (internal quotation marks omitted). Only “in exceptional cases, where it is clear
    that no other alternative would have been reasonable, [may we] affirm a dismissal
    2
    or default judgment despite the absence of such a discussion.” 
    Id. Here, despite
    Plaintiffs seeking lesser sanctions and given that no motions to compel or other
    discovery motions were filed, the district court did not discuss the availability of
    lesser sanctions before it entered default. Accordingly, I find the district court
    abused its discretion in entering default as a discovery sanction and would vacate
    that order as to all Defendants.
    Second, although the parties did not raise the issue,1 under Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), “[i]f the party against whom a default judgment is sought
    has appeared personally or by a representative, that party or its representative must
    be served with written notice of the application at least 7 days before the hearing.”
    Because Defendants appeared by answering the complaint, they were entitled to
    seven days’ notice before entry of default. That notice was never provided as
    Plaintiffs filed and served their motion for default judgment on June 17, 2014 (the
    day of the discovery deadline), and the district court entered an order summarily
    granting the motion on June 18, 2014, without a hearing. “The failure to provide
    55(b)(2) notice, if the notice is required, is a serious procedural irregularity that
    usually justifies setting aside a default judgment or reversing for the failure to do
    1
    “[A] court of appeals may review issues sua sponte . . . where to not do so would
    be unduly harsh to one or both of the parties.” United States v. Hoyt, 
    888 F.2d 1257
    , 1258 (9th Cir. 1989).
    3
    so.” Wilson v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 
    564 F.2d 366
    , 369 (9th Cir. 1977). There is
    good reason for this requirement. It provides a party faced with the extreme
    sanction of default an opportunity to respond before default is entered. Defendants
    were given no such opportunity. However, because this issue was not directly
    raised before the district court or this court, I concur in the majority’s decision to
    remand to the district court for further proceedings as to whether the Restaurant’s
    default judgment should be set aside, on this ground or others.
    Accordingly, I would vacate the default judgement as to the Joes, and
    remand to the district court for further proceedings only on whether to set aside the
    default judgement against the Restaurant for failure to be represented by counsel.
    4