Luis Sanchez v. William P. Barr , 919 F.3d 1193 ( 2019 )


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  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LUIS ENRIQUE SANCHEZ, AKA               No. 14-71768
    Enrique Cruz Sanchez, AKA Luis
    Llamas Sanchez, AKA Luis Charles         Agency No.
    Sanchez, AKA Enrique Sanchez            A076-359-028
    Cruz, AKA Luis Enrique Sanchez
    Llamas,
    Petitioner,       ORDER
    v.
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    Filed April 1, 2019
    Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Richard A. Paez,
    and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.
    Order;
    Concurrence in Order by Judge Paez;
    Statement Respecting Order by Judge O’Scannlain;
    2                       SANCHEZ V. BARR
    SUMMARY *
    Immigration
    The panel filed an order denying rehearing en banc in a
    case in which the panel held that Luis Sanchez may be
    entitled to termination of removal proceedings without
    prejudice as the result of having made a prima facie showing
    of an egregious violation of 
    8 C.F.R. § 287.8
    (b)(2) (to detain
    a person for questioning, an immigration officer must have
    reasonable suspicion the person is, or is attempting to be,
    engaged in an offense against the United States, or is an alien
    illegally in the country), and remanded for the agency to
    afford the Government an opportunity to rebut Sanchez’s
    prima facie case.
    Concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge
    Paez, joined by Judge Wardlaw, wrote to reiterate points in
    response to Judge O’Scannlain’s separate statement. Judge
    Paez wrote that Judge O’Scannlain’s statement attempted to
    obscure the core issue—the egregious regulatory violation—
    with the smokescreen of the exclusionary rule, and wrote
    that Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion rested on a
    mischaracterization of decades of precedent.
    Judge Paez wrote that, contrary to Judge O’Scannlain’s
    assertions, the panel did not pull the remedy of termination
    with prejudice out of thin air; rather, the remedy was based
    on this court’s precedent and consistent with the Supreme
    Court’s long-standing concern for regulatory violations that
    implicate fundamental rights.         Responding to Judge
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    SANCHEZ V. BARR                       3
    O’Scannlain’s insistence that the court has no authority to
    address an egregious violation of this regulation, Judge Paez
    wrote that the regulation implicates constitutional rights,
    thereby triggering the court’s duty to ensure agency
    compliance.     Judge Paez also responded to Judge
    O’Scannlain’s opinion that the remedy would do nothing but
    delay Sanchez’s “inevitable removal,” stating that this view
    misses the essence of Sanchez’s claim and the harm he
    sought to remedy. In this regard, Judge Paez wrote that more
    was at stake than the outcome of a single case in that the
    remedy recognized the tainted nature of the initial detention
    and, one hopes, would encourage agency compliance.
    Finally, Judge Paez wrote that Judge O’Scannlain’s parade
    of horribles regarding the consequences of the panel’s
    remedy were unsubstantiated and, at best, hypothetical.
    Respecting the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge
    O’Scannlain, joined by Judges Callahan, Bea, Ikuta,
    Bennett, and R. Nelson, wrote that the court should have
    reheard this case en banc to correct the panel’s errant
    decision, a very unfortunate precedent with troublesome
    consequences for the court’s immigration jurisprudence.
    Judge O’Scannlain observed that the government in this case
    possessed independent and (constitutionally firm) evidence
    establishing Sanchez’s unlawful status, and, as a result,
    suppression of the evidence obtained by the arrest would do
    Sanchez no good. Judge O’Scannlain wrote that, eager to
    give Sanchez some relief, the panel stretched this court’s
    case law beyond recognition by awarding termination
    without prejudice instead of an appropriate Fourth
    Amendment remedy—suppression of the unlawfully
    obtained evidence.
    Judge O’Scannlain wrote that the panel’s decision
    (1) defied the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Lopez-
    4                    SANCHEZ V. BARR
    Mendoza, 
    468 U.S. 1032
     (1984), (2) ignored basic Fourth
    Amendment principles by ordering a more-intrusive result
    than the Amendment authorizes, (3) fashioned a remedy to
    enforce agency regulations without a sound legal basis for
    such an imposition, (4) showed a profound
    misunderstanding of the difference between substantive and
    procedural rights and their appropriate remedies, (5) cited as
    authority a handful of inapposite out-of-circuit precedents,
    and (6) imposed serious practical costs on the administration
    of immigration proceedings. Judge O’Scannlain concluded
    that, worst of all, the opinion’s imposition of an
    extraordinary remedy wastes everyone’s time, for it does
    nothing but delay the petitioner’s inevitable removal.
    ORDER
    A judge of the court sua sponte requested a vote on
    whether to rehear this case en banc. A vote was taken, and
    the matter failed to receive a majority of the votes of the
    nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc consideration.
    See Fed. R. App. P. 35(f). Rehearing en banc is DENIED.
    PAEZ, Circuit Judge, with whom WARDLAW, Circuit
    Judge joins, concurring in denial of rehearing en banc:
    This case began when the United States Coast Guard
    seized Luis Sanchez solely on the basis of his race. The
    critical question before the panel was what, if any, remedy
    existed for Sanchez. We thus confronted a clear case of
    racial profiling—an egregious violation of the Department
    of Homeland Security’s own internal regulation to deter
    unlawful searches and seizures, 
    8 C.F.R. § 287.8
    (b)(2). In
    SANCHEZ V. BARR                                 5
    line with the Second Circuit, we held that an egregious
    violation of § 287.8(b)(2) could warrant termination of
    removal proceedings without prejudice and we remanded to
    the agency to afford the Government an opportunity to rebut
    Sanchez’s prima facie case. Sanchez v. Sessions, 
    904 F.3d 643
    , 653–54 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Rajah v. Mukasey,
    
    544 F.3d 427
    , 446–47 (2d Cir. 2008)). Nothing more,
    nothing less. This limited but tailored remedy ensures that
    immigration officers are held accountable for violating rules
    that are meant to “safeguard” individuals’ fundamental
    rights. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 
    468 U.S. 1032
    , 1044 (1984).
    Even the Government agreed that remand, not rehearing en
    banc, was the appropriate next step for Sanchez’s case.
    Judge O’Scannlain’s separate statement attempts to
    obscure the core issue—the egregious regulatory violation—
    with the smokescreen of the exclusionary rule. 1 His quarrel
    with our opinion, however, rests on a mischaracterization of
    decades of precedent that this court has wisely sidestepped.
    I therefore concur in the court’s denial of rehearing en banc
    and respectfully but firmly reiterate a few points in response
    to errors in Judge O’Scannlain’s statement.
    1
    Judge O’Scannlain’s reliance on Lopez-Mendoza is particularly
    telling as it illustrates a misunderstanding of the case law. In holding
    that the Fourth Amendment does not generally apply to civil immigration
    proceedings, the Supreme Court relied in part on the fact that the agency
    “has developed rules restricting stop, interrogation, and arrest practices.”
    
    468 U.S. at
    1044–45. Moreover, the Court stated that it was not
    addressing a regulatory violation because “no challenge [wa]s raised
    here to the [agency]’s own internal regulations.” 
    Id. at 1050
    . Thus,
    Lopez-Mendoza explicitly left open the question of how courts should
    address regulatory violations in this context.
    6                        SANCHEZ V. BARR
    ***
    As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute that Sanchez
    made a prima facie showing of a violation of § 287.8(b)(2):
    he was detained solely on the basis of his Latino appearance
    and hence, without “reasonable suspicion,” as required by
    the regulation. 2 As detailed in our opinion, the Coast Guard
    detained Sanchez and his three companions, including a 14-
    month-old child, after they called 911 for assistance when
    they were stranded on a fishing trip from Channel Islands
    Harbor. Without reasonable suspicion, the Coast Guard
    contacted Customs and Border Protection to report “the
    possibility of 4 undocumented worker[] aliens,” which
    ultimately led to Sanchez’s arrest, interrogation and removal
    proceedings. Looking to past cases involving regulatory
    violations, we joined the Second Circuit to hold that
    petitioners like Sanchez may be entitled to termination of
    their removal proceedings without prejudice for egregious
    regulatory violations. 3 Sanchez, 904 F.3d at 653 (citing
    2
    The regulation provides: “[i]f the immigration officer has a
    reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that the person
    being questioned is, or is attempting to be, engaged in an offense against
    the United States or is an alien illegally in the United States, the
    immigration officer may briefly detain the person for questioning.”
    
    8 C.F.R. § 287.8
    (b)(2).
    3
    Judge O’Scannlain’s attempt to sidestep the holding of Rajah is
    unconvincing. The plain language of Rajah identifies termination as an
    appropriate remedy for “pre-hearing,” “conscience-shocking” regulatory
    violations. 
    544 F.3d at 447
    . Rajah therefore expressly allows for
    termination in Sanchez’s case because racial profiling is “conscience-
    shocking” and egregious. Sanchez, 904 F.3d at 656 (citing, inter alia,
    City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
    488 U.S. 469
    , 521 (1989) (Scalia,
    J., concurring)). Moreover, subsequent cases in the Second Circuit have
    faithfully applied the Rajah framework. Maldonado v. Holder, 
    763 F.3d 155
    , 163 (2d Cir. 2014). The fact that the Second Circuit has identified
    SANCHEZ V. BARR                                7
    United States v. Calderon-Medina, 
    591 F.2d 529
     (9th Cir.
    1979); Rajah, 
    544 F.3d at
    446–47).
    Contrary to Judge O’Scannlain’s assertions, we did not
    pull such a remedy out of thin air. As we mapped out, see
    Sanchez, 904 F.3d at 653–55, the theory behind termination
    without prejudice can be traced back to our 1979 decision in
    Calderon-Medina, which established that regulatory
    violations could “invalidate a deportation proceeding” if
    “the regulation serves a purpose of benefit” to the immigrant
    and “the violation prejudiced interests” which were
    protected by the regulation. 4 
    591 F.2d at 531
    . The remedy
    turns on when the violation occurred and to what degree,
    not—as Judge O’Scannlain claims—what part of the
    Constitution is implicated. See Sanchez, 904 F.3d at 655
    (concluding that for the rare subset of cases involving pre-
    hearing regulatory violations, “[o]nly full termination of the
    proceedings without prejudice can ‘effectively cure[] any
    procedural defect by putting the parties into the position they
    would have been had no procedural error taken place.’”
    (citation omitted)). We need not look further than our
    discussion in Calderon-Medina: “the basis for such reversals
    is not . . . the Due Process Clause, but rather a rule of
    administrative law.” 
    591 F.2d at
    531 (citing Mendez v. INS,
    the remedy but not yet applied it illustrates, not the non-existence of the
    remedy, but rather, the difficulty that petitioners face in making a prima
    facie showing of an egregious violation.
    4
    This remedy has since been endorsed, in one form or another, by
    several of our sister circuits, as well as the Board of Immigration
    Appeals. See, e.g., Montilla v. INS, 
    926 F.2d 162
    , 166–68 (2d Cir. 1991);
    Leslie v. Attorney Gen., 
    611 F.3d 171
    , 180 (3d Cir. 2010); Castaneda-
    Delgado v. INS, 
    525 F.2d 1295
    , 1302 (7th Cir. 1975); Yui Fong Cheung
    v. INS, 
    418 F.2d 460
    , 465 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Matter of Garcia-Flores,
    
    17 I. & N. Dec. 325
    , 328–29 (BIA 1980).
    8                    SANCHEZ V. BARR
    
    563 F.2d 956
    , 959 (9th Cir. 1977)). Thus, the core inquiry
    is whether the regulation serves a “purpose of benefit” to the
    petitioner. 
    Id.
    This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
    long-standing concern for regulatory violations that
    implicate fundamental rights. See Bridges v. Wixon,
    
    326 U.S. 135
     (1945); United States ex rel. Accardi v.
    Shaughnessy, 
    347 U.S. 260
     (1954); see also United States v.
    Raya-Vaca, 
    771 F.3d 1195
    , 1204 (9th Cir. 2014). And this
    is where the Fourth Amendment comes into play. Because
    § 287.8 (b)(2) reflects the Fourth Amendment guarantee
    against unreasonable searches and seizures, the panel
    opinion concludes that the regulation was promulgated for
    the benefit of immigrant petitioners. Sanchez, 904 F.3d
    at 651–52. As Judge O’Scannlain acknowledges, our
    authority to compel an agency to follow its own regulations
    must have its source in the Constitution itself or some federal
    statute. Op. Respecting Denial at 18 (citing United States v.
    Caceres, 
    440 U.S. 741
    , 749–55 (1979)). The upshot of
    Caceres is that “[a] court’s duty to enforce an agency
    regulation is most evident when compliance with the
    regulation is mandated by the Constitution or federal law.”
    
    Id. at 749
    . The regulation at issue here no doubt implicates
    constitutional rights, thereby triggering our duty to ensure
    agency compliance.
    Yet, Judge O’Scannlain insists that we have no authority
    to address the Government’s egregious violation of
    § 287.8(b)(2) and opines that the remedy we ordered would
    do nothing but delay Sanchez’s “inevitable removal.” This
    completely misses the essence of Sanchez’s claim and the
    harm he seeks to remedy. There is more at stake than the
    outcome of a single case. See Montilla, 
    926 F.2d at 170
    .
    “Careless observance by an agency of its own administrative
    SANCHEZ V. BARR                        9
    processes weakens its effectiveness in the eyes of the public
    because it exposes the possibility of favoritism and of
    inconsistent application of the law.” 
    Id.
     at 169 (citing
    McKart v. United States, 
    395 U.S. 185
    , 195 (1969)). In the
    context of this case, slap-on-the-wrist repudiations that
    permit the agency to pick up where it left off despite racial
    profiling do little to safeguard individuals in this country
    from immigration enforcement practices that “teeter[] on the
    verge of ‘the ugly abyss of racism.’” Maldonado, 763 F.3d
    at 174 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (quoting Korematsu v. United
    States, 
    323 U.S. 214
    , 233 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting)).
    In such circumstances, termination without prejudice may be
    appropriate because it forces the agency to begin anew—a
    remedy that properly recognizes the tainted nature of the
    initial detention and, one hopes, encourages agency
    compliance in the future.
    As a final point, Judge O’Scannlain trots out a parade of
    horribles that are unsubstantiated and, at best, hypothetical.
    As the opinion emphasized, termination without prejudice is
    a remedy “reserved for truly egregious cases” of
    immigration enforcement. Sanchez, 904 F.3d at 655. Any
    fears that this remedy will spur crafty lawyers across the
    country to disrupt removal proceedings are belied by the fact
    that the Second Circuit recognized this very remedy in 2008
    and there have been no such harebrained schemes since.
    ***
    The reality of immigration proceedings—with no
    established right to appointed counsel, no right to discovery,
    or any other host of rights implicated in other proceedings—
    is that individuals would be hard-pressed to reach the stage
    that Sanchez has in proving a prima facie case of an
    egregious regulatory violation. Because he has met his
    initial burden of showing a racially motivated detention, we
    10                        SANCHEZ V. BARR
    ordered a narrowly tailored remedy: Sanchez’s removal
    proceedings would be terminated, but only if the
    Government cannot meet its burden of rebutting Sanchez’s
    prima facie showing on remand. Given the procedural
    posture of this case, and all the reasons outlined above and
    in our opinion, the court wisely denied rehearing en banc.
    O’SCANNLAIN,          Circuit    Judge, **   with    whom
    CALLAHAN, BEA, IKUTA, BENNETT, and R. NELSON,
    Circuit Judges, join, respecting the denial of rehearing en
    banc:
    In this deportation proceeding, which commenced over
    eight years ago, our court’s opinion concedes that admissible
    evidence establishes Mexican citizen Luis Enrique
    Sanchez’s removability. Current immigration law therefore
    required the three-judge panel to allow the deportation order
    to take effect. Unsatisfied with such prospect, the panel
    holds instead that Sanchez’s entire removal proceeding now
    must be terminated because he was detained without
    reasonable suspicion—a violation of the Fourth
    Amendment.
    Such an absurd result contravenes basic Fourth
    Amendment principles, defies Supreme Court precedent,
    and lacks any basis in our case law (or that of any other
    circuit). Worse, the panel disguises the Fourth Amendment
    **
    As a judge of this court in senior status, I no longer have the power
    to vote on calls for rehearing cases en banc or formally to join a dissent
    from failure to rehear en banc. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 46
    (c); Fed. R. App.
    P. 35(a). Following our court’s general orders, however, I may
    participate in discussions of en banc proceedings. See Ninth Circuit
    General Order 5.5(a).
    SANCHEZ V. BARR                            11
    harm as a “regulatory violation” to work a simple and
    obvious end-run around it. At bottom, the panel fails to grasp
    that Fourth Amendment wrongs warrant Fourth Amendment
    remedies—nothing less, but nothing more. This case has
    languished for almost a decade, and now the government is
    reduced to restarting deportation proceedings, using the
    same evidence to achieve the same outcome that the
    Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered in 2011. Our court should
    have reheard this case en banc to correct the panel’s errant
    decision, a very unfortunate precedent with troublesome
    consequences for our immigration jurisprudence.
    I
    The facts are straightforward. 1 Luis Enrique Sanchez is
    a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without
    inspection in 1988. In 2004, Sanchez applied for and
    received “Family Unity Benefits” from the United States
    Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”), which
    temporarily authorized him to live and to work in the United
    States. USCIS later denied Sanchez’s request for an
    extension of these benefits in 2008, and at that point he no
    longer enjoyed lawful status to remain in the United States.
    In February 2010, Sanchez and three others were
    marooned off the coast of California when their fishing
    boat’s engine lost power. The Coast Guard towed their boat
    into port, demanded identification documents, and detained
    them for two hours until Customs and Border Protection
    (“CBP”) officers arrived. The CBP officers took Sanchez to
    a CBP facility, interrogated and strip-searched him, and then
    released him. The officers prepared a Form I-213 (Record of
    1
    The facts in this Section are drawn from the opinion. See Sanchez
    v. Sessions, 
    904 F.3d 643
    , 646–49 (9th Cir. 2018).
    12                        SANCHEZ V. BARR
    Deportable/Inadmissible Alien), which included Sanchez’s
    express admission to them that he had entered the United
    States without inspection and was undocumented.
    In November 2010, the Department of Homeland
    Security (“DHS”) issued a Notice to Appear and charged
    Sanchez with being removable. To prove Sanchez’s
    removability, the government relied on both the Form I-213
    prepared by the CBP officers and on Sanchez’s prior
    application for Family Unity Benefits. Sanchez sought to
    have the Form I-213 suppressed and to have his removal
    proceedings terminated. He argued that his detention by
    CBP officers was based solely on race in contravention of
    the Fourth Amendment and 
    8 C.F.R. § 287.8
    (b), which
    requires arresting officers to possess a “reasonable
    suspicion” of the person’s unlawful presence. 2
    The IJ denied the motion and ordered Sanchez removed.
    In 2014, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
    dismissed Sanchez’s appeal, leaving the deportation order in
    place. It concluded that, regardless of whether the Form
    I-213 should have been suppressed, the government could
    use “independent evidence . . . to establish his nationality
    and identity.” See Sanchez v. Sessions, 
    904 F.3d 643
    , 648
    2
    The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be
    secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
    searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
    The relevant regulation provides: “If the immigration officer has a
    reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that the person
    being questioned is, or is attempting to be, engaged in an offense against
    the United States or is an alien illegally in the United States, the
    immigration officer may briefly detain the person for questioning.”
    
    8 C.F.R. § 287.8
    (b)(2).
    SANCHEZ V. BARR                              13
    (9th Cir. 2018). Sanchez timely petitioned for review in our
    court in 2014. 3
    II
    Sanchez contends specifically that the Coast Guard
    detained him based on his Latino appearance in violation of
    the Fourth Amendment and 
    8 C.F.R. § 287.8
    (b). The three-
    judge panel agreed, but instead of holding merely that the
    evidence obtained from the arrest should have been
    suppressed, its opinion orders the entire deportation
    proceeding terminated. The opinion’s irredeemable flaw is
    its attempt to cure an illegal arrest—a quintessential Fourth
    Amendment violation—with a remedy that the Fourth
    Amendment would never authorize.
    A
    If Sanchez’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated,
    then he is indeed entitled to a Fourth Amendment remedy.
    Under our circuit’s case law, Sanchez may (and indeed did)
    seek the exclusion of wrongfully obtained evidence from his
    immigration proceedings. See, e.g., Lopez-Rodriguez v.
    Mukasey, 
    536 F.3d 1012
    , 1018 (9th Cir. 2008). 4 But here, as
    3
    A word of explanation regarding the inordinate delay in this case’s
    resolution. Although briefing in our court was completed in March 2015,
    the case was not argued until March 2017. In August of the same year, a
    reasonable time after argument, the panel issued its decision. See
    Sanchez v. Sessions, 
    870 F.3d 901
     (9th Cir. 2017). After the tragic
    passing of a member of the initial three-judge panel, a re-constituted
    panel withdrew the original opinion in July 2018 and filed the revised
    opinion at issue here in September 2018. A call to rehear the case en banc
    failed.
    4
    I continue to believe that our application of the exclusionary rule
    in civil deportation proceedings flouts the Supreme Court’s decision in
    14                       SANCHEZ V. BARR
    the panel reluctantly concedes, the brute fact is that
    suppression does him no good: the government possesses
    independent (and constitutionally firm) evidence
    establishing Sanchez’s unlawful status. See Sanchez,
    904 F.3d at 653. Eager to give Sanchez some relief, however,
    the panel stretches our case law beyond recognition. Instead
    of suppression of the unlawfully obtained document, the
    panel awarded him “termination without prejudice,” thus
    mandating commencement of a new round of removal
    proceedings with another hearing before the IJ, another
    appeal to the BIA, and another petition for review to our
    court—potentially another eight years of safe haven in the
    United States. Id. at 657.
    The opinion seems to invoke a straightforward
    compensatory-justice theory. Sanchez’s initial detention, the
    opinion reasons, resulted from racial profiling, so the
    subsequent deportation proceeding was “tainted from [its]
    roots.” Id. at 655 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
    only “full termination of the proceedings without prejudice
    can effectively cure any procedural defect by putting the
    parties into the position [in which] they would have been had
    no procedural error taken place.” Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted). Stated differently, the opinion purports to
    restore Sanchez to his rightful position by washing away the
    “taint” of his unlawful arrest. To do so, it prescribes a
    government “do-over,” now nine years after the first round
    INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 
    468 U.S. 1032
     (1984). See Lopez-Rodriguez v.
    Holder, 
    560 F.3d 1098
    , 1106 (9th Cir. 2009) (Bea, J., dissenting from
    the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that “our precedent has set us
    on a collision course with the Supreme Court” by incorporating “the
    exclusionary rule, with all its attendant costs, back into immigration
    proceedings, after the Court has taken it out”). Here, the panel works a
    radical and unwarranted expansion of our already dubious precedent.
    SANCHEZ V. BARR                       15
    started, as if the entire eight-year-long deportation
    proceeding had never occurred.
    B
    Such approach fails. The Fourth Amendment does not
    authorize a court, for example, to invalidate an arrest,
    prosecution, or subsequent proceeding simply because it
    resulted from such a violation. See United States v.
    Morrison, 
    449 U.S. 361
    , 366 (1981) (“[W]e have not
    suggested that searches and seizures contrary to the Fourth
    Amendment warrant dismissal of the indictment.”). Such
    limitation makes sense. The Fourth Amendment safeguards
    the substantive rights to “privacy and security.” Carpenter v.
    United States, 
    138 S. Ct. 2206
    , 2213 (2018) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). It does not establish a right to be
    free from prosecution for crimes committed—even if such
    prosecution results from an illegal search. See United States
    v. Leon, 
    468 U.S. 897
    , 906 (1984) (“[T]he use of fruits of a
    past unlawful search or seizure works no new Fourth
    Amendment wrong.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    The Supreme Court’s application of the exclusionary
    rule confirms the correct approach. Because a Fourth
    Amendment violation is “fully accomplished by the
    unlawful search and seizure,” trial remedies like the
    exclusionary rule are “neither intended nor able to cure” the
    constitutional harm. 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    As such, exclusion is not designed to restore the defendant
    to his pre-violation position, but rather to deter future
    violations by offering him a windfall (i.e., the exclusion of
    incriminating evidence at trial). See Hudson v. Michigan,
    
    547 U.S. 586
    , 591 (2006). Just as with the exclusionary rule
    itself, however, the panel’s novel termination remedy does
    not “cure” the initial unlawful arrest. Thus, the opinion’s
    core premise—that termination washes away the “taint” of
    16                   SANCHEZ V. BARR
    the government’s initial violation—contravenes the proper
    application of the Fourth Amendment.
    To illustrate, consider whether the panel’s theory would
    make any sense in a criminal proceeding. Suppose that a
    citizen is unconstitutionally detained because of his race, but
    law enforcement officials also discover—because of
    evidence obtained independently of such arrest—that he
    committed a drug crime and charge him accordingly. The
    exclusionary rule, of course, would not compel the
    suppression of the “independently acquired” evidence. Utah
    v. Strieff, 
    136 S. Ct. 2056
    , 2061 (2016). Could the court
    instead dismiss the criminal indictment because the illegal
    arrest tainted the criminal proceeding that followed? Could
    the court order the defendant to be released from custody?
    Of course not. See Morrison, 
    449 U.S. at 366
     (“The [Fourth
    Amendment] remedy in the criminal proceeding is limited to
    denying the prosecution the fruits of its transgression.”).
    Indeed, the panel does not cite a single case that terminates
    a criminal proceeding for such a reason. And if termination
    of proceedings would be unavailable in a criminal
    prosecution, then it should be inconceivable in a civil
    deportation proceeding.
    Perhaps aware that Fourth Amendment doctrine
    forecloses its reasoning, the panel alludes instead to a
    separate justification for its remedy: deterrence. See
    Sanchez, 904 F.3d at 655; see also Paez Concurrence at 8–9.
    But whether such remedy will prevent future violations
    against other aliens has nothing to do with restoring Sanchez
    to his rightful position. Worse, the panel’s indistinct
    reference to the remedy’s deterrence value rests on
    contestable empirical assumptions, and the panel makes no
    effort to show that such benefits outweigh the costs. Cf. INS
    v. Lopez-Mendoza, 
    468 U.S. 1032
    , 1040–50 (1984)
    SANCHEZ V. BARR                       17
    (balancing the benefits and costs of the exclusionary rule in
    deportation proceedings). Besides, the panel’s subtle
    reliance on deterrence smuggles in the very reasoning that
    drives the Court’s application of the exclusionary rule—
    reinforcing, yet again, that the Fourth Amendment should
    guide this case’s resolution.
    C
    Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court’s leading case on
    the application of the Fourth Amendment to civil deportation
    proceedings, also repudiates the panel’s reasoning. There,
    government agents arrested Lopez-Mendoza “at his place of
    employment” even though the “agents had not sought a
    warrant to search the premises or to arrest any of its
    occupants.” 
    Id. at 1035
    . Below, he “objected only to the fact
    that he had been summoned to a deportation hearing
    following an unlawful arrest.” 
    Id. at 1040
    . Nevertheless, the
    Supreme Court upheld the IJ’s removal order because the
    “mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent
    deportation proceeding.” 
    Id. at 1041
     (emphasis added and
    brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Lopez-Mendoza rejects the opinion’s core premise. Here
    too, Sanchez’s illegal arrest has “no bearing” on his removal
    proceeding. Consequently, the arrest cannot “taint[]” the
    proceeding “from [its] roots.” Sanchez, 904 F.3d at 655
    (internal quotation marks omitted). The panel ignores the
    fact that the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the very
    theory on which it relies.
    III
    To avoid the Fourth Amendment’s doctrinal dead-end,
    the panel mysteriously claims that its remedy seeks to cure
    only a “regulatory violation”—not a violation of the Fourth
    18                       SANCHEZ V. BARR
    Amendment itself. See Sanchez, 904 F.3d at 653–55. The
    relevant regulation states that an immigration officer may
    “detain [a] person for questioning” if the officer has a
    “reasonable suspicion . . . that the person being questioned
    is . . . an alien illegally in the United States.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 287.8
    (b)(2). The panel reasons that the Coast Guard’s
    violation of § 287.8(b)(2)—again, Sanchez’s detention on
    the basis of race—estops the government from continuing
    the proceeding.
    But § 287.8(b)(2), as the opinion notes, exists simply to
    “effectuate” the Fourth Amendment and “all but parrots” its
    requirements. Sanchez, 904 F.3d at 651, 652 n.9; see also
    Paez Concurrence at 8. We may not launder Fourth
    Amendment violations through agency regulations to
    authorize a remedy that the Fourth Amendment would never
    allow. The panel’s decision to order the government to
    terminate deportation proceedings because of a regulatory
    violation is unsustainable in theory and unfounded in
    precedent. 5
    A
    Let’s begin with a first principle that the opinion
    obscures: our authority to compel an agency to follow its
    own regulations must have its source in the Constitution
    itself or some federal statute. See United States v. Caceres,
    5
    One need not dwell on the opinion’s specific doctrinal test because
    its errors are so much more fundamental. But for ease of reference, it
    held that a petitioner should receive such termination remedy if: “(1) the
    agency violated a regulation, (2) the regulation was promulgated for the
    benefit of petitioners; and (3) the violation was egregious, meaning that
    it involved conscience-shocking conduct, deprived the petitioner of
    fundamental rights, or prejudiced the petitioner.” Sanchez, 904 F.3d
    at 655.
    SANCHEZ V. BARR                        19
    
    440 U.S. 741
    , 749–55 (1979) (refusing to compel an agency
    to follow its own regulation because such regulations were
    not “required by the Constitution or by statute,” and because
    neither the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, nor
    the Administrative Procedure Act authorized the Court to
    enforce compliance). We lack a roving commission to seek
    out and to redress every wrong inflicted by the Executive
    Branch, remediating instead only specific legal wrongs with
    the specific remedies authorized by federal law.
    Unfortunately, the opinion never bothers to identify the
    legal basis for its “regulatory violation” theory. Certainly,
    the panel invokes the Constitution when it observes that the
    violated regulation “effectuate[s] the Fourth Amendment.”
    Sanchez, 904 F.3d at 652 n.9; see also id. at 651 (regulation
    “all but parrots” Fourth Amendment standards); id. at 652
    (regulation     “reflects    the     Fourth     Amendment’s
    requirements”); id. at 656 n.15 (regulation “is premised on
    Fourth Amendment standards”). Yet the Fourth Amendment
    itself cannot sustain the panel’s holding. Which raises the
    question: what is the legal basis for the panel’s remedy?
    It cannot be the “Fifth Amendment due process
    guarantee that operates in removal proceedings.” Chuyon
    Yon Hong v. Mukasey, 
    518 F.3d 1030
    , 1035 (9th Cir. 2008).
    The Due Process Clause promises aliens the “full and fair”
    opportunity to assert the right to remain in the United States.
    Montes-Lopez v. Holder, 
    694 F.3d 1085
    , 1092 (9th Cir.
    2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). But here,
    Sanchez’s unlawful arrest has no effect at all on the
    deportation proceeding itself. His illegal arrest does not
    infringe upon his ability to offer evidence, to obtain counsel,
    or to make his case before the IJ. No legal support there!
    Nor is it the Immigration and Nationality Act, see 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , or “a rule of administrative law,” United
    20                    SANCHEZ V. BARR
    States v. Calderon-Medina, 
    591 F.2d 529
    , 531 (9th Cir.
    1979); see also Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz,
    
    435 U.S. 78
    , 92 n.8 (1978) (stating that cases mandating
    agency compliance with their own regulations “enunciate
    principles of federal administrative law rather than of
    constitutional law”). Indeed, the otherwise-thorough opinion
    does not include a single sentence of textual analysis
    demonstrating that § 1252 authorizes us to order the
    government to restart deportation proceedings because of an
    initial unlawful arrest. Likewise, the panel cannot claim to
    articulate some new rule of administrative common law
    because its holding is incompatible with our treatment of
    other administrative agencies. See Caceres, 
    440 U.S. at
    749–
    55.
    In sum, the panel’s inability to identify the legal basis for
    its remedy is telling, as it suggests that there isn’t one.
    Instead, the gravamen of Sanchez’s complaint is that the
    government violated the Fourth Amendment—not his due
    process rights, not a statutory right, not some rule of
    administrative law, and not an unidentifiable potpourri of
    protected interests. But if this case involves a Fourth
    Amendment wrong, it should be controlled by Fourth
    Amendment jurisprudence. Those principles, however,
    unambiguously foreclose the panel’s extravagant remedy.
    B
    Unsurprisingly, no other court has imposed such a
    remedy. Indeed, the panel does not identify a single decision
    in which a federal court actually required termination of
    proceedings when a regulatory violation invaded Fourth
    Amendment interests. Instead, the panel scrounges up a
    single Ninth Circuit case concerning a deprivation of a
    procedural (not substantive) right in a criminal proceeding,
    see Calderon-Medina, 
    591 F.2d at 529
    ; a BIA decision that
    SANCHEZ V. BARR                            21
    (needless to say) is not precedent at all, see Matter of Garcia-
    Flores, 
    17 I. & N. Dec. 325
     (BIA 1980); a Second Circuit
    opinion that it over-reads, see Rajah v. Mukasey, 
    544 F.3d 427
     (2d Cir. 2008); and a smattering of inapposite out-of-
    circuit decisions. See Sanchez, 904 F.3d at 654–55.
    The bulk of the cases it cites in support of its theory
    concern regulations offering procedural protections that
    ensure constitutionally (or statutorily) mandated
    adjudicative due process. 6 But such procedural protections
    differ in kind from the substantive interests protected by the
    regulation in this case. Because the violation of a procedural
    right (e.g., the right to counsel) increases the risk of
    erroneous deportation, such violation might require a new
    proceeding with the procedural protection restored. Cf.
    Morrison, 
    449 U.S. at
    364–65 (describing the Court’s
    approach to Sixth Amendment remedies). By contrast, the
    regulation in this case—like the Fourth Amendment itself—
    safeguards each person’s substantive right to privacy. Thus,
    it makes no sense to draw on cases involving defects in the
    proceedings themselves to address an unlawful arrest.
    The panel’s resort to Rajah—which did concern
    regulations designed to effectuate the Fourth Amendment—
    fares no better. The panel claims that the Second Circuit held
    that “petitioners may be entitled to termination of their
    removal proceedings without prejudice for egregious
    regulatory violations.” Sanchez, 904 F.3d at 953 (citing
    Rajah, 
    544 F.3d at
    446–47). But Rajah does not go that far.
    6
    See Snajder v. INS, 
    29 F.3d 1203
    , 1206 (7th Cir. 1994) (right to
    counsel); Batanic v. INS, 
    12 F.3d 662
    , 667 (7th Cir. 1993) (right to
    counsel); Montilla v. INS, 
    926 F.2d 162
    , 166 (2d Cir. 1991) (right to
    counsel); Calderon-Medina, 
    591 F.2d at 530
     (right to communicate with
    consular or diplomatic officers); Castaneda-Delgado v. INS, 
    525 F.2d 1295
    , 1302 (7th Cir. 1975) (right to counsel).
    22                   SANCHEZ V. BARR
    Although the Second Circuit suggested that in some other
    case a showing of “prejudice,” “conscience-shocking
    conduct,” or a “deprivation of fundamental rights” might
    justify termination of proceedings, it did not give any
    examples of such a circumstance. Rajah, 
    544 F.3d at 447
    .
    Moreover, Rajah cites to no legal authority for imposing
    such a remedy when the violated regulation effectuates the
    Fourth Amendment; instead, like the opinion here, it relies
    only on inapposite cases involving procedural protections.
    See 
    id.
     (citing Waldron v. INS, 
    17 F.3d 511
    , 518 (2d Cir.
    1993); Montilla v. INS, 
    926 F.2d 162
    , 166 (2d Cir. 1991)).
    Rajah cannot support the panel’s innovation.
    IV
    Finally, the panel’s opinion creates a host of practical
    problems.
    A
    First, the termination-of-proceedings rule creates
    perverse incentives for aliens and immigration lawyers to
    inject inefficiency into deportation proceedings. The opinion
    offers a windfall (termination of proceedings, no less) to
    those who can show that immigration officials violated their
    own regulations during the investigation, detention, and
    removal proceedings—even if such violations had no effect
    on the proceedings that followed. Lingering on such
    technicalities, however, ignores the Supreme Court’s
    instruction that “[p]ast conduct is relevant only insofar as it
    may shed light on the respondent’s right to remain.” Lopez-
    Mendoza, 
    468 U.S. at 1038
     (emphasis added).
    At the same time, the panel’s theory could deter the
    government from formulating “additional standards to
    govern prosecutorial and police procedures.” Caceres,
    SANCHEZ V. BARR                        23
    
    440 U.S. at
    755–56. The conclusion that regulatory
    violations authorize federal courts to terminate otherwise-
    meritorious removal proceedings could give the government
    reason to scrub from the books any regulations that benefit
    aliens. Perversely, then, the opinion’s holding may help
    Sanchez only to deprive all other aliens of the benefits of the
    government’s “own comprehensive scheme for deterring
    Fourth Amendment violations by its officers.” Lopez-
    Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044.
    B
    The panel’s novel termination-of-proceedings remedy
    also invites a wave of litigation to map its metes and bounds.
    The initial question, of course, is what exactly “termination
    without prejudice” means. Sanchez, 904 F.3d at 657. The
    BIA will undoubtedly dismiss proceedings, but DHS could
    then serve Sanchez with a new Notice to Appear and start all
    over again. The opinion offers Sanchez nothing more than a
    meaningless formality before his inevitable removal.
    Perhaps, however, the panel has something more drastic
    in mind. Its reasoning, after all, is that the remedy must put
    Sanchez into his rightful position as if “no procedural error
    [had] taken place.” Id. at 655 (internal quotation marks
    omitted). Such reasoning sets up a counter-factual in which
    Sanchez was never detained, never interrogated, and never
    issued the Notice to Appear. Must the BIA tear up the Form
    I-213 about Sanchez? Delete all records of him from the
    government’s databases? Order each implicated government
    official to forget everything he ever knew about Sanchez?
    Doubtless, enterprising lawyers will seize on the opinion’s
    extravagant reasoning to seek still-more intrusive remedies
    in civil deportation proceedings. We should not invite their
    spurious arguments.
    24                   SANCHEZ V. BARR
    C
    I also fear that the decision may not be limited to the
    immigration context. The opinion introduces a glaring
    discontinuity between civil removal proceedings on the one
    hand and other administrative proceedings and criminal
    prosecutions on the other. The opinion’s holding allows
    aliens who suffer regulatory violations to reap a windfall not
    present in any analogous area of law.
    A criminal defendant convicted on the basis of illegally
    obtained evidence or a coerced confession has no similar
    opportunity. He can ask for a new trial with the improperly
    obtained evidence suppressed, but he cannot demand that the
    court quash his indictment. Likewise, in administrative
    contexts, a party can challenge an enforcement action based
    on procedural failures by the agency. But courts do not
    enjoin the agency from altogether enforcing the law against
    the regulated party. I am sure that criminal defendants and
    civil litigants would much prefer that courts dismissed their
    cases too. When they ask our court to punish regulatory
    failures the same way in other contexts, how can we deny
    them the same windfall?
    V
    This case should have been simple. The sole question in
    a deportation proceeding is whether the alien has a “right to
    remain in this country in the future.” Lopez-Mendoza,
    
    468 U.S. at 1038
    . Here, the government can establish
    Sanchez’s unlawful status with admissible evidence, so the
    BIA correctly affirmed the IJ’s removal order.
    Instead, the panel’s refusal to accept this outcome has
    produced a decision that (1) defies the Supreme Court’s
    decision in Lopez-Mendoza, (2) ignores basic Fourth
    SANCHEZ V. BARR                       25
    Amendment principles by ordering a more-intrusive result
    than the Amendment authorizes, (3) fashions a remedy to
    enforce agency regulations without a sound legal basis for
    such an imposition, (4) shows a profound misunderstanding
    of the difference between substantive and procedural rights
    and their appropriate remedies, (5) cites as authority a
    handful of inapposite out-of-circuit precedents, and
    (6) imposes serious practical costs on the administration of
    immigration proceedings.
    Worst of all, the opinion’s imposition of an extraordinary
    remedy wastes everyone’s time, for it does nothing but delay
    the petitioner’s inevitable removal. The en banc process
    exists to ensure the sound development of our circuit’s case
    law, and we should have used it here to correct the panel’s
    extravagant and erroneous decision.