Anthony Wafer v. Anthony Hedgpeth , 627 F. App'x 586 ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OCT 01 2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY DARNELL WAFER, No. 13-56933
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:04-cv-05694-AHS-
AJW
v.
ANTHONY HEDGPETH, Warden, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Alicemarie H. Stotler, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 3, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, FISHER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Anthony Wafer appeals the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas
petition challenging his convictions for robbery, burglary, assault and murder in
connection with a string of small business robberies. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 2253, we review de novo, see White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 883 (9th
Cir. 2010), and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
1. We need not determine whether Wafer’s claim under Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), was procedurally defaulted. Because the claim
was addressed by the district court and has been fully briefed, we exercise our
discretion to deny the claim on the merits. See Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d
758, 777 n.10 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) and Gatlin v.
Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999)).
Although Wafer asserts his February 1999 Faretta request was unequivocal
under United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614, 621-23 (9th Cir. 2000),
abrogated in part by Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), and Adams v.
Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1989), the California Court of Appeal’s
contrary conclusion was a reasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2). See Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 882-84 (9th Cir. 2007).
Wafer made the request in the context of a substitution motion; his clear preference
was appointment of new counsel; he did not renew his request between June 1999
and October 2000, the first day of trial; and the trial court, which was in the best
position to assess Wafer’s words in context, concluded he did not really want to
represent himself. When Wafer’s request to represent himself is considered in the
context of the entire hearing, the state court of appeal reasonably concluded the
request was equivocal.
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The California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that Wafer’s second Faretta
request, made on the first day of trial, was untimely was neither contrary to nor an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has never addressed whether such a request is
timely, see Stenson, 504 F.3d at 884-85; Marshall v. Taylor, 395 F.3d 1058, 1060-
61 (9th Cir. 2005), and Ninth Circuit case law holding on direct appeal that a
request is timely if made before a jury is impaneled, e.g., United States v. Arlt, 41
F.3d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1994), does not control under § 2254(d)(1).
2. Wafer has not established cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural
default of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IATC) claim. Under Martinez
v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012), ineffective assistance of postconviction
review (PCR) counsel can establish cause to excuse procedural default of an IATC
claim where (1) PCR counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984), in failing to raise the claim in a prisoner’s initial state habeas
petition and (2) the underlying IATC claim has some merit. Here, the record
shows trial counsel consulted a causation expert before trial but did not call an
expert at trial, instead relying on cross examination of the prosecution’s expert
witnesses to cast doubt on the cause of the victim’s death. Trial counsel, therefore,
appears to have made a reasonable tactical decision to proceed without an expert,
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distinguishing this case from those upon which Wafer relies. Cf. Duncan v.
Ornoski, 528 F.3d 1222, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 2008) (defense counsel failed even to
consult an expert, and thus had no basis for forgoing an expert at trial); Caro v.
Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 2002) (same). Wafer, therefore, has
not shown PCR counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise an IATC
claim in Wafer’s initial state habeas petition.
3. Wafer also has not shown cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural
default of his claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). “Ineffective
assistance of counsel can constitute cause to excuse a procedural default only if the
petitioner had a constitutional right to counsel in the proceeding in which the
default occurred.” Smith v. Idaho, 392 F.3d 350, 357 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991)). Here, Wafer had no right to
counsel in seeking discretionary review from the California Supreme Court, so his
counsel’s failure to raise his Batson claim in that forum does not establish cause.
See id. Although Wafer could establish cause by showing that he should not be
charged with the acts or omissions of his attorney, see Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.
Ct. 912, 922-24 (2012), he has neither made nor attempted to make that showing
here.
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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***
Wafer’s unopposed motion to file an oversized letter brief (Dkt. 40), filed
August 25, 2015, is GRANTED. Counsel is admonished, however, for filing the
motion late and justifying the late motion by pointing to his incorrect construction
of the word and page limits imposed by the court.
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