Sukhjinderpal Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 554 F. App'x 643 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                FEB 13 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SUKHJINDERPAL SINGH, AKA                         No. 10-71444
    Surinder Ghotra, AKA Sarvjinderpal
    Singh Multani,                                   Agency No. A075-301-837
    Petitioner,
    MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted February 11, 2014**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: CALLAHAN and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and HELLERSTEIN, Senior
    District Judge.***
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Alvin K. Hellerstein, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
    District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    Sukhjinderpal Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s
    (IJ) denial of his asylum, withholding of removal, and United Nations Convention
    Against Torture (CAT) claims. We dismiss the petition for review in part and deny
    it in part.
    To the extent that the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision and cited
    to Matter of Burbano, 
    20 I. & N. Dec. 872
    , 874 (BIA 1994), we review the
    decision of the IJ as the BIA’s decision. Abebe v. Gonzales, 
    432 F.3d 1037
    , 1039
    (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). To the extent that the BIA also provided its own
    analysis, we review the BIA’s decision as well. Cruz Rendon v. Holder, 
    603 F.3d 1104
    , 1109 (9th Cir. 2010). We review the agency’s factual findings, including
    adverse credibility determinations, for substantial evidence, and we uphold the
    findings unless the record compels a contrary result. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B);
    Monjaraz-Munoz v. INS, 
    327 F.3d 892
    , 895 (9th Cir. 2003).
    The pre-REAL ID Act standards for adverse credibility determinations
    govern Singh’s petition. See Rizk v. Holder, 
    629 F.3d 1083
    , 1087 n.2. (9th Cir.
    2011). “As long as one of the identified grounds underlying a negative credibility
    finding is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of the claims of
    persecution, we are bound to accept the negative credibility finding.” Khadka v.
    2
    Holder, 
    618 F.3d 996
    , 1000 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Wang v. INS, 
    352 F.3d 1250
    ,
    1259 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]hether we have rejected some of the IJ’s grounds for an
    adverse credibility finding is irrelevant.”).
    As a preliminary matter, we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s
    conclusion that Singh’s asylum application is time-barred. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a)(3) (providing that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any
    determination [as to timeliness]”). While Congress has “restore[d] our jurisdiction
    over constitutional claims or questions of law,” Ramadan v. Gonzales, 
    479 F.3d 646
    , 650 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted), Singh
    disputes the facts underlying the IJ’s timeliness ruling. See Rizk, 
    629 F.3d at 1087
    (explaining that “credibility determinations are findings of fact by the IJ”). We
    therefore dismiss Singh’s petition for review of the denial of his asylum
    application.
    Turning to the merits, substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse
    credibility determination. Singh adopted several different identities in connection
    with his applications, and the agency properly rejected his excuses for doing so.
    See Farah v. Ashcroft, 
    348 F.3d 1153
    , 1156 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.3
    (c)(2) (“The applicant’s signature establishes a presumption that the applicant
    is aware of the contents of the application.”). Further, Singh provided inconsistent
    3
    accounts regarding his alleged association with Sikh political organizations and his
    purported history of arrests and torture. These inconsistencies go to the heart of
    Singh’s claim of persecution, and they deprive his testimony of the “requisite ring
    of truth.” Rizk, 
    629 F.3d at 1088
     (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kaur
    v. Gonzales, 
    418 F.3d 1061
    , 1067 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen inconsistencies that
    weaken a claim for asylum are accompanied by other indications of dishonesty . . .
    an adverse credibility determination may be supported by substantial evidence.”).
    The agency properly declined to rely on witness declarations that were
    inconsistent with Singh’s testimony. In the absence of credible testimony, Singh’s
    withholding of removal claim fails. See Farah, 
    348 F.3d at 1156
    . Similarly, the
    agency properly rejected Singh’s CAT claim, because he fails to identify any
    record evidence that would compel a finding that it is more likely than not that he
    would be tortured if returned to India. See Shrestha v. Holder, 
    590 F.3d 1034
    ,
    1048–49 (9th Cir. 2010).
    PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
    4