Antwoine Bealer v. R. Brannum ( 2019 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         APR 4 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ANTWOINE MARQUISE BEALER,                       No. 16-16582
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 1:12-cv-01516-DAD-EPG
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    R. BRANNUM; S. RIOS,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 2, 2019**
    Before:      WALLACE, FARRIS, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
    Antwoine Marquise Bealer, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from
    the district court’s judgment following a jury verdict against Bealer in his 42
    U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims related to defendants’ alleged use of
    excessive force. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    The district court properly screened and dismissed Bealer’s claims against
    the warden, the associate warden, nurse Torricer, and Sergeant Epperson because
    Bealer failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915A; Hamilton v. Brown, 
    630 F.3d 889
    , 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (court reviews de
    novo dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); see also Mendiola–Martinez v. Arpaio,
    
    836 F.3d 1239
    , 1248 (9th Cir. 2016) (requirements for deliberate indifference
    claim); Watison v. Carter, 
    668 F.3d 1108
    , 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (requirements for
    cruel and unusual punishment claim); Starr v. Baca, 
    652 F.3d 1202
    , 1207 (9th Cir.
    2011) (requirements for supervisory liability).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bealer’s motions
    for injunctive relief related to Bealer’s allegations that he had limited access to the
    law library and his legal materials because Bealer failed to establish that absent
    such relief he is likely to suffer irreparable harm. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.
    Council, 
    555 U.S. 7
    , 20 (2008) (setting forth standard for issuance of preliminary
    injunction).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in its discovery orders. See
    Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 
    342 F.3d 1080
    , 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (district courts
    are vested with “broad discretion to permit or deny discovery”). Contrary to
    Bealer’s contention, the district court afforded him multiple and ample
    opportunities to participate in discovery, including depositions.
    2                                     16-16582
    We reject, as unsupported by the record, Bealer’s allegations regarding juror
    bias. Bealer contends that certain jurors were biased against him based solely on
    the fact that the jurors had friends or relatives who were employed in law
    enforcement at some time. However, this is insufficient to demonstrate bias. Cf.
    Tinsley v. Borg, 
    895 F.2d 520
    , 529 (9th Cir. 1990) (“We will not presume bias
    merely because a juror works in law enforcement[.]”); see also Fields v. Brown,
    
    503 F.3d 755
    , 767 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“The determination of whether a juror
    is actually biased is a question of fact, that we review for manifest error or abuse of
    discretion.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
    We reject Bealer’s contentions that he was prejudiced by the requirement to
    wear ankle restraints during trial because the district court took appropriate
    measures to conceal the restraints from the jury, and Bealer does not contend that
    the jury was aware of the restraints. See Williams v. Woodford, 
    384 F.3d 567
    , 592-
    93 (9th Cir. 2004) (no prejudice resulting from shackles not visible to jury).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett
    v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Greenwood v. FAA, 
    28 F.3d 971
    , 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an
    appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim, particularly when, as
    here, a host of other issues are presented for review.”).
    3                                     16-16582
    All pending motions are denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    4   16-16582