Oscar Chupin Romero v. Loretta E. Lynch , 601 F. App'x 521 ( 2015 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT APR 30 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
OSCAR MANUEL CHUPIN ROMERO, No. 12-70983
Petitioner, Agency No. A099-961-956
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 22, 2015**
Before: GOODWIN, BYBEE, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Oscar Manuel Chupin Romero, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions
pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing
his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for
substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d
1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny in part and grant in part the petition for
review, and we remand.
The record does not compel the conclusion that Chupin Romero established
changed or extraordinary circumstances excusing the untimely filing of his asylum
application. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4), (5); see also Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479
F.3d 646, 656-58 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
Further, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief
because Chupin Romero failed to establish it is more likely than not he would be
tortured at the instigation of or with the acquiescence of the government if returned
to El Salvador. See id. at 1073.
In denying Chupin Romero’s withholding of removal claim, the agency
concluded Chupin Romero failed to establish past persecution or a fear of future
persecution on account of a protected ground. Substantial evidence supports the
BIA’s finding that Chupin Romero did not establish that he was harmed or
threatened because of his membership in a particular social group of tall people.
See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741-42 (9th Cir. 2009) (under REAL
ID Act, record did not compel conclusion that a protected ground was a central
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motivating reason for incident). However, with respect to the social group of
young men targeted by gangs, when the IJ and BIA issued their decisions in this
case, they did not have the benefit of this court’s decisions in Henriquez-Rivas v.
Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), Cordoba v. Holder, 726 F.3d
1106 (9th Cir. 2013), and Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2014), or
the BIA’s decisions in Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2014), and
Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014). Thus, we remand Chupin
Romero’s withholding of removal claim to determine the impact, if any, of these
decisions on Chupin Romero’s social group of young men targeted by gangs. See
INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-18 (2002) (per curiam).
Each party shall bear its own costs for this petition for review.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; GRANTED in part;
REMANDED.
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