Russell Johnson, III v. Lucent Technologies Inc. , 669 F. App'x 406 ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 27 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RUSSELL H. JOHNSON, III, No. 14-56542
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-06002- CAS-CT
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 2, 2016**
Pasadena, California
Before: TASHIMA, WARDLAW, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Russell H. Johnson appeals from the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Appellee Lucent Technologies Inc. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
In 1989, Johnson brought suit against Lucent’s predecessor in interest,
AT&T, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for failure to pay long-term
disability benefits in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (“ERISA”). The Pennsylvania district court’s judgment required Johnson to
provide periodic proof of treatment and afforded AT&T the right to move the
district court to terminate benefits if Johnson failed to comply. Between 1990 and
2002, Johnson fully complied with the 1989 judgment – as amended in 1990 – by
providing periodic documentation evidencing medical treatment. Beginning in
2003, however, Johnson ceased providing documentation. Accordingly, in 2006,
the Pennsylvania district court granted Lucent’s motion to terminate benefits;
Lucent ceased making long-term disability payments to Johnson in January 2007.
The Third Circuit affirmed the termination of benefits. Johnson v. Lucent Techs.,
Inc., 285 F. App’x 854, 855 (3d Cir. 2008).
In this action, Johnson alleges that Lucent ceased paying benefits in
retaliation for a 2005 lawsuit in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, resulting in the
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). The district court granted
summary judgment to Lucent on the ground that Johnson’s claims are barred by
res judicata as a result of the 2008 Third Circuit ruling. The district court also held
that Johnson’s IIED claim was preempted by ERISA. We review the district
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court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. McIndoe v. Huntington Ingalls Inc.,
817 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2016).
1. Res judicata applies when there is: “(1) an identity of claims; (2) a
final judgment on the merits; and (3) identity or privity between parties.” Stewart
v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In determining the identity of claims, we consider: “(1) whether rights
or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by
prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is
presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the
same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional
nucleus of facts.” Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 673
F.3d 914, 917–18 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Johnson’s
retaliation claim meets all of these criteria. Johnson essentially asks us to overturn
the judgment of the Third Circuit affirming the termination of his benefits. He
presented substantially the same evidence in both actions. Both suits involve the
same right, namely Johnson’s right to long-term benefits under Lucent’s ERISA
plan. Finally, and most importantly, Johnson had every opportunity to present
evidence of his compliance with the 1989 judgment to the Pennsylvania district
court. If, as Johnson contends, Lucent had improper motives for seeking to
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terminate his benefits, that fact could have been raised before the Pennsylvania
district court and the Third Circuit. Johnson’s claim of retaliation under § 1981 is
therefore barred by res judicata.
2. Johnson’s IIED claim fares no better. “ERISA contains one of the
broadest preemption clauses ever enacted by Congress.” Joanou v. Coca-Cola
Co., 26 F.3d 96, 99 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Under §
514(a), ERISA broadly ‘preempts any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any [covered] employee benefit plan . . . .’” Fossen v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Mont., Inc., 660 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2011)
(alterations in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). In analyzing a state law
cause of action, such as IIED, “the focus is whether the claim is premised on the
existence of an ERISA plan, and whether the existence of the plan is essential to
the claim’s survival.” Providence Health Plan v. McDowell, 385 F.3d 1168, 1172
(9th Cir. 2004). The gravamen of Johnson’s IIED claim is that Lucent’s “cessation
of benefits constituted an intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Johnson v.
Lucent Techs. Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). Indeed, but for Lucent’s
termination of his benefits, there would have been no grounds for Johnson’s state
law action. Johnson’s IIED claim is preempted by ERISA.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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