Dolores Montoya v. Navy Exchange Service Command ( 2019 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    APR 16 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    DOLORES MONTOYA,                                 No.   17-72136
    Petitioner,                        BRB No. 16-0599
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    NAVY EXCHANGE SERVICE
    COMMAND and DIRECTOR, OFFICE
    OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
    PROGRAM,
    Respondents.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Benefits Review Board
    Submitted March 8, 2019**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: KLEINFELD, NGUYEN, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
    Dolores Montoya petitions for review the decision of the Benefits Review
    Board (the “Board”) upholding the Administrative Law Judge’s denial of
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    permanent total disability benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Worker’s
    Compensation Act, 
    33 U.S.C. § 901
     et seq., as extended by the Non-Appropriated
    Fund Instrumentalities Act, 
    5 U.S.C. § 8171
     et seq. We have jurisdiction pursuant
    to 
    33 U.S.C. § 921
    (c). We deny the petition for review.
    The Board’s decisions are reviewed for errors of law and adherence to the
    substantial evidence standard after an “independent review of the administrative
    record.” Van Skike v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 
    557 F.3d 1041
    ,
    1045 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Christie v. Georgia-pacific Co., 
    898 F.3d 952
    , 956
    (9th Cir. 2018) (“The Board is required to accept the ALJ’s findings unless they
    are contrary to law, irrational, or unsupported by substantial evidence.” (citations
    and internal quotation marks omitted)). “A decision by the [Board] is supported by
    substantial evidence if there exists ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
    might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Van Skike, 
    557 F.3d at
    1045–46 (citation omitted).
    The Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Montoya failed
    to rebut the Navy Exchange Service Command’s identification of suitable
    alternative employment on August 10, 2012, through a “diligent” yet unsuccessful
    job search. Kalama Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 
    354 F.3d 1085
    , 1090 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Rhine v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., 596
    
    2 F.3d 1161
    , 1166 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing with approval Board decision holding that
    “[c]laimant may not retain entitlement to total disability benefits merely by
    alleging that he did not seek work because he was unsure if he would be hired”
    (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). The only specific attempt to obtain
    employment in the record is Montoya’s asking a woman selling curling irons at a
    mall kiosk about a job, after which Montoya “gave up,” and made no further
    efforts. Substantial evidence thus supported the Board’s decision that Montoya did
    not make a “diligent” search for employment.1 Kalama, 
    354 F.3d at 1090
    . Even
    accepting the “reasonable person” standard for which Montoya argues, the Board’s
    conclusion is supportable on the record.2 See Rhine, 596 F.3d at 1166.
    The petition for review is denied.
    1
    We similarly reject the argument, if any, that the Navy Exchange did not
    identify suitable alternative employment based on Montoya’s alleged inability to
    seek employment without assistance. See Hairston v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 
    849 F.2d 1194
    , 1196 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the Board should inquire “whether
    there exists a reasonable likelihood” the claimant, considering his specific
    characteristics, would be hired “if he diligently sought the job” in determining the
    availability of suitable alternative employment).
    2
    Although Montoya argues that she lacked the capacity to seek employment
    on her own, the evidence also suggests she could have asked her daughter or
    husband for the necessary minimal assistance.
    3