Hue Huang v. Loretta E. Lynch ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 02 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HUE BING HUANG, No. 13-71190
Petitioner, Agency No. A070-169-278
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 25, 2015**
Before: McKEOWN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Hue Bing Huang, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s decision denying his motion to reopen deportation
proceedings conducted in absentia. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, Avagyan v.
Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2011), and we deny the petition for review.
The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Huang’s motion to reopen
on the grounds that notice was proper and that Huang failed to rebut the strong
presumption of effective service arising from the service of his hearing notice by
certified mail. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(1)(F) (1994) (repealed) (obligation to
notify court of address change); see also id. § 1252b(a)(2)(A), (c)(1) (written
notice is considered sufficient if sent to the most recent address provided).
To the extent Huang contends he failed to appear due to exceptional
circumstances, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion as
untimely where he waited seventeen years to file a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (motion to reopen in absentia proceedings generally must be
filed within 180 days of the removal order), and he did not establish the due
diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline where he admits he
purposefully evaded numerous opportunities to redress his in absentia order, see
Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 678-80.
In addition, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying where Huang
failed to establish that reopening was warranted based on a claim of changed
country conditions in China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii); Avagyan, 646
2 13-71190
F.3d at 678 (“The BIA abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary,
irrational, or contrary to law.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Huang’s remaining contentions are unavailing.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
3 13-71190