United States v. Bahena-Cardenas ( 2005 )


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  •                  FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                  No. 03-50479
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                            D.C. No.
    CR-02-00300-BTM
    ESTEBAN BAHENA-CARDENAS,
    OPINION
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Barry T. Moskowitz, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    December 9, 2004—Pasadena, California
    Filed June 13, 2005
    Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Cynthia Holcomb Hall, and
    Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Hall
    6993
    6996         UNITED STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS
    COUNSEL
    Michael Edmund Burke, San Diego, California, for the
    defendant-appellant.
    Anne Kristina Perry, Assistant United States Attorney, San
    Diego, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.
    UNITED STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS             6997
    OPINION
    HALL, Senior Circuit Judge:
    Esteban Bahena-Cardenas was convicted by a jury of enter-
    ing the United States without permission of the Attorney Gen-
    eral after being excluded, deported, or removed from the
    United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Bahena-Cardenas first came to the attention of the immi-
    gration service following his and his brother’s arrest and con-
    viction for possessing heroin with intent to sell. After serving
    his sentence for the drug crime, he and his brother were
    ordered deported following a joint hearing in front of an
    immigration judge (“IJ”) at which they were represented by
    counsel. Bahena-Cardenas was not able to attend the first day
    of the hearing because he was in a coma caused by a car acci-
    dent. The IJ denied his lawyer’s request that his case be sev-
    ered from his brother’s so that the hearing would not take
    place in his absence. During this first day, the government
    presented the testimony of the undercover Drug Enforcement
    Agency (“DEA”) agent who arrested Bahena-Cardenas and
    his brother. After Bahena-Cardenas recovered and was pres-
    ent, the agent was recalled and fully cross-examined. The IJ
    determined that Bahena-Cardenas was not a United States cit-
    izen and ordered him deported.
    In 2000, a San Diego County employee discovered Bahena-
    Cardenas in San Diego. He was subsequently charged with
    entering the United States without receiving permission from
    the Attorney General after being deported under 18 U.S.C.
    § 1326. He was tried in front of a jury and convicted on June
    5, 2003. Three major issues arose at trial, namely, whether
    Bahena-Cardenas was an American citizen, whether an expert
    witness should have been allowed to testify about delayed
    birth certificates in Mexico, and whether there was sufficient
    6998          UNITED STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS
    evidence that Bahena-Cardenas physically left the country
    after being deported and later voluntarily reentered. On
    appeal, Bahena-Cardenas also raised due process claims con-
    cerning his deportation hearing and contends that his sentence
    was in error.
    The jury was instructed to decide the following elements
    beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) whether the defendant was not
    a citizen of the United States; (2) whether the defendant had
    previously been deported and actually removed from the
    United States to Mexico; (3) whether the defendant voluntar-
    ily reentered and remained in the United States without the
    Attorney General consenting to a reapplication by the defen-
    dant for admission into the United States; and (4) whether the
    defendant was found in the southern district of California.
    With regard to Bahena-Cardenas’ alienage, the prosecution
    had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bahena-Cardenas
    was not a United States citizen. Bahena-Cardenas argued that
    he was born in San Diego and was therefore a United States
    citizen. Both sides introduced as evidence a number of docu-
    ments compiled in Bahena-Cardenas’ immigration record or
    “A file.” The government’s evidence included a Mexican
    birth certificate that was created when Bahena-Cardenas was
    13, several school records from American schools listing
    Mexico as his place of birth, and a certificate of baptism
    issued in 1985 listing his birthplace as Mexico. As evidence
    of being born in the United States, Bahena-Cardenas intro-
    duced two additional certificates of baptism (signed by differ-
    ent pastors) from 1988 and 1989 that showed his birth place
    as San Diego, a Mexican tourist visa, typically issued to
    American citizens for travel in Mexico issued to Bahena-
    Cardenas, a hospital admission record indicating a California
    birthplace, and a 1988 birth registration showing that Bahena-
    Cardenas was born at home in San Diego. The defense also
    submitted as evidence of United States citizenship a voter reg-
    istration card and social security records. Bahena-Cardenas
    UNITED STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS            6999
    also introduced a student eligibility report for the year 1982-
    83 that listed his citizenship as American.
    Both sides also elicited witnesses testimony. A prosecution
    witness testified that non-citizens can procure voter registra-
    tion cards and social security records because no evidence of
    citizenship is required. A defense witness testified that she
    was a teenager when Bahena-Cardenas was born and was
    with Bahena-Cardenas’ mother at her San Diego home when
    she began feeling labor pains. The witness testified that she
    went to get her mother while a friend got another adult, Flavio
    Canio, who arrived to help deliver the baby. The witness was
    not allowed inside the house but remained on the porch while,
    Mrs. Bahena-Cardenas gave birth. Two or three days later, the
    witness went into the house and saw the baby Esteban. How-
    ever, the witness was not able to remember the date of Este-
    ban’s birth.
    Bahena-Cardenas’ mother testified that Esteban was born at
    home in San Diego. She said that the only people in the room
    with her when Esteban was born were her husband and a
    friend, Flavio Canio. She testified that the family did not get
    an American birth certificate for Esteban when he was youn-
    ger because “my husband was negligent, he didn’t let me do
    anything. . . . Then, afterwards, when the child grew, that is
    when I told my husband, let’s take care of the certificate for
    the child.” She was not aware of anyone getting Esteban a
    Mexican birth certificate. On cross-examination, the prosecu-
    tor impeached her with testimony from the deportation pro-
    ceeding in which she had testified that her husband and sister-
    in-law, not Flavio Canio, were present at the birth. She also
    admitted that she could not remember Esteban’s date of birth.
    She was not able to explain why Esteban’s school records
    listed Mexico as his place of birth. Nor could she explain why
    she waited until her younger son became a United States citi-
    zen to adjust her status, rather than adjusting when Esteban
    turned 18, as would have been allowed had Esteban been a
    United States citizen.
    7000          UNITED STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS
    The defense sought to present an expert witness to explain
    the phenomenon of delayed birth certificates in Mexico. The
    expert witness, a sociology professor, had done research into
    families living along the border of Mexico and the United
    States and was prepared to testify that according to a small
    study she directed of such families, around ten percent of
    them lied to get Mexican birth certificates. The judge
    excluded this testimony because, he ruled, there was an insuf-
    ficient foundation to suggest that the study’s results were rele-
    vant to the issue of Bahena-Cardenas’ birth certificate, which
    was procured in a different state. Nor could the expert witness
    testify as to whether there was an amnesty program in place
    at the time that allowed families to register births without pay-
    ing a fee, although she was allowed to testify to the general
    existence of such amnesty programs. The judge also allowed
    the expert to testify that having a Mexican birth certificate is
    required to enroll in public schools and to receive free health
    care in Mexico.
    The second element the prosecution was required to prove
    was whether Bahena-Cardenas actually left the United States
    following his deportation order. The government produced a
    warrant of deportation, signed by a deportation officer who
    attested to watching Bahena-Cardenas walk across the border.
    That agent did not testify at trial. Instead, another agent testi-
    fied that the normal practice is for deportation officers to sign
    the warrant of deportation when they see the alien leave the
    United States.
    The jury was instructed to find Bahena-Cardenas guilty
    only if the government had proven all the necessary elements
    beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury returned a verdict of
    guilty. When the jury foreperson attempted to read the verdict
    in open court, he had difficulty, and the juror sitting next to
    him read it instead.
    At sentencing, the judge denied all of the defense attorney’s
    requests for downward adjustments, including that for accept-
    UNITED STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS            7001
    ing responsibility. The judge increased the sentence because
    of Bahena-Cardenas’ prior convictions. The judge ruled that
    although he had discretion not to increase Bahena-Cardenas’
    criminal history score because the conviction for heroin traf-
    ficking was 20 years old, he declined to do so. He said he was
    influenced at least in part by the fact that Bahena-Cardenas
    had a more recent conviction for transportation of metham-
    phetamine.
    DISCUSSION
    I.   Constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1326
    Bahena-Cardenas argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is unconsti-
    tutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    (2000),
    because an administrative adjudication — a prior deportation
    — is an element of the offense. He argues that because a
    deportation hearing is held without the same procedural pro-
    tections and with a lower standard of proof than criminal pro-
    ceedings, such a hearing cannot be one of the elements of a
    criminal offense.
    [1] Section 1326 does not violate the rule of Apprendi,
    which requires that “any fact that increases the penalty for a
    crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be sub-
    mitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable 
    doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490
    . Under § 1326 the government must prove that an
    alien was “denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed
    from the United States” and “thereafter . . . enters, attempts
    to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States.” The
    relevant element is whether Bahena-Cardenas was ordered
    deported, and the jury found that fact beyond a reasonable
    doubt. Although a deportation hearing establishes that an
    alien was “denied admission” or “excluded,” and establishing
    this fact satisfies an element of a § 1326 conviction, the gov-
    ernment may not rely on the deportation hearing, but must
    separately prove the exclusion element to secure a § 1326
    conviction. Therefore the criminal trial on a §1326 charge
    7002           UNITED STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS
    does not “allow the use of an administrative determination as
    conclusive evidence of a fact in a criminal prosecution.”
    United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 
    481 U.S. 828
    , 834 n.7
    (1987).
    Second, the fact that there are fewer due process safeguards
    in a deportation hearing does not make § 1326 unconstitu-
    tional because the Supreme Court has held that deportation
    hearings must comport with the requirements of due process
    before they “may be used to establish conclusively an element
    of a criminal offense.” 
    Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 838
    . To
    ensure that an alien is convicted of violating § 1326 only after
    a valid deportation hearing, the deportation hearing must be
    subject to judicial review, including collateral review if neces-
    sary. 
    Id. Because all
    facts necessary for a conviction, includ-
    ing whether the defendant was previously deported, must be
    proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and because the
    deportation itself may be attacked collaterally, § 1326 is not
    unconstitutional. See United States v. Lara-Aceves, 
    183 F.3d 1007
    , 1011-12 (9th Cir. 1999) reversed on other grounds by
    United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 
    247 F.3d 905
    (9th Cir. 2001)
    (holding that using a prior deportation as an element in a
    § 1326 conviction is not unconstitutional despite the lesser
    protections available in a deportation hearing).
    II.    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Bahena-Cardenas argues that there was insufficient evi-
    dence with respect to three of the four elements of 8 U.S.C.
    § 1326 — voluntary entry, physical departure after deporta-
    tion, and alienage. Because a jury found as a matter of fact
    that Bahena-Cardenas was guilty, we “must review the evi-
    dence presented against the defendant in the light most favor-
    able to the government to determine whether any rational trier
    of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Pacheco-
    Medina, 
    212 F.3d 1162
    , 1163 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quota-
    tions omitted).
    UNITED STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS                   7003
    A.    Voluntary Entry
    [2] Bahena-Cardenas argues that the government did not
    present sufficient evidence that he voluntarily reentered the
    United States, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1326.1 Although the
    prosecution did not present any direct evidence of voluntary
    entry, such entry could be permissibly inferred from the gov-
    ernment’s evidence.
    At trial, the government presented evidence that Bahena-
    Cardenas was found in National City, California, a city in San
    Diego County that does not share a border with Mexico.
    Bahena-Cardenas did not present any evidence to the con-
    trary. This evidence is sufficient to prove voluntary entry
    under United States v. Quintana-Torres, 
    224 F.3d 1157
    (9th
    Cir. 2000).
    [3] In Quintana-Torres, we held that “evidence of [the
    defendant] being in the United States a distance from the bor-
    der was sufficient in this case to justify any reasonable juror
    inferring that he had voluntarily entered the United States.”
    
    Id. at 1158.
    In the absence of evidence suggesting that the
    defendant entered the United States involuntarily, his pres-
    ence in the United States “is circumstantial proof [of volun-
    tary reentry] that is convincing unless explained away”
    because of the small likelihood that someone entered the
    United States involuntarily. 
    Id. at 1159.
    Because Bahena-
    Cardenas did not present any such evidence, we hold that the
    government produced sufficient evidence to allow any ratio-
    1
    Bahena-Cardenas also argues that the allegations in the indictment
    were insufficient because the indictment did not allege entry. However,
    “we have never suggested that the crime of ‘entry’ must be charged in
    order to charge the crime of being ‘found in’ ” the United States. United
    States v. Parga-Rosas, 
    238 F.3d 1209
    , 1213 (9th Cir. 2001). In Parga-
    Rosas, the court specifically held that even though voluntary entry is an
    element that must be proven at trial, it need not be specifically alleged
    when the indictment charges that the defendant was found in the United
    States. 
    Id. 7004 UNITED
    STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS
    nal jury to decide that Bahena-Cardenas entered the United
    States voluntarily.
    B.   Physical Removal
    The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
    Bahena-Cardenas physically left the country sometime
    between the time he was ordered deported and the time he
    was found in the United States. United States v. Romo-Romo,
    
    246 F.3d 1272
    , 1275-76 (9th Cir. 2001). Indeed, “an alien
    must actually leave the country before he can be convicted
    under § 1326.” 
    Id. Bahena-Cardenas argues
    that the govern-
    ment failed to provide sufficient evidence of physical removal
    because the only evidence showing that he actually left the
    United States after he was ordered deported was inadmissible
    hearsay under Crawford v. Washington, 
    124 S. Ct. 1354
    (2004).
    To prove physical removal, the government offered into
    evidence a warrant of deportation, signed by an immigration
    official. The form included a statement that the officer who
    signed the document “witnessed” Bahena-Cardenas’ depar-
    ture. At trial, a second immigration official testified that it
    was standard practice for immigration officers to complete
    and sign a warrant of deportation as they witnessed an alien’s
    deportation. This second immigration officer admitted, how-
    ever, that he did not “personally observe Mr. Bahena leaving
    the country.”
    Before Crawford, 
    124 S. Ct. 1354
    , the admissibility of the
    warrant of deportation was clearly established in this circuit.
    See United States v. Contreras, 
    63 F.3d 852
    , 857 (9th Cir.
    1995) (holding that “[t]he I-205 form [warrant of deportation]
    is hearsay, but is admissible under the public records excep-
    tion to the hearsay rule”); see also United States v.
    Hernandez-Rojas, 
    617 F.2d 533
    (9th Cir. 1980). Bahena-
    Cardenas argues that after the Supreme Court’s decision in
    UNITED STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS              7005
    Crawford, the warrant of deportation is no longer admissible.
    We disagree.
    [4] In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that “the govern-
    ment cannot introduce testimonial evidence against a criminal
    defendant where the declarant is unavailable at trial and there
    was no opportunity for cross-examination at the time the prior
    testimony was given.” United States v. Wilmore, 
    381 F.3d 868
    , 871 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citing 
    Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374
    ); see Parle v. Runnels, 
    387 F.3d 1030
    , 1037
    (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that Crawford does not apply to non-
    testimonial hearsay). However, the Supreme Court declined to
    define what constitutes testimonial evidence. Instead, the
    Court noted that “[w]e leave for another day any effort to
    spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’ What-
    ever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior tes-
    timony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a
    former trial; and to police interrogations.” 
    Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374
    .
    [5] We conclude that the warrant of deportation is nontesti-
    monial because it was not made in anticipation of litigation,
    and because it is simply a routine, objective, cataloging of an
    unambiguous factual matter. In United States v. Hernandez-
    Rojas, 
    617 F.2d 533
    , 535 (9th Cir. 1980), we held that a war-
    rant of deportation “has none of the features of the subjective
    report made by a law enforcement official in an on-the-scene
    investigation, which investigative reports lack sufficient guar-
    antees of trustworthiness because they are made in an adver-
    sary setting and likely to be used in litigation.” Indeed, “[t]he
    notation that [defendant] was deported to Mexico was a min-
    isterial, objective observation, which has inherent reliability
    because of the Government’s need to keep accurate records of
    the movement of aliens.” 
    Id. Additionally, in
    United States v.
    Contreras, 
    63 F.3d 852
    , 857 (9th Cir. 1995), we echoed this
    reasoning, holding that “the notation on an I-205 form [war-
    rant of deportation] indicating that an alien has left the coun-
    try is a routine, objective, indeed mechanical recording of an
    7006          UNITED STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS
    unambiguous factual matter.” In this sense, the warrant of
    deportation is no different than a birth certificate or any other
    public record which constitutes the routine cataloguing of an
    unambiguous factual matter. Surely Crawford did not mean to
    require the doctor or nurse who actually filled out a birth cer-
    tificate to testify as to its veracity.
    We hold that the warrant of deportation in this case is non-
    testimonial and thus admissible. Accordingly, the government
    provided sufficient evidence of physical removal.
    C.   Alienage
    Bahena-Cardenas argues that there was insufficient evi-
    dence for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was
    not a United States citizen. “This sufficiency-of-the-evidence
    challenge can succeed only if, viewing the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of
    fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” U.S. v. Lo, 
    231 F.3d 471
    , 475
    (9th Cir. 2000). However,
    this inquiry does not require a court to ask itself
    whether it believes that the evidence at the trial
    established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead,
    the relevant question is whether, after viewing the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
    tion, any rational trier of fact could have found the
    essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
    doubt.
    Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 318-319 (1979) (emphasis
    in original) (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 
    406 U.S. 356
    , 362
    (1972)). We have held that “[t]his familiar standard gives full
    play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve
    conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
    reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.”
    
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
    .
    UNITED STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS              7007
    The government’s evidence to support its claim of alienage
    consisted of (1) a Mexican birth certificate obtained by
    Bahena-Cardenas’ father when he was 13; (2) elementary and
    secondary school records from American schools that listed
    Mexico as his place of birth; (3) a 1985 certificate of baptism
    issued in the United States listing his birthplace as Mexico;
    and (4) evidence of deportation. In his defense, Bahena-
    Cardenas introduced (1) additional certificates of baptism
    from a church in the United States signed by different pastors
    in 1988 and 1989 that showed his birth place as San Diego;
    (2) a Mexican tourist visa typically issued to American citi-
    zens traveling to Mexico; (3) a hospital admission record indi-
    cating a California birthplace; (4) a voter registration card
    issued after deportation proceedings began, (5) social security
    records; (6) a student eligibility report from 1982-83 listing
    his citizenship as American; (7) a birth certificate issued in
    1988 showing that Bahena-Cardenas was born at home in San
    Diego; and (8) testimony from his mother and a family friend
    that Bahena-Cardenas was born at home in San Diego.
    [6] The jury resolved the conflicting evidence in the gov-
    ernment’s favor and concluded beyond a reasonable doubt
    that defendant was not a United States citizen. While the evi-
    dence was contradictory on this point, contradictory evidence
    alone does not require us to find that no rational jury could
    have made such a finding. It is the responsibility of the jury
    to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence,
    and to draw reasonable inferences. That the jury found the
    defendant guilty shows that the jury rejected or found uncon-
    vincing the contrary evidence. As the Supreme Court held in
    
    Johnson, 406 U.S. at 362
    (internal citations omitted):
    Jury verdicts finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
    are regularly sustained even though the evidence was
    such that the jury would have been justified in hav-
    ing a reasonable doubt; even though the trial judge
    might not have reached the same conclusion as the
    jury; and even though appellate judges are closely
    7008            UNITED STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS
    divided on the issue whether there was sufficient evi-
    dence to support a conviction.
    After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
    the government, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could
    have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a rea-
    sonable doubt.
    III.    Foreperson’s Inability to Read the Verdict
    [7] When the jury foreman attempted to read the verdict in
    open court, he stumbled and stammered, and ultimately a dif-
    ferent juror read the verdict. Bahena-Cardenas argues that
    these actions were signs of juror illiteracy and that having an
    illiterate person on the jury would compromise his due pro-
    cess rights because the juror would not have been able to read
    the large number of written exhibits introduced by both sides.
    Bahena-Cardenas does not cite any case law in support of his
    contention that inclusion of an illiterate juror is a due process
    violation, and we can find none. Additionally, such conduct
    seems equally indicative of nervousness. Accordingly, we
    conclude that the foreperson’s difficulty reading the verdict in
    open court did not result in a violation of Bahena-Cardenas’
    due process rights.
    IV.     Due Process Challenges to the Original Deportation
    Hearing
    A due process violation that renders the underlying depor-
    tation invalid also invalidates a conviction under 8 U.S.C.
    § 1326. 
    Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 840
    . Bahena-Cardenas
    argues that the underlying deportation was invalid because the
    hearing violated his due process rights in two ways. First,
    Bahena-Cardenas argues that his due process rights were vio-
    lated because he was in a coma during the first day of his
    hearing. Second, Bahena-Cardenas contends that the immigra-
    tion judge’s failure to advise him of the possibility of discre-
    UNITED STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS            7009
    tionary relief violated due process. We are not persuaded by
    either argument.
    A.   Lack of Presence at Hearing
    [8] Bahena-Cardenas argues that holding the immigration
    hearing when he could not be present violated his due process
    rights. He is correct that due process requires physical pres-
    ence in deportation hearings. See United States v. Leon-Leon,
    
    35 F.3d 1428
    , 1431 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Purba v. INS,
    
    884 F.2d 516
    , 517 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that an alien is
    entitled to be physically present at a deportation hearing)).
    However, we conclude that the violation was not prejudicial.
    Bahena-Cardenas argues that holding the hearing without
    his presence was such an egregious due process violation that
    it is unnecessary to show prejudice. However, we have con-
    sistently held that defendants must show prejudice in order to
    invalidate a § 1326 conviction even when the due process vio-
    lation is clear. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarado-Delgado,
    
    98 F.3d 492
    , 493 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that
    defendant who was deported without being informed of his
    right to a deportation hearing, while having established a vio-
    lation of due process, must still show prejudice); 
    Leon-Leon, 35 F.3d at 1431
    (holding that “in spite of any violation of the
    alien’s due process rights, the deportation order may still be
    used to prove an element of a crime if the alien fails to show
    prejudice resulting from the violation”); United States v.
    Proa-Tovar, 
    975 F.2d 592
    , 595 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
    (holding that “[t]he defendant also bears the burden of prov-
    ing prejudice” when immigration judge did not act in accord
    with due process).
    [9] Bahena-Cardenas has not demonstrated that he was
    prejudiced by his absence on the first day of his deportation
    hearing. During the portion of the hearing that Bahena-
    Cardenas missed, the only person who testified was the DEA
    agent who arrested Bahena-Cardenas for selling heroin. The
    7010          UNITED STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS
    agent was later recalled and subjected to full cross-
    examination in Bahena-Cardenas’ presence. Moreover, the
    immigration judge specifically did not find the agent’s testi-
    mony dispositive.
    Bahena-Cardenas also argues that his absence from the
    beginning of the trial violated his Sixth Amendment rights
    because he was denied the opportunity to assist his lawyer
    effectively during the deportation hearing, making it the
    equivalent of an “uncounseled prior.” Although aliens in
    deportation proceedings have no constitutional right to coun-
    sel under the Sixth Amendment, 
    Lara-Aceves, 183 F.3d at 1010
    (citing Magallanes-Damian v. INS, 
    783 F.2d 931
    , 933
    (9th Cir. 1986)), the Fifth Amendment right to due process
    has been construed to give aliens the right to have counsel
    present. See Baltazar-Alcazar v. INS, 
    386 F.3d 940
    , 944 (9th
    Cir. 2004).
    Bahena-Cardenas, however, was not denied counsel. In
    fact, his lawyer was present at the hearing and it was Bahena-
    Cardenas himself who was unavailable. We find no precedent
    that suggests that a defendant’s absence from a hearing or
    trial, when counsel is present, constitutes a denial of the right
    to counsel. Indeed, the right to counsel is important because
    of the difficulty aliens have in presenting their cases force-
    fully and effectively:
    A petitioner must weave together a complex tapestry
    of evidence and then juxtapose and reconcile that
    picture with the voluminous, and not always consis-
    tent, administrative and court precedent in this
    changing area. . . . These factors and related legal
    requirements are daunting enough for a seasoned
    immigration lawyer. . . . It is no wonder we have
    observed with only a small degree of hyperbole, the
    immigration laws have been termed second only to
    the Internal Revenue Code in complexity. A lawyer
    UNITED STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS             7011
    is often the only person who could thread the laby-
    rinth.
    
    Baltazar-Alcazar, 386 F.3d at 947-48
    (internal citations and
    quotations omitted). An alien’s absence from the proceedings
    when a lawyer is ably representing his interests does not
    create such problems.
    Accordingly, we conclude that Bahena-Cardenas’ § 1326
    conviction should not be overturned based on the fact that he
    was not present for the beginning of his deportation hearing.
    B.    Failure to Inform of Discretionary Relief
    Bahena-Cardenas argues that his due process rights were
    violated because the immigration judge did not advise him of
    plausible discretionary relief. Bahena-Cardenas was deported
    following a conviction for selling heroin, and he is therefore
    excludable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). The only waiver
    available is found in subsection (h), which applies only to
    those aliens who were convicted of a single offense of simple
    possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana, and therefore
    does not apply to Bahena-Cardenas. Accordingly, because
    Bahena-Cardenas could not plausibly qualify for discretionary
    relief, there is no due process violation.
    V.     Testimony of Mexican “Cultural Expert”
    Bahena-Cardenas argues that the district judge erred in
    refusing to allow one of the defense’s expert witnesses to tes-
    tify. We review the district court’s decision to exclude expert
    witness testimony for abuse of discretion. United States v.
    Cordoba, 
    194 F.3d 1053
    (9th Cir. 1999). We conclude that it
    was not an abuse of discretion to hold that such testimony
    involved more cultural stereotypes than scientific evidence.
    The defense provided a witness who claimed to be an
    expert in Mexican transborder culture. Outside of the pres-
    7012          UNITED STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS
    ence of the jury, the expert testified about a small-scale study
    she performed in which a small percentage of study respon-
    dents in Tijuana reported lying to Mexican officials in order
    to get a Mexican birth certificate. The defense argued that the
    study supported the possibility that Bahena-Cardenas’ father
    similarly lied when registering his son’s birth. The district
    court refused to allow the testimony, reasoning that the study
    was too small and did not involve practices in Guerrera, the
    state that issued Bahena-Cardenas’ birth certificate. The court
    also reasoned that only impermissible stereotypes would
    allow the jury to generalize from the expert’s study to the par-
    ticular facts in this case. The court did allow the expert to tes-
    tify that having a Mexican birth certificate is required to
    enroll in public schools and to receive free health care in
    Mexico.
    [10] The expert’s study involved only 56 people, and of
    those, only five or six reported lying to get a Mexican birth
    certificate. Generalizing from this scant evidence to reach
    conclusions in this particular case could encourage jurors to
    resort to cultural stereotypes. Refusing to allow expert testi-
    mony that would encourage or require jurors to rely on cul-
    tural stereotypes is not an abuse of discretion. See United
    States v. Verduzco, 
    373 F.3d 1022
    , 1034 (9th Cir. 2004)
    (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude
    expert witness testimony regarding drug cultures); Jinro
    America Inc. v. Secure Investments, Inc., 
    266 F.3d 993
    , 1007
    (9th Cir. 2001) (“Allowing an expert witness in a civil action
    to generalize that most Korean businesses are corrupt, are not
    to be trusted and will engage in complicated business transac-
    tions to evade Korean currency laws is tantamount to ethnic
    or cultural stereotyping, inviting the jury to assume the
    Korean litigant fits the stereotype.”); United States v. Rubio-
    Villareal, 
    927 F.2d 1495
    , 1502 n.6 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
    that it was not an abuse of discretion to reject testimony that
    “would have shown that [defendant’s] failure to register his
    truck is a common phenomenon in Mexico”).
    UNITED STATES v. BAHENA-CARDENAS           7013
    VI.   Sentencing
    [11] Because Bahena-Cardenas did not challenge his sen-
    tence on Sixth Amendment grounds in the district court, we
    grant a limited remand pursuant to United States v. Ameline,
    No. 02-30326, slip op. at 6368-71 (9th Cir. June 1, 2005) (en
    banc).
    CONCLUSION
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED IN PART and REMANDED.