Galdamez v. Potter ( 2005 )


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  •                  FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ARLENE GALDAMEZ,                          No. 03-35682
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                          D.C. No.
    CV-00-01768-JJ
    JOHN POTTER, Postmaster General,
    OPINION
    Defendant-Appellee.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    John Jelderks, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    March 11, 2005—Portland, Oregon
    Filed July 15, 2005
    Before: Procter Hug, Jr., Marsha S. Berzon, and
    Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Hug
    8253
    GALDAMEZ v. POTTER                   8257
    COUNSEL
    Thomas F. Spaulding, Spaulding Cox & Schaeffer, LLP, Port-
    land, Oregon, for the appellant.
    Ronald K. Silver, Assistant United States Attorney, Portland,
    Oregon, for the appellee.
    OPINION
    HUG, Circuit Judge:
    Arlene Galdamez appeals the district court’s denial of her
    motion for a new trial following a defense verdict in her Title
    VII case against the United States Postal Service. We treat
    Galdamez’s timely appeal from denial of the new trial motion
    as an appeal from final judgment. See 11 Charles Alan
    Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice
    & Procedure § 2818, at 191-93 (1995); accord Medrano v.
    City of Los Angeles, 
    973 F.2d 1499
    , 1502-03 (9th Cir. 1992);
    In re Nicholson, 
    779 F.2d 514
    , 515-16 (9th Cir. 1985). There-
    fore, we have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . Although
    the district court correctly denied Galdamez’s motion to
    amend the pretrial order and did not abuse its discretion in
    formulating either the jury instructions or the special verdict,
    it nonetheless erred by denying her request for an instruction
    on the Postal Service’s potential liability for harassment by
    8258                  GALDAMEZ v. POTTER
    customers and community members based on her race and
    national origin. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in
    part, and remand for a new trial on Galdamez’s harassment
    claim.
    I
    Factual and Procedural Background
    Arlene Galdamez was born in Honduras and speaks English
    with a discernible accent. She began working for the Postal
    Service in 1983. In late 1993, she took over as postmaster in
    Willamina, Oregon. Galdamez immediately began to make a
    number of changes designed to bring the Willamina office
    into line with Postal Service regulations. For example, she
    insisted on timely payment of post office box fees, prohibited
    non-employees from entering non-public areas, and insisted
    on returning incorrectly addressed mail even when carriers
    knew how to deliver it. These changes were met by hostility
    and opposition from both customers and other postal workers.
    Customers complained to Jim Bogroff, her immediate super-
    visor, as well as William Jackson, the District Manager for
    Oregon. Local media also devoted considerable coverage to
    the controversy.
    Galdamez, however, perceived a good deal of this hostility
    as stemming from her race, national origin, and accented
    English. Throughout her time in Willamina, she endured
    offensive verbal comments from customers and community
    members, references in local newspapers to her accent and
    foreign birth, direct and indirect threats to her safety, and van-
    dalism to her car. According to Galdamez, her reports of
    harassment and requests for assistance were rebuffed by
    Bogroff and other Service managers.
    Community opposition culminated in a petition drive and
    a “town hall” meeting, held on March 26, 1997, aimed at
    removing Galdamez from her position. The petition and meet-
    GALDAMEZ v. POTTER                           8259
    ing were organized by Ron “Chris” Greenhill, a postal cus-
    tomer whose mail was delayed at the post office for some
    time because the Greenhills did not have a proper mail recep-
    tacle at their rural address. Despite requests from Galdamez,
    neither Bogroff nor Jackson attended the community meeting
    to defend her, and Jackson made a number of comments criti-
    cal of her performance in interviews with local and regional
    newspapers.1
    At around the same time, the Postal Service initiated a
    disciplinary investigation of Galdamez based on complaints
    that she was “rude” and that her insistence on regulatory com-
    pliance undermined good customer service. On March 21,
    1997, Bogroff held an investigative interview with Galdamez
    and her representative, Bob Bernal.2 During that meeting,
    Galdamez insisted that a great deal of the community criti-
    cism was motivated by her foreign birth and accent rather
    than her performance as postmaster. Several days later, Bog-
    roff notified Galdamez that she was being placed on adminis-
    trative leave effective April 1, 1997, and prohibited her from
    entering non-public areas of the post office. Bogroff then pro-
    posed formal discipline by way of a “Letter of Warning in
    Lieu of Time-Off Suspension,” which Jackson later approved.
    Galdamez filed this action in district court alleging race,
    color, and/or national origin discrimination in violation of
    Title VII. The parties consented to trial before a magistrate
    judge,3 who entered a stipulated pretrial order setting forth the
    1
    In contrast, when Janet Batchelor, a white postmaster, experienced
    similar community resistance to operational changes in another rural Ore-
    gon town, Jackson and other Service personnel attended a community
    meeting and provided considerable public support.
    2
    Although postmasters are not union members, they are entitled to a
    representative from the National Association of Postmasters of the United
    States during disciplinary proceedings. On March 25, 1997, Ron Gates
    replaced Bob Bernal as Galdamez’s representative.
    3
    All references to the “district court” herein refer to proceedings before
    and rulings by the magistrate judge.
    8260                  GALDAMEZ v. POTTER
    pertinent claims and issues of fact for trial. Following the
    close of evidence, Galdamez made an oral motion to amend
    the pretrial order to include a retaliation claim, which the dis-
    trict court denied. The district court also refused to give a
    requested jury instruction on the Postal Service’s potential lia-
    bility for failing to investigate and remedy harassment at the
    hands of customers and community members.
    During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge seek-
    ing clarification of the special verdict form. In response, the
    district court gave the jury a modified special verdict form
    and additional instructions requiring the jury to decide
    whether discrimination occurred, and if so, to specify which
    of Galdamez’s three primary supervisors—Bogroff, Jackson,
    and John Fusco, who substituted for Bogroff during part of
    1996—had intentionally discriminated against her. The jury
    returned a verdict for the Postal Service, finding that Gal-
    damez had not “established by a preponderance of the evi-
    dence that her national origin was a motivating factor in any
    adverse employment action on the part of her supervisors that
    affected the terms and conditions of her employment.” Find-
    ing no discrimination, the jury did not reach the specific ques-
    tions as to each supervisor’s role. The jurors also submitted
    a handwritten note with their verdict stating their unanimous
    conviction that the Postal Service had subjected Galdamez to
    some “adverse employment action.” The district court denied
    Galdamez’s motion for a new trial, and this timely appeal fol-
    lowed.
    II
    Standard of Review
    We review the district court’s denial of Galdamez’s new
    trial motion for abuse of discretion. Ostad v. Or. Health Scis.
    Univ., 
    327 F.3d 876
    , 883 (9th Cir. 2003). Standards for
    reviewing the district court’s particular decisions are dis-
    cussed more fully in each section below.
    GALDAMEZ v. POTTER                     8261
    III
    Analysis
    A.   Motion to Amend the Pretrial Order
    Following the close of evidence, Galdamez moved to
    amend the pretrial order to include a retaliation claim.
    According to Galdamez, evidence emerged at trial that the
    Postal Service had subjected her to various retaliatory actions
    after Ron Gates, Galdamez’s second official representative in
    disciplinary proceedings, told Bogroff that an EEO investiga-
    tion might result from the attempt to discipline Galdamez.
    The district court, noting that the disciplinary process started
    well before Gates made the comment, and thus could not have
    been instituted in retaliation for it, denied the motion for lack
    of evidence to support the claim.
    [1] Galdamez had the burden of showing that an amend-
    ment to the pretrial order was necessary to prevent “manifest
    injustice.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e); Byrd v. Guess, 
    137 F.3d 1126
    , 1132 (9th Cir. 1998). In evaluating a motion to amend
    the pretrial order, a district court should consider four factors:
    (1) the degree of prejudice or surprise to the defendants if the
    order is modified; (2) the ability of the defendants to cure the
    prejudice; (3) any impact of modification on the orderly and
    efficient conduct of the trial; and (4) any willfulness or bad
    faith by the party seeking modification. 
    Id.
     We review the dis-
    trict court’s denial of the motion for abuse of discretion. 
    Id. at 1131
    .
    [2] Even if the evidence was sufficient to support a retalia-
    tion claim, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    denying the motion. Galdamez had all of the essential evi-
    dence she identified in support of the claim well before entry
    of the pretrial order. However, she did not file her motion
    until after the close of evidence, and thereby deprived the
    Postal Service of any opportunity to present additional evi-
    8262                        GALDAMEZ v. POTTER
    dence or examine witnesses on this issue. Had the district
    court granted the motion, the Postal Service would have been
    able to respond to the retaliation claim only in closing argu-
    ment. The Postal Service thus may have been prejudiced by
    the modification and would not have been able to cure that
    prejudice effectively. See Byrd, 
    137 F.3d at 1131-32
    .
    [3] We conclude that Galdamez has not shown the requisite
    manifest injustice.
    B.     Mixed Motive Instruction
    Galdamez contends that the district court failed to give a
    mixed motive instruction despite sufficient evidence.4 The
    district court’s formulation of jury instructions is reviewed for
    abuse of discretion, as is the sufficiency of the evidence to
    support a mixed motive instruction. See Costa v. Desert Pal-
    4
    Galdamez requested a mixed motive instruction based on Costa v.
    Desert Palace, Inc., 
    299 F.3d 838
     (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d, 
    539 U.S. 90
     (2003). In pertinent part, her requested instruction read:
    If you find that the plaintiff’s national origin and/or color was a
    motivating factor in the defendant’s treatment of the plaintiff, the
    plaintiff is entitled to your verdict, even if you find that the
    defendant’s conduct was also motivated by a lawful reason. . . .
    The plaintiff is entitled to damages unless the defendant proves
    by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant would
    have treated plaintiff similarly even if the plaintiff’s national ori-
    gin and/or color had play [sic] no role in the employment deci-
    sion.
    The district court instead instructed the jury that Galdamez had to estab-
    lish two elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
    1) That [Galdamez’s] supervisors at the United States Postal Ser-
    vice subjected [Galdamez] to adverse employment action that
    affected the terms and conditions of [her] employment while she
    was the Postmaster in Willamina, and
    2) That [Galdamez’s] national origin was a motivating factor in
    the supervisors’ decision to subject [her] to that adverse employ-
    ment action.
    GALDAMEZ v. POTTER                   8263
    ace, Inc., 
    299 F.3d 838
    , 858 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d,
    
    539 U.S. 90
     (2003). Whether an instruction misstates the law,
    however, is a legal issue reviewed de novo. 
    Id.
    [4] The evidence in the record was sufficient to support a
    mixed motive instruction. See Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co.,
    
    350 F.3d 1061
    , 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (as amended); Costa, 
    299 F.3d at 858-59
    . The instruction given was a mixed motive
    instruction: It asked the jury whether Galdamez’s national ori-
    gin was “a motivating factor,” not the motivating factor, in
    the Postal Service’s decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
    (emphasis added). The district court declined to instruct the
    jury on the affirmative defense that the Postal Service would
    have taken the same action in the absence of an impermissible
    motivating factor, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), because
    the Postal Service never raised it. This was neither an abuse
    of discretion, nor a misstatement of the law, because it pre-
    served the portion of the mixed motive instruction required by
    the evidence, and because omission of the affirmative
    defense, if anything, favored Galdamez.
    [5] In any event, any instructional error here was more
    likely than not harmless. See Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 
    270 F.3d 794
    , 805-06 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining civil harmless
    error standard). The jury was instructed that it could find for
    Galdamez if her national origin was “a motivating factor” for
    her adverse treatment. When presented with a note from
    jurors during deliberations, expressing some confusion as to
    whether discriminatory animus had to be “the” motivating
    factor as opposed to “a” motivating factor, the district court
    clarified that “[a] ‘motivating factor’ means that it has to be
    at least one of the reasons for any adverse employment
    action.” Finally, when asked in the special verdict form
    whether Galdamez had proven that her national origin was “a
    motivating factor in any adverse employment action on the
    part of her supervisors,” the jury answered “No,” but took
    pains to include a separate note stating its unanimous conclu-
    sion that Galdamez’s supervisors “subjected Ms. [Galdamez]
    8264                  GALDAMEZ v. POTTER
    to adverse employment action.” There was thus a clear find-
    ing that discriminatory animus was not “a motivating factor”
    in the Postal Service’s decision. In other words, the jury
    received a fair approximation of a mixed motive instruction
    as it pertained most clearly to Galdamez’s disparate treatment
    claim, but resolved the facts against her. Therefore, any error
    stemming from the district court’s truncated version of the
    mixed motive instruction was more likely than not harmless.
    C.     Employer Liability for Customer Harassment
    [6] Galdamez claims that the district court erroneously
    refused to instruct the jury on the Postal Service’s duty to
    investigate and remedy actionable harassment by customers
    and community members. “A party is entitled to an instruc-
    tion about his or her theory of the case if it is supported by
    law and has foundation in the evidence.” Jones v. Williams,
    
    297 F.3d 930
    , 934 (9th Cir. 2002). The district court variously
    cited three rationales for its decision: 1) that Title VII does
    not provide a “stand-alone” claim for failure to investigate
    and remedy racial or national origin harassment by third par-
    ties unless that failure itself is motivated by discriminatory
    animus; 2) that Galdamez, as a management-level employee,
    was responsible for remedying any such harassment herself;
    and 3) that the evidence did not support the requested instruc-
    tion. We view the first two rationales as conclusions going to
    the legal requirements of the claim, and thus review them de
    novo, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Companies v. Alaskan Pride
    Partnership, 
    106 F.3d 1465
    , 1469 (9th Cir. 1997), while we
    review the third, evidentiary conclusion for abuse of discre-
    tion. See Jones, 
    297 F.3d at 934
    .
    [7] The district court erred as a matter of both law and fact
    in refusing the instruction. An employer may be held liable
    for the actionable third-party harassment of its employees
    where it ratifies or condones the conduct by failing to investi-
    gate and remedy it after learning of it. See, e.g., Little v. Win-
    dermere Relocation, Inc., 
    301 F.3d 958
    , 968 (9th Cir. 2002)
    GALDAMEZ v. POTTER                        8265
    (holding employer liable where, by “failing to take immediate
    and effective corrective action,” it “ratified” rape of employee
    by potential client); Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc.,
    
    107 F.3d 754
    , 756 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We now hold that an
    employer may be held liable for sexual harassment on the part
    of a private individual . . . where the employer either ratifies
    or acquiesces in the harassment by not taking immediate and/
    or corrective actions when it knew or should have known of
    the conduct.”).5 This hostile environment theory of employer
    liability is grounded in negligence and ratification rather than
    intentional discrimination. See Swenson v. Potter, 
    271 F.3d 1184
    , 1191-92 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Burlington Indus., Inc.
    v. Ellerth, 
    524 U.S. 742
    , 759 (1998)). Therefore, the district
    court applied incorrect law in refusing the instruction based
    on its belief that Galdamez had to prove that discriminatory
    animus motivated the Postal Service’s failure to act.
    [8] The district court also erred in concluding that Gal-
    damez’s position as postmaster relieved the Postal Service of
    responsibility to investigate and prevent harassment. Title VII
    prohibits racial and national origin discrimination by an
    employer “against any individual with respect to [her] com-
    pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,”
    42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added), and makes no
    relevant distinctions between managerial and other employ-
    ees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (defining “employee” as “an
    individual employed by an employer,” subject to certain
    exceptions inapplicable here); see also Little, 
    301 F.3d at 964
    (holding employer liable for failing to address rape of
    management-level employee). Galdamez is as entitled as any
    other employee to the protections of Title VII. The district
    court erred to the extent that it concluded otherwise.
    5
    Although these cases involved hostile work environments created by
    third-party sexual harassment, the same analysis applies to instances of
    racial or national origin harassment. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
    Morgan, 
    536 U.S. 101
    , 116 n.10 (2002); see also 
    29 C.F.R. § 1606.8
    (e).
    8266                  GALDAMEZ v. POTTER
    Finally, the evidence was sufficient to support jury instruc-
    tions on both a hostile work environment and employer liabil-
    ity. To make out a hostile work environment claim, Galdamez
    must show (1) that she was subjected to verbal or physical
    conduct based on her race or national origin; (2) that the con-
    duct was unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was “suffi-
    ciently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her]
    employment and create an abusive work environment.”
    Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 
    349 F.3d 634
    , 642 (9th Cir.
    2003). In order to satisfy the third element of this test, she
    must show that her work environment was both subjectively
    and objectively hostile. See McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 
    360 F.3d 1103
    , 1113 (9th Cir. 2004). In making the objective
    determination, we look to all of the circumstances, including
    the frequency, severity, and nature (i.e., physically threatening
    or humiliating as opposed to merely verbally offensive) of the
    conduct. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642. The required severity
    of the conduct varies inversely with its pervasiveness and fre-
    quency. McGinest, 
    360 F.3d at 1113
    . Finally, the objective
    hostility of the environment must be considered “from the
    perspective of a reasonable person belonging to the racial or
    ethnic group of the plaintiff.” 
    Id. at 1115
    .
    [9] Properly instructed as to these requirements, a reason-
    able jury could have found that Galdamez experienced a hos-
    tile work environment based on her national origin. Galdamez
    began to receive hostile comments from customers and other
    residents based on her race, accent, and national origin almost
    immediately upon taking the job in Willamina. Several cus-
    tomers, including the mayor, expressed displeasure with hav-
    ing a Hispanic postmaster or criticized her accented English.
    One local newspaper referred to Galdamez’s “thick accent
    from her native Honduras” in explaining that she had not
    “made friends in some quarters” and was the object of an
    ouster campaign. Supervisor John Fusco made notes of a con-
    versation with the mayor in which he referred to “culture” and
    “prejudice,” but could not recall why at the time of trial.
    GALDAMEZ v. POTTER                            8267
    [10] A reasonable jury also could have found that the com-
    munity’s treatment of Galdamez was both subjectively and
    objectively severe or pervasive. Galdamez received threats to
    her life and safety, including an anonymous letter promising
    to “get rid of you foreigner.” A customer warned Galdamez
    that Willamina was a “redneck town,” and that “[e]veryone”
    would get together and “come and kill [her]” if she persisted
    in trying to enforce postal regulations. Galdamez’s subordi-
    nates also recalled hearing of at least two other similar threats,
    and one postal worker gave Galdamez a list of townspeople
    who would “not think twice” about “get[ting] together and
    kill[ing]” her. Greenhill, one of the primary organizers of the
    mass meeting, told a local newspaper that he did not want
    Galdamez to be present because he “didn’t want her tarred
    and feathered on the spot [and] didn’t want this to turn into
    a public lynching.” Finally, Galdamez’s car was vandalized in
    the post office lot, an act that Ron Gates thought may have
    been racially motivated. Other Postal Service employees con-
    firmed at trial that they thought Galdamez’s difficulties
    stemmed from community prejudice.
    [11] These comments and acts took place over the course
    of three years, and included not only offensive remarks, but
    also racially charged references to potential mob violence,
    indirect threats to physical safety, and property damage. In
    context, it is somewhat difficult to disentangle the acts explic-
    itly based on Galdamez’s national origin from those that may
    have had some other motivation.6 Nonetheless, considering all
    6
    We recently followed the Third Circuit in concluding that there are no
    “talismanic expressions” of racial animus necessary to sustain a harass-
    ment claim, and recognized that racially charged “code words” may pro-
    vide evidence of discriminatory intent by “send[ing] a clear message and
    carry[ing] the distinct tone of racial motivations and implications.”
    McGinest, 
    360 F.3d at 1117
     (quoting Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental
    Group, 
    85 F.3d 1074
    , 1083 (3d Cir. 1996)). The word “redneck,” a term
    that appears several times in the record of this case, can suggest racial hos-
    tility. See, e.g., Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 
    191 F.3d 647
    , 666 (6th Cir.
    1999) (“The evidence demonstrates that Quanex management adopted the
    8268                      GALDAMEZ v. POTTER
    of the circumstances, a jury reasonably could have found that
    Galdamez was subjected to unwelcome, severe, and pervasive
    national origin harassment that affected the terms and condi-
    tions of her employment, see Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642, and
    that the environment was both subjectively and objectively
    abusive when considered from the perspective of a reasonable
    person of her race and national origin. Cf. McGinest, 
    360 F.3d at 1115-19
     (reversing summary judgment against plaintiff
    subjected to numerous offensive racial comments and one
    potentially injurious situation over the course of several
    years). The evidence thus supported a hostile work environ-
    ment instruction.
    [12] The evidence also supported an instruction on the
    Postal Service’s potential liability for failing to investigate
    and remedy the harassment. Once the Postal Service actually
    knew (or reasonably should have known) about what Gal-
    damez was experiencing, it was required to “undertak[e]
    remedial measures ‘reasonably calculated to end the harass-
    ment.’ ” McGinest, 
    360 F.3d at 1120
     (quoting Ellison v.
    Brady, 
    924 F.2d 872
    , 882 (9th Cir. 1991)). The “reasonable-
    attitude that everyone knew the plant was a ‘redneck’ environment, and
    that therefore, racially offensive conduct taking place there was not
    harassment, but conduct African-American employees had to accept as
    part of life at Quanex.”); United States v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., No.
    H-83-5107, 
    1987 WL 9919
    , at *18 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 1987) (finding that
    city’s reputation as “a white ‘redneck’ or racist community” had discour-
    aged minority applicants from seeking jobs in school district); but see Syp-
    niewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 
    307 F.3d 243
    , 257-58 (3d Cir.
    2002) (noting that in certain contexts “redneck” may “imply . . . racial
    intolerance and bigotry,” but concluding that a t-shirt bearing the word
    was unrelated to the specific racial harassment at issue). The repeated ref-
    erences in the record here to Willamina being a “redneck” town, in combi-
    nation with Greenhill’s public statements evoking a potential lynching,
    convey an atmosphere of racial hostility, and thus could support a reason-
    able inference that some community members’ actions were based on Gal-
    damez’s race or national origin, notwithstanding the absence in some
    instances of “talismanic” language to that effect.
    GALDAMEZ v. POTTER                         8269
    ness” of such remedial measures would depend on the Postal
    Service’s ability to stop the harassment and to deter potential
    harassers, as well as the promptness of the response. 
    Id.
    [13] Galdamez testified that she informed her superiors
    almost immediately after taking office in 1994 of customer
    harassment based on her accent and national origin.7 When
    Galdamez first complained of the harassment, Bogroff told
    her Willamina was a “redneck town” and that she was
    “tough” enough to deal with the treatment. Jackson testified
    that postmasters were expected to “grin and bear” racist
    remarks and harassment, at least up to the point where law
    enforcement involvement became necessary. These same
    supervisors also testified that they did not know whether they
    had any specific obligation to look into racial harassment, or
    special procedures for confronting it, as they did in the con-
    text of sexual harassment. This evidence suggests that the
    Postal Service’s response to Galdamez’s difficulties was lim-
    ited at best.
    [14] On the other hand, there was some evidence that Gal-
    damez’s superiors did respond, specifically by offering Gal-
    damez a position in a town with a larger Hispanic community
    and by arranging for a diversity specialist to inquire into the
    situation. They did so, however, only in conjunction with
    imposing formal discipline against Galdamez. Weighing all
    the evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that the
    harassment was actionable, that management-level Postal Ser-
    vice employees knew or should have known about it while it
    was happening, and that they nonetheless failed to take steps
    reasonably calculated to end and deter it, at least to the extent
    7
    Other testimony suggested that management-level Postal Service per-
    sonnel first became aware of the harassment in 1997. An employer’s lia-
    bility runs only from the time it knew or should have known of the
    conduct. Swenson v. Potter, 
    271 F.3d 1184
    , 1192 (9th Cir. 2001). Given
    the conflicting testimony in the record, this should be a factual question
    for the jury.
    8270                       GALDAMEZ v. POTTER
    such steps were within their power. See McGinest, 
    360 F.3d at 1120
    ; Ellison v. Brady, 
    924 F.2d 872
    , 882 (9th Cir. 1991).
    The conflicting testimony as to the timing and extent of the
    Service’s response clearly presents issues of fact that could be
    resolved either way. In this light, it was an abuse of discretion
    to deny Galdamez an instruction on this theory of her case.
    [15] These errors were not harmless. In this circuit we pre-
    sume prejudice where civil trial error is concerned, and the
    burden shifts to the Postal Service to demonstrate “that it is
    more probable than not that the jury would have reached the
    same verdict” had it been properly instructed. Obrey v. John-
    son, 
    400 F.3d 691
    , 701 (9th Cir. 2005). The jury was
    instructed to determine only whether Galdamez’s superiors
    acted with discriminatory intent in disciplining her. The jurors
    never were told that the Postal Service also could be liable for
    actionable harassment by third parties if it failed to take rea-
    sonable steps within its power to address the problem. More-
    over, the jury might have felt that there was some
    discriminatory aspect of the case it could not reach, as evi-
    denced by its handwritten addendum to the special verdict
    form emphasizing that the Postal Service had subjected Gal-
    damez to some adverse employment action. Properly
    instructed, the jury may well have held the Postal Service lia-
    ble. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial on
    this claim.8
    8
    We do not suggest that a new trial be held on all issues raised in the
    previous trial, but only on the harassment claim and the theory of
    employer liability that did not go to the jury. In appropriate situations, we
    may confine a new trial to particular issues. See, e.g., Ward v. City of San
    Jose, 
    967 F.2d 280
    , 284-85 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 11 Charles Alan
    Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Proce-
    dure § 2814, at 158 (2d ed. 1995). Here the issues relating to whether Gal-
    damez was subjected to customer harassment and whether her employer
    is liable for failing to investigate her allegations are “so distinct and sepa-
    rable from others that a trial of [those] alone may be had without injus-
    tice.” Gasoline Prods. Co., Inc. v. Champlin Refining Co., 
    283 U.S. 494
    ,
    500 (1931).
    GALDAMEZ v. POTTER                           8271
    D.     The Verdict Form’s Emphasis on Named Supervisors
    [16] Galdamez raised several objections to the special ver-
    dict form, which required jurors to specify which of three
    named supervisors intentionally discriminated against her.
    “As long as the questions are adequate to obtain a jury deter-
    mination of all the factual issues essential to judgment, the
    trial court has complete discretion as to the form of the special
    verdict.” Saman v. Robbins, 
    173 F.3d 1150
    , 1155 (9th Cir.
    1999).
    [17] Question 1 on the special verdict form provided:
    Has Plaintiff Arlene Graves (Galdamez) established
    by a preponderance of the evidence that her national
    origin was a motivating factor in any adverse
    employment action on the part of her supervisors
    that affected the terms and conditions of her employ-
    ment while she was the postmaster in Willamina?
    Yes                     No     X
    It was only if the answer to that question was “Yes” that the
    jury was to specify in Question 2 whether particular supervi-
    sors had intentionally discriminated against her. Thus, the jury
    having found that her national origin was not a motivating
    factor in any adverse employment action, any deficiency in
    the form of Question 2 was irrelevant here.9
    9
    We emphasize that our holding is confined to these narrow facts.
    Although this is not the case here, it is conceivable that a question asking
    jurors to identify discrimination on the part of individual supervisors could
    inadvertently limit or otherwise influence the jury’s consideration of other
    questions, including that of liability on the part of the employer. Moreover,
    had Galdamez’s harassment claim also gone to the jury, the special verdict
    form would have been improper with respect to that claim, because it
    would have precluded a finding in her favor on the Postal Service’s liabil-
    ity for third-party harassment. Finally, such a special verdict form would
    have been inappropriate had this case involved an allegation that one indi-
    8272                     GALDAMEZ v. POTTER
    E. Changes to the Special Verdict Form After Closing
    Argument
    [18] Galdamez contends that the district court erred by
    changing the verdict form during deliberations, thereby
    depriving her of the opportunity to address the verdict form
    in closing arguments. The district court may have abused its
    discretion by changing the verdict form after submitting the
    case to the jury. See Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 
    167 F.3d 514
    , 521-23 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Landes Const. Co.,
    Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., 
    833 F.2d 1365
    , 1374 (9th Cir.
    1987). Any such error, however, was harmless. Galdamez
    does not explain how her closing argument would have been
    different had the substance of the revised form been disclosed
    in time for her to make adjustments. The only logical adjust-
    ment she could have made would have been to direct her
    arguments to the actions of the three supervisors named in the
    special verdict form. In fact, she devoted the bulk of her clos-
    ing argument to the actions of two of these supervisors, sug-
    gesting that the argument she actually made was basically the
    vidual’s discriminatory animus infected a more complex decision-making
    process. Title VII may still be violated where the ultimate decision-maker,
    lacking individual discriminatory intent, takes an adverse employment
    action in reliance on factors affected by another decision-maker’s discrim-
    inatory animus. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
    490 U.S. 228
    ,
    232-35 (1989) (describing process by which the employer’s “Policy
    Board,” informed by various comments from partners, some of which
    demonstrated an illegal bias based on sex, took an adverse employment
    action); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 
    913 F.2d 398
    , 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
    that company decisionmaker that acts as “the conduit of [a lower-level
    supervisor’s] prejudice — his cat’s paw” — is liable under Title VII).
    These are but three examples of cases in which the district court proba-
    bly would have abused its discretion by focusing the jury on named indi-
    viduals. Given the various ways employers structure their personnel
    decisions, a special verdict form such as the one used here is unlikely to
    be illuminating, and in many cases may mislead or confuse the jury or oth-
    erwise lead to error. As a general matter, therefore, we discourage the use
    of such special verdicts in these cases.
    GALDAMEZ v. POTTER                   8273
    same argument she would have made had the district court
    disclosed the substance of the special verdict in a more timely
    fashion. See Ruvalcaba, 
    167 F.3d at 522-23
    . Therefore, we
    must conclude that any error in the timing of disclosure was
    harmless.
    IV
    Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denial of Gal-
    damez’s motion for a new trial is AFFIRMED in part,
    REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for a new trial on her
    hostile work environment claim and the Postal Service’s
    potential liability.
    Each party shall bear their own costs on appeal.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-35682

Filed Date: 7/14/2005

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015

Authorities (23)

Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co. , 51 S. Ct. 513 ( 1931 )

john-ward-individually-and-as-administrator-of-the-estate-of-anton-ward , 967 F.2d 280 ( 1992 )

Gabriel Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles Daryl Gates, ... , 167 F.3d 514 ( 1999 )

In the Matter of Ray Dwaine Nicholson and Billie Jean ... , 779 F.2d 514 ( 1985 )

ellen-byrd-and-vivien-harkness-v-james-guess-ronald-bates-anthony , 137 F.3d 1126 ( 1998 )

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth , 118 S. Ct. 2257 ( 1998 )

firemans-fund-insurance-companies-switzerland-general-insurance-company , 106 F.3d 1465 ( 1997 )

Kerry Ellison v. Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the ... , 924 F.2d 872 ( 1991 )

73-fair-emplpraccas-bna-219-69-empl-prac-dec-p-44500-97-cal , 107 F.3d 754 ( 1997 )

guadalupe-medrano-amparo-medrano-and-guadalupe-medrano-jr-louie-medrano , 973 F.2d 1499 ( 1992 )

betty-jones-v-willie-williams-city-of-los-angeles-michael-akana-grady , 297 F.3d 930 ( 2002 )

Linda Jackson v. Quanex Corporation , 191 F.3d 647 ( 1999 )

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins , 109 S. Ct. 1775 ( 1989 )

George McGinest v. Gte Service Corp. Mike Biggs , 360 F.3d 1103 ( 2004 )

Carol Aman Jeanette Johnson v. Cort Furniture Rental ... , 156 A.L.R. Fed. 699 ( 1996 )

Landes Construction Co., Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-... , 833 F.2d 1365 ( 1987 )

Melody S. Swenson v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General of ... , 271 F.3d 1184 ( 2001 )

Maureen Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., a Washington ... , 301 F.3d 958 ( 2002 )

thomas-sypniewski-jr-matthew-sypniewski-brian-sypniewski-v-warren-hills , 307 F.3d 243 ( 2002 )

david-h-ostad-v-oregon-health-sciences-university-an-oregon-public , 327 F.3d 876 ( 2003 )

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