United States v. Maria Moe , 781 F.3d 1120 ( 2015 )


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  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                No. 13-30224
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                      6:13-cr-00003-
    SEH-1
    MARIA LOURDES MOE,
    Defendant-Appellant.           OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    November 17, 2014—Portland, Oregon
    Filed March 27, 2015
    Before: Richard R. Clifton, Milan D. Smith, Jr.,
    and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Clifton;
    Concurrence by Judge Hurwitz
    2                    UNITED STATES V. MOE
    SUMMARY*
    Criminal Law
    The panel affirmed a conviction for conspiracy to possess
    with intent to distribute methamphetamine.
    Rejecting the defendant’s contention that the evidence
    presented to the jury established only a buyer-seller
    transaction, the panel held that the evidence was sufficient to
    support her conviction for conspiracy, where the evidence
    indicated an ongoing relationship of mutual trust, there was
    testimony that the defendant was involved in the business of
    methamphetamine trafficking, there was evidence that the
    defendant’s supplier knew that the defendant was engaged in
    redistributing the methamphetamine that she was buying from
    him, and the supplier had an interest in fostering those
    downstream sales.
    The panel held that the district court did not err by failing
    to instruct the jury on how to determine a single conspiracy
    versus multiple conspiracies, where the defendant stood trial
    alone and the facts to do not support a multiple conspiracies
    defense.
    The panel held that the district court did not err in
    rejecting the defendant’s proposal to instruct the jury on the
    difference between a buyer-seller relationship and a
    conspiracy relationship, where the instructions as a whole
    accurately informed the jury that a conspiracy could not be
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    UNITED STATES V. MOE                      3
    found based only on the sales by the supplier to the
    defendant.
    The panel held that the district court did not err when it
    curtailed as irrelevant cross-examination of the supplier
    aimed at showing that he associated with other individuals
    and was involved in other conspiracies, where the multiple
    conspiracy theory of defense did not apply.
    Concurring, Judge Hurwitz urged this court to follow the
    Seventh Circuit, which requires district courts to give a
    buyer-seller instruction whenever a jury could conceivably
    have determined that the buyer-seller relationship which
    existed did not involve an overarching conspiratorial
    agreement.
    COUNSEL
    Michael Donahoe, Federal Defenders of Montana, Helena,
    Montana, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Paulette L. Stewart, Assistant United States Attorney, Helena,
    Montana, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    4                  UNITED STATES V. MOE
    OPINION
    CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:
    Maria Moe appeals her conviction for conspiracy to
    possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in
    violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Her primary arguments rest on
    the so-called “buyer-seller rule,” under which a conviction for
    conspiracy cannot be based solely on the purchase of an
    unlawful substance, even though such a transaction
    necessarily involves an agreement between at least two
    parties, the buyer and the seller. “Rather, conspiracy requires
    proof of ‘an agreement to commit a crime other than the
    crime that consists of the sale itself.’ Were the rule otherwise,
    every narcotics sale would constitute a conspiracy.” United
    States v. Lennick, 
    18 F.3d 814
    , 819 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting
    United States v. Lechuga, 
    994 F.2d 346
    , 347 (7th Cir. 1993)
    (en banc)).
    Moe contends that the evidence presented to the jury
    established only that she purchased methamphetamine from
    a supplier—that is, established only a buyer-seller
    transaction—not that she was engaged in a conspiracy with
    the seller in connection with subsequent distribution. She also
    contends that the district court should have given an
    instruction to the jury regarding the buyer-seller rule. We
    conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the
    conviction. We further conclude that although a specific
    buyer-seller instruction may be useful and might be required
    in some circumstances, it was not necessary here. We are not
    persuaded by any of Moe’s other arguments, and therefore
    affirm.
    UNITED STATES V. MOE                        5
    I. Background
    Maria Moe was indicted in January 2013 on two counts:
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or
    more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and distribution
    of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C.
    § 841(a)(1). She pleaded not guilty and went to trial.
    During the two-day trial that followed, the government
    called five witnesses. These included four government agents
    and one cooperating witness, Shawn Ellifritt. Ellifritt testified
    that he supplied methamphetamine to Moe. Moe lived in
    Helena, Montana, but traveled to Spokane, Washington, to
    buy methamphetamine from Ellifritt. She typically purchased
    a half ounce of methamphetamine one time per month. From
    December 2009 until December 2010, Moe made at least
    seven purchases. Ellifritt estimated that these transactions
    involved approximately 140 grams of methamphetamine.
    Moe and Ellifritt communicated by phone. There were at least
    94 cell phone contacts between Ellifritt and Moe, including
    51 text messages. The two used a code to communicate
    regarding the availability of methamphetamine: for example,
    when Ellifritt texted Moe that the weather was bad, that
    meant methamphetamine was not available or there was
    potential trouble with law enforcement.
    Moe filed motions for acquittal and for a new trial on
    sufficiency of the evidence grounds. Moe also proposed
    several supplemental jury instructions, including a multiple
    conspiracies instruction and an instruction on the difference
    between a buyer-seller relationship and a conspiracy
    relationship. The district court rejected both of these
    instructions.
    6                  UNITED STATES V. MOE
    The jury convicted Moe on the conspiracy count but
    could not reach a unanimous verdict on the distribution count,
    which was subsequently dismissed. Moe was sentenced to 66
    months imprisonment and four years supervised release.
    II. Discussion
    Moe presents three arguments on appeal. First, she asserts
    there was insufficient evidence before the jury to support her
    conviction for conspiracy. Second, she argues the district
    court erred by declining to give two proposed jury
    instructions. Third, she asserts that the district court erred by
    curtailing her cross-examination of a government witness. We
    consider these challenges in turn.
    A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    We employ “a two-step inquiry for considering a
    challenge to a conviction based on sufficiency of the
    evidence.” United States v. Nevils, 
    598 F.3d 1158
    , 1164 (9th
    Cir. 2010) (en banc). “First, a reviewing court must consider
    the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to
    the prosecution.” 
    Id. “Second, after
    viewing the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the prosecution, the reviewing
    court must determine whether this evidence, so viewed, is
    adequate to allow ‘any rational trier of fact [to find] the
    essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
    
    Id. (alteration in
    original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,
    
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979)). Although we review a claim of
    insufficient evidence de novo, United States v. Sullivan,
    
    522 F.3d 967
    , 974 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), our
    evaluation remains deferential and accords respect to the
    jury’s role “as weigher of the evidence,” 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
    .
    UNITED STATES V. MOE                         7
    The elements of conspiracy are “(1) an agreement to
    accomplish an illegal objective, and (2) the intent to commit
    the underlying offense.” United States v. Herrera-Gonzales,
    
    263 F.3d 1092
    , 1095 (9th Cir. 2001). But although “the
    essence of conspiracy is agreement,” United States v. Feola,
    
    420 U.S. 671
    , 692 (1975), not every agreement to commit an
    illegal objective may serve as the basis for a conspiracy
    conviction.
    Under the buyer-seller rule, “mere sales to other
    individuals do not establish a conspiracy to distribute or
    possess with intent to distribute . . . .” 
    Lennick, 18 F.3d at 819
    n.4. This “narrow exception” to conspiracy liability, United
    States v. Parker, 
    554 F.3d 230
    , 234 (2d Cir. 2009), applies
    even though “[a] drug sale is itself an agreement: a buyer and
    seller come together, agree on terms, and exchange money or
    commodities at the settled rate.” United States v. Brown,
    
    726 F.3d 993
    , 998 (7th Cir. 2013). Instead, a conviction for
    “conspiracy requires proof of an agreement to commit a
    crime other than the crime that consists of the sale itself.”
    
    Lennick, 18 F.3d at 819
    (quotation marks omitted).
    Thus, for a charge of conspiracy to possess a drug with
    intent to distribute, “the government must show that the buyer
    and seller had an agreement to further distribute the drug in
    question.” 
    Id. at 819
    n.4. “Express agreement is not required;
    rather, agreement may be inferred from conduct.” United
    States v. Hegwood, 
    977 F.2d 492
    , 497 (9th Cir. 1992); see
    also Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 
    319 U.S. 703
    , 714
    (1943) (“[I]t can make no difference the agreement was a
    tacit understanding, created by a long course of conduct and
    executed in the same way.”).
    8                 UNITED STATES V. MOE
    Here, Moe asserts that the evidence before the jury proved
    only that Ellifritt sold methamphetamine to her. The
    government argues that Moe and Ellifritt’s relationship was
    more than a purely transactional one and instead crossed the
    line into conspiracy.
    Distinguishing between a conspiracy and a buyer-seller
    relationship requires a fact-intensive and context-dependent
    inquiry that is not amenable to bright-line rules. See United
    States v. Hawkins, 
    547 F.3d 66
    , 74 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting the
    “highly fact-specific” nature of the “inquiry into whether the
    circumstances surrounding a buyer-seller relationship
    establish an agreement to participate in a distribution
    conspiracy”). Certain principles are established, however.
    A casual sale of drugs, of a quantity consistent with
    personal use on the part of the buyer, with no evidence of any
    subsequent (or planned) redistribution of purchased drugs,
    will likely fall within the ambit of the buyer-seller rule. See
    
    Lennick, 18 F.3d at 819
    ; see also United States v. Medina,
    
    944 F.2d 60
    , 65–66 (2d Cir. 1991) (characterizing “the typical
    buy-sell scenario” as “involv[ing] a casual sale of small
    quantities of drugs” and contrasting that scenario to a case in
    which “there is advanced planning among the alleged
    co-conspirators to deal in wholesale quantities of drugs
    obviously not intended for personal use”), abrogated on other
    grounds by Bailey v. United States, 
    516 U.S. 137
    (1995).
    In contrast, we will uphold a conviction for conspiracy
    between buyer and seller where there is “‘evidence of a
    prolonged and actively pursued course of sales coupled with
    the seller’s knowledge of and a shared stake in the buyer’s
    illegal venture.’” United States v. Ramirez, 
    714 F.3d 1134
    ,
    UNITED STATES V. MOE                               9
    1140 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Thomas,
    
    284 F.3d 746
    , 752 (7th Cir. 2002)).
    A number of factors may be relevant in deciding whether
    there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for
    conspiracy. We look not just to the characteristics of
    individual transactions but to “the ‘entire course of dealing’”
    between alleged co-conspirators. United States v. Mincoff,
    
    574 F.3d 1186
    , 1194 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 
    Thomas, 284 F.3d at 753
    ). “No single factor is dispositive.” 
    Hawkins, 547 F.3d at 74
    . Instead, a reviewing court should “take into
    account all . . . the evidence surrounding the alleged
    conspiracy and make a holistic assessment of whether the
    jury reached a reasonable verdict.” United States v. Long,
    
    748 F.3d 322
    , 326 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).
    Among the factors that courts have considered relevant in
    making this determination are the following: whether the
    drugs were sold on credit1 or on consignment;2 the frequency
    of sales;3 the quantity of drugs involved;4 the level of trust
    1
    E.g., 
    Mincoff, 574 F.3d at 1193
    (“[S]elling drugs on credit is especially
    indicative of a conspiracy because it gives the seller a stake in the buyer’s
    successful resale of the drugs.”) (alteration in original) (quoting United
    States v. Bender, 
    539 F.3d 449
    , 454 (7th Cir. 2008)).
    2
    E.g., United States v. Vallar, 
    635 F.3d 271
    , 287 (7th Cir. 2011).
    3
    E.g., United States v. Reid, 
    523 F.3d 310
    , 317 (4th Cir. 2008)
    (“[E]vidence of continuing relationships and repeated transactions can
    support the finding that there was a conspiracy, especially when coupled
    with substantial quantities of drugs.”).
    4
    In Mincoff, the court concluded that “a rational trier of fact could have
    found the buyer-seller rule inapplicable to the facts of this case” because,
    among other things, the “large quantities” of drugs involved “could
    10                      UNITED STATES V. MOE
    demonstrated between buyer and seller, including the use of
    codes;5 the length of time during which sales were ongoing;6
    whether the transactions were standardized;7 whether the
    parties advised each other on the conduct of the other’s
    business;8 whether the buyer assisted the seller by looking for
    other customers;9 and whether the parties agreed to warn each
    support an inference of further 
    distribution.” 574 F.3d at 1193
    –94. It is
    true that “‘[t]he sale of large quantities of controlled substances, without
    more, cannot sustain a conspiracy conviction.’” 
    Ramirez, 714 F.3d at 1140
    (alteration in original) (quoting 
    Lennick, 18 F.3d at 819
    n.5). But while the
    quantity of sales alone cannot support a conspiracy conviction, it
    nevertheless is a relevant factor to be considered. Cf. United States v.
    Howard, 
    966 F.2d 1362
    , 1364 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that a “huge
    quantity” of narcotics “permits an inference of conspiracy” although it is
    not “by itself . . . enough to convict defendant”) (emphasis added).
    5
    E.g., United States v. Pressler, 
    256 F.3d 144
    , 155 (3d Cir. 2001)
    (concluding that where buyer and seller “conducted their business in
    code,” this “demonstrated a considerable degree of coordination and
    suggested the presence of a cooperative relationship”); see also United
    States v. Contreras, 
    249 F.3d 595
    , 599 (7th Cir. 2001) (looking to “the
    level of mutual trust between the buyer and seller” as a relevant factor).
    6
    E.g., Direct 
    Sales, 319 U.S. at 713
    (emphasizing “prolonged
    cooperation”); see also United States v. Gibbs, 
    190 F.3d 188
    , 199 (3d Cir.
    1999) (noting “length of affiliation”); 
    Lechuga, 994 F.2d at 350
    (“Prolonged cooperation is neither the meaning of conspiracy nor an
    essential element, but it is one type of evidence of an agreement that goes
    beyond what is implicit in any consensual undertaking, such as a spot
    sale.”).
    7
    E.g., 
    Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 199
    .
    8
    E.g., 
    Brown, 726 F.3d at 999
    .
    9
    
    Id. UNITED STATES
    V. MOE                11
    other of potential threats from competitors or law
    enforcement.10
    We now turn to the facts of this case. Between December
    2009 and December 2010, Ellifritt sold methamphetamine to
    Moe on at least seven occasions. These transactions had a
    standard format. Moe was not just a casual or occasional
    buyer. She described Ellifritt as a reliable source of
    methamphetamine, a “gold mine.” Moe and Ellifritt
    communicated closely together and coordinated their actions,
    thereby demonstrating prolonged cooperation. They had their
    own code for communicating regarding the availability of
    drugs. Significantly, Ellifritt took affirmative steps to warn
    Moe when a threat from law enforcement was present: on the
    same day that law enforcement searched Ellifritt’s residence,
    Ellifritt texted Moe, “Bad weather, lay low.”
    These are indications of an ongoing relationship of
    “mutual trust,” beyond a simple buyer-seller transaction. See
    
    Mincoff, 574 F.3d at 1194
    ; 
    Pressler, 256 F.3d at 155
    (noting
    that the use of codes is one indication of a conspiracy rather
    than a buyer-seller relationship). The jury heard testimony
    that Moe was involved in the business of methamphetamine
    trafficking and had a supplier in Washington. There was
    evidence that Ellifritt knew that Moe was engaged in
    redistributing the methamphetamine that she was buying from
    him: Ellifritt was told that Moe was “the money” in an
    ongoing downstream redistribution effort. Ellifritt had an
    interest in fostering those downstream sales, which created
    the demand for his repeated sales to Moe.
    10
    E.g., 
    Vallar, 635 F.3d at 287
    .
    12                 UNITED STATES V. MOE
    We conclude that the evidence before the jury, viewed in
    the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to
    support Moe’s conviction for conspiracy.
    B. Jury Instructions
    Next, Moe asserts that the district court erred in failing to
    give two supplemental jury instructions that she proposed. “A
    criminal defendant has a constitutional right to have the jury
    instructed according to h[er] theory of the case, provided that
    the requested instruction is supported by law and has some
    foundation in the evidence.” United States v.
    Anguiano-Morfin, 
    713 F.3d 1208
    , 1209 (9th Cir. 2013)
    (quotation marks omitted). That said, “[w]e review the jury
    instructions as a whole and accord the trial judge substantial
    latitude so long as the instructions fairly and adequately
    covered the issues presented.” United States v. Bauer, 
    84 F.3d 1549
    , 1560 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The abuse of
    discretion standard governs our review of “the language and
    formulation of a jury instruction,” United States v. Cortes,
    
    757 F.3d 850
    , 857 (9th Cir. 2013), and our review of
    “whether [an instruction] has some foundation in the
    evidence,” 
    Anguiano-Morfin, 713 F.3d at 1209
    . “Whether an
    instruction is supported by law is reviewed de novo.” United
    States v. Marguet-Pillado, 
    648 F.3d 1001
    , 1006 (9th Cir.
    2011) (quotation marks omitted).
    1. Multiple Conspiracies
    Moe asserts that the district court erred by failing to
    instruct the jury on how to determine a single versus multiple
    conspiracies. We are not persuaded.
    UNITED STATES V. MOE                      13
    “A multiple conspiracies instruction is generally required
    where the indictment charges several defendants with one
    overall conspiracy, but the proof at trial indicates that a jury
    could reasonably conclude that some of the defendants were
    only involved in separate conspiracies unrelated to the overall
    conspiracy charged in the indictment.” United States v.
    Anguiano, 
    873 F.2d 1314
    , 1317 (9th Cir. 1989). The
    instruction is needed in order to mitigate the problem of
    “transference or ‘spillover’ of guilt” from one co-defendant
    to another. 
    Id. at 1318.
    In contrast, “[a] multiple conspiracy
    instruction is not required when a defendant stands trial alone
    because there is no problem of spillover.” United States v.
    Liu, 
    631 F.3d 993
    , 1000 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks
    omitted). Here, Moe stood trial alone and the facts do not
    support a multiple conspiracies defense.
    2. Buyer-Seller Rule
    Next, Moe suggests that the district court erred in
    rejecting her proposal to instruct the jury on the difference
    between a buyer-seller relationship and a conspiracy
    relationship.
    “A defendant is not entitled to have the jury instructed in
    the particular language of h[er] choice.” United States v.
    Montgomery, 
    150 F.3d 983
    , 1002 (9th Cir. 1998) (quotation
    marks omitted). Nevertheless, a “district court’s failure to
    give a defendant’s requested instruction that is supported by
    law and has some foundation in the evidence warrants per se
    reversal, unless other instructions, in their entirety,
    adequately cover that defense theory.” 
    Marguet-Pillado, 648 F.3d at 1006
    (citation and quotation marks omitted).
    Thus, our review of a trial court’s decision to deny a
    requested jury instruction requires that we answer three
    14                 UNITED STATES V. MOE
    questions. First, was the proposed instruction supported by
    law? Second, did the proposed instruction have some
    foundation in the evidence? Third, did other instructions
    given to the jury, considered in their entirety, fail to cover the
    defense theory? Where the answer to all three questions is
    “yes,” we must reverse and remand for a new trial.
    First, was a buyer-seller defense supported by law? We
    conclude that it was. Our court has made it clear a buyer-
    seller relationship alone cannot, as a matter of law, support a
    conviction for conspiracy. See 
    Lennick, 18 F.3d at 819
    n.4.
    Second, was there some evidentiary support for a buyer-
    seller instruction in this case? There was. As we conclude
    above, the evidence before the jury was capable of supporting
    the conclusion that Moe and Ellifritt were co-conspirators.
    But there was at least some evidence that cut the other way,
    including evidence that Ellifritt did not sell to Moe on credit
    or consignment, and that Ellifritt had no direct involvement
    in any reselling of the methamphetamine by Moe. A jury
    could have concluded that Ellifritt was not party to a
    conspiracy that encompassed downstream resales and that the
    relationship between Moe and Ellifritt was limited to that of
    a buyer and a seller.
    Third, did the other instructions given to the jury fail to
    fully convey the distinction between a buyer-seller
    relationship and a co-conspiracy relationship? Here, we
    conclude the answer is no. The district court instructed the
    jury on the general elements of conspiracy. This instruction
    informed the jury that “[a] conspiracy is a kind of criminal
    partnership” (emphasis added), and that, in order to convict,
    the jury had to “find that there was a plan to commit at least
    one of the crimes charged in the indictment as an object of the
    UNITED STATES V. MOE                              15
    conspiracy.” (emphasis added). The only other crime charged
    in the indictment concerned Moe’s alleged distribution in
    Montana to other purchasers downstream, not Moe’s
    purchases from Ellifritt. We presume the jury followed these
    instructions. See Zafiro v. United States, 
    506 U.S. 534
    , 540
    (1993). The instructions as a whole accurately informed the
    jury that a conspiracy could not be found based only on the
    sales by Ellifritt to Moe. See 
    Bauer, 84 F.3d at 1560
    –61.
    District courts may decide to provide a jury instruction in
    drug conspiracy cases that focuses specifically on the
    difference between a buyer-seller relationship and a co-
    conspirator relationship. Such an instruction might assist a
    jury in working through the subtle and fact-intensive
    determinations that must be made, and in some cases they
    might be essential.11 But in light of the “substantial latitude”
    11
    We emphasize that we do not hold as a matter of law that a specific
    buyer-seller instruction is never required when a jury is properly instructed
    on the elements of conspiracy. Several circuits have adopted such a rule.
    See, e.g., Riggs v. United States, 
    209 F.3d 828
    , 832–33 (6th Cir. 2000),
    abrogated on other grounds by Moss v. United States, 
    323 F.3d 445
    (6th
    Cir. 2003); United States v. Asibor, 
    109 F.3d 1023
    , 1035 (5th Cir. 1997);
    but see United States v. Mims, 
    92 F.3d 461
    , 464 (concluding that a
    buyer-seller instruction is always required if the jury “could conceivably
    have determined that the buyer-seller relationship which existed did not
    involve an overarching conspiratorial agreement”), on reh’g, 
    101 F.3d 494
    (7th Cir. 1996). We hold only that, under the circumstances of this case,
    it was not error to fail to give the instruction Moe requested.
    In other circumstances, an instruction on the buyer-seller rule might
    well be required. For instance, suppose that another count in Moe’s
    indictment had been simple possession based on her purchases from
    Ellifritt. Or, suppose that Ellifritt had been named as a defendant and
    charged both with the sale (distribution) to Moe and with conspiracy to
    distribute downstream. Such cases might present more substantial risk of
    a jury mistaking a sale as a basis on which to find a conspiracy between
    16                     UNITED STATES V. MOE
    we accord trial courts in formulating jury instructions, 
    Bauer, 84 F.3d at 1560
    , we are not prepared to hold that the district
    court erred in this case when it denied Moe’s requested
    buyer-seller instruction.
    C. Cross-Examination
    Finally, Moe asserts that the trial court erred when it
    curtailed cross-examination of Ellifritt aimed at showing that
    he associated with other individuals and was involved in
    other conspiracies. Specifically, Moe suggests that had
    defense counsel been allowed to conduct the cross
    examination he prepared, there is no doubt that the jury
    would have realized that there was no single conspiracy
    involving many but at most a random collection of named
    drug users and sellers. She asserts that this resulted in a denial
    of her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to defend the case
    brought against her. The district court, for its part, concluded
    that the testimony was not relevant.
    Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to “a
    meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”
    Holmes v. South Carolina, 
    547 U.S. 319
    , 324 (2006)
    (quotation marks omitted). With respect to cross-
    examination, “trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the
    Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable
    limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about,
    among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the
    issues.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 
    475 U.S. 673
    , 679 (1986).
    And “[a] limitation on cross examination does not violate the
    a buyer and seller in the absence of a more explicit instruction detailing
    the distinction. In these and other circumstances, a buyer-seller instruction
    might be necessary. In this case, however, it was not.
    UNITED STATES V. MOE                       17
    Confrontation Clause unless it limits relevant testimony.”
    United States v. Holler, 
    411 F.3d 1061
    , 1066 (9th Cir. 2005)
    (quotation marks omitted). Here, the testimony was not
    relevant because the multiple conspiracy theory of defense
    did not apply. That Ellifritt might have had dealings with
    others did not tend to disprove the possibility of the alleged
    conspiracy between Moe and Ellifritt. Thus, the district court
    did not err by limiting the cross-examination of Ellifritt to the
    conspiracy that was charged.
    III.     Conclusion
    We affirm Moe’s conviction for conspiracy under 21
    U.S.C. § 846.
    AFFIRMED.
    HURWITZ, Circuit Judge, concurring:
    I agree that the instructions in this case, as a whole,
    “accurately informed the jury that a conspiracy could not be
    found based only on the sales . . . to Moe,” and that Moe
    demonstrated no prejudice from the court’s failure to give a
    separate buyer-seller instruction. I therefore join the panel
    opinion.
    Even when the instructions accurately inform the jury of
    what is required to find a conspiracy, however, “the line
    between a conspiracy and a mere buyer-seller relationship is
    difficult to discern.” United States v. Gee, 
    226 F.3d 885
    , 895
    (7th Cir. 2000). Recognizing this, the Seventh Circuit
    sensibly requires district courts to give a buyer-seller
    18                 UNITED STATES V. MOE
    instruction whenever a jury “could conceivably have
    determined that the buyer-seller relationship which existed
    did not involve an overarching conspiratorial agreement.”
    United States v. Mims, 
    92 F.3d 461
    , 464 (7th Cir. 1996); 
    Gee, 226 F.3d at 895
    . To determine if a case “presents one of
    those situations,” that court evaluates criteria such as whether
    (1) “[t]he proffered evidence of a conspiracy was
    circumstantial and not overwhelming,” (2) “[t]he evidence
    was as consistent with a buyer-seller relationship as it was
    with a conspiracy,” and (3) “[t]he instructions allowed the
    jury to make a guilty finding without determining whether the
    government had proved the existence of a conspiracy.” 
    Gee, 226 F.3d at 895
    .
    I urge our court to follow the Seventh Circuit. Although
    a federal judge or experienced criminal practitioner can
    discern that a buyer-seller relationship cannot alone establish
    a conspiracy, this concept is far from intuitive for jurors,
    particularly when, as here, “the existence of a conspiratorial
    agreement was closely contested and conflicting evidence
    was presented.” 
    Id. at 896
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The buyer-seller instruction serves “to ensure a jury finding
    on this essential element” of conspiracy. 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    District courts, of course, have “substantial latitude” in
    formulating instructions. United States v. Bauer, 
    84 F.3d 1549
    , 1560 (9th Cir. 1996). But properly distinguishing
    between a buyer-seller relationship and a conspiracy regularly
    goes to the heart of “the essential fairness and integrity of the
    trial.” 
    Gee, 226 F.3d at 896
    (internal quotation marks
    omitted). A buyer-seller instruction facilitates the jury’s
    resolution of this recurrent issue, and thus well serves the
    interests of justice.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-30224

Citation Numbers: 781 F.3d 1120, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 4987, 2015 WL 1379722

Judges: Clifton, Smith, Hurwitz

Filed Date: 3/27/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (33)

United States v. Marguet-Pillado , 648 F.3d 1001 ( 2011 )

Holmes v. South Carolina , 126 S. Ct. 1727 ( 2006 )

Bailey v. United States , 116 S. Ct. 501 ( 1995 )

United States v. Edward L. Mims and Cleveland J. McDade , 92 F.3d 461 ( 1996 )

United States v. Luz Medina, Silverio Polanco, Franklin ... , 944 F.2d 60 ( 1991 )

United States v. Gregory Lennick , 18 F.3d 814 ( 1994 )

Jackson v. Virginia , 99 S. Ct. 2781 ( 1979 )

United States v. Humberto Lechuga , 994 F.2d 346 ( 1993 )

united-states-v-terrence-gibbs-aka-terry-aka-t-terrence-gibbs-in-no , 190 F.3d 188 ( 1999 )

United States v. Daniel E. Pressler, United States of ... , 256 F.3d 144 ( 2001 )

United States v. Lavell Ray Hegwood Fred Wilson, Jr. , 977 F.2d 492 ( 1992 )

United States v. Hawkins , 547 F.3d 66 ( 2008 )

United States v. Eliseo Contreras , 249 F.3d 595 ( 2001 )

United States v. Peter James Holler , 411 F.3d 1061 ( 2005 )

Direct Sales Co. v. United States , 63 S. Ct. 1265 ( 1943 )

United States v. Maria Velarde Anguiano , 873 F.2d 1314 ( 1989 )

United States v. Vallar , 635 F.3d 271 ( 2011 )

United States v. Parker , 554 F.3d 230 ( 2009 )

United States v. Sullivan , 522 F.3d 967 ( 2008 )

Robert Moss (99-1951 01-1797) and Ronald Kohn (01-1610) v. ... , 323 F.3d 445 ( 2003 )

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