Connie Earnshaw v. Commissioner of Social Security , 357 F. App'x 36 ( 2009 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                              NOV 16 2009
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    CONNIE EARNSHAW,                                 No. 08-56004
    Plaintiff - Appellant,              D.C. No. 5:07-cv-01296-VBK
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
    SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Victor B. Kenton, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted October 6, 2009
    Pasadena, California
    Before: KLEINFELD and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and TRAGER,** District
    Judge.
    Connie Earnshaw appeals from the district court’s judgment, which affirmed
    the ALJ’s finding that she is not disabled. We affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable David G. Trager, Senior United States District Judge
    for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    1
    The ALJ found that Earnshaw was of advanced age, could no longer perform
    her past work, and had a residual functional capacity to perform “a slightly
    narrowed range of light work.” At the hearing, the vocational expert identified
    only one sedentary occupation, receptionist, that Earnshaw could perform given
    her limitations. Because the vocational expert’s testimony designated only one job
    Earnshaw could perform, within the sedentary category, the sedentary grid rules
    apply. See Distasio v. Shalala, 
    47 F.3d 348
    , 350 (9th Cir. 1995).
    Earnshaw argues that under Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 
    468 F.3d 1111
    (9th Cir.
    2006), she must be found disabled as a matter of law because the vocational expert
    identified only one occupation that she could perform. Lounsburry is inapplicable,
    however, because the sedentary grid rules (and not the light work grid rules) apply
    to this case. The outcome is instead controlled by Tommasetti v. Astrue, 
    533 F.3d 1035
    , 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2008). In Tommassetti, the vocational expert identified
    only one sedentary occupation that the claimant could perform, but for which jobs
    existed in significant numbers in the national economy. 
    Id. at 1038.
    Tommassetti
    held that under the sedentary grid rules this constituted a “significant range of
    work” and the claimant was not disabled. 
    Id. at 1043-44.
    In this case, Earnshaw
    was found to be capable of performing the sedentary occupation of receptionist, for
    2
    which jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Thus, the ALJ
    properly concluded that Earnshaw is not disabled.
    Earnshaw also argues that the ALJ did not properly consider the opinions of
    her treating physicians, Dr. Walker and Dr. Wood. Earnshaw is incorrect. The
    ALJ properly considered the testimony of Earnshaw’s treating physicians, and
    listed specific, legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the record for
    rejecting their findings. Magallanes v. Bowen, 
    881 F.2d 747
    , 751 (9th Cir. 1989).
    Finally, Earnshaw argues that the ALJ failed to consider the lay testimony of
    Earnshaw’s sister-in-law, Tana Earnshaw. Any potential error here was harmless
    because the testimony was not clearly competent or favorable to the claimant.
    Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Security Admin., 
    454 F.3d 1050
    , 1055 (9th Cir. 2006).
    Tana Earnshaw’s testimony indicated insufficient contact with the claimant to
    provide relevant evidence of the claimant’s ability to work, and as a whole
    undermined rather than supported the claimant’s disability claim.
    AFFIRMED.
    3