United States v. Glass , 357 F. App'x 58 ( 2009 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 19 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 05-50221
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 02-CR-331-DOC
v.
MEMORANDUM *
LEIGH-DAVIS GLASS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 2, 2009
Pasadena, California
Before: GOULD and BEA, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY, ** District Judge.
Leigh-Davis Glass appeals her conviction and sentence for two counts of
making a false declaration in court proceedings, two counts of bank fraud, and one
count of bankruptcy fraud. She appeals the District Court’s decision to allow her
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for
the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
to represent herself, the application of a 12-level sentencing enhancement for the
loss amount, and the imposition of restitution.
The District Court was correct in allowing Glass to exercise her right to
self-representation. A criminal defendant has the right to waive representation by
counsel and to represent herself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
Whether a defendant is competent to exercise the right to self-representation is
determined by the same standard as whether a defendant is competent to stand trial.
Godinez v.Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 401 (1993). Nonetheless, a court may deny a
defendant the right to self-representation when the defendant, though competent to
stand trial, suffers from a “severe mental illness.” Indiana v. Edwards, ___ U.S.
___, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387–88 (2008). Following Edwards, under different facts,
this Court has remanded a case to allow a trial court to determine if it would have
required a self-represented, mentally ill defendant to have counsel, in light of the
Edwards decision, where the trial court’s threshold Faretta ruling relied on the
defendant’s “absolute legal right” to self-representation. United States v.
Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1060, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2009).
Here, the District Court conducted at least three separate Faretta inquiries
during which the judge discussed with Glass her education, her capabilities, and
her desire to represent herself. While the District Court expressed concern about
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Glass’ hostility and irrational behavior, it balanced this concern against her desire
to represent herself and her educational background. Glass graduated from law
school. No party ever questioned Glass’ competence to stand trial, and the District
Court did not have evidence to suggest Glass suffered from a severe mental illness.
Additionally, the District Court made findings, supported by the record, that Glass’
competence was not impaired at the trial, but that she was engaging in delay
tactics. Remand is not warranted under Ferguson because the District Court judge
balanced his observations of Glass’ behavior against her right to self-
representation, instead of basing his decision on an “absolute” right to self-
representation. Cf. Ferguson, 560 F.3d at 1063–64. Further, the District Court
judge explained that, in his opinion, Glass was “quite capable, quite
knowledgeable, and [was] obstructing the process” and that he was “absolutely
convinced . . . [Glass was] quite capable of defending [herself].” The District
Court correctly allowed Glass to represent herself in these proceedings.
The District Court was not mistaken when it applied a 12-level enhancement
to Glass’ Guidelines range for intended loss of greater than $200,000. For
purposes of determining the offense level, the loss amount is the greater of actual
loss or intended loss. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n. 2(A) (2001). Loss may be reduced
by pledged collateral. Id. at cmt. n. 2(E)(ii). In calculating intended loss, intended
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loss is not necessarily reduced by the value of pledged collateral, but the collateral
may be considered in determining the defendant’s intent. United States v.
McCormac, 309 F.3d 623, 629 (9th Cir. 2002). The District Court found Glass did
not intend to repay the loan because she had used a false name, she made only one
nominal payment, and she continued to challenge the bank’s right to foreclose on
the property at the time of sentencing. Therefore, under McCormac, the District
Court correctly declined to credit the collateral against the intended loss amount.
Last, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Glass to
pay restitution to the defrauded bank, despite evidence the bank had recovered the
funds through a foreclosure proceeding. While a district court has broad discretion
to award restitution, the restitution amount must reflect collateral already received
by a victim. United States v. Smith, 944 F.2d 618, 625–26 (9th Cir. 1991). The
District Court’s oral judgment was explicit that Glass would not be required to pay
restitution if the loss was satisfied through the foreclosure. However, the written
judgment does not reflect this fact. To ensure clarity, the case is remanded so the
District Court can amend the written judgment to reflect the oral pronouncement
that Glass need not pay restitution if the bank received the full amount of the
fraudulently obtained mortgage from the foreclosure sale. See United States v.
Orlando, 553 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2009).
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AFFIRMED and REMANDED for the limited purpose of conforming
the written judgment to the oral judgment announced at sentencing.
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