Great Basin Mine v. Epa ( 2005 )


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  •                  FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    GREAT BASIN MINE WATCH,              
    Petitioner,
    v.
    UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
    
    No. 03-70231
    PROTECTION AGENCY,
    OPINION
    Respondent,
    NEWMONT USA, LIMITED; STATE OF
    NEVADA,
    Respondents-Intervenors.
    
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Environmental Protection Agency
    Argued and Submitted
    November 1, 2004—San Francisco, California
    Filed March 23, 2005
    Before: William C. Canby, Jr., Pamela Ann Rymer, and
    Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Canby
    3539
    3542              GREAT BASIN MINE v. EPA
    COUNSEL
    Roger Flynn, Bradley A. Bartlett, Western Mining Action
    Project, Boulder, Colorado, for the petitioner.
    Andrew J. Doyle, Environmental Defense Section, United
    States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the
    respondent.
    William J. Frey, Deputy Attorney General, Carson City,
    Nevada, for intervenor State of Nevada.
    OPINION
    CANBY, Circuit Judge:
    Great Basin Mine Watch petitions for review of a final rule
    of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) allowing
    Nevada to split one of its clean air areas (“area 61”) into two
    (“lower 61” and “upper 61”). Great Basin contends that the
    EPA, by approving the split, violated its statutory and regula-
    tory duties under the Clean Air Act because it failed to con-
    sider the effect of a major pollution emitter, Barrick
    Goldstrike Mine, in area 61. We deny Great Basin’s petition
    for review because we conclude that the EPA did not act arbi-
    GREAT BASIN MINE v. EPA                    3543
    trarily, capriciously, or contrary to law when it granted
    Nevada’s request to divide area 61, and that the existence and
    operation of the Mine did not preclude the division.
    Background
    [1] The Clean Air Act includes a program for the preven-
    tion of significant deterioration of air quality (“PSD” pro-
    gram), which applies to areas that are actually or potentially
    low in air pollution. Several of the program’s restrictions on
    emissions are triggered when a major stationary source (i.e.,
    a major pollution emitter) submits an application for a permit
    for new construction or major modification within the area
    under the appropriate regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)
    (14)(ii). A central issue in the present appeal is whether the
    PSD restrictions were triggered, or must be deemed triggered,
    in area 61 by the actions of the Barrick Mine. Great Basin
    contends that the PSD restrictions were triggered, and that as
    a consequence EPA’s decision to allow division of area 61
    was impermissible. We agree with the EPA, however, that the
    restrictions were not triggered, and that division of area 61
    was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. Before we
    explain our reasons, we think it best to describe briefly the
    relevant framework of the Act.
    1.   The Clean Air Act’s PSD Program
    [2] The Clean Air Act regulates air pollutants such as par-
    ticulate matter, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxide. See 42
    U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409. The Act requires the division of states
    into air quality planning areas (“baseline areas”). These base-
    line areas are assigned one of three labels—attainment,
    unclassifiable, or nonattainment—depending on the quality of
    their air. If an area fails to meet national air quality standards,
    it is classified as a nonattainment area. If an area meets
    national standards, it is classified as an attainment area. If it
    is unclear whether the area meets the standards, the area is
    denominated unclassifiable. The PSD program applies to the
    3544                  GREAT BASIN MINE v. EPA
    latter two categories, and it is undisputed that area 61 falls
    within them.1
    [3] In attainment and unclassifiable areas, the PSD program
    attempts to maintain the relatively clean air by limiting the
    total pollution “increment” per year. The PSD restrictions are
    not automatic, however; they come into effect when an appli-
    cation is filed under the appropriate regulations for new con-
    struction of a major stationary source or for major
    modification of an existing major source within the area. 40
    C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(14)(ii). It is important for our purposes to
    note that application for a permit is the trigger, not simply the
    existence of substantial pollution emissions. The filing of
    such an application establishes a “minor source baseline date”
    for which the EPA determines the ambient “baseline concen-
    tration” for the area. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(13), (14)(ii). There-
    after, the PSD program places strict limits on aggregate
    increases in pollution within the baseline area whether the
    increases come from minor or major sources.
    [4] If no major source within a baseline area has applied for
    a permit, however, the PSD restrictions are not triggered. In
    that event, pollution emitters are free to operate under the less
    restrictive national air quality standards, rather than the stric-
    ter standards of the PSD program. See, e.g., Reno-Sparks
    Indian Colony v. EPA, 
    336 F.3d 899
    , 902-03 (9th Cir. 2003).
    2.    Discretion to Redesignate Baseline Areas
    Because the PSD program is administered by baseline
    areas, the number and size of these areas has a very consider-
    able effect on potential polluters. The greater the number and
    the smaller the size of the baseline areas, “the less likely it is
    that a major source has applied for a permit within any one
    area, thereby establishing a baseline date.” 
    Id. at 903.
    Thus a
    1
    Area 61 was classified as attainment for sulfur dioxide and as unclassi-
    fiable for particulate matter and nitrogen dioxide.
    GREAT BASIN MINE v. EPA                 3545
    minor source is more likely to “find an area in which to oper-
    ate where it is not subject to the requirements of the PSD pro-
    gram.” 
    Id. On a
    smaller scale, the division of one baseline
    area into two might have a similar effect; if a major source
    were to seek a permit in only one of the two newly-divided
    areas, the other might escape PSD regulation that would have
    applied had the original area not been split.
    [5] Despite this consideration, the EPA has broad discretion
    to grant a state’s request to divide an area for which no base-
    line date or baseline concentration has been established. The
    EPA may grant redesignation requests “on the basis of air
    quality data, planning and control considerations, or any other
    air quality-related considerations the Administrator deems
    appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(3)(A). This decision also
    must rely on “sufficient data.” 40 C.F.R. § 81.300(a).
    [6] The situation is different when PSD restrictions have
    already been triggered in an area. Division of such an area
    into two new areas raises additional problems. One is the
    question whether one of the new areas may or should be “un-
    triggered” because the major source that triggered the PSD
    restrictions lies in the other new area. Perhaps in recognition
    of this and other problems, the discretion of the EPA is more
    limited when dealing with redesignation of an area for which
    PSD restrictions have been triggered. The EPA cannot
    redesignate, for example, if the new area would “intersect or
    be smaller than the area of impact of any major stationary
    source or major modification which . . . [e]stablishes a minor
    source baseline date.” 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.166(b)(15)(ii),
    52.21(b)(15)(ii). Moreover, the EPA has indicated that it is
    more likely to deny a request to split an area in which the
    PSD caps apply because the redesignation may allow greater
    deterioration of the air quality.
    The Present Controversy
    This dispute arose when the State of Nevada submitted its
    request to the EPA to divide baseline area 61 (550 square
    3546               GREAT BASIN MINE v. EPA
    miles) into two, lower 61 and upper 61. Nevada claimed that
    the split would aid its air quality management because the two
    new areas more accurately reflect the “local air transport pro-
    cesses,” industrial development, and the region’s topography,
    among other reasons. Much of the present dispute arises from
    the fact that, in Nevada’s view, the Barrick Mine, although a
    major source, has never applied or been required to apply for
    a permit for new construction or a major modification. This
    situation presumably results from the fact either that the Mine
    was a major source before the Clean Air Act’s requirements
    took effect, or that it became a major source by small incre-
    ments not subject to permits. Nevada reflected its view in its
    redesignation request, in which it asserted that “Area 61 does
    not contain any PSD sources, and it has not been significantly
    impacted by any major source or modification,” although it
    acknowledged that Barrick Goldstrike Mine was “a major
    source for PM10, NOx [nitrogen oxide], and SO2.”
    In response to Nevada’s request, the EPA issued a proposed
    rule granting the request to split area 61 into lower 61 and
    upper 61. See 67 Fed. Reg. 21194, 21197 (Apr. 30, 2002).
    The EPA proposed to approve the request because of its pol-
    icy to “provide States a fair degree of autonomy to balance air
    quality management with economic planning” and because
    the redesignation would not interfere with Nevada’s manage-
    ment of air quality in the area. 
    Id. In concluding
    that the
    change met the statutory and regulatory requirements of the
    Act, the EPA relied on its conclusion that “no PSD source has
    located in [area 61], . . . and the newly created baseline areas
    . . . do not intersect the area of impact of any major PSD
    source nor do they have boundaries that are smaller than such
    impact area.” 
    Id. In a
    footnote, the proposed rule acknowledged that the Bar-
    rick Mine was a major source, but disregarded it because “the
    source has not been subject to PSD review.” 
    Id. at 21196
    n.3.
    The proposed rule also stated that the redesignation did not
    result in “an untriggering of the baseline area,” and thus there
    GREAT BASIN MINE v. EPA                    3547
    was “no elimination of already consumed [pollution] incre-
    ment and no consumed increment would be added to the base-
    line for the area.” 
    Id. at 21197.
    Moreover, the division did not
    “carve out small ‘postage stamp’ areas encompassing only the
    significant impact area around a major PSD source.” 
    Id. at n.4.
    The EPA also solicited public comment on its proposed
    rule.
    Relying on the reasons listed in the proposed rule, the
    EPA’s final rule granted Nevada’s request despite criticism
    from several commentators, including Great Basin. See 67
    Fed. Reg. 68769, 68771, 68776 (Nov. 13, 2002). Great Basin
    petitioned for review under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
    Standard of Review
    “In reviewing a final action by the EPA, we reverse only
    if it is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law or if it exceeds
    the statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” Exxon
    Mobil Corp. v. EPA, 
    217 F.3d 1246
    , 1248 (9th Cir. 2000). We
    will overturn a final action of the EPA, “if the agency has
    relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to con-
    sider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
    problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
    counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
    that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
    product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v.
    State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 43 (1983).
    Discussion
    The critical question is whether Barrick Goldstrike Mine
    (hereafter “Barrick”) triggered the PSD pollution regulations
    in area 61. If not, the choice whether to approve the rede-
    signation is committed to the EPA’s discretion within broad
    limits that we have already described. We conclude that Barr-
    ick did not trigger the PSD restrictions, and that the EPA did
    not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law in approv-
    3548               GREAT BASIN MINE v. EPA
    ing division of area 61. We therefore deny the petition for
    review.
    1. The Barrick Mine Did Not Trigger the PSD
    Restrictions
    [7] Great Basin attacks the final rule on four fronts, and we
    address each in turn. Great Basin first argues that Barrick’s
    status as a major source triggered the minor source baseline
    date, thereby limiting the EPA’s discretion to redesignate area
    61. The minor source baseline date is triggered by an applica-
    tion for a permit under the PSD program. See 40 C.F.R.
    § 52.21(b)(14)(ii); 
    Reno-Sparks, 336 F.3d at 903
    . The PSD
    program requires a permit for (1) any new “major emitting
    facility” or (2) any modification of a major facility that
    increases the net emissions of regulated pollutants. See, e.g.,
    Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 
    540 U.S. 461
    ,
    472 (2004). Although the PSD program requires a permit for
    the construction of a major emitting facility built after August
    7, 1977, see 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1), the record does not indi-
    cate when Barrick was constructed, or whether it was initially
    constructed as a major emitting facility. Therefore, Great
    Basin’s first challenge fails.
    [8] Barrick did undertake modifications, however, and they
    are the center of Great Basin’s final three challenges. There
    is no dispute that Barrick modified its facilities three times in
    2001. There also is no dispute that the PSD program requires
    a permit for any “major modification” that causes a forty tons-
    per-year (“tpy”) increase in nitrogen oxides. 40 C.F.R.
    § 51.21(b)(23)(I); Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. 
    Conservation, 540 U.S. at 472
    . Finally, it is undisputed that, in the aggregate,
    Barrick’s three 2001 modifications increased nitrogen oxide
    emissions over forty tpy. It is disputed, however, whether
    these totals should be accumulated, and the EPA argues that,
    when viewed separately, no single modification caused an
    increase of forty tpy or more.
    GREAT BASIN MINE v. EPA                           3549
    In April, August, and October, 2001, Barrick sought per-
    mits from the State of Nevada’s Bureau of Air Quality for
    each of the three modifications. For the first and largest emis-
    sions modification, Barrick claimed that nitrogen oxide emis-
    sions would increase by less than forty tpy.2 Barrick estimated
    that its starting nitrogen oxide emissions were 383.3 tpy, and
    its modified emissions would be 423.1 tpy. This figure (39.8)
    falls narrowly below the forty tpy trigger.3
    Great Basin disputes the starting point, however. Great
    Basin contends that Barrick reported its starting emissions as
    374.6, not 383.3, resulting in an increase of 48.5 tpy of nitro-
    gen oxides. The EPA responds that this is a “scrivener’s error
    on Barrick’s part,” and the accurate starting point is 383.3 tpy.
    The EPA and Nevada chose to rely on this higher starting fig-
    ure, and their reasonable reliance is supported by the record.
    We therefore view 383.3 as the correct starting point, and the
    first modification causes less than a forty tpy increase in nitro-
    gen oxides.
    The next modification increased the estimated nitrogen
    oxide emissions from 423.1 to 426 tpy.4 Under either starting
    point, then, if the nitrogen oxide emissions increases from the
    two modifications are combined for purposes of the PSD trig-
    ger, the modifications exceed forty tpy (i.e., 42.9).5 Thus,
    Great Basin’s final two arguments contend that these totals
    should be accumulated.
    2
    This modification put twelve of Barrick’s emergency electric genera-
    tors into regular use.
    3
    Both the EPA and the State of Nevada noted the narrowness of this
    margin, and Nevada conditioned the issuance of its permit on Barrick’s
    agreement that the new generator use would not cause forty tpy or more
    of additional nitrogen oxide emissions.
    4
    This modification replaced “existing backfill crushing, screening, and
    shotcrete plants and [made] miscellaneous changes to related existing
    facilities.” It is important to note that this modification is unrelated to the
    previous modification.
    5
    The final modification did not change the nitrogen oxide emissions.
    3550                  GREAT BASIN MINE v. EPA
    [9] Great Basin first argues that the modifications should be
    accumulated because, in November 2001, Barrick submitted
    an operating permit application to Nevada “incorporat[ing]”
    all three “currently pending” modifications. Great Basin
    claims that the EPA should treat this operating permit applica-
    tion as a PSD permit application grouping the three modifica-
    tions. Title V operating permits, however, are not part of the
    Act’s PSD program. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f; United
    States v. Marine Shale Processors, 
    81 F.3d 1329
    , 1356 (5th
    Cir. 1996); New York v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 
    263 F. Supp. 2d 650
    , 661 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). Therefore, the Act
    does not require the EPA to treat PSD permits and operating
    permits interchangeably.6
    Finally, Great Basin argues that it should prevail because,
    under the EPA’s practice of accumulation, the April and
    August modifications exceed the forty tpy threshold. The final
    rules of the EPA—at the time of its decision—indicate that,
    for major sources, minor emissions increases are accumulated
    during a period “contemporaneous” with the modification,
    with “contemporaneous” basically meaning within the preced-
    ing five years. See Requirements for Preparation, Adoption,
    and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Pro-
    mulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52676,
    52701-02 (Aug. 7, 1980). Obviously, the gap between April
    and August of the same year is less than five years. Therefore,
    according to Great Basin, the modifications should have trig-
    gered the PSD caps, and the EPA failed to consider this
    important factor in its decision.7
    6
    Our disposition of this issue makes it unnecessary for us to examine
    Great Basin’s assumption that incorporating three separate modifications
    in one permit application would require the effects of the modifications to
    be accumulated.
    7
    The EPA counters that Great Basin failed to show prejudice because
    the EPA could divide area 61 even if Barrick had triggered the PSD pro-
    gram. This argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, the EPA stated
    in its final rule that it relied on the conclusion that Barrick (or any other
    entity) had not triggered the PSD caps.
    GREAT BASIN MINE v. EPA                          3551
    [10] This argument fails for at least two reasons. First,
    Great Basin waited far too long to raise it. Great Basin raised
    the argument neither before the agency, nor in its petition for
    review, nor in its opening brief in this court; it presented the
    argument for the first time in its reply brief here. Second, and
    more important, even if we were to agree with Great Basin’s
    interpretation, vacating the EPA’s rule on that basis would
    serve no purpose. In 2003, the EPA clarified the regulation,
    and it now states that emission increases are not netted unless
    the modification, in and of itself, is significant (i.e., results in
    this case in a forty or more tpy increase of nitrogen oxides).
    Therefore, even if the EPA incorrectly read the regulation then8
    to mean exactly what it states now,9 remanding the decision
    to the agency would not change the result because no individ-
    ual modification met the threshold.
    Second, while the decision to redesignate is largely discretionary, see,
    e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(3)(A), it does have its limits, particularly when
    a major source has triggered the PSD program. The EPA is prohibited, for
    example, from dividing area 61 if the new area would “intersect or be
    smaller than the area of impact of any major stationary source or major
    modification which . . . [e]stablishes a minor source baseline date.” 40
    C.F.R. §§ 52.21(b)(15)(ii), 51.166(b)(15)(ii). Operating under the assump-
    tion that Barrick did not trigger a minor source baseline date, the EPA did
    not analyze whether lower 61 intersects with, or is smaller than, Barrick’s
    area of impact. Counsel for the EPA analyzed it in his brief, and he
    thoughtfully concluded that it did not. The EPA itself, however, did not
    analyze the issue when it made its decision.
    8
    The regulation stated that a “ ‘major modification’ means any physical
    change in . . . a major stationary source that would result in a significant
    net emissions increase of [nitrogen oxides].” 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(I)
    (2002).
    9
    The regulation states that a “ ‘major modification’ means any physical
    change . . . that would result in: a significant emissions increase [of nitro-
    gen oxides]; and a significant net emissions increase of that pollutant from
    the major stationary source.” 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(I) (2004) (emphasis
    added). A “significant emissions increase” in nitrogen oxides means an
    increase that exceeds 40 tpy. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.21(b)(23), (40). The EPA’s
    comments on this change assert that the new regulation “clarif[ies] what
    has always been [its] policy.” 67 Fed. Reg. 80186, 80190 (Dec. 31, 2002).
    3552                  GREAT BASIN MINE v. EPA
    2. The EPA’s Rule Approving Redesignation Was Not
    Arbitrary, Capricious, or Contrary to Law
    [11] Having determined that Barrick did not trigger the
    PSD program, we conclude that the EPA permissibly granted
    Nevada’s request to redesignate. As we pointed out earlier,
    the EPA has broad discretion to grant or deny requests. With
    the exception of barriers irrelevant here, the EPA may grant
    the request “on the basis of air quality data, planning and con-
    trol considerations, or any other air quality-related consider-
    ations the Administrator deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C.
    § 7407(d)(3)(A); see also 40 C.F.R. § 81.300(a). The EPA’s
    decision complies with these statutory and regulatory criteria.
    The record adequately supports the EPA’s finding that the
    two new areas more accurately reflect the region’s “local air
    transport processes,” industrial development, and topography,
    among other reasons. The record also does not indicate that
    either Nevada or the EPA have a history of carving out “post-
    age stamp” baseline areas, and upper and lower 61 are no excep-
    tions.10 Therefore, EPA did not act arbitrarily or exceed its
    authority in granting Nevada’s request.11
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
    10
    The smaller of the two areas, lower 61, is over 200 square miles.
    Although it was pointed out in oral argument that, in the West, 200 square
    miles seems more like a postage stamp than it would elsewhere, we con-
    clude that lower 61 still does not qualify.
    11
    In light of this disposition, we deny Great Basin’s request for attor-
    neys’ fees. See Western States Petroleum Ass’n v. EPA, 
    87 F.3d 280
    , 286
    (9th Cir. 1996).