Jessica Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc. , 603 F. App'x 589 ( 2015 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 19 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JESSICA GESSELE; ASHLEY ORTIZ; No. 15-35262
NICOLE GESSELE; TRICIA TETRAULT;
CHRISTINA MAULDIN; JASON DIAZ, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-01092-BR
both on behalf of themselves individually
and in addition, on behalf of the other
similarly situated employees, MEMORANDUM*
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
JACK IN THE BOX, INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 4, 2015
Portland, Oregon
Before: W. FLETCHER and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges and WALTER, ** Senior
District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Donald E. Walter, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
This is an appeal from a district court order remanding to state court a putative
class action by employees of Jack in the Box Inc. (“the Employees”), asserting
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219, and
Oregon law.
The Employees made similar claims in a previous suit. The district court
found that the FLSA claims in that suit were untimely because the Employees had
failed to file the written consents required in FLSA collective actions within the
statute of limitations. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 255(a), 256. The district court
dismissed the prior action without prejudice, describing the failure to file timely
consents as depriving the court of jurisdiction. Jack in the Box did not appeal.
The Employees then filed this case in state court, asserting FLSA claims not
included in the previous suit. Jack in the Box removed, asserting federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and diversity jurisdiction under the Class
Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), id. § 1332(d). The district court remanded, finding
the jurisdictional assertions barred by issue preclusion and judicial estoppel in light
of the dismissal of the prior suit.
We have jurisdiction over Jack in the Box’s appeal of the remand order under
28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1). We reverse and remand.
1. Regardless of whether the jurisdictional issues in the prior suit were
correctly decided, Jack in the Box is precluded from relitigating them. See Gupta
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v. Thai Airways Int’l, Ltd., 487 F.3d 759, 767 (9th Cir. 2007); Kendall v. Overseas
Dev. Corp., 700 F.2d 536, 539 (9th Cir. 1983). But, issue preclusion only
“forecloses relitigation of factual or legal issues that have been actually and
necessarily decided in earlier litigation.” San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco
City & Cnty., 364 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
Because the prior decision did not address the timeliness of the newly asserted FLSA
claims, nor did it consider CAFA jurisdiction, Jack in the Box is not precluded from
invoking federal jurisdiction in this suit. The district court therefore erred in
remanding any of the Employees’ FLSA and state-law claims to state court.
2. Judicial estoppel bars a party from taking contradictory positions. See
Hendricks & Lewis PLLC v. Clinton, 766 F.3d 991, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2014); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Ret. Income Plan for Hourly-Rated Emps. of ASARCO, Inc.,
512 F.3d 555, 563–64 (9th Cir. 2008). In the first case, Jack in the Box argued that
the court lacked original jurisdiction over the untimely FLSA claims, and the court
therefore could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.
This argument is not inconsistent with Jack in the Box’s current arguments that there
is no time bar to the newly asserted FLSA claims, or that the district court has CAFA
jurisdiction over the state-law claims.
3. We agree with the district court that Jack in the Box did not waive its right
to remove through its filings in the state court or its prior conduct in this litigation.
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See Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 651 F.3d 1039, 1045 n.2 (9th Cir.
2011) (per curiam); EIE Guam Corp. v. Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd., 322
F.3d 635, 649 (9th Cir. 2003).
4. For the reasons above, we REVERSE the district court’s remand order
and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.
4