Adriana Suero v. Michael Astrue , 372 F. App'x 808 ( 2010 )


Menu:
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                              MAR 31 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ADRIANA Q. SUERO,                                No. 08-56679
    Plaintiff - Appellant,              D.C. No. 2:06-cv-07596-PA-AGR
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
    Social Security Administration,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 2, 2010**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: KLEINFELD, WARDLAW and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
    Adriana Suero appeals from the district court’s judgment, which affirmed
    the ALJ’s finding that Suero was disabled as of November 28, 1999. We affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    The ALJ found that Suero’s impairments did not meet or equal any of the
    impairments listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4. Suero argues
    that her impairments meet Listings 1.02 and 1.04. Suero failed to meet her burden
    of showing that she meets each characteristic of the listed impairment by
    establishing “symptoms, signs and laboratory findings ‘at least equal in severity
    and duration’ to the characteristics of a relevant listed impairment, or, if a
    claimant's impairment is not listed, then to the listed impairment ‘most like’ the
    claimant's impairment.” See Young v. Sullivan, 
    911 F.2d 180
    , 183-84 (9th Cir.
    1990). Thus, there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the ALJ’s
    conclusion that Suero’s impairments did not meet or equal any listed impairments.
    We reject Suero’s argument that the record was not adequately developed.
    However, there is no evidence of an ambiguity or gap in the file that would trigger
    the ALJ’s duty to further develop the evidence. See Mayes v. Massanari, 
    276 F.3d 453
    , 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001). To the extent that the ALJ might have had such a
    duty in this case, the ALJ discharged it by leaving the record open after the August
    2003 hearing to allow Suero to submit additional evidence. Tonapetyan v. Halter,
    
    242 F.3d 1144
    , 1150 (9th Cir. 2001).
    The ALJ considered Suero’s subjective complaints, and found that objective
    evidence established that Suero had underlying medically determinable
    2
    impairments that could produce her symptoms. In his first opinion, the ALJ
    indicated that he found Suero to be credible, but in his second opinion, the ALJ
    rejected Suero’s testimony as only “partially credible.” There is substantial
    evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Suero was only
    partially credible, and the ALJ pointed to several clear and convincing reasons for
    his change of opinion: the discrepancy between the medical evidence (describing
    her fibromyalgia as mild, and noting improvement in her condition) and her claims
    of extreme limitations (not being able to hold a coffee cup); her unwillingness to
    undergo surgery and lack of aggressive treatment of these allegedly extreme
    symptoms, and the apparent untruthfulness of Suero’s statement that she was only
    treated by one physician until December 2001 (when she later submitted evidence
    that she was treated by a Chilean physician beginning in 1999). We defer to the
    ALJ’s evaluation of the evidence and determination of credibility.
    There was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s
    determination that Suero was not disabled prior to November 28, 1999. Suero did
    not present any medical evidence or opinion supporting her testimony that she
    suffered extreme limitations during the claimed period from March 1996 to
    November 1999. The ALJ properly concluded based on the grids and the
    vocational expert’s testimony that, given Suero’s residual capacity as supported by
    3
    substantial evidence in the record, Suero could have performed other jobs in the
    national economy and was not disabled during that period. See Bayliss v.
    Barnhart, 
    427 F.3d 1211
    , 1217-18 (9th Cir. 2005).
    AFFIRMED.
    4