United States v. Willimas ( 2006 )


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  •                  FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                 No. 04-50182
    Plaintiff-Appellee,          D.C. No.
    v.                         CR-03-00985-
    TASHIRI WAYNE WILLIAMS,                     MMM-01
    Defendant-Appellant.
         OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    May 6, 2005—Pasadena, California
    Filed January 30, 2006
    Before: James R. Browning, Raymond C. Fisher and
    Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Fisher
    1181
    1184              UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
    COUNSEL
    Carlton F. Gunn, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Ange-
    les, California, for the defendant-appellant.
    Beong-Soo Kim, Assistant United States Attorney, Criminal
    Complaints Section, Los Angeles, California, for the plaintiff-
    appellee.
    OPINION
    FISHER, Circuit Judge:
    Tashiri Williams (“Williams”) appeals a district court order
    denying his motion to suppress a written confession that he
    UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS               1185
    gave to United States Diplomatic Security Service (“DSS”)
    agents during interrogation. According to a DSS investigation
    report, the agents interrogated Williams in two steps — first,
    they asked him questions until he confessed; then, immedi-
    ately after his oral confession, they read him his Miranda
    rights and asked him to write down what he had previously
    told them. The district court suppressed Williams’ oral state-
    ments because they were elicited in violation of Miranda, but
    admitted his postwarning written confession on the ground
    that the statement “was voluntarily made.” We reverse.
    Under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Missouri v.
    Seibert, 
    542 U.S. 600
    (2004), rendered after the district
    court’s ruling, a trial court must suppress postwarning confes-
    sions obtained during a deliberate two-step interrogation
    where the midstream Miranda warning was objectively inef-
    fective. Because the district court did not have the benefit of
    Seibert, it did not determine whether the agents deliberately
    withheld the Miranda warning, and if so, whether the warning
    finally given effectively apprised Williams that he had a “gen-
    uine choice whether to follow up on [his] earlier admission.”
    
    Id. at 616
    (Souter, J., plurality opinion). We therefore remand
    to the district court for further findings consistent with this
    opinion.
    I.
    On July 11, 2003, Williams filed a passport application at
    the United States Passport Office in Los Angeles, California.
    The application he submitted contained his own identification
    information, but the photographs he attached were those of his
    acquaintance, Hussein Iddrissu (“Iddrissu”). A fraud manager
    noticed the discrepancy and notified DSS agents. Four days
    later, when Iddrissu arrived at the Passport Office to pick up
    the completed passport, DSS Special Agents O’Neil and
    Dobbs stopped him for questioning. During questioning, they
    requested that Iddrissu call Williams and ask him to come to
    the office.
    1186                   UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
    Williams and Iddrissu’s brother, Hassan, arrived at the gov-
    ernment building shortly after it closed, around 6 p.m.
    According to the investigation report (prepared by Agent
    Dobbs), the agents met Williams and Hassan at the building
    entrance, took them into the DSS offices and separated the
    two men for questioning. The agents escorted Williams into
    a reception area and began interrogating him.1 They started by
    showing Williams his passport application. Williams immedi-
    ately responded, “[t]hat’s not my picture.” Agent O’Neil then
    told Williams that he had a choice: “We can do this the easy
    way or the hard way. . . . I think we have enough to arrest you
    now and let the courts figure it out, or you can talk to us and
    tell us what’s going on and, you know, it might be better for
    you in the long run.” Williams complied and told the agents
    that he and Iddrissu had planned a joint trip to London and
    taken passport pictures together for the trip. The pictures,
    Williams explained, must have been inadvertently switched.
    Agent O’Neil called Williams’ account a “bullshit story”
    and described to him how criminal charges could affect his
    professional ambitions. In response, Williams changed his
    story and admitted to submitting Iddrissu’s photograph on the
    passport application.
    After this oral confession, Agent O’Neil read Williams his
    Miranda rights, gave him a waiver of rights form and asked
    him to write a statement.2 When Williams asked what he
    should write, both agents declined to specify, though Agent
    Dobbs testified that in response to such questions agents gen-
    erally tell suspects that they should write “what you’ve told
    1
    The district court found that Williams was in custody at this point.
    2
    Before the district court, the agents testified that they read Williams his
    rights before asking any questions. This testimony contradicted the inves-
    tigation report filed by Agent Dobbs immediately after the incident. The
    district court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter and found that the
    agents did not issue Miranda warnings until after Williams made his
    inculpatory comments, immediately before he wrote his statement. The
    government has not appealed this factual finding.
    UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS                1187
    us.” Williams wrote: “There is nothing I can say, but I made
    a mistake. I just tried to get a passport without my picture for
    someone else. I just don’t want this to be on my record.”
    A federal grand jury indicted Williams on three counts: (1)
    conspiracy to make a false statement in a passport application
    in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) making a false statement
    in a passport application in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542; and
    (3) making a false statement within the jurisdiction of the
    United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Before trial,
    Williams moved to suppress both his oral and his written
    statements. The district court granted suppression of the oral
    confession because “the government [had] not met its burden
    of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that Williams
    waived his Miranda rights before he made [the] incriminating
    statements” to the agents. However, the court denied Wil-
    liams’ motion to suppress the written confession because nei-
    ther his oral statements nor written confession were coerced
    and his written confession “was voluntarily made.” After trial,
    a jury found Williams guilty of all three felony charges and
    the district court sentenced him to four years of probation,
    including six months of home detention.
    II.
    The adequacy of a Miranda warning and the voluntariness
    of a suspect’s statements are questions of law that are
    reviewed de novo. United States v. San Juan-Cruz, 
    314 F.3d 384
    , 387 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Bautista, 
    362 F.3d 584
    , 589 (9th Cir. 2004). “The admission of statements made
    in violation of a person’s Miranda rights is reviewed for
    harmless error.” United States v. Butler, 
    249 F.3d 1094
    , 1098
    (9th Cir. 2001).
    III.
    [1] “In order to combat [the pressures inherent in custodial
    interrogation] and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the
    1188               UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
    privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be ade-
    quately and effectively apprised of his rights.” Miranda v.
    Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 467 (1966). A Miranda warning func-
    tions both to reduce the risk that an involuntary or coerced
    statement will be admitted at trial and to implement the Fifth
    Amendment’s self-incrimination clause. 
    Id. at 457-58;
    see
    also Chavez v. Martinez, 
    538 U.S. 760
    , 790 (2003) (Kennedy,
    J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, if a suspect
    in custody does not receive an adequate warning effectively
    apprising him of his rights before he incriminates himself, his
    statements may not be admitted as evidence against him.
    
    Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479
    . Williams contends that the midin-
    terrogation Miranda warning he received did not adequately
    apprise him of his rights and therefore his written confession
    should not have been admitted.
    A.
    The Supreme Court has twice addressed the admissibility
    of a confession obtained after a Miranda warning but pre-
    ceeded by the suspect’s earlier, unwarned incriminating state-
    ments. In Oregon v. Elstad, 
    470 U.S. 298
    , 301 (1985), Elstad,
    a burglary suspect, made incriminating comments to a police
    officer at his home without first receiving a Miranda warning.
    Officers then took him to the county sheriff’s office, placed
    him in an interrogation room, read him his Miranda rights and
    questioned him at length. See 
    id. During this
    interrogation,
    and approximately 30 minutes after making his original incul-
    patory comments, Elstad expanded significantly on his earlier
    statements and made a full confession. 
    Id. at 301-02.
    [2] Before the Supreme Court, Elstad argued that his con-
    fession should be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree”
    because, although made after a proper Miranda warning, his
    confession was tainted by the earlier unwarned comments. 
    Id. at 303.
    In a related argument, Elstad asserted that the coercive
    impact of his unwarned statement — inherent in a defendant’s
    having “let the cat out of the bag” — required suppression
    UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS                        1189
    because the statement compromised the voluntariness of his
    postwarning statement. 
    Id. at 302-04.
    Focusing on the volun-
    tariness of Elstad’s unwarned comments, the Court rejected
    both arguments. 
    Id. at 306-14.
    The Court reasoned that “ab-
    sent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the
    initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an
    unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of com-
    pulsion” with respect to the postwarning confession. 
    Id. at 314.
    Rather, “[o]nce warned, the suspect is free to exercise his
    own volition in deciding whether or not to make a statement
    to the authorities.” 
    Id. at 308.
    The Court thus held that a “sus-
    pect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive
    questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights
    and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda
    warnings.” Id at 318.3
    As Justice O’Connor explained in her Seibert dissent,
    3
    The Court’s belief that Elstad’s prewarning statements were voluntary
    played a decisive role in its analysis. The Court reasoned that in cases
    where a postwarning confession was preceeded by a “clearly voluntary”
    but unwarned statement, a “careful and thorough” midstream warning “or-
    dinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission
    of the earlier statement” because it “conveys the relevant information”
    regarding a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights. 
    Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310-11
    ,
    314 (emphasis added). In such circumstances, “the suspect’s choice
    whether to exercise his privilege to remain silent should ordinarily be
    viewed as an act of free will.” 
    Id. at 311
    (emphasis added) (internal quota-
    tion marks and internal citations omitted). However, Elstad also appeared
    to limit its holding to the circumstances of the case:
    [i]t is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple
    failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual
    coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the sus-
    pect’s ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory
    process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is inef-
    fective for some indeterminate period. Though Miranda requires
    that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibil-
    ity of any subsequent statement should turn in these circum-
    stances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.”
    
    Id. at 309
    (emphasis added).
    1190                   UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
    Elstad also held that “if [the prewarning] statement is shown
    to have been involuntary, the court must examine whether the
    taint dissipated through the passing of time or a change in cir-
    cumstances.” 
    Seibert, 542 U.S. at 628
    (emphasis added).4
    Similarly, Elstad requires the court to suppress a postwarning
    statement if the suspect demonstrates that his statement was
    involuntary despite the Miranda warning. 
    Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318
    (explaining that “the finder of fact must examine the sur-
    rounding circumstances and the entire course of police con-
    duct with respect to the suspect in evaluating the
    voluntariness of his statements”). Thus, under Elstad, if the
    prewarning statement was voluntary (or if involuntary, the
    change in time and circumstances dissipated the taint), then
    the postwarning confession is admissible unless it was invol-
    untarily made despite the Miranda warning. See United States
    v. Wauneka, 
    770 F.2d 1434
    , 1440 (9th Cir. 1985); accord
    United States v. Stewart, 
    388 F.3d 1079
    , 1090 (7th Cir. 2004).5
    4
    As stated in Elstad, “[w]hen a prior statement is actually coerced, the
    time that passes between confessions, the change in place of interroga-
    tions, and the change in identity of the interrogators all bear on whether
    that coercion has carried over into the second 
    confession.” 470 U.S. at 310
    .
    5
    Voluntariness is a totality of circumstances inquiry that assesses “both
    the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.”
    Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
    412 U.S. 218
    , 226-27 (1973) (noting that
    although “the state of the accused’s mind, and the failure of the police to
    advise the accused of his rights, [are] certainly factors to be evaluated in
    assessing . . . ‘voluntariness,’ . . . they [are] not in and of themselves deter-
    minative”). The court should therefore “determine[ ] the factual circum-
    stances surrounding the confession, assess[ ] the psychological impact on
    the accused, and evaluate[ ] the legal significance of how the accused
    reacted.” 
    Id. at 226.
    In the past, for example, the Court considered “the
    youth of the accused, his lack of education, or his low intelligence, the
    lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of
    detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the
    use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.” 
    Id. (internal citations
    omitted). We have similarly stated that voluntariness
    depends on such factors as “the surrounding circumstances, the combined
    effect of the entire course of the officer’s conduct upon the defendant,
    UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS                      1191
    [3] We followed Elstad in United States v. Orso, 
    266 F.3d 1030
    (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Orso made inculpatory state-
    ments in a patrol car en route to a police station and then,
    immediately upon arriving at the station, received a Miranda
    warning and 
    confessed. 266 F.3d at 1032-33
    . Pointing to
    Elstad’s disjunctive clause, “[a]bsent deliberately coercive or
    improper tactics,” Orso argued that her postwarning state-
    ments should be suppressed because the officers engaged in
    improper tactics (questioning her during the car ride without
    giving a Miranda warning), which “tainted” her warned con-
    fession. 
    Id. at 1034-36
    (quoting 
    Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314
    ). We
    declined to distinguish Elstad. Reasoning that “the overriding
    theme running through [Elstad] is the voluntariness of the
    unwarned statement,” we held that where a suspect’s initial,
    unwarned statements are voluntary, her subsequent, warned
    statements are admissible regardless of alleged improper
    police tactics.6 
    Id. at 1036,
    1038. “[T]he most persuasive read-
    ing of the ‘improper tactics’ passage [of Elstad],” we
    explained, “is that the Court simply meant to connect such
    police conduct to the potential involuntariness of the
    unwarned statements.” 
    Id. at 1037.
    Thus, Orso held that
    where a postwarning statement is voluntarily made, the
    “warned confession should . . . be suppressed only if [the pre-
    warning statements] were involuntary, and any taint therefrom
    had not dissipated by the time [the suspect] was read the
    Miranda warnings.” 
    Id. at 1039.
    including the effect of his previously having made a confession, and the
    manner in which the officers utilized this prior confession in obtaining a
    second confession.” 
    Wauneka, 770 F.2d at 1440
    . In addition, the govern-
    ment must prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. Lego
    v. Twomey, 
    404 U.S. 477
    , 489 (1972); see also 
    Seibert, 542 U.S. at 609
    n.1.
    6
    Because Orso did not argue that her postwarning confession was invol-
    untary, we did not address the voluntariness of the warned statement. See
    
    Orso, 266 F.3d at 1039
    n.4.
    1192              UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
    B.
    At issue in Seibert was the admissibility of a confession
    obtained by the use of a two-step interrogation strategy,
    termed “question-first,” that called for the deliberate with-
    holding of the Miranda warning until the suspect confessed,
    followed by a Miranda warning and a repetition of the confes-
    sion already 
    given. 542 U.S. at 604
    , 609-11 (Souter, J., plural-
    ity opinion). As the facts in Seibert make clear, “[t]he object
    of [the] question-first [tactic] is to render Miranda warnings
    ineffective by waiting for a particularly opportune time to
    give them, after the suspect has already confessed.” 
    Id. at 611;
    see also 
    Orso, 266 F.3d at 1043-44
    (Paez, J., concurring) (the
    fact that the interrogating officer deliberately withheld the
    Miranda warning “deprived Orso of information that was
    indispensable to her exercise of free will”).
    Like defendants Elstad and Orso, Seibert made incriminat-
    ing statements both before and after receiving a Miranda
    warning. Officers awakened Seibert, suspected of murdering
    a teenager in a mobile home fire, at 3 a.m. and drove her to
    a police station where one officer, who later testified that he
    was explicitly instructed not to provide a Miranda warning at
    this point, interrogated her for 30 to 40 minutes until she con-
    fessed. 
    Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604-05
    . Immediately after Seibert
    confessed, she was given a 20-minute coffee and cigarette
    break. 
    Id. at 605.
    Officer Hanrahan then turned on a tape
    recorder, gave her a Miranda warning and resumed question-
    ing:
    Hanrahan: “’Trice, didn’t you tell me that he was
    supposed to die in his sleep?”
    Seibert: “If that would happen, ’cause he was on that
    new medicine, you know . . .”
    Hanrahan: “The Prozac? And it makes him sleepy.
    So he was supposed to die in his sleep?”
    UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS                1193
    Seibert: “Yes.”
    
    Id. As in
    Elstad, the trial court suppressed the prewarning
    statements but admitted the postwarning confession. See 
    id. at 606.
    Five Justices of the Supreme Court, however, found Seibert
    distinguishable from Elstad even though Seibert’s prewarning
    statements were, like Elstad’s, uncoerced and made voluntar-
    ily. Justice Souter, joined in a plurality by Justices Stevens,
    Ginsburg and Breyer, and Justice Kennedy concurring sepa-
    rately, voted to suppress Seibert’s self-incriminating state-
    ments, despite the fact that she gave them after receiving her
    Miranda warning and ostensibly waiving her rights. See 
    id. at 609,
    616-17 (Souter, J., plurality opinion) (acknowledging
    that a Miranda warning largely guarantees the admissibility of
    confessions); 
    id. at 618
    (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judg-
    ment). Contrary to Elstad, these Justices acknowledged that
    some two-step interrogations yield inadmissible statements
    even in the absence of coercion. They were therefore unwill-
    ing to permit interrogators to exploit the mere form of the
    Miranda warning while depriving it of any meaningful sub-
    stance. As Justice Souter explained, the circumstances of Sei-
    bert’s interrogation “challeng[ed] the comprehensibility and
    efficacy of the Miranda warnings to the point that a reason-
    able person in the suspect’s shoes would not have understood
    them to convey a message that she retained a choice about
    continuing to talk.” 
    Id. at 617
    (Souter, J., plurality opinion).
    Justice Kennedy agreed, stating that a two-step interrogation
    technique “designed to circumvent Miranda,” 
    id. at 618
    ,
    “simply creates too high a risk that postwarning statements
    will be obtained when a suspect was deprived of knowledge
    essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights
    and the consequences of abandoning them.” 
    Id. at 621
    (Ken-
    nedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    [4] Although five Justices agreed that Seibert’s postwarn-
    ing statement was inadmissible, the case did not produce a
    1194              UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
    majority opinion. According to the plurality, when interroga-
    tors question first and warn later, the threshold inquiry is
    “whether it would be reasonable to find that in these circum-
    stances the warnings could function ‘effectively’ as Miranda
    requires.” 
    Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611-12
    . The plurality therefore
    focused on several objective factors to determine whether the
    Miranda warning given in each case fulfilled the function of
    advising the suspect that he or she had “a real choice about
    giving an admissible statement” during the second stage of
    interrogation. 
    Id. at 612.
    The contrast between Elstad and [Seibert] reveals a
    series of relevant facts that bear on whether Miranda
    warnings delivered midstream could be effective
    enough to accomplish their object: the completeness
    and detail of the questions and answers in the first
    round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the
    two statements, the timing and setting of the first and
    the second, the continuity of police personnel, and
    the degree to which the interrogator’s questions
    treated the second round as continuous with the first.
    
    Id. at 615.
    The plurality reasoned that the interrogation of
    Elstad at the police station “present[ed] a markedly different
    experience” — separate in time, location and tone — from the
    brief interaction at Elstad’s home; as a result, the Miranda
    warning given at the station offered Elstad a “genuine choice
    whether to follow up on [his] earlier admission.” 
    Id. at 615-
    16.
    In Seibert, by contrast, officers interrogated Seibert at
    length before giving the Miranda warning and gave her only
    a short break without any change of location after she con-
    fessed, and then the same officer from the prewarning interro-
    gation expressly used her unwarned statements to obtain a
    warned confession. 
    Id. at 616
    . In the plurality’s view, these
    facts “by any objective measure reveal[ed] a police strategy
    adapted to undermine the Miranda warnings.” 
    Id. (emphasis UNITED
    STATES v. WILLIAMS                         1195
    added).7 In determining whether the warning was effective,
    the plurality expressly stated that the “focus is on facts apart
    from [the interrogator’s] intent that show the question-first
    tactic at work.” 
    Id. at 616
    -17 n.6. Because the facts in Seibert
    did not “reasonably support a conclusion that the warnings
    given could have served their purpose,” the plurality held that
    Seibert’s postwarning statements were inadmissible. 
    Id. at 617
    .
    Although Justice Kennedy agreed that Seibert could be dis-
    tinguished from Elstad, he viewed the plurality’s test for
    admissibility as “cut[ting] too broadly” because the objective
    inquiry into a midstream Miranda warning’s effectiveness
    applied “to every two-stage interrogation.” 
    Id. at 621
    -22. At
    the same time, he recognized that in Seibert’s case, the police
    withheld the Miranda warning “to obscure both the practical
    and legal significance of the admonition when finally given.”
    
    Id. at 620.
    To avoid undermining Miranda’s “clarity,” Justice
    Kennedy would also evaluate the effectiveness of a midstream
    warning using an objective inquiry, but only in cases in which
    the police deliberately employed the two-step strategy to
    undermine Miranda:
    If the deliberate two-step strategy has been used,
    postwarning statements that are related to the sub-
    stance of prewarning statements must be excluded
    unless curative measures are taken before the post-
    warning statement is made. Curative measures
    should be designed to ensure that a reasonable per-
    son in the suspect’s situation would understand the
    7
    As the plurality explained, “[w]hen the same officer who had con-
    ducted the first phase recited the Miranda warnings, he . . . did not advise
    that her prior statement could not be used. . . . The impression that the fur-
    ther questioning was a mere continuation of the earlier questions and
    responses was fostered by references back to the confession already given.
    It would have been reasonable to regard the two sessions as parts of a con-
    tinuum, in which it would have been unnatural to refuse to repeat at the
    second stage what had been said before.” 
    Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616-17
    .
    1196                  UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
    import and effect of the Miranda warning and of the
    Miranda waiver. For example, a substantial break in
    time and circumstances between the prewarning
    statement and the Miranda warning may suffice in
    most circumstances . . . . Alternatively, an additional
    warning that explains the likely inadmissibility of
    the prewarning custodial statement may be suffi-
    cient.
    
    Id. at 622
    (emphasis added). However, absent a showing that
    the law enforcement officers deliberately used the question-
    first tactic to lessen the warning’s effectiveness, Justice Ken-
    nedy would apply Elstad’s voluntariness standards to deter-
    mine whether the postwarning confession is admissible. 
    Id. at 622
    . Because the officers in Seibert deliberately employed the
    question-first technique and then took no curative measures to
    ensure that the midstream warning effectively apprised Sei-
    bert of her rights, Justice Kennedy joined the plurality in con-
    cluding that Seibert’s postwarning statement was
    inadmissible. Id.8
    Justice O’Connor, writing for the four dissenting Justices,
    disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that Elstad could be
    distinguished, but agreed with the plurality that Justice Ken-
    nedy’s proposed “intent-based test” should not be applied. 
    Id. at 622
    -29 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent-
    ing Justices viewed the objective inquiry into the midstream
    warning’s effectiveness as “inform[ing] the psychological
    judgment regarding whether the suspect has been informed
    effectively of her right to remain silent.” 
    Id. at 624.
    Because
    they viewed this inquiry as relying on the theory that the “lin-
    8
    Justice Breyer also wrote a brief concurrence indicating that he would
    instruct courts to exclude the “fruits” of the unwarned questioning unless
    the “failure to warn was in good faith.” 
    Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617
    (Breyer,
    J., concurring). Although Justice Breyer joined the plurality opinion in
    full, he also stated that he agreed with Justice Kennedy’s opinion “insofar
    as it is consistent with [the application of a] good-faith exception” to an
    exclusionary rule. 
    Id. at 618.
                        UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS                    1197
    gering compulsion” of the unwarned statement requires sup-
    pression of the postwarning statement — which Elstad
    rejected — the dissenting Justices would have evaluated the
    two-step interrogation procedure under Elstad’s voluntariness
    standards. 
    Id. at 627-28.
    C.
    [5] To determine whether Williams’ confession falls within
    the exception to Elstad carved out in Seibert, we must first
    decide how to interpret Seibert in light of these splintered
    opinions. This is a question of first impression in this circuit,
    although Judge Berzon has provided thoughtful guidance in a
    recent dissenting opinion. See United States v. Rodriguez-
    Preciado, 
    399 F.3d 1118
    , 1138-43 (9th Cir. 2005) (Berzon, J.,
    dissenting).
    [6] Ordinarily, “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case
    and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent
    of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as
    that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
    judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United States,
    
    430 U.S. 188
    , 193 (1977) (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted). We need not find a legal opinion which a
    majority joined, but merely “a legal standard which, when
    applied, will necessarily produce results with which a major-
    ity of the Court from that case would agree.” Planned Parent-
    hood v. Casey, 
    947 F.2d 682
    , 693 (3d Cir. 1991), aff’d in part
    and rev’d in part on other grounds, 
    505 U.S. 833
    (1992); see
    also Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 
    233 F.3d 1188
    , 1200
    (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that Justice Powell’s analysis in
    Bakke is “the narrowest footing upon which a race-conscious
    decision making process could stand”); King v. Palmer, 
    950 F.2d 771
    , 781-82 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc) (explaining that
    “the narrowest opinion must represent a common denomina-
    tor of the Court’s reasoning”).9 To determine whether Seibert
    9
    Applying Marks’ rule, we have often construed one Justice’s concur-
    ring opinion as representing a logical subset of the plurality’s and as
    1198                  UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
    contains a precedential holding, we must identify and apply
    a test which satisfies the requirements of both Justice Souter’s
    plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.
    [7] Applying the Marks rule to Seibert, we hold that a trial
    court must suppress postwarning confessions obtained during
    a deliberate two-step interrogation where the midstream
    Miranda warning — in light of the objective facts and cir-
    cumstances — did not effectively apprise the suspect of his
    rights. Although the plurality would consider all two-stage
    interrogations eligible for a Seibert inquiry, Justice Kennedy’s
    opinion narrowed the Seibert exception to those cases involv-
    ing deliberate use of the two-step procedure to weaken Miran-
    da’s protections. See 
    Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d at 1139
    (Berzon, J., dissenting) (“Justice Kennedy concurred in Sei-
    bert on a ground arguably narrower than that relied upon by
    the plurality.”); United States v. Kiam, ___ F.3d ___, 
    2005 WL 3578853
    at *7 (3d Cir. Jan. 3, 2006) (stating that the
    Third Circuit “applies the Seibert plurality opinion as nar-
    rowed by Justice Kennedy”); United States v. Briones, 
    390 F.3d 610
    , 613-14 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the “first
    step” in Justice Kennedy’s “narrower test” is “to determine
    whether a [two-step] interrogation process was used as a
    deliberate strategy”); 
    Stewart, 388 F.3d at 1090
    (“Justice Ken-
    nedy thus provided a fifth vote to depart from Elstad, but only
    where the police set out deliberately to withhold Miranda
    warnings until after a confession has been secured.”). In other
    words, both the plurality and Justice Kennedy agree that
    where law enforcement officers deliberately employ a two-
    step interrogation to obtain a confession and where separa-
    tions of time and circumstance and additional curative warn-
    adopting a holding that would affect a narrower range of cases than that
    of the plurality. See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 
    395 F.3d 1128
    , 1135-
    38 (9th Cir. 2005); Ctr. for Fair Pub. Policy v. Maricopa County, 
    336 F.3d 1153
    , 1161 (9th Cir. 2003); 
    Smith, 233 F.3d at 1199-1200
    . Accord-
    ingly, we have held such a concurrence binding under Marks.
    UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS                         1199
    ings are absent or fail to apprise a reasonable person in the
    suspect’s shoes of his rights, the trial court should suppress
    the confession.10 This narrower test — that excludes confes-
    sions made after a deliberate, objectively ineffective mid-
    stream warning — represents Seibert’s holding. In situations
    where the two-step strategy was not deliberately employed,
    Elstad continues to govern the admissibility of postwarning
    statements. See also United States v. Mashburn, 
    406 F.3d 303
    ,
    309 (4th Cir. 2005) (“The admissibility of postwarning state-
    ments is governed by Elstad unless the deliberate ‘question-
    first’ strategy is employed.”); 
    Briones, 390 F.3d at 614
    (applying Elstad after determining that law enforcement offi-
    cers did not use a “deliberate strategy” of two-step interroga-
    tion to circumvent Miranda); 
    Stewart, 388 F.3d at 1090
    (“Where the initial violation of Miranda was not part of a
    deliberate strategy to undermine the warnings, Elstad appears
    to have survived Seibert.”).
    1.    Determining Deliberateness
    As an initial matter, we note that Justice Kennedy did not
    articulate how a court should determine whether an interroga-
    tor used a deliberate two-step strategy.11 Justice Kennedy
    envisioned a deliberateness test that focuses on intent, but as
    10
    Justices Souter and Kennedy may differ on one aspect of the Seibert
    exception analysis, which is the effectiveness of additional curative warn-
    ings. Justice Souter explained that the plurality does not “hold that a for-
    mal addendum warning that a previous statement could not be used would
    be sufficient to change the character of the question-first procedure to the
    point of rendering an ensuing statement admissible,” but that “its absence
    is clearly a factor.” 
    Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616
    n.7 (Souter, J., plurality opin-
    ion). Justice Kennedy suggested that an addendum warning “may be suffi-
    cient.” 
    Id. at 622
    (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Because no
    curative warnings were given here, we need not determine the Court’s
    holding on this issue.
    11
    For example, Justice Kennedy’s opinion is silent as to what, if any,
    presumptions apply or which party bears the burden of proving or disprov-
    ing deliberateness.
    1200                  UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
    the plurality noted, “the intent of the officer will rarely be as
    candidly admitted as it was here.” 
    Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617
    n.6
    (Souter, J., plurality opinion). Consistent with our sister cir-
    cuits, we hold that in determining whether the interrogator
    deliberately withheld the Miranda warning, courts should
    consider whether objective evidence and any available subjec-
    tive evidence, such as an officer’s testimony, support an infer-
    ence that the two-step interrogation procedure was used to
    undermine the Miranda warning.12 See 
    id. at 616
    (Souter, J.,
    plurality opinion) (concluding that the facts present in Seibert
    “by any objective measure reveal a police strategy adapted to
    undermine the Miranda warnings.”); see also 
    Briones, 390 F.3d at 614
    (examining objective evidence in the record to
    conclude that interrogators did not use a deliberate strategy of
    two-step interrogations). Such objective evidence would
    include the timing, setting and completeness of the prewarn-
    ing interrogation, the continuity of police personnel and the
    overlapping content of the pre- and postwarning statements.
    
    Id. at 615
    (Souter, J., plurality opinion); see also 
    id. at 621
    (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing the
    overlapping content of Seibert’s two confessions as evidence
    of “the temptations for abuse inherent in the two-step tech-
    nique”).13 By focusing on both “facts apart from intent that
    12
    This test functions appropriately as a combination of Justice Souter’s
    plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. See Siegmund v.
    Gen. Commodities Corp., 
    175 F.2d 952
    , 953 (9th Cir. 1949) (“The reasons
    assigned by the two groups of Justices who concurred in the result are . . .
    applicable . . . .”).
    13
    For example, in United States v. Briones, the Eighth Circuit concluded
    that the record contained no evidence suggesting that law enforcement
    officers deliberately delayed the Miranda warning to circumvent the sus-
    pect’s 
    rights. 390 F.3d at 614
    . The court noted that the suspect did not
    make an incriminating statement during the first interview as it was cut
    short by the suspect’s unwillingness to answer the officer’s questions. 
    Id. Instead, the
    suspect’s “unexpected” (and unwarned) inculpatory statement
    “did not result from interrogation” because it was made in the lobby after
    the initial questioning had ended. 
    Id. Moreover, the
    suspect’s postwarning
    confession came a day and a half after the initial interview during a meet-
    ing with law enforcement officers which the suspect himself requested.
    UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS                        1201
    show the question-first tactic at work,” 
    Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616-17
    n.6 (Souter, J., plurality opinion), and any available
    subjective evidence of deliberateness, courts will better ensure
    that law enforcement officers do not circumvent the Fifth
    Amendment right against self-incrimination through the use
    of “interrogation practices . . . likely . . . to disable [an indi-
    vidual] from making a free and rational choice” about speak-
    ing. 
    Miranda, 384 U.S. at 464-65
    .
    Once a law enforcement officer has detained a suspect and
    subjects him to interrogation — as was the case in Seibert and
    is the case here — there is rarely, if ever, a legitimate reason
    to delay giving a Miranda warning until after the suspect has
    confessed.14 Instead, the most plausible reason for the delay is
    an illegitimate one, which is the interrogator’s desire to
    weaken the warning’s effectiveness. As Justice Souter
    explained:
    By any objective measure . . . it is likely that if the
    interrogators employ the technique of witholding
    warnings until after interrogation succeeds in elicit-
    ing a confession, the warnings will be ineffective in
    preparing the suspect for successive interrogation,
    close in time and similar in content. After all, the
    reason that question-first is catching on is as obvious
    as its manifest purpose, which is to get a confession
    the suspect would not make if he understood his
    rights at the outset; the sensible underlying assump-
    tion is that with one confession in hand before the
    warnings, the interrogator can count on getting its
    duplicate, with trifling additional trouble.
    14
    Justice Kennedy suggested that in some situations, there may be a
    legitimate reason for not giving a suspect an immediate Miranda warning,
    such as when an officer does not plan to question the suspect or is waiting
    for a more appropriate time to do so. 
    Seibert, 542 U.S. at 620
    (Kennedy,
    J., concurring in the judgment). However, unlike the facts in Seibert and
    this case, those situations assume that the officer has not begun interrogat-
    ing the suspect.
    1202               UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
    
    Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613
    (Souter, J., plurality opinion). Justice
    Kennedy agreed: “the two-step technique permits the accused
    to conclude that the right not to respond did not exist when
    the earlier incriminating statements were made. The strategy
    is based on the assumption that Miranda warnings will tend
    to mean less when recited midinterrogation, after inculpatory
    statements have already been obtained.” 
    Id. at 620
    (Kennedy,
    J., concurring in the judgment). Because law enforcement
    officers generally retain control over the timing of a Miranda
    warning and giving the warning to a custodial suspect
    imposes only a minimal burden, the officer’s deferral of the
    warning until after a suspect’s incriminating response further
    supports an inference of deliberateness.
    [8] In sum, when a law enforcement officer interrogates a
    suspect but does not give a Miranda warning until after
    obtaining a confession or an incriminating statement, a court
    in deciding whether to suppress a subsequent, postwarning
    confession must determine whether the warning was deliber-
    ately withheld. The court should consider any objective evi-
    dence or available expressions of subjective intent suggesting
    that the officer acted deliberately to undermine and obscure
    the warning’s meaning and effect.
    2.   Determining Effectiveness
    When an interrogator has deliberately employed the two-
    step strategy, Seibert requires the court then to evaluate the
    effectiveness of the midstream Miranda warning to determine
    whether the postwarning statement is admissible. 
    Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615
    (Souter, J., plurality opinion); 
    id. at 622
    (Ken-
    nedy, J., concurring in the judgment). The court must deter-
    mine, based on objective evidence, whether the midstream
    warning adequately and effectively apprised the suspect that
    he had a “genuine choice whether to follow up on [his] earlier
    admission.” 
    Id. at 616
    (Souter, J., plurality opinion). In its
    analysis, the court should look both to the objective circum-
    stances the plurality cited as “bear[ing] on whether Miranda
    UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS                         1203
    warnings delivered midstream could be effective enough to
    accomplish their object,” 
    id. at 615
    (Souter, J., plurality opin-
    ion), and to the curative measures characterized by Justice
    Kennedy as “designed to ensure that a reasonable person in
    the suspect’s situation would understand the import and effect
    of the Miranda warning,” 
    id. at 622
    (Kennedy, J., concurring
    in the judgment). See also 
    Stewart, 388 F.3d at 1091
    (explain-
    ing that if the two-step interrogation was deliberately used,
    “then the analysis of the Seibert plurality and Justice Kenne-
    dy’s concurrence merge, requiring an inquiry into the suffi-
    ciency of the break in time and circumstances between the
    unwarned and warned confessions”).
    Thus, the court must address (1) the completeness and
    detail of the prewarning interrogation, (2) the overlapping
    content of the two rounds of interrogation, (3) the timing and
    circumstances of both interrogations, (4) the continuity of
    police personnel, (5) the extent to which the interrogator’s
    questions treated the second round of interrogation as continu-
    ous with the first and (6) whether any curative measures were
    taken. See 
    Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615
    (Souter, J., plurality opin-
    ion); 
    id. at 622
    (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
    Notably, both the plurality and Justice Kennedy found signifi-
    cant that in giving Seibert her Miranda warning, “the police
    did not advise that her prior statement could not be used.” 
    Id. at 616
    (Souter, J., plurality opinion); 
    id. at 622
    (Kennedy, J.,
    concurring in the judgment) (noting that an additional warn-
    ing that explains the inadmissibility of the prewarning state-
    ment would serve as a curative measure).15 Justice Kennedy
    also found particularly troubling the overlapping content of
    the officers’ pre- and postwarning questions: “[r]eference to
    the prewarning statement [during the postwarning question-
    ing] was an implicit suggestion that the mere repetition of the
    earlier statement was not independently incriminating. The
    15
    The plurality, however, noted that including such a cautionary state-
    ment would not, on its own, necessarily cure the defects of the question-
    first procedure. 
    Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617
    n.7 (Souter, J., plurality opinion).
    1204               UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
    implicit suggestion was false.” 
    Id. at 621
    (Kennedy, J., con-
    curring in the judgment). Finally, Justice Kennedy viewed the
    continuous nature of the interrogation relevant to the suspect’s
    experience of interrogation, suggesting — again, as a curative
    measure — that a “substantial break in time and circum-
    stances” between pre- and postwarning questioning, would
    “in most circumstances, . . . allow[ ] the accused to distin-
    guish the two contexts and appreciate that the interrogation
    ha[d] taken a new turn.” 
    Id. at 622
    .
    [9] On the other hand, where the court finds deliberateness
    to be absent, “[t]he admissibility of postwarning statements
    should continue to be governed by the principles of Elstad.”
    
    Id. at 622
    (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
    3.   Seibert’s effect on relevant precedent
    [10] Seibert diminishes Elstad but does not destroy it. We
    conclude, however, that Orso cannot stand as the law of the
    circuit in light of Seibert. Under Orso, regardless of the police
    tactics employed, voluntary postwarning inculpatory state-
    ments are excluded only when the prewarning statements
    were not only unwarned but also involuntary, and any taint
    therefrom had not dissipated by the time the Miranda warning
    was given. 
    Orso, 266 F.3d at 1039
    . However, a majority of
    the Justices in Seibert would bar postwarning confessions
    elicited during deliberate and unremedied two-step interroga-
    tions, even if they were given after voluntary unwarned state-
    ments.
    [11] This holding abrogates Orso, because it indicates that
    there are some “improper tactics,” short of coercion, that taint
    a two-step confession. See 
    Orso, 266 F.3d at 1036
    (rejecting
    petitioner’s contention that confession was inadmissible
    because it was obtained by “improper tactics”). Because a
    majority of the Court has held that in some category of cases
    involving voluntary prewarning statements, police conduct
    may nonetheless render Miranda warnings ineffective, we
    UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS                      1205
    cannot simply revert to our prior law. See Miller v. Gammie,
    
    335 F.3d 889
    , 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that
    when a three-judge panel is faced with intervening precedent
    from a higher court that is “clearly irreconcilable” with a prior
    holding of this court, the panel is bound by the intervening
    authority).
    D.
    [12] Because the district court did not have the benefit of
    Seibert, it did not make the requisite factual inquiries to deter-
    mine whether Agents O’Neil and Dobbs deliberately
    employed the two-step interrogation, and if so, whether the
    midstream warning effectively apprised Williams of his
    rights. Without this targeted factual analysis, we cannot be
    certain that Williams’ postwarning statement was properly
    admitted as evidence. Although the evidence strongly sug-
    gests that the midstream warning did not “function ‘effec-
    tively’ as Miranda requires,” 
    Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611-12
    (Souter, J., plurality opinion), we are unable to determine on
    the record before us whether the two-step strategy was used
    deliberately to undermine Miranda (and therefore whether
    Seibert’s objective inquiry into effectiveness applies). We
    therefore reverse the district court’s order denying suppres-
    sion of Williams’ postwarning confession, vacate the judg-
    ment of conviction and remand for the district court to hold
    a new suppression hearing consistent with this opinion. The
    district court shall determine, based on objective as well as
    any available subjective evidence, whether the two-step inter-
    rogation was deliberately used to circumvent Miranda, and if
    so, whether objective evidence demonstrates that the mid-
    stream warning failed to apprise Williams effectively of his
    rights, thereby requiring suppression of the postwarning confes-
    sion.16 If the district court finds that the confession must be
    suppressed, Williams’ conviction cannot stand.
    16
    The objective inquiries into deliberateness and effectiveness function
    practically as an analysis of whether the facts of a particular case more
    1206                   UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
    IV.
    The government argues that even if the district court erred
    in denying suppression, we should uphold Williams’ convic-
    tion because any erroneous admission of Williams’ written
    confession was harmless. “On direct review, the govern-
    ment’s commission of a constitutional error requires reversal
    of a conviction unless the government proves ‘beyond a rea-
    sonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute
    to the verdict obtained.’ ” United States v. Garibay, 
    143 F.3d 534
    , 539 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Chapman v. California, 
    386 U.S. 18
    , 24 (1967)). Any error in this case was not harmless
    beyond a reasonable doubt.17
    Erroneous admission of a confession does not constitute
    structural error. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 
    499 U.S. 279
    ,
    306-12 (1991). The Supreme Court has, however, acknowl-
    edged that:
    closely resemble those in Seibert or Elstad. Although we leave this analy-
    sis for the district court, several facts should guide its inquiries. For exam-
    ple, Williams was in custody from the point at which Agents O’Neil and
    Dobbs took him into the old reception area and began questioning him.
    Before giving the Miranda warning, Agent O’Neil questioned Williams
    using standard interrogation techniques and until he obtained a confession;
    then, without any break in time or change of venue, he read Williams his
    Miranda rights and asked Williams to write down what he had already
    told them. Finally, the court should determine whether the agents took any
    curative measures “to ensure that a reasonable person in the suspect’s situ-
    ation would understand the import and effect of the Miranda warning and
    of the Miranda waiver.” 
    Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622
    (Kennedy, J., concurring
    in the judgment).
    17
    Assuming Williams’ postwarning confession was improperly admit-
    ted, we would also conclude under the standard of Brecht v. Abrahamson,
    
    507 U.S. 619
    (1993), that the written confession “likely had a substantial
    and injurious impact on the verdict.” Sims v. Brown, 
    425 F.3d 560
    , 570
    (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Taylor v. Maddox, 
    366 F.3d 992
    , 1016 (9th Cir.
    2004). Unlike in Sims, the evidence of Williams’ guilt is not so “over-
    whelming” as to preclude the “reasonable likelihood that the challenged
    statement[ ] actually prejudiced him.” 
    Id. at 571.
                      UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS                    1207
    A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, “the
    defendant’s own confession is probably the most
    probative and damaging evidence that can be admit-
    ted against him . . . . Certainly, confessions have pro-
    found impact on the jury, so much so that we may
    justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind
    even if told to do so.”
    
    Id. at 296
    (quoting Bruton v. United States, 
    391 U.S. 123
    ,
    139-40 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)). In Fulminante, the
    Court distinguished between two types of erroneously admit-
    ted confessions — those that “concern isolated aspects of the
    crime or may be incriminating only when linked to other evi-
    dence” and “full confession[s] in which the defendant dis-
    closes the motive for and means of the crime.” 
    Id. The latter,
    the Court explained, will seldom be harmless because they
    “may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence alone in reach-
    ing its decision.” 
    Id. [13] Our
    case law tracks this distinction. We have held
    erroneous admission of inculpatory statements harmless under
    the Chapman standard only where the confession did not go
    to the heart of the case. See, e.g., 
    Garibay, 143 F.3d at 539
    -
    40 (holding admission not harmless where defendant’s state-
    ments “were the thrust of the prosecution’s case”); United
    States v. Harrison, 
    34 F.3d 886
    (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing
    conviction where district court erroneously admitted defen-
    dant’s statement that provided a detailed account of the
    crimes charged); cf. United States v. Padilla, 
    387 F.3d 1087
    ,
    1093-94 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding error harmless where “[t]he
    only usefulness of the statement was that it was inconsistent
    with the defense Padilla put on”). Williams’ full confession
    went to the heart of his case.
    [14] Additionally, contrary to the government’s assertion,
    we cannot be certain on the record before us that the jury
    would have pieced together the other evidence presented by
    the government and reached a guilty verdict. In addition to the
    1208              UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
    confession, the government submitted Williams’ application,
    which listed Williams’ height as 5’ 8” (a height between Wil-
    liams’ actual height and Iddrissu’s), the testimony of a clerk
    that he showed Williams his application with Iddrissu’s pho-
    tographs attached and Williams’ testimony that plans for the
    trip to London, mentioned in the application, had not been
    finalized. This evidence clearly supported the government’s
    argument that Williams intended to obtain a passport for
    Iddrissu. But Williams also presented contrary evidence to the
    jury. He testified that the photographs must have been
    switched inadvertently, or, in the alternative, that Iddrissu
    must have intentionally switched the photographs without
    telling Williams. In the absence of the confession, it is not
    clear that the jury would have credited the government’s story
    over Williams’ version. As we cannot be certain “beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contrib-
    ute to the verdict obtained,” and in light of the Court’s guid-
    ance in Fulminante, we hold that the admission of Williams’
    written confession, if erroneous, was not harmless. 
    Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24
    .
    V.
    [15] We REVERSE the district court’s order denying sup-
    pression, VACATE the judgment of conviction and
    REMAND the case to the district court for further proceed-
    ings consistent with this opinion.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-50182

Filed Date: 1/30/2006

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015

Authorities (27)

United States v. Kevin Joseph Bautista , 362 F.3d 584 ( 2004 )

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey , 112 S. Ct. 2791 ( 1992 )

United States v. Jody Myesha Orso , 266 F.3d 1030 ( 2001 )

Arizona v. Fulminante , 111 S. Ct. 1246 ( 1991 )

Leif Taylor v. Thomas M. Maddox, Interim Director George ... , 366 F.3d 992 ( 2004 )

center-for-fair-public-policy-an-arizona-non-profit-corporation-dream , 336 F.3d 1153 ( 2003 )

Missouri v. Seibert , 124 S. Ct. 2601 ( 2004 )

katuria-e-smith-angela-rock-michael-pyle-for-themselves-and-all-others , 233 F.3d 1188 ( 2000 )

United States v. Isaac San Juan-Cruz , 314 F.3d 384 ( 2002 )

Miranda v. Arizona , 86 S. Ct. 1602 ( 1966 )

United States v. Nicholas Padilla , 387 F.3d 1087 ( 2004 )

Siegmund v. General Commodities Corporation , 175 F.2d 952 ( 1949 )

United States v. Eric Kevin Mashburn , 406 F.3d 303 ( 2005 )

United States v. Allen Wauneka , 770 F.2d 1434 ( 1985 )

United States v. Timothy Stewart , 388 F.3d 1079 ( 2004 )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF—APPELLEE v. ERIBERTO ... , 390 F.3d 610 ( 2004 )

United States v. Lawrence Antelope, United States of ... , 395 F.3d 1128 ( 2005 )

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christine-l-miller-guardian-ad-litem-tonnie-savage-guardian-ad-litem-v , 335 F.3d 889 ( 2003 )

United States v. Sonja Harrison , 34 F.3d 886 ( 1994 )

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