Calisher & Associates, Inc. v. Rgcm, LLC , 373 F. App'x 697 ( 2010 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                              APR 02 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    CALISHER & ASSOCIATES, INC., a                   No. 08-56978
    California corporation,
    D.C. No. 2:08-cv-06523-MMM-E
    Plaintiff-counter-defendant -
    Appellee,
    MEMORANDUM *
    v.
    RGCM, LLC, a Texas limited liability
    company; MASTERCRAFTERS
    CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT,
    INC., a Texas corporation; PAUL
    MANOHARAN, an individual, AKA
    Paulrajan Manoharan; RON ROCK, an
    individual,
    Defendants - Appellants,
    RIO GRANDE MEDICAL CENTER,
    LTD., AKA Rio Grande City Medical
    Center, Ltd., AKA Tropy Plex Medical
    Center, Ltd., AKA RGCMC, Ltd.,
    Defendant-counter-claimant -
    Appellant.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    CALISHER & ASSOCIATES, INC., a               No. 08-56979
    California corporation,
    D.C. No. 2:08-cv-06540-MMM-E
    Plaintiff-counter-defendant -
    Appellee,
    v.
    PHARR MEDICAL CENTER LTD., a
    Texas limited partnership, DBA Valley
    Medical Center, Ltd.,
    Defendant-counter-claimant -
    Appellant,
    VMC, LLC, a Texas limited liability
    company, AKA VMC General, LLC;
    MASTERCRAFTERS CONSTRUCTION
    & DEVELOPMENT INC., a Texas
    corporation; PAUL MANOHARAN, an
    individual AKA Paulrajan Manoharan;
    RON ROCK, an individual,
    Defendants - Appellants,
    and
    RGCM, LLC, a Texas limited liability
    company; RIO GRANDE MEDICAL
    CENTER, LTD., AKA Rio Grande City
    Medical Center Ltd., AKA Tropy Plex
    Medical Center, Ltd., AKA RGCMC, Ltd.,
    Defendants.
    2
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 3, 2010**
    Pasadena, California
    Before:         KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge, and
    GETTLEMAN, *** District Judge.
    The district court remanded these cases to the Los Angeles Superior Court
    after finding that the contracts at issue selected that court as the exclusive forum
    for the parties’ dispute. We affirm.
    We have jurisdiction to hear defendants’ appeals from the district court’s
    remand order. See Kamm v. ITEX Corp., 
    568 F.3d 752
    , 757 (9th Cir. 2009).
    Federal law governs the enforceability of forum selection clauses in cases removed
    on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc.,
    
    858 F.2d 509
    , 513 (9th Cir. 1988). We review de novo the district court’s
    interpretation of a forum selection clause. See Hunton Wesson Foods, Inc. v.
    Supreme Oil Co., 
    817 F.2d 75
    , 77 (9th Cir. 1987).
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Robert W. Gettleman, United States District Judge for
    the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
    3
    The clause — stating that “litigation shall be subject to the laws and Rules of
    Evidence of the state of California with the venue being Los Angeles County
    Superior Court” — requires that claims arising from the contract be litigated in the
    Los Angeles County Superior Court. “This language requires enforcement of the
    clause because [defendants] not only consented to the jurisdiction of the state
    courts of [California], but further agreed by mandatory language that the venue for
    all actions arising out of the [contract] would be [Los Angeles County Superior
    Court].” Docksider, Ltd. v. Sea Tech., Ltd., 
    875 F.2d 762
    , 764 (9th Cir. 1989)
    (interpreting the clause “Venue of any action brought hereunder shall be deemed to
    be in Gloucester County, Virginia.”).
    The clause does not use permissive language nor does it merely evince
    consent to the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles Superior Court. The clause is
    therefore distinguishable from the clauses at issue in the cases relied on by
    defendants. See Hunt 
    Wesson, 817 F.2d at 76
    –78 (“The courts of California,
    County of Orange, shall have jurisdiction over the parties in any action at law
    relating to the subject matter or the interpretation of this contract.”); N. Cal. Dist.
    Council of Laborers v. Pittsburg - Des Moines Steel Co., 
    69 F.3d 1034
    , 1036 (9th
    Cir. 1995) (“A decision of the Board of Adjustment . . . or the decision of a
    permanent arbitrator shall be enforceable by a petition to confirm an arbitration
    4
    award filed in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, State of
    California.”).
    AFFIRMED.
    5