Santos Villatoro-Molina v. Merrick Garland ( 2023 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 24 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SANTOS VILLATORO-MOLINA, AKA                    No.    18-72070
    Santos Villa,
    Agency No. A205-576-490
    Petitioner,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted February 21, 2023**
    Before: OWENS, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
    Santos Villatoro-Molina, a citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review the
    Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order affirming the denial of his application
    for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(1), and
    we dismiss in part and deny in part.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    1. Villatoro argues that separation from his daughter would create an
    exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, and that this court should reverse the
    Immigration Judge (IJ) and BIA’s judgments as a result. This court has held that
    hardship determinations are discretionary. Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 
    327 F.3d 887
    , 891 (9th Cir. 2003). We are statutorily barred from reconsidering discretionary
    decisions under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(B)(i), and so we lack jurisdiction to review
    this issue. See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 
    424 F.3d 926
    , 929–30 (9th Cir. 2005).
    2. Next, Villatoro asserts that the IJ failed to inform him of his apparent
    eligibility for voluntary departure and did not allow him or his counsel to address
    the issue, violating his due process rights. Reversal of the BIA’s decision is
    appropriate only if the proceedings were so fundamentally unfair that Villatoro was
    unable to present his case, and if Villatoro shows he was materially so prejudiced
    that the violations affected the outcome. Benedicto v. Garland, 
    12 F.4th 1049
    , 1058
    (9th Cir. 2021); Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 
    439 F.3d 614
    , 620 (9th Cir. 2006); see
    also Tovar-Landin v. Ashcroft, 
    361 F.3d 1164
    , 1167 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]here is no
    constitutionally protected liberty interest in the discretionary privilege of voluntary
    departure.”). Neither of Villatoro’s claims meet this threshold.
    While the IJ has a duty to inform noncitizens of apparent eligibility for relief,
    the “apparent eligibility” standard of 
    8 C.F.R. § 1240.11
    (a)(2) is only triggered when
    “the facts before the IJ raise a ‘reasonable possibility that the petitioner may be
    2
    eligible for relief.’” C.J.L.G. v. Barr, 
    923 F.3d 622
    , 626 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting
    Moran-Enriquez v. INS, 
    884 F.2d 420
    , 423 (9th Cir. 1989)). Here, the IJ denied
    voluntary departure “because no evidence was presented regarding this form of relief
    from removal.” 1    The IJ has no duty to comb the record for evidence of
    eligibility. See United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 
    629 F.3d 894
    , 900 (9th Cir. 2010)
    (“Until the alien himself or some other person puts information before the judge that
    makes such eligibility apparent, this duty does not come into play.”) (quoting
    Moran-Enriquez, 
    884 F.2d at 422
    ).
    Villatoro’s claim that the IJ did not allow him to address his eligibility for
    voluntary departure also fails. There are no facts in the record to suggest Villatoro
    was denied this opportunity, and when the IJ asked if the parties wished to make any
    further arguments or submit further documents, Villatoro declined.
    The BIA held that Villatoro had not “demonstrated any harm that deprived
    him of due process, including any prejudicial defects in the proceedings below.” See
    Matter of Santos, 
    19 I&N Dec. 105
    , 112 (BIA 1984). Villatoro fails to show that his
    proceedings were fundamentally unfair or that he suffered any prejudice, so there
    are no grounds to reverse the BIA’s decision.
    DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.
    1
    Villatoro argues the IJ erred in finding that he lacked a good moral character. As
    the BIA explained, the IJ did not make an explicit finding regarding Villatoro’s
    moral character.
    3