Robert Radcliffe v. Experian Information Solutions ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 23 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT RADCLIFFE, CHESTER No. 21-56284
CARTER, MARIA FALCON, CLIFTON C.
SEALE III, ARNOLD LOVELL, Jr., D.C. No.
8:05-cv-01070-DOC-MLG
Plaintiff-Appellants,
and MEMORANDUM*
CHARLES JUNTIKKA AND
ASSOCIATES LLP, Counsel for Plaintiffs,
Appellant,
and
JOSE HERNANDEZ, KATHRYN PIKE,
LEWIS MANN, ROBERT RANDALL,
BERTRAM ROBISON,
Plaintiff-Appellees,
and
CADDELL & CHAPMAN, Counsel for
Plaintiffs; LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN
& BERNSTEIN LLP, Counsel for Plaintiffs;
FRANCIS MAILMAN SOUMILAS, P.C.,
Counsel for Plaintiffs; NATIONAL
CONSUMER LAW CENTER, Counsel for
Plaintiffs; CONSUMER LITIGATION
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
ASSOCIATES, P.C., Counsel for Plaintiffs;
CALLAHAN, THOMPSON, SHERMAN &
CAUDILL LLP, Counsel for Plaintiffs;
PUBLIC JUSTICE, P.C., Counsel for
Plaintiffs,
Appellees,
v.
EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES,
LLC; EXPERIAN INFORMATION
SOLUTIONS, INC.; TRANS UNION LLC,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 17, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: WARDLAW, NGUYEN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Counsel Charles Juntikka (Juntikka) appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion to vacate an arbitration award that allocated attorneys’ fees among class
counsel from a class action against three credit-reporting companies. Juntikka
contends that the arbitrator exceeded her powers in violation of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, when she relied on equitable
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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considerations to fashion her final fee award instead of applying the terms of the
class counsels’ fee allocation agreements.
We review a district court’s decision to confirm an arbitration award by
“accepting findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous but deciding questions of
law de novo.” Aspic Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. ECC Centcom Constructors LLC, 913
F.3d 1162, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Exercising jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
we affirm.
The district court properly denied Juntikka’s motion to vacate the arbitration
award. “The [FAA] enumerates limited grounds on which a federal court may
vacate, modify, or correct an arbitral award.” Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache
Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Arbitrators
“exceed their powers” under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA “not when they merely
interpret or apply the governing law incorrectly, but when the award is ‘completely
irrational’ or exhibits a ‘manifest disregard of the law.’” Id. at 997 (citations
omitted). Thus, a court may vacate an arbitration decision pursuant to § 10(a)(4)
only if the arbitrator “strays from interpretation and application of the agreement
and effectively dispense[s] h[er] own brand of industrial justice.” Major League
Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (first alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Here, the arbitrator did not show manifest disregard of the law when she
applied equitable considerations in arriving at the fee award. The arbitrator relied
on our precedent in In re FPI/Agretech Securities Litigation, 105 F.3d 469 (9th
Cir. 1997), and Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002), to
conclude that a court may reject a fee allocation agreement if it “rewards an
attorney in disproportion to the benefits that attorney conferred upon the class,”
Agretech, 105 F.3d at 473. The arbitrator provided copious evidence that Juntikka
and his partner, Dan Wolf, failed to confer a net benefit on the class from their pre-
objection efforts. Because the arbitrator relied on Agretech and Vizcaino in
determining the ultimate award, she did not “dispense[] h[er] own brand of
industrial justice,” Major League Baseball, 532 U.S. at 509 (citation omitted), and
therefore did not exceed her powers in violation of § 10(a)(4).
Juntikka argues that the arbitrator’s reliance on Agretech is misplaced
because it merely recognizes a district court’s authority to override a fee
arrangement, not that of an arbitrator. However, “[m]anifest disregard . . . requires
something beyond and different from a mere error in the law or failure on the part
of the arbitrators to understand and apply the law.” HayDay Farms, Inc. v. FeeDx
Holdings, Inc., 55 F.4th 1232, 1240 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Even if the
arbitrator incorrectly applied Agretech, “we may not reverse an arbitration award
even in the face of an erroneous interpretation of the law.” Collins v. D.R. Horton,
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Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007); see also E. Associated Coal Corp. v.
United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000) (“[T]he fact that a court is
convinced [an arbitrator] committed serious error does not suffice to overturn [her]
decision.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Juntikka maintains that, even if the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard
the law, the arbitrator exceeded her powers because her decision “fail[ed] to draw
its essence from the agreement.” Aspic, 913 F.3d at 1166 (citation omitted). To be
sure, we have vacated arbitration awards where the arbitrator blatantly disregards
express terms of the parties’ agreements. See Aspic, 913 F.3d at 1168; Pac. Motor
Trucking Co. v. Auto. Machinists Union, 702 F.2d 176, 177 (9th Cir. 1983); see
also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682–83 (2010).
But in those cases, the arbitrator “underst[oo]d and correctly state[d] the law, but
proceed[ed] to disregard the same.” Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1104 (9th
Cir. 2009) (alterations in original) (citation omitted); see Aspic, 913 F.3d at 1167–
68. Here, the arbitrator understood the relevant law as permitting her to override
the contract and allocate fees in proportion to the benefit Juntikka and Wolf
conferred upon the class. Accordingly, the district court properly denied the
motion to vacate the fee award.
AFFIRMED.
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