Carolyn Sanford v. Landmark Protection, Inc. , 495 F. App'x 783 ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 25 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CAROLYN R. SANFORD, No. 11-16427
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-00447-RS
v.
MEMORANDUM *
LANDMARK PROTECTION, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Richard Seeborg, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 10, 2012 **
Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Carolyn R. Sanford appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in her employment action alleging retaliation and discrimination in
violation of Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”), as well as state law claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Vasquez v. County of
Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Sanford’s
retaliation claim because the court correctly concluded that Sanford’s signing of a
blank form did not constitute an adverse employment action, and because Sanford
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Landmark
Protection’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment
actions, including the delay in Sanford’s vacation pay and her discharge, were
pretextual. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 646 (defining “adverse employment action”);
Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1065-66, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004)
(listing elements of a retaliation claim and explaining that circumstantial evidence
of pretext must be specific and substantial, and that timing alone is insufficient to
establish pretext); see also Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000)
(discussing retaliatory harassment).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Sanford’s sex
discrimination claims because the use of her true name over the radio and sending
her to a wrong pick-up location did not constitute adverse employment actions, and
because Sanford failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
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similarly situated individuals outside of her protected class were treated more
favorably, or whether Landmark Protection’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for its adverse employment actions, including the discipline for the incident on
April 24, 2009, were pretextual. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640-42 & n.5 (applying
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to discrimination claim under Title
VII, discussing “similarly situated” individuals requirement, and explaining that
circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial); Chuang v.
Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (defining
“adverse employment action”); Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1113 (Cal.
2000) (McDonnell Douglas framework applies to state claims of discrimination
based on a theory of disparate treatment).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Sanford’s age
discrimination claims because Sanford failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether Landmark Protection’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
its adverse employment actions, including the discipline for the incident on April
24, 2009 and her discharge, were pretextual. See Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599,
607 (9th Cir. 2012) (McDonnell Douglas framework applies to ADEA claims on
summary judgment); Guz, 8 P.3d at 1113.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Sanford’s
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disability discrimination claims because Sanford failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether Landmark Protection discriminated against her
because of her alleged disability. See Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d
1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999) (elements of prima facie case of disability
discrimination under the ADA); Faust v. Cal. Portland Cement Co., 58 Cal. Rptr.
3d 729, 745 (Ct. App. 2007) (same elements under California’s Fair Employment
and Housing Act).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Sanford’s
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because it correctly concluded that
the alleged conduct was not “extreme and outrageous.” Hughes v. Pair, 209 P.3d
963, 976 (Cal. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Sanford’s deceit
claim because Sanford failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether Landmark Protction made false statements. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1710(defining “deceit”); Lazar v. Superior Court, 909 P.2d 981, 984-85 (Cal. 1996)
(elements of fraud); Manderville v. PCG & S Grp., Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 59, 68
(Ct. App. 2007) (elements of intentional misrepresentation).
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We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
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