Fones4All Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FONES4ALL CORPORATION,                     
    Petitioner,
    No. 06-75388
    VERIZON; AT&T,
    Intervenors,                    FCC No.
    v.                                  WC05-261
    OPINION
    FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS                              DENYING
    COMMISSION; UNITED STATES OF                       REHEARING
    AMERICA,
    Respondents.
    
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Federal Communications Commission
    Argued and Submitted
    September 12, 2008—Pasadena, California
    Filed April 7, 2009
    Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,
    Circuit Judges, and Brian E. Sandoval,* District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge Schroeder
    COUNSEL
    Michael B. Hazzard, Washington, DC, for petitioner
    Fones4All Corporation.
    *The Honorable Brian E. Sandoval, United States District Judge for the
    District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
    4129
    4130                FONES4ALL CORP. v. FCC
    Scott H. Angstreich, Washington, DC, for the intervenors.
    James M. Carr, Washington, DC, for respondents Federal
    Communications Commission, et al.
    OPINION
    SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:
    Fones4All has filed a petition for rehearing and petition for
    rehearing en banc, suggesting there is a conflict between the
    opinion in this case, published at 
    550 F.3d 811
     (9th Cir.
    2008), and Great Falls Community TV Cable Co. v. FCC, 
    416 F.2d 238
     (9th Cir. 1969), and Washington Utilities & Trans-
    portation Commission v. FCC, 
    513 F.2d 1142
     (9th Cir. 1975),
    overruled on other grounds by Nevada v. Burford, 
    918 F.2d 854
     (9th Cir. 1990).
    In both of those cases, this court did in fact require the par-
    ties to exhaust their administrative remedies, as we did here.
    There is no direct conflict. Great Falls and Washington Utili-
    ties do contain some language suggesting that this court has
    discretion to refuse to defer to the Federal Communications
    Commission (“FCC” or “Commission”), by not requiring
    exhaustion, even though section 405’s exhaustion requirement
    is statutory. In Great Falls this court stated that “section 405
    is not inflexible,” 
    416 F.2d at 239
    , but then declined to reach
    the merits of the petitioner’s claim because the Commission
    had no opportunity to consider the question the petitioner
    brought before the court, 
    id. at 242-43
    . In Washington Utili-
    ties this court reiterated that “section 405 is not inflexible,”
    
    513 F.2d at 1167
    , but concluded that “the balance should be
    struck against possible review,” 
    id. at 1168
    . Accordingly,
    although these two cases say that there could be a futility
    exception to section 405’s exhaustion requirement, neither
    case found one.
    FONES4ALL CORP. v. FCC                  4131
    To the extent those early cases reflect a flexible attitude
    toward exhaustion, however, they represent a prior era of
    administrative law. Both predate Chevron USA v. Natural
    Resources Defense Council, 
    467 U.S. 837
     (1984), where the
    Supreme Court emphasized that courts should generally defer
    to administrative agencies’ expertise. The Supreme Court
    later urged federal courts not to apply judicial doctrines, such
    as futility, to statutory exhaustion requirements, where Con-
    gress has “provided otherwise.” See Booth v. Churner, 
    532 U.S. 731
    , 741 n.6 (2001). Here, Congress has provided other-
    wise by expressly stating that the FCC be given an “opportu-
    nity to pass” on issues. 
    47 U.S.C. § 405
    . The D.C. Circuit has
    more recently described this exhaustion requirement as one
    that is “strictly construed” by that circuit. In re Core
    Commc’ns, 
    455 F.3d 267
    , 276 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Any validity
    that the disputed language in Great Falls and Washington
    Utilities may once have had has been superseded by interven-
    ing Supreme Court authority and is no longer binding. Miller
    v. Gammie, 
    335 F.3d 889
    , 900 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
    For these reasons, there is no basis for granting the petition
    for rehearing. The full court has been advised of the petition
    for rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote on
    whether to rehear the matter en banc. The petition for rehear-
    ing and rehearing en banc are denied.
    PRINTED FOR
    ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE—U.S. COURTS
    BY THOMSON REUTERS/WEST—SAN FRANCISCO
    The summary, which does not constitute a part of the opinion of the court, is copyrighted
    © 2009 Thomson Reuters/West.