Boucher v. Shaw ( 2007 )


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  •                     FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    THELMA BOUCHER, ARDITH                          Nos. 05-15454
    BALLARD, JOSEPH W. KENNEDY III                        05-15702
    and LOCAL 226, AFL-CIO,                            D.C. No.
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,            CV-04-01738-PMP
    v.
             ORDER
    DAN SHAW, MICHAEL VILLAMOR,                     CERTIFYING A
    JAMES VAN WOERKOM, DOES 1-50,                   QUESTION TO
    Defendants-Appellees.                THE SUPREME
    COURT OF
            NEVADA
    Filed April 6, 2007
    Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Richard D. Cudahy,* and
    M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judges.
    COUNSEL
    Richard G. McCracken and Kristin L. Martin, McCracken,
    Stemerman, Bowen & Holsberry, 1630 South Commerce
    Street, Suite A-1, Las Vegas, Nevada 89102, for the
    plaintiffs-appellants.
    Constance L. Akridge and Matthew T. Milone, Jones Vargas,
    3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, 3rd Floor South, Las Vegas,
    Nevada 89109, for the defendants-appellees.
    *The Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, Senior United States Circuit Judge
    for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
    3937
    3938                      BOUCHER v. SHAW
    ORDER
    Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Proce-
    dure, we respectfully certify to the Nevada Supreme Court the
    question of law set forth in Section III of this order. This
    question of law will be determinative of a question pending
    before this court, and there is no clearly controlling precedent
    in the decisions of the Nevada Supreme Court.
    We hold the issue concerning union standing and the Fair
    Labor Standards Act claim in abeyance pending the result of
    certification.
    I.   Background
    The Castaways Hotel, Casino and Bowling Center (the
    “Castaways”) closed in January 2004.1 The plaintiffs in the
    present case are three former employees of the Castaways and
    the labor union that represented those employees. The indi-
    vidual plaintiffs, Ardith Ballard, Thelma Boucher and Joseph
    Kennedy III, seek to recover unpaid wages for themselves and
    for a class of Castaways employees. Ballard alleges that she
    has not been paid for the last pay period that she worked at
    the Castaways. Boucher alleges that she was not paid for the
    final pay period until two weeks after her employment was
    terminated. All three individual plaintiffs allege that they have
    not been paid their accrued vacation and holiday pay. Culi-
    nary Workers Union, Local 226 (“Local 226”) seeks to
    recover wages which were withheld as dues from the pay-
    checks of Thelma Boucher and other employees. The plain-
    tiffs assert claims under Chapter 608 of the Nevada Revised
    Statutes and under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 
    29 U.S.C. § 206
    (a). For the purposes of this certification order,
    only the Nevada state law claims are at issue.
    1
    The defendants in their brief refer to the Castaways as VSS Enterprises
    LLC dba The Castaways Hotel, Casino and Bowling Center (“VSS”).
    BOUCHER v. SHAW                    3939
    The defendants in the present case are three Castaways’
    managers. Dan Shaw was the Chairman and Chief Executive
    Officer of the Castaways at the time the plaintiffs were dis-
    charged. Michael Villamor was responsible for handling labor
    and employment matters at the Castaways. And, James Van
    Woerkom was the Castaways’ Chief Financial Officer. Shaw
    and Villamor were also members of VSS Enterprises LLC
    dba The Castaways. Shaw had a 70 percent ownership in the
    Castaways, and Villamor had a 30 percent ownership interest.
    The plaintiffs allege that each defendant had custody or con-
    trol over the “plaintiffs, their employment, or their place of
    employment at the time that the wages were due.”
    The Castaways had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protec-
    tion on June 26, 2003. In January 2004, at the time the indi-
    vidual plaintiffs were discharged, the Castaways was
    operating as a debtor in possession. On February 10, 2004,
    after the plaintiffs were discharged, the Chapter 11 petition
    was converted to a Chapter 7 petition. The Castaways ceased
    operating around the time the bankruptcy case was converted
    to Chapter 7.
    The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in Nevada state court on
    October 14, 2004. On December 21, 2004, Defendant Dan
    Shaw removed the case to the United States District Court for
    the District of Nevada and filed a motion to dismiss pursuant
    to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Villamor and
    Van Woerkom separately filed motions to dismiss as well,
    alleging the same grounds for dismissal as Shaw. The district
    court granted each of the defendant’s motions in full. Boucher
    v. Shaw, No. CV-S-04-1738-PMP (PAL) (D. Nev. Jan. 25,
    2005); Boucher v. Shaw, No. CV-S-04-1738-PMP (PAL) (D.
    Nev. Feb. 18, 2005); Boucher v. Shaw, No. CV-S-04-1738-
    PMP (PAL) (D. Nev. Apr. 11, 2005). The district court con-
    cluded: (1) that the defendants were not “ ‘employer[s]’ under
    Chapter 608 of the Nevada Revised Statutes”; (2) “Local 226
    lacks standing to bring a claim of violation of NRS 608”; and
    (3) the “plaintiffs cannot maintain a cause of action under the
    3940                        BOUCHER v. SHAW
    Fair Labor Standards Act” against the defendants. Boucher v.
    Shaw, No. CV-S-04-1738-PMP (PAL), slip op. at 1-2 (D.
    Nev. Jan. 25, 2005).
    On appeal to this court, the plaintiffs challenged the district
    court’s determination that the defendants were not “employ-
    ers” under Chapter 608 of the Nevada Revised Statutes,
    among other arguments.
    II.   Discussion
    Chapter 608 of the Nevada Revised Statutes provides a
    statutory scheme for wage protection. “An employer shall pay
    to the employee wages for each hour the employee works.”
    
    Nev. Rev. Stat. § 608.016
    . “Whenever an employer dis-
    charges an employee, the wages and compensation earned and
    unpaid at the time of such discharge shall become due and
    payable immediately.” 
    Nev. Rev. Stat. § 608.020
    . “If an
    employer fails to pay: (a) Within 3 days after the wages or
    compensation of a discharged employee becomes due . . . the
    wages or compensation of the employee continues at the same
    rate from the day he . . . was discharged until paid or for 30
    days, whichever is less.” 
    Nev. Rev. Stat. § 608.040
    (1).
    The application of these statutes to the present case
    depends on whether the defendants were “employers” under
    Chapter 608. “ ‘Employer’ includes every person having con-
    trol or custody of any employment, place of employment or
    any employee.” 
    Nev. Rev. Stat. § 608.011
    . The question in
    this case is whether the defendants as individual managers are
    “employers” under § 608.011. This is a question of first impres-
    sion.2 Neither the Nevada Supreme Court nor the Ninth Cir-
    2
    Only the district court in the present case has encountered this specific
    question. In Westbrook v. GES Exposition Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-
    00532-KJD-GWF, 
    2006 WL 3751052
    , at *1 (D. Nev. Dec. 18, 2006), the
    district court determined that the individual defendants in that case did not
    meet the definition of “employer” under Nevada Revised Statutes
    BOUCHER v. SHAW                            3941
    cuit has published an opinion analyzing the definition of
    employer under Nevada Revised Statutes § 608.011.
    The plaintiffs contend that the broad language of the statute
    makes clear that liability for unpaid wages extends beyond the
    common law employer to individual managers, like the defen-
    dants in the present case. They also urge the court to construe
    Chapter 608 of the Nevada Revised Statutes liberally in
    accordance with United States Supreme Court, Ninth Circuit
    and Nevada Supreme Court precedents which have inter-
    preted other wage statutes liberally.
    The defendants argue that Section 608.011 should be lim-
    ited to the entity that “created and maintained the employment
    relationship.” See Leonard v. McMorris, 
    63 P.3d 323
    , 329
    (Colo. 2003). The defendants further argue that the plaintiffs’
    interpretation of the statute to include individual managers as
    employers would be inconsistent with Nevada’s limited liabil-
    ity protection pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes §§ 86.371,
    86.381.
    A number of courts in other states have considered whether
    individuals can be liable as “employers” under state wage
    protection statutes. At least three states have held that their
    respective states’ wage protection statutes permit individual
    managers to be held liable as employers. Butler v. Hartford
    Technical Inst., Inc., 
    704 A.2d 222
    , 227 (Conn. 1997); Chu
    Chung v. New Silver Palace Rest., Inc., 
    272 F. Supp. 2d 314
    ,
    318-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Ellerman v. Centerpoint Prepress,
    Inc., 
    22 P.3d 795
    , 799 (Wash. 2001). However, the definition
    of “employer” provided in Section 608.011 is unique to
    Nevada.
    § 608.011 because they did not “control the purse strings.” Whether the
    defendants in the present case actually had control or custody of the plain-
    tiffs is not at issue, since the present appeal concerns a motion to dismiss
    where an allegation of control or custody is sufficient, not a motion for
    summary judgment as was the case in Westbrook.
    3942                    BOUCHER v. SHAW
    Most of the case law on this question concerns whether an
    individual as an officer or agent of the corporation (and not
    necessarily as an employer) can be held liable under a state’s
    wage protection statutory scheme. The state statutes at issue
    in these cases explicitly allow for agent or officer liability.
    Courts in a number of states have held that an individual act-
    ing as an agent or officer of the corporation can be held liable
    under the state’s respective wage protection statute. See Rich-
    mond v. Hutchinson, 
    829 A.2d 1075
    , 1078 (N.H. 2003); Mul-
    ford v. Computer Leasing, Inc., 
    759 A.2d 887
    , 891 (N.J.
    Super. Ct. Law Div. 1999); Mohney v. McClure, 
    568 A.2d 682
    , 686 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), affirmed 
    604 A.2d 1021
     (Pa.
    1992); Dumas v. InfoSafe Corp., 
    463 S.E.2d 641
    , 645 (S.C.
    Ct. App. 1995); Mullins v. Venable, 
    297 S.E.2d 866
    , 868 (W.
    Va. 1982). But see Leonard v. McMorris, 
    63 P.3d 323
    , 333
    (Colo. 2003) (holding that Colorado’s Wage Claim Act does
    not make officers and agents of a corporation jointly and sev-
    erally liable, along with the corporation, for the payment of
    wages). Section 608.011 does not allow for officer or agent
    liability, nor is this the basis for the plaintiffs’ claims in the
    present case.
    We conclude that the statute is ambiguous and that the case
    law from other states is of limited use. Because this question
    represents an issue of first impression and has significant
    implications for Nevada’s wage protection law and because
    we cannot be certain how the Nevada Supreme Court would
    resolve this matter, we believe certification on this question
    of law to be appropriate.
    III.   Question Certified to the Nevada Supreme Court
    The question of law we certify is:
    Can individual managers be held liable as employers
    for unpaid wages under Chapter 608 of the Nevada
    Revised Statutes?
    BOUCHER v. SHAW                      3943
    IV.    Conclusion
    The plaintiffs’ appeal presents an issue of Nevada state law
    which will be determinative of an issue essential to the resolu-
    tion of the state claims raised in the present case. For this rea-
    son, we request that the Nevada Supreme Court accept and
    decide the question herein certified. We agree to abide by the
    Nevada Supreme Court’s decision as specified by Rule 5 of
    the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, which states that
    “[t]he written opinion of the Supreme Court stating the law
    governing the questions certified . . . shall be res judicata as
    to the parties.” Nev. R. App. P. 5(g).
    The clerk of this court shall forward a copy of this order,
    under official seal, to the Nevada Supreme Court, along with
    copies of all briefs and excerpts of record that have been filed
    with this court. The parties shall notify the clerk of this court
    within 14 days of any decision by the Nevada Supreme Court
    to accept or decline certification. If the Nevada Supreme
    Court accepts certification, the parties shall then notify the
    clerk of this court within 14 days of the issuance of that
    Court’s opinion.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    ____________________
    Margaret McKeown
    United States Circuit Judge
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