Dante Magdaluyo, Jr. v. Mgm Grand Hotel, LLC ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 4 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANTE B. MAGDALUYO, Jr., No. 17-16867
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01806-APG-
GWF
v.
MGM GRAND HOTEL, LLC, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 2, 2019**
Before: TROTT, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Dante B. Magdaluyo Jr. appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his employment action alleging Title VII and state law claims. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Vasquez v. County
of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Magdaluyo’s
hostile work environment claim because Magdaluyo failed to raise a genuine
dispute that he suffered harassment on account of his national origin. See Manatt
v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements of
Title VII hostile work environment claim). In order to color with racial and ethnic
animus every unwelcome event that has happened to him at MGM, Magdaluyo
relies on an incident that allegedly occurred in 2008. According to Magdaluyo, his
direct floor supervisor told him that he “hates Filipinos” and that he hopes the
United States will “invade the Philippines.” Although we recognize that the
supervisor, Rosen, denies making these remarks, viewing this non-hearsay
evidence in the light most favorable to Magdaluyo, it is nevertheless insufficient to
impute discriminatory animus to the dozens, indeed “hundreds,” of MGM
employees Magdaluyo accuses of an immense conspiracy against him. According
to him this conspiracy began in 1996, more than ten years before Rosen’s alleged
offensive statements. Moreover, the alleged harassment which rendered his
workplace hostile and toxic began because of MGM management’s suspicion that
he stole a valuable chip from a baccarat tournament. Between 1996 and 2008,
Magdaluyo offers no evidence of racial animus, only suspicions. Although we do
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not dismiss Rosen’s alleged offensive statements as “stray remarks,” those remarks
plus unsupported suspicions are not enough to create a genuine issue of fact
requiring a trial to resolve.
The district court properly dismissed Magdaluyo’s retaliation claim because
Magdaluyo failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that he suffered an
adverse action as a result of engaging in protected activity. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d
at 646 (setting forth elements of Title VII retaliation claim).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Magdaluyo’s
public disclosure of private facts claim because Magdaluyo failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his private information was publicly
disclosed. See State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. ex rel. Cty. of Clark, 42 P.3d 233, 240
(Nev. 2002) (setting forth requirements for a public disclosure of private facts
claim).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Magdaluyo’s
defamation claim because there was no genuine factual dispute that the statements
in question were either made outside of the limitations period, not published to
third parties, or nonactionable expressions of opinion. See Pegasus v. Reno
Newspapers, Inc., 57 P.3d 82, 90 (2002) (setting forth requirements for a
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defamation claim and explaining that statements of opinion are not defamatory).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Magdaluyo’s
workplace violence claims relating to allegations that took place in 2012 and 2013
because these claims were time-barred. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(c) (two-
year statute of limitation for assault and battery). Contrary to Magdaluyo’s
contention, these allegations did not relate back to the date of filing his initial
complaint in this action. See Asarco, LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 765 F.3d 999,
1005 (9th Cir. 2014) (otherwise time-barred claim in an amended pleading relates
back to the date of a timely original pleading if the amended claim arises out of the
same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as was set forth in the original
complaint).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Magdaluyo’s
workplace violence claims relating to allegations that took place in 2014 and 2015
because Magdaluyo failed to demonstrate that the alleged assaults were reasonably
foreseeable to defendant. See Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 P.3d 1026, 1036-37
(Nev. 2005) (discussing claims under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.745, and explaining that
an employer is liable only if the employee’s intentional conduct is reasonably
foreseeable under the circumstances).
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The district court properly granted summary judgment on Magdaluyo’s
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because Magdaluyo failed to raise
a genuine dispute of material fact that defendant engaged in extreme or outrageous
conduct. See Candelore v. Clark Cty. Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d 588, 591 (9th Cir.
1992) (setting forth elements of an emotional distress claim under Nevada law).
Because Magdaluyo’s intrusion upon seclusion claim was dismissed by
stipulation, and because the remaining claims were dismissed at summary
judgment, Magdaluyo’s argument regarding the magistrate judge’s adverse
inference instruction is moot. See Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Baker, 22 F.3d
880, 896 (9th Cir. 1994).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant’s motion
to strike Magdaluyo’s objections to defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
because the filing was late and failed to comply with the local rules regarding
length. See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth
standard of review, and explaining that “[b]road deference is given to a district
court’s interpretation of its local rules”); see also D. Nev. R. 7-3 (setting page
limits for a response to a motion for summary judgment).
We reject as unsupported by the record Magdaluyo’s contention that the
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district court failed to rule on his false light claim.
We reject as without merit Magdaluyo’s contention that defendant
committed fraud upon the court, that district court judge Richard F. Boulware II
engaged in ex parte communications with defendant, or that district court judge
Andrew P. Gordon was biased.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Magdaluyo’s pending motion (Docket Entry No. 20) is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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