Richard Skinner v. Louisville Ladder, Inc. ( 2019 )

FILED
JAN 09 2019
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD SKINNER, No. 17-56060
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:16-cv-03136-PSG-FFM
v.
LOUISVILLE LADDER, INC., DBA MEMORANDUM*
Davidson Ladders, Inc. and DOES, 1-50,
inclusive,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 5, 2018
Pasadena, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and STEEH,** District
Judge.
Richard Skinner appeals the district court’s order dismissing this case for
lack of standing. We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable George Caram Steeh III, United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
Because the district court considered matters outside the pleadings in
granting Louisville Ladder, Inc.’s motion to dismiss, the motion is treated as one
for summary judgment. See Mayer v. Wedgewood Neighborhood Coal., 707 F.2d
1020, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); see also Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of
Med., 363 F.3d 916, 921–22 (9th Cir. 2004). The district court did not err in
failing to adhere to formal notice requirements, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, because
Skinner was fairly apprised that the district court would consider materials beyond
the pleadings, as evidenced by his inclusion of such extraneous materials in his
opposition to that motion, see Olsen, 363 F.3d at 922, and was also given an
adequate opportunity to respond and to supplement the record (and did so with
affidavits and evidence, all without disputing his lack of standing), see San Pedro
Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 477 (9th Cir. 1998).
The district court did not err in granting Louisville’s motion because there
was no genuine issue of material fact that Skinner lacked prudential standing to
pursue his claims. Because Skinner’s bankruptcy filing transferred the claims
asserted here to his bankruptcy estate and Skinner failed to disclose the claims on
the relevant bankruptcy schedules, they “continue[] to belong to the bankruptcy
estate and did not revert to” Skinner at the closing of his bankruptcy case. See
Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2001); see also 11 U.S.C.
2
§ 541(a). Given that the trustee of the bankruptcy estate did not abandon these
claims, and in fact pursued a settlement of them with Louisville, the estate
remained the real party in interest. See Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225–26
(9th Cir. 2004).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Skinner’s motion
for a continuance given that Skinner was not diligent, had an opportunity to
respond to Louisville’s motion, and failed to indicate he could have cured his
standing deficiency in light of the bankruptcy trustee’s expressed intent not to
abandon the claims. See United States v. 2.61 Acres of Land, 791 F.2d 666,
671–72 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).1
AFFIRMED.
1
Because we decide on these grounds, we do not consider whether Skinner
should be judicially estopped from bringing these claims under Ah Quin v. County
of Kauai Department of Transportation, 733 F.3d 267 (9th Cir. 2013).
3