United States v. Paul Iseda ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 20 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 18-50000
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:17-cr-00334-R-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
PAUL YUTAKA ISEDA, a.k.a. Paul Iseda,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 17, 2018**
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Paul Yutaka Iseda appeals four conditions of supervised release imposed
following his guilty-plea conviction for being a felon in possession of explosive
materials, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 842(i). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Iseda first contends that the district court did not adequately explain its basis
for requiring mental health treatment as a condition of supervised release. Because
Iseda failed to object in the district court, we review for plain error. See United
States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012). The district court did
not plainly err because the record, which is rife with references to Iseda’s
pronounced stress and anxiety, makes clear why it imposed the condition. See id.
at 1090 (“[T]he district court need not state at sentencing the reasons for imposing
each condition of supervised release . . . if the reasoning is apparent from the
record.” (internal quotations and alterations omitted)).
Iseda next argues that the condition requiring mental health treatment is
substantively unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion because
the condition is reasonably related to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) and it involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
necessary to meet the goals of sentencing. See United States v. Lopez, 258 F.3d
1053, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2001).
Finally, Iseda challenges Standard Conditions 5, 6, and 14. Following our
decision in United States v. Evans, 883 F.3d 1154, 1162-64 (9th Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 133 (2018), we vacate those conditions and remand for the
district court to cure the constitutional deficiencies.
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED AND REMANDED in part.
2 18-50000