Gabriel Roman v. Jefferson at Hollywood Lp ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 30 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GABRIEL LUCIAN ROMAN, AKA No. 11-56168
Gabriel L. Roman,
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-03155-RGK-
Plaintiff - Appellant, AJW
v.
MEMORANDUM *
JEFFERSON AT HOLLYWOOD LP,
DBA Jefferson at Hollywood Apartments;
GREYSTAR REAL ESTATES
PARTNERS, LLC,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 11, 2012 **
Pasadena, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: PREGERSON and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and PIERSOL, Senior
District Judge.***
Appellant appeals the district court’s dismissal of his federal Fair Housing
Act (FHA) claims against Appellees, the owners of Jefferson at Hollywood
Apartments. The parties are familiar with the facts underlying the appeal and thus
we do not state them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1291. We affirm.
The district court properly concluded that Appellant failed to state a claim
under the FHA. To show reasonable accommodation discrimination, a plaintiff is
required to show that: (1) he suffers a “handicap” as defined by the FHA; (2)
defendants knew or should have known of plaintiff’s handicap; (3) accommodation
“may be necessary” to afford the plaintiff “an equal opportunity to use and enjoy
the dwelling”; and (4) defendants refused to make such an accommodation. 42
U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir.
2003).
Appellant alleged that he suffers from depression and anxiety and that
Appellees were aware of his condition. But Appellant failed to allege anything
***
The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for South Dakota, sitting by designation.
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showing that Appellees’ waiver of a $75 monthly storage fee was necessary for
Appellant’s use and enjoyment of his two-bedroom Section 8 apartment, rather
than for his live-in caretaker’s convenience. See United States v. Cal. Mobile
Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d 1374, 1381 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the
plaintiff failed to prove her prima facie case of FHA discrimination because she
“failed to show why [her caretaker]’s convenience is necessary for her own use and
enjoyment of her home”). See also Budnick v. Town of Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109,
1119-20 (9th Cir. 2008).
Appellant also failed to allege anything showing that his second requested
accommodation, that he be immediately moved to a top-floor, Section 8 eligible
unit, was reasonable or even possible. Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143,
1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a plaintiff alleging FHA reasonable
accommodation discrimination has the burden to show reasonableness or
possibility of accommodations). Instead, Appellant’s allegations show that no
Section 8 eligible top-floor unit was available at the time of his request and that
Appellees made reasonable efforts to accommodate Appellant, including placing
him on waitlists for other Section 8 units and making arrangements for him to
switch his unit with a comparable unit just above his by paying $300 for overall
moving expenses.
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Regarding Appellant’s FHA retaliation claim, Appellant did not allege any
facts to show that it was Appellant’s request for accommodations, rather than
Appellant’s persistent harassment of Appellees’ leasing staff and other tenants, that
caused Appellees to complain to the Los Angeles Housing Authority. See DuBois
v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir.
2006) (affirming grant of summary judgment to defendants as to plaintiff’s FHA
retaliation claim in part because of plaintiff’s failure to show a “casual link”
between his protected activity and defendants’ adverse action).
The district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of
Appellant’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Such jurisdiction is
“purely discretionary” once all federal claims have been dismissed. Carlsbad
Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1862, 1866-67 (2009).
Finally, the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s request to allow
Luminita, Appellant’s ex-wife and caretaker, to speak on his behalf in court. See
28 U.S.C. § 1654. While the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires state
courts to make disability accommodations, the ADA does not apply to federal
courts. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A).
Accordingly, the district court is AFFIRMED.
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