United States v. Daniel Davis ( 2019 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 23 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No. 18-35112
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. Nos.    1:12-cv-00646-EJL
    1:07-cr-00255-EJL
    v.
    DANIEL MITCHELL DAVIS, a.k.a. Daniel            MEMORANDUM*
    M. Davis,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Idaho
    Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted January 15, 2019**
    Before:      TROTT, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
    Federal prisoner Daniel Mitchell Davis appeals pro se from the district
    court’s orders denying his motion for return of property under Federal Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 41(g) and his motion for reconsideration. We have jurisdiction
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for return of
    property under Rule 41(g). See United States v. Gladding, 
    775 F.3d 1149
    , 1151-52
    (9th Cir. 2014). The district court properly denied Davis’s request for money
    damages for forfeited property that had been destroyed. See Ordonez v. United
    States, 
    680 F.3d 1135
    , 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[E]ven when it results in a wrong
    without a remedy, the federal courts are without jurisdiction to award money
    damages against the government under Rule 41(g) until Congress tells [the court]
    otherwise.”). However, based on the government’s incomprehensible general
    response in the district court and on appeal, we are unable to determine the merits
    of Davis’s appeal as to the Zenith Monitor and HP Pavilion computer, which the
    government indicated were still in its possession, and remand to the district court
    for further consideration on these items.1 In light of this disposition, we do not
    reach Davis’s argument that he is entitled to compensation under the Fifth
    Amendment for the government’s use of those items.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Davis’s motion for
    reconsideration as to the destroyed property because Davis presented no proper
    1
    The district court properly denied Davis’s motion to return the remaining
    items of property in light of the government’s explanation that it was retaining the
    property in connection with Davis’s pending habeas corpus proceedings under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    . See Gladding, 775 F.3d at 1152. Because Davis’s § 2255
    proceedings have concluded, the government has agreed to return these items of
    property (miscellaneous papers, HP mouse and keyboard) to Davis.
    2                                     18-35112
    basis for reconsideration. See School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v.
    ACandS, Inc., 
    5 F.3d 1255
    , 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating abuse of discretion
    standard and explaining when reconsideration is appropriate).
    AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, REMANDED.
    3                                    18-35112
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-35112

Filed Date: 1/23/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021