Paul Carrick v. Tamyra Rice ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 23 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAUL CARRICK, No. 18-16257
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:18-cv-00454-LHK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TAMYRA ANN RICE, Santa Cruz County
Counsel; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Lucy H. Koh, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 15, 2019**
Before: TROTT, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Paul Carrick appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law violations arising out of
Santa Cruz County’s destruction of structures on his property. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Garity v. APWU Nat’l
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Labor Org., 828 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2016) (collateral estoppel); Stewart v. U.S.
Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (res judicata). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Carrick’s action as barred by the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel because Carrick’s claims were
raised, or could have been raised, in prior federal and state actions, and the issues
regarding the legality of the Abatement Order and the preemptive effect of the
Homestead Act were litigated and necessarily decided in those actions. See White
v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926-27 (9th Cir. 2012) (federal and California
doctrines of collateral estoppel); San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego
City Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2009) (California doctrine of res
judicata); Stewart, 297 F.3d at 956 (“Res judicata applies when there is: (1) an
identity of claims; (2) a final judgment on the merits; and (3) identity or privity
between parties.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Carrick leave to
amend because amendment would have been futile. See Gordon v. City of
Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that leave to amend may be denied because amendment would be
futile).
Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal on the basis of res judicata
and collateral estoppel, we do not consider the parties’ contentions regarding the
2 18-16257
sanctions motion.
We reject as meritless Carrick’s contentions regarding the district court’s
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, its complicity in the
destruction of the structures on his property, and its responsibility for his failure to
file an opposition to the motion to dismiss.
We do not consider issues that were not specifically and distinctly raised and
argued in Carrick’s opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2
(9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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