Norman Daniels, III v. Stuart Sherman ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 23 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NORMAN GERALD DANIELS III, No. 17-17421
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00202-AWI-SAB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STUART SHERMAN, Warden, CSATF,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 15, 2019**
Before: TROTT, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Norman Gerald Daniels III, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from
the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Mendoza v. The Roman
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Catholic Archbishop of L.A., 824 F.3d 1148, 1149 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Daniels’s ADA
claim because Daniels failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether any alleged violation arose from discrimination against him because of a
disability. See Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th
Cir. 2010) (“The ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not
inadequate treatment for disability.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Daniels’s requests
for injunctive relief because Daniels lacks standing to seek statewide injunctive
relief on behalf of other visually disabled inmates. See McCollum v. Cal. Dep’t. of
Corr. & Rehab., 647 F.3d 870, 879 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]o demonstrate third party
standing, a plaintiff must show his own injury, a close relationship between
himself and the parties whose rights he asserts, and the inability of the parties to
assert their own rights.” (citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Daniels’s motion to
withdraw his admissions because any withdrawal of Daniels’s admissions would
prejudice defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b); Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d
616, 621 (9th Cir. 2007) (standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Daniels’s various
motions to compel. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)
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(standard of review; discovery rulings “will not be disturbed except upon the
clearest showing that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice
to the complaining litigant” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Getz v. Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing motions
for discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) and explaining that a plaintiff must show
that the discovery sought would have precluded summary judgment).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Daniels’s motion
for leave to file a second amended complaint because amendment would have been
futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th
Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without
leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Daniels’s motion
for reconsideration regarding the denial of his motion to file a second amended
complaint because Daniels failed to establish any basis for such relief. See Sch.
Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir.
1993) (setting forth grounds for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We reject as without merit Daniels’s contentions regarding any district court
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discrimination or bias.
AFFIRMED.
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