Oltman v. Holland ( 2008 )


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  •                     FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JACK OLTMAN, individually and as         
    Executor of the Estate of Bernice
    Oltman; SUSAN OLTMAN,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,           No. 07-35135
    v.
           D.C. No.
    CV-05-01408-JLR
    HOLLAND AMERICA LINE, INC., a
    Washington corporation; HOLLAND                  OPINION
    AMERICA LINE—USA, INC., a
    Delaware corporation,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    July 9, 2008—Seattle, Washington
    Filed August 19, 2008
    Before: Richard R. Clifton and N. Randy Smith,
    Circuit Judges, and Brian Sandoval,* District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge Clifton
    *The Honorable Brian Sandoval, United States District Judge for the
    District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
    10985
    10988        OLTMAN v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE
    COUNSEL
    Noah C. Davis (argued), In Pacta, PLLC, Seattle, Washing-
    ton, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
    John P. Hayes (argued) and Paul S. Smith, Forsberg &
    Umlauf, P.S., Seattle Washington, for the defendants-
    appellees.
    OLTMAN v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE                   10989
    OPINION
    CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:
    Jack Oltman and his mother, Bernice Oltman,1 allege that
    they both contracted a serious gastrointestinal illness on a
    cruise ship operated by Defendants Holland America Line,
    Inc. and Holland America Line—USA, Inc. (collectively,
    Holland). Together with Jack’s wife Susan, they filed an
    action against Holland in Washington state court, which later
    dismissed the action based on a forum selection clause in the
    cruise contract.2 The same day the state court dismissed the
    action, the Oltmans filed an essentially identical action
    against Holland in the federal court specified in the forum
    selection clause. Holland moved for summary judgment,
    arguing that the federal filing was too late based on a one-year
    limitations clause contained in the cruise contract. The Olt-
    mans objected, arguing, among other things, that their filing
    in state court had been timely even though the one-year period
    had expired prior to their federal filing. The district court
    granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of Holland
    after concluding the claims were time-barred under the con-
    tract.
    The primary question presented by this appeal is whether
    the contractual limitations period should have been equitably
    tolled based on the timely filing of the state court action and
    the prompt filing in federal court after the state action was
    dismissed. We answer that question in the affirmative and
    reverse.
    1
    Bernice passed away on September 19, 2006. Her interests in this law-
    suit are now represented by Jack, as the executor of Bernice’s estate.
    2
    Because Jack, Bernice, and Susan Oltman share the same last name, in
    this opinion they are identified by their first names.
    10990             OLTMAN v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE
    I.       Background
    Jack booked a cruise for himself and his mother, Bernice,
    on March 18, 2004. They boarded Holland’s ship, the MS
    Amsterdam, in Chile less than two weeks later, on March 31,
    2004, and arrived in San Diego, California, as scheduled on
    April 17. They received their travel documents at the time
    they boarded the ship in Chile.3
    The travel documents were contained in a travel booklet,
    which included their itinerary, the contract governing the
    cruise (the cruisetour contract), and cancellation information.
    The contract began on page 11 of the booklet and stated that
    it was “ISSUED SUBJECT TO THE TERMS AND CONDI-
    TIONS ON THIS PAGE AND THE FOLLOWING PAGES.”
    The contract advised the Oltmans to “READ TERMS AND
    CONDITIONS CAREFULLY.” The contract noted that
    “THIS DOCUMENT IS A LEGALLY BINDING CON-
    TRACT” and included a forum selection clause stating that
    any lawsuit arising out of the cruise or contract must be liti-
    gated in the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
    trict of Washington or, if that court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction, “in the courts of King County, State of Washing-
    ton.”
    The contract also informed the Oltmans that “YOUR
    ATTENTION IS ESPECIALLY DIRECTED TO” various
    clauses in the contract, including clause A.3, which provided:
    3. Time Limits for Noticing Claims and Filing
    and Service of Lawsuits. In any case governed by
    3
    According to Jack, they received their travel documents either “six
    days prior to the cruise[ ] or at the time [they] boarded the cruise ship in
    Valparaiso, Chile.” Construing this evidence in the light most favorable to
    the Oltmans, for purposes of this appeal we assume they received the
    travel documents at the time they boarded the ship. See Olsen v. Idaho
    State Bd. of Med., 
    363 F.3d 916
    , 922 (9th Cir. 2004).
    OLTMAN v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE             10991
    46 United States Code Section 183b, which is a
    United States statute that permits any shipowner to
    limit the time during which a passenger may file a
    claim or commence suit against a shipowner, you
    may not maintain a lawsuit against us or the Ship for
    loss of life or bodily injury unless written notice of
    the claim is delivered to us not later than six (6)
    months after the day of death or injury, the lawsuit
    is commenced not later than one (1) year after the
    day of death or injury, and valid service of the law-
    suit on Owner, the HAL Company or the Ship, as
    applicable, is made within thirty (30) days following
    the expiration of that one-year period. For all other
    claims, including but not limited to claims for loss or
    damage to baggage, breach of contract, illness or
    death or injury, not governed by 46 United States
    Code Section 183b, you may not maintain a lawsuit
    against us or the Ship, nor will we or the Ship be lia-
    ble therefore, unless we are provided with written
    notice of claim within thirty (30) days after conclu-
    sion of the Cruise or Cruisetour, the lawsuit for such
    claim is commenced not later than one-year after
    conclusion of the Cruise or Cruisetour, and valid ser-
    vice of the lawsuit on Owner, the Ship or the HAL
    Company, as applicable, is made within thirty (30)
    days following the expiration of that one-year
    period.
    While on the cruise, Jack and Bernice allege that they con-
    tracted “a severe gastrointestinal disease [that] broke out and
    infected many of the passengers.” On April 16, 2004, the day
    before the ship arrived in San Diego, Jack visited the ship’s
    infirmary for “stomach discomfort.” That night, Jack “felt
    much better.” The next morning, however, his “disposition
    changed drastically” and he “fell horribly ill” with “pounding
    in my head,” “aching throughout my body,” and “feelings of
    being hot and cold” and “nauseas with diarrhea.” Jack and
    10992          OLTMAN v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE
    Bernice continued to suffer from the “illness, its symptoms
    and/or side effects” for more than a year.
    On March 30, 2005, shortly before expiration of the one-
    year time limit set by the contractual provision quoted above,
    the Oltmans, who were then residents of California, filed a
    complaint against Holland in King County Superior Court. It
    alleged, among other things, that Holland’s negligence led to
    the illnesses of Jack and Bernice. The complaint also included
    a claim by Susan for loss of consortium.
    Holland moved to dismiss that action on the ground that the
    forum selection clause required the action to be filed in the
    U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington.
    On August 12, 2005, the state trial court granted that motion.
    The Oltmans appealed that state court dismissal, but to protect
    themselves, they also filed the current action in the Western
    District of Washington on the same day the state court action
    was dismissed.
    That was, however, more than one year after Jack and Ber-
    nice became ill and their cruise trip ended. Holland brought
    a motion for summary judgment in federal district court on
    the ground that the federal action was filed after the one-year
    limitations period established by the contract. The district
    court granted that motion with regard to the claims brought by
    Jack and Bernice. The court concluded that the one-year limi-
    tations period in the cruise contract was reasonably communi-
    cated and was fundamentally fair, so it was effective and
    barred the claims brought by Jack and Bernice, both of whom
    were parties to the contract. The court denied summary judg-
    ment on Susan’s loss of consortium claim, however, conclud-
    ing that the contract, including its limitations clause, did not
    apply to Susan, as she was not a party to the contract.
    Holland subsequently brought another motion for summary
    judgment on Susan’s loss of consortium claim on a different
    ground, arguing that her claim must be dismissed because
    OLTMAN v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE             10993
    Jack contracted his illness outside of United States territorial
    waters while federal maritime law recognizes such a claim
    only where the illness was contracted within territorial waters.
    After that motion was filed but before it was resolved, the
    Washington Court of Appeals, on appeal from the state trial
    court’s dismissal, concluded that the cruise contract does
    apply to Susan. See Oltman v. Holland Am. Line USA, Inc.,
    
    148 P.3d 1050
    , 1058 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006), overruled in part
    by 
    178 P.3d 981
    , 990, 995 (Wash. 2008). The district court
    honored that ruling by granting Holland’s motion for sum-
    mary judgment on Susan’s claim on collateral estoppel
    grounds, holding that Susan’s loss of consortium claim, like
    the claims of Jack and Bernice, was time-barred under the
    contract. The court did not address Holland’s argument based
    on the contention that Susan’s claim should not be recognized
    because Jack did not become ill within U.S. territorial waters.
    The Oltmans later brought two separate motions, one each
    under Rules 59 and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
    dure, for the court to reconsider its summary judgment orders.
    They argued that the limitations period should have been
    equitably tolled and cited for the first time two cases in sup-
    port of that argument: Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. RR. Co., 
    380 U.S. 424
    (1965), and Berry v. Pac. Sportfishing, Inc., 
    372 F.2d 213
    (9th Cir. 1967). The district court denied both motions.
    On February 26, 2007, the Oltmans appealed the district
    court’s summary judgment orders and orders denying relief
    under Rules 59 and 60(b). While this appeal was pending, the
    Washington Supreme Court reversed the state court of
    appeals’ decision that Susan is bound by the cruise contract,
    held that the contract does not apply to Susan, and remanded
    her loss of consortium claim to the King County Superior
    Court. See 
    Oltman, 178 P.3d at 990
    , 995. The state supreme
    court, in effect, reached the same conclusion that the district
    court reached when it first considered the issue. Because this
    case was already on appeal, though, the district court has not
    10994              OLTMAN v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE
    been able to revisit that question, and it is left for us to take
    into account this subsequent development.
    II.       Discussion
    The Oltmans seek reversal of the district court’s summary
    judgment orders. They contend that the one-year limitations
    clause in the contract is invalid because it was not reasonably
    communicated and is fundamentally unfair. They further
    assert that, even if the limitations clause is enforceable, the
    limitations period should have been equitably tolled during
    the pendency of the state court action. Lastly, the Oltmans ask
    this court to remand Susan’s loss of consortium claim in light
    of the Washington Supreme Court’s recent decision.
    We review a district court’s decision to grant summary
    judgment de novo. 
    Olsen, 363 F.3d at 922
    . Under Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 56, we must determine whether,
    viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
    moving party, there are any genuine issues of material fact
    and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant
    substantive law. Id.; see generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
    A.        Validity of the One-Year Limitations Clause
    1.    Reasonable Communicativeness Test
    [1] This court employs the two-pronged “reasonable com-
    municativeness test” to “determine under federal common law
    and maritime law when the passenger of a common carrier is
    contractually bound by the fine print of a passenger ticket.”
    Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 
    306 F.3d 827
    , 835 (9th Cir.
    2002). The first prong of the test “focuses on the physical
    characteristics of the ticket” and requires courts to “assess
    features such as size of type, conspicuousness and clarity of
    notice on the face of the ticket, and the ease with which a pas-
    senger can read the provisions in question.” 
    Id. (internal quo-
    tation marks and brackets omitted). The second prong
    OLTMAN v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE             10995
    “requires us to evaluate the circumstances surrounding the
    passenger’s purchase and subsequent retention of the ticket/
    contract,” including “the passenger’s familiarity with the
    ticket, the time and incentive under the circumstances to study
    the provisions of the ticket, and any other notice that the pas-
    senger received outside of the ticket.” 
    Id. at 836
    (quotation
    marks and emphasis omitted).
    [2] Jack and Bernice were given a travel booklet that
    included their itinerary and the cruise contract. The table of
    contents appears before the itinerary and lists four items,
    including “CONTRACT (PLEASE READ),” which begins on
    page 11. On the third page of the contract, the passengers’
    cabin number is listed, under which the following appears:
    “ISSUED SUBJECT TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
    ON THIS PAGE AND THE FOLLOWING PAGES. READ
    TERMS AND CONDITIONS CAREFULLY.” The upper
    right side of that page states “CRUISE AND CRUISETOUR
    CONTRACT” and the word “CONTRACT” appears in large
    print on the right margin of that page. The next page is enti-
    tled “IMPORTANT NOTICE TO PASSENGERS” and states
    that “THIS DOCUMENT IS A LEGALLY BINDING CON-
    TRACT” and that “YOUR ATTENTION IS ESPECIALLY
    DIRECTED TO CLAUSES A.1, A.3, . . . WHICH CON-
    TAIN IMPORTANT LIMITATIONS ON YOUR RIGHT TO
    ASSERT CLAIMS AGAINST US.” The top of the next page
    says “IMPORTANT TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF
    CONTRACT—READ CAREFULLY BEFORE ACCEPT-
    ING.” The following page contains clause A.3, to which pas-
    sengers are “especially directed,” and is entitled “Time Limits
    for Noticing Claims and Filing and Service of Lawsuits.” That
    clause clearly states that “you may not maintain a lawsuit
    against us or the Ship for loss of life or bodily injury unless
    . . . the lawsuit is commenced not later than one (1) year after
    the day of death or injury.” Based on the physical characteris-
    tics of the contract, the terms and conditions of the one-year
    limitations clause are sufficiently conspicuous and meet the
    first prong of the test. See 
    Wallis, 306 F.3d at 835-36
    .
    10996          OLTMAN v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE
    [3] Regarding the Oltmans’ “purchase and subsequent
    retention of the ticket/contract,” see 
    id. at 836
    (quotation
    marks omitted), construing the evidence in their favor, they
    received the travel booklet at the time of departure because
    Jack purchased the tickets only thirteen days prior. Although
    the Oltmans may not have read the terms and conditions
    before departing, they were free to read them at their leisure
    and presented no evidence that their travel booklets were
    taken away from them during or after the cruise trip. Because
    the Oltmans had the opportunity to read the contract at any
    point before filing their first complaint, they had the “ability
    to become meaningfully informed,” and the second prong of
    the reasonable communicativeness test is met. See 
    id. (empha- sis
    and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we uphold the
    district court’s decision that the limitations clause was reason-
    ably communicated to Jack and Bernice.
    2.    Fundamental Fairness
    [4] Cruisetour contract clauses are also “subject to judicial
    scrutiny for fundamental fairness.” Carnival Cruise Lines,
    Inc. v. Shute, 
    499 U.S. 585
    , 595 (1991). Courts focus on
    whether the clause was included because of “bad-faith
    motive” and whether the clause was “a means of discouraging
    cruise passengers from pursuing legitimate claims.” 
    Id. Here, there
    is no evidence that Holland included the limitations
    clause out of bad faith or that the clause was intended to dis-
    courage legitimate claims. Moreover, “Congress has . . . indi-
    cated that [cruisetour] contracts may legally shorten the
    limitations period to one year.” Dempsey v. Norwegian Cruise
    Line, 
    972 F.2d 998
    , 999 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
    [5] In determining whether the clause is fundamentally fair,
    this court also considers whether Holland obtained Jack’s and
    Bernice’s “accession to the . . . clause by fraud or overreach-
    ing.” 
    Shute, 499 U.S. at 595
    . The Oltmans argue that Holland
    “either induced Plaintiffs to enter into this contract based
    upon the misrepresentations (that the trip was safe and enjoy-
    OLTMAN v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE                   10997
    able) and the failure to disclose (that there had been at least
    863 other cases of gastrointestinal illness aboard the [ship]
    . . .) or [Holland] breached this covenant.” In order to estab-
    lish fraudulent inducement, the Oltmans must show, among
    other things, that Holland knew of the falsity and intended
    that they rely on that falsity. See Webster v. L. Romano Eng’g
    Corp., 
    34 P.2d 428
    , 430 (Wash. 1934). The Oltmans offer no
    evidence establishing whether Holland intended that they rely
    on the alleged misrepresentations or otherwise acted with
    fraud. The limitations clause is therefore fundamentally fair,
    and we uphold the district court’s conclusion that the one-year
    limitations clause is valid and enforceable.
    B.    Equitable Tolling of the Limitations Period
    The Oltmans contend that, even if the limitations clause is
    enforceable, the district court erred in dismissing their claims
    as time-barred because the limitations period should have
    been tolled during the pendency of the state court action. The
    Oltmans rely on Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. RR. Co., 
    380 U.S. 424
    (1965), and Berry v. Pac. Sportfishing, Inc., 
    372 F.2d 213
    (9th
    Cir. 1967).4
    In Burnett, the plaintiff timely filed his action under the
    Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) in Ohio state court,
    where the defendant moved to dismiss based on improper
    
    venue. 380 U.S. at 424-25
    . Eight days after the state court dis-
    missed the action on that ground, the plaintiff brought an
    identical action in federal court. 
    Id. at 425.
    Because the fed-
    eral complaint was filed after the limitations period had
    4
    Although the Oltmans did not cite these cases in their summary judg-
    ment papers, we consider all pertinent legal authority when conducting a
    de novo review. See Thomas v. Or. Fruit Prods. Co., 
    228 F.3d 991
    , 995
    (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that under de novo review, a court “consider[s]
    anew both the legal and factual aspects of” a claim). Moreover, the Olt-
    mans raised the issue of tolling in their summary judgment papers, in
    some fashion at least, when they urged that “this suit was a continuation
    of the state court action.”
    10998          OLTMAN v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE
    expired, it was dismissed as untimely. 
    Id. The dismissal
    was
    affirmed on appeal, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari
    to determine “whether petitioner’s suit in the Ohio state court
    tolled the FELA statute of limitations.” 
    Id. at 425-26.
    [6] The Supreme Court first examined FELA’s congressio-
    nal intent, acknowledging that the “basic question to be
    answered in determining whether, under a given set of facts,
    a statute of limitations is to be tolled, is one ‘of legislative
    intent whether the right shall be enforceable after the pre-
    scribed time.’ ” 
    Id. at 426
    (ellipses and internal citation omit-
    ted). The Court also observed the general policies underlying
    statutes of limitations and equitable tolling, noting that stat-
    utes of limitations “are primarily designed to assure fairness
    to defendants” and to “promote justice by preventing surprises
    through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slum-
    ber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
    witnesses have disappeared.” 
    Id. at 428
    (quotation marks and
    citation omitted). The Court also stated, however, that “[t]his
    policy of repose . . . is frequently outweighed . . . where the
    interests of justice require vindication of the plaintiff’s
    rights.” 
    Id. The Court
    observed that “[b]oth federal and state
    jurisdictions have recognized the unfairness of barring a
    plaintiff’s action solely because a prior timely action is dis-
    missed for improper venue after the applicable statute of limi-
    tations has run.” 
    Id. at 430,
    434 (“[B]oth Congress and the
    States have made clear, through various procedural statutes,
    their desire to prevent timely actions brought in courts with
    improper venue from being time-barred merely because the
    limitation period expired while the action was in the improper
    court.”).
    [7] The Court ultimately concluded that the FELA statute
    of limitations was tolled. 
    Id. at 427-28.
    This decision “effectu-
    ate[d] the basic congressional purposes” behind FELA. 
    Id. at 427.
    The Court also reasoned that tolling applied because the
    plaintiff “did not sleep on his rights but brought an action
    within the statutory period in the state court.” 
    Id. at 429.
    The
    OLTMAN v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE               10999
    Court noted that the plaintiff’s failure to file in federal court
    was “not because he was disinterested, but solely because he
    felt that his state action was sufficient.” 
    Id. Further, the
    defen-
    dant “could not have relied upon the policy of repose
    embodied in the limitation statute, for it was aware that peti-
    tioner was actively pursuing his FELA remedy; in fact, [the
    defendant] appeared specially in the [state] court to file a
    motion for dismissal on grounds of improper venue.” 
    Id. at 430.
    In Berry, which the Oltmans also cite, the plaintiff brought
    a claim for the wrongful death of her husband, which
    occurred on the high 
    seas. 372 F.2d at 213-14
    . The plaintiff
    had filed a timely action in state court and later filed an
    untimely claim in federal court, after realizing that the federal
    court had exclusive jurisdiction over her claim. 
    Id. This court
    applied Burnett’s reasoning to conclude that the limitations
    period was tolled during the pendency of the state action, not-
    ing that “the claim certainly had not been allowed to slumber
    until evidence had been lost, memories had faded, and wit-
    nesses had disappeared” because the plaintiff “had been press-
    ing her suit” in state court. 
    Id. at 215.
    Because the state court
    action “accomplished the purposes referred to in the Burnett
    case, . . . the statute of limitations was tolled.” 
    Id. [8] Holland
    argues on appeal that Burnett and Berry are
    distinguishable because they dealt with statutory limitations
    periods, while the limitations period in this case was “set by
    contract.” Holland asks this court to instead follow Levick v.
    Steiner Transocean Ltd., 
    377 F. Supp. 2d 1251
    , 1258 (S.D.
    Fla. 2005), which concluded that “[t]he instant case is distin-
    guishable from Burnett in that the limitations period at issue
    arises out of a contract.” (Emphasis added). We note, how-
    ever, that the court to which appeals from the Southern Dis-
    trict of Florida are taken—the Eleventh Circuit—recently
    described Levick’s distinction between statutory and contrac-
    tual limitations periods to be “dubious” and “questionable”
    and observed that it “had expressly rejected this distinction
    11000          OLTMAN v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE
    in” a case that pre-dated Levick. See Booth v. Carnival Corp.,
    
    522 F.3d 1148
    , 1151 n.4 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that the
    Eleventh Circuit had previously rejected Levick’s distinction
    in Bailey v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 
    774 F.2d 1577
    , 1579
    n.3 (11th Cir. 1985)).
    The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Booth is also pertinent
    because it addressed the very issue currently before us. Booth
    concerned a wrongful death action that stemmed from a fatal
    scuba diving accident that occurred while the decedent was a
    passenger on a Carnival cruise 
    ship. 522 F.3d at 1149
    . The
    cruise contract contained clauses specifying a one-year limita-
    tions period and designating the Southern District of Florida
    as the appropriate forum. 
    Id. The plaintiff,
    Victor Booth, as a
    personal representative of the decedent’s estate, filed a timely
    action against Carnival in state court where it was dismissed
    for improper venue. 
    Id. at 1149-50.
    More than five months
    after filing the state court complaint, Booth filed an identical
    action in the proper federal court, after the limitations period
    had expired. 
    Id. at 1150.
    Carnival challenged the federal com-
    plaint as untimely, but the district court ruled that “the con-
    tractual limitation period was subject to equitable tolling.” 
    Id. On appeal,
    the Eleventh Circuit concluded that “Burnett’s
    reasoning extends beyond the FELA context and sheds impor-
    tant light on the instant case.” 
    Id. at 1151
    n.4. The court noted
    that, although the Burnett Court examined the legislative
    intent behind FELA, “the Court did not limit its analysis to a
    FELA-specific inquiry; rather, the Court articulated several
    general principles that supported equitable tolling under the
    circumstances.” 
    Id. at 1151
    (footnote omitted). Because Booth
    “timely filed suit in a state court,” the Eleventh Circuit con-
    cluded that “Booth in no way slept on his claims.” 
    Id. at 1152.
    Further, the court stated that, “[e]ven though Booth filed the
    instant federal suit after the contractual limitation period had
    run, Carnival was aware within the limitation period that
    Booth was actively pursuing his cause of action.” 
    Id. Finally, the
    court observed that the “underlying policy of repose . . .
    OLTMAN v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE              11001
    is not violated by equitable tolling in this case” because
    “Booth diligently pursued his claim.” 
    Id. at 1152-53.
    The
    Eleventh Circuit therefore “equitably tolled the parallel fed-
    eral action during the pendency of the state suit.” 
    Id. at 1153.
    We conclude, like the Booth court, that Burnett guides our
    decision in the present case. Burnett articulated general prin-
    ciples concerning equitable tolling and statutes of limitations
    that are applicable to this case. Further, we previously noted
    that “[e]quitable tolling is routinely held to be proper where,
    as here, a claimant filed suit in a venue without jurisdiction
    over the claim.” Sloan v. West, 
    140 F.3d 1255
    , 1262 (9th Cir.
    1998) (applying equitable tolling to Title VII discrimination
    claims).
    [9] Holland acknowledged that it would not be prejudiced
    by a decision to toll the limitations period. The Oltmans did
    not sleep on their claims, but brought a timely action in state
    court. See 
    Burnett, 380 U.S. at 429
    . Holland was served pro-
    cess and notified of the claims on a timely basis. Holland was
    aware that the Oltmans were actively pursuing their claims
    and even “appeared specially in the [state] court to file a
    motion for dismissal on grounds of improper venue.” See 
    id. at 430.
    Like in Burnett, the Oltmans’ failure to file suit in fed-
    eral court was “not because [they were] disinterested, but
    solely because [they] felt that [their] state action was suffi-
    cient.” See 
    id. at 429.
    Further, as the Oltmans note, during the
    state court hearing on Holland’s motion to dismiss the origi-
    nal complaint, Holland’s counsel stated his understanding that
    the Oltmans could “refile in federal court.” Had Holland
    removed the case to federal court rather than moved to dis-
    miss it, the timeliness of the Oltmans’ claims would have
    been preserved. Under the circumstances of this case, where
    the Oltmans’ timely state court complaint was dismissed for
    improper forum, they then promptly filed in federal court, and
    Holland is not prejudiced by tolling the limitations period, we
    hold that the policy of repose is outweighed by the interests
    of justice and that the limitations period should have been
    11002           OLTMAN v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE
    equitably tolled. See 
    Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428
    , 434-35; 
    Booth, 522 F.3d at 1152-53
    . We therefore reverse the district court’s
    dismissal of the claims via summary judgment as time-barred.5
    C.     Loss of Consortium Claim
    Even if Susan’s claims were deemed subject to the one-
    year limitations period, those claims would similarly be enti-
    tled to equitable tolling. In light of the subsequent reversal by
    the state supreme court, Holland acknowledges that the deci-
    sion of the state court of appeals, on which the district court
    expressly relied in granting summary judgment to Holland on
    Susan’s claim, is no longer good law, such that Susan is not
    subject to the one-year contractual limitations period in any
    event. We agree. Summary judgment on that basis must be
    reversed.
    [10] Holland argues that we should affirm the judgment
    against Susan’s claim on other grounds, however, offering to
    us the argument that was presented to but not ruled upon by
    the district court, that Susan’s claim cannot be recognized
    because Jack became ill outside of U.S. territorial waters.
    Because the district court did not address the merits of this
    argument and the Oltmans’ other claims have been revived,
    we decline the invitation to take up Holland’s argument at this
    time, reverse the district court’s summary judgment as to
    Susan’s loss of consortium claim based on the purportedly
    untimely filing, and remand that claim to the district court for
    further consideration.
    III.    Conclusion
    Under the circumstances of this case, equitable tolling
    applies and the Oltmans’ claims were not untimely. We there-
    5
    Because we reverse the district court’s summary judgment, we need
    not and do not decide whether the Oltmans were entitled to relief under
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 59 or 60(b).
    OLTMAN v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE             11003
    fore reverse the district court’s orders granting summary judg-
    ment on the Oltmans’ claims and remand the claims to the
    district court for further proceedings.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.