Nancy Radin v. Darlene Hunt , 499 F. App'x 684 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              NOV 26 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    NANCY RADIN,                                      Nos. 11-57228
    12-55432
    Plaintiff - Appellant/Appellee,
    D.C. No. 2:10-cv-08838-JAK-SS
    v.
    DARLENE HUNT and SHOWTIME                         MEMORANDUM *
    NETWORKS, INC., a Delaware
    corporation,
    Defendants - Appellees/Appellants.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 9, 2012
    Pasadena, California
    Before: BRIGHT,** GRABER, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiff Nancy Radin appeals the district court’s denial of additional
    discovery to her, its grant of summary judgment to Defendants Darlene Hunt and
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Myron H. Bright, Senior Circuit Judge for the United
    States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    Showtime Network, Inc., and its award of attorney fees to Defendants under 
    17 U.S.C. § 505
    . Defendants cross-appeal the denial of their motion for sanctions
    under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. We affirm.
    1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying additional
    discovery. Tatum v. City of San Francisco, 
    441 F.3d 1090
    , 1100 (9th Cir. 2006).
    It permissibly rested its decision on its determination that Plaintiff’s failure to
    engage in discovery earlier was not excusable. See Pfingston v. Ronan Eng’g Co.,
    
    284 F.3d 999
    , 1005 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The failure to conduct discovery diligently is
    grounds for the denial of [additional discovery].").
    2. The district court correctly granted summary judgment to Defendants as
    to Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim. Viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to Plaintiff, Mortimer v. Baca, 
    594 F.3d 714
    , 721 (9th Cir. 2010), no
    reasonable jury could conclude either that Defendants had access to Plaintiff’s
    work or that the two works are substantially similar—much less strikingly similar,
    see Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 
    462 F.3d 1072
    , 1076 (9th Cir.
    2006) (holding that, to establish copying, a plaintiff generally must show both
    access and substantial similarity); Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 
    212 F.3d 477
    , 485 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that an inference of copying may arise without
    evidence of access where the works are "strikingly similar").
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    3. Nor did the district court apply an incorrect standard in assessing
    Defendants’ Rule 11 motion. The district court’s statement is consistent with Rule
    11, as it evinces a concern with the merit of Plaintiff’s suit as it developed in
    litigation, and not just at the time of filing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Further,
    when the statement is read in context, it is clear the court did not rest its denial of
    sanctions on the sincerity of Plaintiff’s beliefs regarding the merits. Neither did
    the court abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Defendants. Omega S.A.
    v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 
    541 F.3d 982
    , 984 (9th Cir. 2008). There is no rule
    against awarding fees under 
    17 U.S.C. § 505
     where a third party indemnifies a
    litigant’s legal expenses. The district court permissibly applied the factors
    identified in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 
    510 U.S. 517
    , 534 n.19 (1994).
    4. With respect to Defendants’ cross-appeal, the district court did not abuse
    its discretion in declining to impose Rule 11 sanctions against Plaintiff or her
    counsel. Sneller v. City of Bainbridge Island, 
    606 F.3d 636
    , 638 (9th Cir. 2010).
    Plaintiff’s copyright claim rested on recognized legal theories and, although it was
    ultimately inadequate to survive summary judgment, the decision of Plaintiff’s
    counsel to pursue the claim was not so factually baseless as to require the district
    court to impose sanctions. See Moore v. Keegan Mgmt. Co. (In re Keegan Mgmt.
    Co., Sec. Litig.), 
    78 F.3d 431
    , 434 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversing sanctions award and
    3
    holding that, to warrant Rule 11 sanctions, a filing must be "frivolous"—that is,
    "both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry." (internal
    quotation marks omitted)).
    AFFIRMED.
    4