Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC v. Haley Colombo ( 2009 )


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  •                     FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    In re: THE MATTER OF THE                  
    COMPLAINT OF MISSION BAY JET
    SPORTS, LLC; AND ROBERT
    ADAMSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A
    MISSION BAY JET SPORTS FOR
    EXONERATION FROM OR LIMITATION
    OF LIABILITY,
    No. 08-56142
    D.C. No.
    MISSION BAY JET SPORTS, LLC, a                CV-08-00146-JM-
    California Limited Liability                        CAB
    Corporation; ROBERT ADAMSON,                      OPINION
    individually and d/b/a MISSION
    BAY JET SPORTS, LLC,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    HALEY COLOMBO; JESSICA SLAGEL,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Jeffrey T. Miller, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    June 3, 2009—Pasadena, California
    Filed June 24, 2009
    Before: Pamela Ann Rymer and Susan P. Graber,
    Circuit Judges, and Ann Aldrich,* District Judge.
    *The Honorable Ann Aldrich, Senior United States District Judge for
    the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
    7853
    7854   MISSION BAY JET SPORTS v. COLOMBO
    Opinion by Judge Rymer
    7856          MISSION BAY JET SPORTS v. COLOMBO
    COUNSEL
    Sterling J. Stires, Law Offices of Charles S. LiMandri, Ran-
    cho Santa Fe, California, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
    Thomas L. Tosdal (argued) and Ann M. Smith, Tosdal, Smith,
    Steiner & Wax, San Diego, California, for the real parties in
    interest, defendants-appellees.
    OPINION
    RYMER, Circuit Judge:
    We must decide whether admiralty jurisdiction exists over
    tort claims by two women who were seriously injured when
    thrown off a jet-propelled Sea-Doo personal watercraft, alleg-
    edly operated negligently, on navigable waters in an area of
    San Diego’s Mission Bay that is reserved for the use of such
    vessels. The district court thought not, but we believe both the
    location of the accident and its connection to traditional mari-
    time activity sustain admiralty jurisdiction. Accordingly, we
    reverse and remand.
    I
    After hours on the evening of July 29, 2007, a friend asked
    Brett Kohl, who worked at Mission Bay Jet Sports, for a jet
    MISSION BAY JET SPORTS v. COLOMBO                     7857
    ski for himself and a group of friends. Kohl took a Sea-Doo
    personal watercraft to Mission Bay, where he offered rides to
    two teenagers, Haley Colombo and Jessica Slagel. With them
    on board, he drove the watercraft in a cul-de-sac of the South
    Pacific Passage that is reserved for personal watercraft by
    posted signs and a north-south buoy line across the west, or
    ocean-facing, side of the area. Slagel and Colombo allege in
    a state court complaint that Kohl drove the watercraft in tight
    circles at 25 miles per hour. They were tossed off once, asked
    Kohl not to do it again, got back on, and were thrown off
    again, this time with the unfortunate consequence that each
    was seriously hurt by the force of the vessel’s jet propulsion
    system. Kohl drove Colombo back to land, while a friend
    drove Slagel. Care was administered by paramedics on shore
    before Colombo and Slagel were taken to the hospital.
    Mission Bay Jet Sports and its owner, Robert Adamson,
    brought this action in federal district court under Federal Rule
    of Civil Procedure 9(h)1 and Supplemental Rule F for Admi-
    ralty or Maritime Claims,2 invoking the court’s admiralty
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1333
    (1) and seeking
    exoneration or limitation of their liability to the $6,005 value
    of the watercraft under the Shipowners Limitation of Liability
    Act, 
    46 U.S.C. § 30505
    . They also asked for an injunction
    against further prosecution of the state court action as to them.
    The district court stayed the state court action. Slagel and
    Colombo moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), contending that the court
    lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that no relief was avail-
    able under the Limitation of Liability Act.
    1
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h) permits pleading of claims for relief that are
    “within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction and also within the court’s
    subject-matter jurisdiction on some other ground.”
    2
    Fed. R. Civ. P., Supp. R. F permits the filing of a complaint under
    admiralty jurisdiction for exoneration from, and limitation of liability for,
    claims against a shipowner, and it outlines procedures for the limitation
    action.
    7858            MISSION BAY JET SPORTS v. COLOMBO
    The district court found that the incident occurred on navi-
    gable waters because the area was within the ebb and flow of
    the tide of the Pacific Ocean. It also found that the cul-de-sac
    was isolated, shallow, and without commercial shipping, and
    that there were no docks, wharfs, or commercial establish-
    ments in the personal watercraft area, that jet ski rental estab-
    lishments are located outside Mission Bay Park, and that there
    was no Coast Guard or Harbor Patrol rescue. The court con-
    cluded that there was no potential impact on maritime com-
    merce because the incident involved injuries from a single-
    recreational vessel accident in an area where no commercial
    shipping occurs. Accordingly, it dismissed the action for lack
    of admiralty jurisdiction and, having done so, did not reach
    applicability of the Limitation of Liability Act.
    Mission Bay Jet Sports and Adamson timely appealed.3
    II
    [1] The United States Constitution grants original jurisdic-
    tion to federal courts to hear admiralty claims. See U.S. Const.
    art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This jurisdiction, codified at 
    28 U.S.C. § 1333
    (1), allows the filing of claims related to maritime con-
    tracts and maritime torts. A party seeking to invoke federal
    admiralty jurisdiction “over a tort claim must satisfy both a
    location test and a connection test.” Gruver, 489 F.3d at 982
    (citing Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge &
    Dock Co., 
    513 U.S. 527
    , 534 (1995)). The tort must occur on
    navigable waters and bear a “significant relationship to tradi-
    tional maritime activity.” Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson,
    
    457 U.S. 668
    , 674 (1982). Thus the “location” prong focuses
    on “whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether
    3
    We review a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo,
    Gruver v. Lesman Fisheries Inc., 
    489 F.3d 978
    , 982 (9th Cir. 2007), and
    the district court’s findings of fact — which it is free to make on a Rule
    12(b)(1) motion — for clear error, H2O Houseboat Vacations Inc. v. Her-
    nandez, 
    103 F.3d 914
    , 916 (9th Cir. 1996).
    MISSION BAY JET SPORTS v. COLOMBO             7859
    injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable
    water.” Grubart, 
    513 U.S. at 534
    . The “connection” or
    “nexus” test “raises two issues.” 
    Id.
     “A court, first, must
    ‘assess the general features of the type of incident involved’
    to determine whether the incident has ‘a potentially disruptive
    impact on maritime commerce.’ ” 
    Id.
     (quoting Sisson v. Ruby,
    
    497 U.S. 358
    , 363, 364 n.2 (1990)). “Second, a court must
    determine whether ‘the general character’ of the ‘activity giv-
    ing rise to the incident’ shows a ‘substantial relationship to
    traditional maritime activity.’ ” 
    Id.
     (quoting Sisson, 
    497 U.S. at
    364 & n.2, 365).
    A
    The parties do not dispute that the Sea-Doo personal water-
    craft is a “vessel” for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction under
    
    1 U.S.C. § 3
    . Nor is there a serious question that Mission Bay,
    including the reserved area where the accident in this case
    occurred, is a body of navigable water because it is open to
    the Pacific Ocean and subject to the ebb and flow of tides. As
    we held in Stone v. Paradise Holdings, Inc. (In re Complaint
    of Paradise Holdings, Inc.), “in tidal waters, the ebb and flow
    of the tides remains the standard.” 
    795 F.2d 756
    , 759 (9th Cir.
    1986).
    Colombo and Slagel argue that the personal watercraft area
    should nevertheless not be considered navigable because it is
    one to two miles from the ocean, past two bridges, cordoned
    off by a row of buoys, and limited to personal watercraft.
    While true, these facts have nothing to do with whether the
    body of water is subject to the ebb and flow of the tides. Nor
    do the buoys or the bridges form a barrier to commerce, as in
    the cases upon which Colombo and Slagel rely. Cf. Adams v.
    Mont. Power Co., 
    528 F.2d 437
     (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that
    federal courts had no jurisdiction over a tort claim on a stretch
    of the Missouri River dammed at both ends and situated
    entirely within the State of Montana); LeBlanc v. Cleveland,
    
    198 F.3d 353
     (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the waters in an
    7860          MISSION BAY JET SPORTS v. COLOMBO
    area of the Hudson River were not navigable because they
    were not accessible to the ocean or continuous boating given
    nine dams and several water falls); In re Complaint of Three
    Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. Ltd. v. Morts, 
    921 F.2d 775
     (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that the Lake of the Ozarks was
    not navigable water because it is entirely contained within the
    State of Missouri and entry or exit is blocked by the Bagnell
    Dam). Although commercial vessels and personal watercraft
    are supposed to operate in different areas of Mission Bay, it
    is a rule that keeps personal watercraft from venturing beyond
    the cul-de-sac to the ocean, or vice-versa for other vessels.
    The reserved area itself is several hundred feet wide and from
    8 to 10 feet deep. The area is neither enclosed nor obstructed;
    the rest of Mission Bay, as well as the Pacific Ocean, are
    accessible for trade or travel.
    [2] We conclude that the waters where the accident
    occurred, being subject to tidal influence, meet the definition
    of “navigable waters” for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction.
    B
    Whether the general features and character of the particular
    incident have a sufficient “connection” or “nexus” to mari-
    time commerce is a more difficult question, but one we are
    guided by Foremost, Sisson, and Grubart to answer affirma-
    tively.
    [3] In Foremost, the Court upheld admiralty jurisdiction
    over the collision of two pleasure boats on the navigable
    waters of the Amite River in Louisiana. In doing so, the Court
    reiterated that the wrong must have a significant relationship
    with traditional maritime activity, but that the maritime activ-
    ity need not be a commercial one. 
    457 U.S. at 674
    . It sufficed
    that the wrong in that case involved the negligent operation of
    a vessel on navigable waters. As the Court explained:
    The federal interest in protecting maritime com-
    merce cannot be adequately served if admiralty juris-
    MISSION BAY JET SPORTS v. COLOMBO                7861
    diction is restricted to those individuals actually
    engaged in commercial maritime activity. This inter-
    est can be fully vindicated only if all operators of
    vessels on navigable waters are subject to uniform
    rules of conduct. The failure to recognize the breadth
    of this federal interest ignores the potential effect of
    noncommercial maritime activity on maritime com-
    merce. For example, if these two boats collided at
    the mouth of the St. Lawrence Seaway, there would
    be a substantial effect on maritime commerce, with-
    out regard to whether either boat was actively, or had
    been previously, engaged in commercial activity.
    
    Id. at 674-75
     (emphasis in original).
    The tort claims in Sisson arose when a fire (caused by a
    defective washer/dryer) aboard a pleasure boat docked at a
    marina, burned the boat, some other boats, and the marina.
    The Court distilled the inquiry to two points: that the incident
    causing the harm — burning boats at a marina on navigable
    waters — was of a sort “likely to disrupt [maritime] commer-
    cial activity,” 
    497 U.S. at 363
    , and that the activity giving rise
    to the incident — storing a vessel on navigable waters — bore
    a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity, 
    id. at 364-67
    .
    Grubart further explicated the Sisson test. There, a suit in
    admiralty was brought by owners of downtown Chicago
    buildings that were flooded as a result of work done by a
    crane that was sitting on a barge in the Chicago River. The
    crane drove piles into the riverbed, but this activity weakened
    an underwater tunnel such that eventually the tunnel (and
    buildings in the Loop) were opened to river water. 
    513 U.S. at 529
    . Noting that the first prong of the Sisson test goes to
    potential effects, not the particular facts of the actual incident,
    the Court indicated that the incident being examined should
    be described “at an intermediate level of possible generality.”
    
    Id. at 538
    . Thus, Grubart described the “general features” of
    7862          MISSION BAY JET SPORTS v. COLOMBO
    the flooding incident “as damage by a vessel in navigable
    water to an underwater structure.” 
    Id. at 539
    . So described,
    the Court had little difficulty concluding this is the sort of
    incident that has a potentially disrupting impact on maritime
    commerce. 
    Id.
     Moving to the second part of the Sisson test,
    the Court framed the inquiry as whether the “general charac-
    ter of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substan-
    tial relationship to traditional maritime activity.” 
    Id.
     It pointed
    out that “[n]avigation of boats in navigable waters clearly
    falls within the substantial relationship.” 
    Id.
     at 540 (citing
    Foremost, 
    457 U.S. at 675
    ). Then the Court characterized the
    activity that gave rise to flooding “as repair or maintenance
    work on a navigable waterway performed from a vessel.” 
    Id.
    And it concluded that this activity was substantially related to
    traditional maritime activity because barges and similar ves-
    sels have traditionally done that sort of work. 
    Id.
    Since Foremost, Sisson, and Grubart, we have taken an
    inclusive view of what general features of an incident have a
    potentially disruptive effect on maritime commerce. For
    example, in Gruver we held that an employer’s assault on a
    crewman on a fishing vessel had a potentially detrimental
    effect on maritime commerce by depriving the vessel of a
    deckhand due to his injuries. 
    489 F.3d at 982-83
    . In Tagha-
    domi v. United States, 
    401 F.3d 1080
    , 1086 (9th Cir. 2005),
    we held that injury to boaters, whose vessel capsized at sea,
    caused by a potential rescuer’s negligence in carrying out its
    rescue operation could potentially affect maritime commerce
    because the “efficacy of search-and-rescue operations has a
    direct effect on the health and lives of seamen,” and “insofar
    as the rescuer can preserve the vessel, it prevents economic
    loss to the vessel’s owner.” In Wallis v. Princess Cruises,
    Inc., 
    306 F.3d 827
    , 840-41 (9th Cir. 2002), we held that a
    claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress by a pas-
    senger on a cruise ship stemming from a master’s speculation
    that the passenger’s husband, who had fallen overboard, had
    probably been “chopped up” by the ship’s propellers, came
    within admiralty jurisdiction as the incident involved a “cruise
    MISSION BAY JET SPORTS v. COLOMBO                      7863
    ship’s treatment of passengers generally,” which “clearly has
    potential to disrupt commercial activity.” Cf. H2O Houseboat,
    
    103 F.3d at 916-17
     (holding that a family’s being poisoned by
    carbon monoxide aboard a houseboat tied to the shore of Lake
    Havasu could not disrupt maritime commerce).4
    [4] Applying these cases here, we believe the incident is
    best described as harm by a vessel in navigable waters to a
    passenger. Although Colombo and Slagel point out that this
    particular incident did not actually disrupt commercial activ-
    ity, the disruption prong does not turn on what happened in
    this particular case but on whether the general features of the
    incident have a potentially disruptive effect. We think it fol-
    lows from Foremost, Sisson, and Grubart, as well as their
    progeny in this circuit, that an incident of this class could
    have a potentially disruptive impact. Among other things, a
    vessel from which a passenger goes overboard in navigable
    waters would likely stop to search and rescue, call for assis-
    tance from others — which, in this area, could include the
    Coast Guard5 and in fact did involve another vessel — and
    ensnarl maritime traffic in the lanes affected.
    [5] So far as the second prong is concerned, we believe the
    activity giving rise to the incident is best characterized as
    operating a vessel in navigable waters. As Foremost and Gru-
    4
    Compare Mink v. Genmar Indus., Inc., 
    29 F.3d 1543
    , 1546 (11th Cir.
    1994) (holding that a maritime nexus was shown where an injured passen-
    ger who was slammed to the deck “could have fallen forward, striking the
    pilot or controls, thus directly interfering with the navigation of the craft
    and potentially causing an accident with another craft,” or “the disruption
    of a serious passenger injury within such intimate confines could have dis-
    tracted the pilot and indirectly interfered with the navigation of a vessel”).
    5
    Coast Guard navigational rules apply. See 
    33 U.S.C. §§ 2001
    (a) &
    2003(o) (applying rules to all vessels on navigable waters shoreward of
    navigation demarcation lines dividing high seas from harbors); 
    33 C.F.R. § 80.1106
     (establishing demarcation line between “Mission Bay South
    Jetty Light 2 to Mission Bay North Jetty Light 1” at the entrance of Mis-
    sion Bay, which includes the area reserved for personal watercraft).
    7864             MISSION BAY JET SPORTS v. COLOMBO
    bart say, this “clearly falls within the substantial relation-
    ship.” Grubart, 
    513 U.S. at
    540 (citing Foremost, 
    457 U.S. at 675
    ); see Paradise Holdings, 
    795 F.2d at 760
     (observing that
    the alleged wrong was the negligent operation of a vessel in
    navigable waters).6 Vessels have traditionally carried passen-
    gers across navigable waters. Being a vessel, this jet ski has
    a maritime connection.
    Like Grubart, Colombo and Slagel argue that this reads Sis-
    son too broadly. Like Grubart, we don’t think so. See 
    513 U.S. at 542-43
    . Unlike Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
    Cleveland, 
    409 U.S. 249
     (1972), for example, where an air-
    plane crashing fortuitously into navigable waters was not
    maritime-related, here there is a clear connection between a
    vessel traveling on navigable waters, causing injury to a pas-
    senger, and traditional maritime activity.
    [6] We conclude that the incident occurred on navigable
    waters. Its general features — harm by a vessel in navigable
    waters to a passenger — had a potential effect on maritime
    commerce, and the general character of the activity — opera-
    tion of a vessel in navigable waters — had a substantial rela-
    tionship to traditional maritime activity. Consequently, the
    federal district court had admiralty jurisdiction.
    6
    See also Hogan v. Overman, 
    767 F.2d 1093
    , 1094 (4th Cir. 1985)
    (holding, in a case where a water skier sued the owner of the boat that was
    towing him when he fell and injured himself, the allegation of “naviga-
    tional error” or the “negligent operation of a vessel on navigable waters”
    that gave rise to the skier’s injury was sufficient to show a substantial rela-
    tionship with traditional maritime activity); cf. Foster v. Peddicord, 
    826 F.2d 1370
    , 1375 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing Hogan where two
    water skiers collided and sued each other, noting that, unlike “Foremost
    . . ., the controversy in this case does not arise out of an alleged naviga-
    tional error such as occurs when a pleasure craft collides with a swimmer,
    water skier, reef, or another vessel”).
    MISSION BAY JET SPORTS v. COLOMBO            7865
    III
    Because it thought that admiralty jurisdiction was lacking,
    the district court understandably never reached the issue of
    whether a claim could proceed under the Shipowners Limita-
    tion of Liability Act. This inquiry may involve factual ques-
    tions on which the record is undeveloped. For these reasons,
    we prefer not to decide issues arising under the Act ourselves.
    Instead, we leave them for the district court to consider in the
    first instance. Accordingly, having determined that the court’s
    admiralty jurisdiction was properly invoked, we remand for
    further proceedings.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.