United States v. Edward Showalter ( 2009 )


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  •                     FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                      No. 08-50109
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                D.C. No.
    8:06-cr-00129-AG-1
    EDWARD SHOWALTER,
    OPINION
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    April 8, 2009—Pasadena, California
    Filed June 26, 2009
    Before: Harry Pregerson and David R. Thompson,
    Circuit Judges, and Jeremy D. Fogel*, District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge Thompson
    The Honorable Jeremy D. Fogel, United States District Judge for the
    Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
    8129
    UNITED STATES v. SHOWALTER             8133
    COUNSEL
    Ezekiel E. Cortez, San Diego, California, for the defendant-
    appellant.
    Mieke Biesheuvel, Assistant United States Attorney, Santa
    Ana, California, for the appellee.
    OPINION
    THOMPSON, Senior Circuit Judge:
    Appellant Edward Showalter (“Showalter”) pleaded guilty
    to one count of wire fraud in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1343
    .
    He now appeals the order denying his motion to withdraw that
    guilty plea and his sentence. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We affirm the denial of Showalter’s motion to
    withdraw his guilty plea, but we vacate his sentence and
    remand for resentencing.
    8134             UNITED STATES v. SHOWALTER
    I.    Background
    From 2003 to 2005, Showalter owned and operated High
    Park Investments (“High Park”). He raised capital to improve
    real property and then sell it for a profit. Showalter promised
    investors returns of 10% to 26%. As security for the invest-
    ments, he was supposed to record deeds of trust on the proper-
    ties in favor of investors who provided money for the
    improvements. The deeds of trust, however, often were not
    recorded, and if they were, the properties were over-
    encumbered.
    Showalter raised more than $15 million from investors, but
    he diverted money he received for uses other than the prom-
    ised improvements to the properties. This included making
    other investments, paying High Park operating expenses, and
    using money for personal purposes.
    The government filed an information against Showalter,
    charging him with one count of wire fraud in violation of
    Title 
    18 U.S.C. § 1343
     for defrauding his investors. Pursuant
    to a plea agreement, Showalter pleaded guilty to that charge.
    Approximately seven months later, Showalter moved to with-
    draw his guilty plea on the basis of newly discov-
    ered/available evidence. The district court denied the motion.
    Showalter was sentenced to 151 months imprisonment fol-
    lowed by three years of supervised release, $15,418,500 in
    restitution, and a $100 special assessment. This appeal fol-
    lowed.
    II.   Discussion
    A.   Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
    The first issue we consider is whether the district court
    abused its discretion by denying Showalter’s motion to with-
    draw his guilty plea.
    UNITED STATES v. SHOWALTER                  8135
    We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial
    of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. United States v.
    Ortega-Ascanio, 
    376 F.3d 879
    , 883 (9th Cir. 2004). Findings
    of fact that underlie the district court’s exercise of its discre-
    tion are reviewed for clear error. Nostratis, 321 F.3d at 1208.
    [1] The decision whether to permit the withdrawal of a plea
    “is solely within the discretion of the district court.” Nostratis,
    321 F.3d at 1208. Before the imposition of a sentence, how-
    ever, withdrawal of a guilty plea should be freely allowed if
    a defendant “can show a fair and just reason for requesting the
    withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). We have
    explained that “[f]air and just reasons for withdrawal include
    inadequate Rule 11 plea colloquies, newly discovered evi-
    dence, intervening circumstances, or any other reason for
    withdrawing the plea that did not exist when the defendant
    entered his plea.” United States v. McTiernan, 
    546 F.3d 1160
    ,
    1167 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted). The defendant
    has the burden of demonstrating the existence of at least one
    of these conditions. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B); United
    States v. Davis, 
    428 F.3d 802
    , 805 (9th Cir. 2005).
    1.   Adequacy of District Court’s Analysis
    Showalter argues the district court erred in denying his
    motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it failed to analyze
    two of the three fair and just reasons he offered as grounds for
    withdrawing his plea. He contends the district court focused
    on only whether there was “newly discovered evidence”
    despite his presentation of three distinct “fair and just rea-
    sons”: (1) newly discovered evidence; (2) newly available
    evidence; and (3) change in circumstances.
    a.   Newly Available Evidence
    [2] Although Showalter argues the district court ignored his
    “newly available evidence” argument, he does not make clear
    how that argument differs from his “newly discovered evi-
    8136             UNITED STATES v. SHOWALTER
    dence” argument. Although he presents the two arguments
    separately, both rely on the same witness declarations, and
    both are assertions that these “new” declarations are a fair and
    just reason justifying withdrawal of the guilty plea. The dis-
    trict court’s analysis and conclusion that Showalter’s prof-
    fered evidence was not new adequately resolved both
    contentions. The district court made a factual finding that
    Showalter was “aware of the potential evidence [the wit-
    nesses] could supply” and “could have not pleaded guilty and
    compelled these same witnesses to testify on his behalf at
    trial.” This finding was not clearly erroneous.
    Even if the district court had failed to address Showalter’s
    “newly available evidence” argument, that argument is merit-
    less because “newly available evidence” does not constitute
    “newly discovered evidence” justifying withdrawal of a guilty
    plea. See United States v. Lockett, 
    919 F.2d 585
    , 591-92 (9th
    Cir. 1990). In Lockett, we affirmed the district court’s denial
    of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea where a co-defendant,
    who previously asserted her right not to testify, offered
    “newly available” testimony that exculpated the defendant. 
    Id.
    We stated that “great caution” must be exercised in consider-
    ing evidence “newly discovered” when it existed all along. 
    Id.
    (citing United States v. Jacobs, 
    475 F.2d 270
    , 286 n.33 (2d
    Cir. 1973)).
    b.   Change in Circumstances
    Showalter also contends the district court ignored his argu-
    ment that there was a “change in circumstances” that consti-
    tuted a fair and just reason for him to withdraw his guilty
    plea. He does not make clear how such “change in circum-
    stances” or “intervening circumstances” differs from the
    “newly discovered evidence” on which his motion was based.
    The district court reasonably assumed that the alleged inter-
    vening circumstances were the proffered declarations of wit-
    nesses and Showalter’s alleged realization that the
    government had overstated the strength of its case against
    UNITED STATES v. SHOWALTER                  8137
    him. He argued that, “Between the new facts that have
    emerged and Mr. Showalter’s realization that the
    SEC/Government have been overstating their case at best if
    not flat out creating facts at worst, Mr. Showalter is in a sig-
    nificantly different position today than he was one year ago
    when he pleaded guilty.”
    [3] Just as the proffered declarations do not constitute
    newly discovered evidence, they do not constitute an inter-
    vening circumstance. As we have stated, the district court
    properly addressed this argument and concluded the witnesses
    were known to Showalter at the time he pleaded guilty and
    could have been called to testify for him at trial. Showalter
    does not explain how witnesses known to him at the time he
    entered his plea can be considered an intervening circum-
    stance.
    c.   Strength of Government’s Case
    [4] The district court also thoroughly addressed Show-
    alter’s argument that the SEC and government exaggerated
    the strength of their case against him. It explained why it was
    not persuaded by the argument:
    In Brady v. United States, 
    397 U.S. 742
     (1970), the
    Supreme Court rejected the idea that a defendant
    could withdraw his guilty plea simply upon discov-
    ering that the State would have a weaker case against
    him than anticipated. Specifically the Court stated:
    Often the decision to plead guilty is heavily
    influenced by the defendant’s appraisal of
    the prosecution’s case against him and by
    the apparent likelihood of securing leniency
    should a guilty plea be offered and accepted
    . . . . A defendant is not entitled to withdraw
    his plea merely because he discovers long
    8138                UNITED STATES v. SHOWALTER
    after the plea has been accepted that his cal-
    culus misapprehended the quality of the
    State’s case or the likely penalties attached
    to alternative courses of action. Brady, 
    397 U.S. at 756-57
    .
    Defendant has merely shown that he has reevaluated
    the government’s purportedly “rock solid” case
    against him and second-guessed his decision to plead
    guilty. But Defendant’s claim that he did not see all
    the government’s cards before pleading guilty does
    not entitle him to withdraw his plea. United States v.
    Schmidt, 
    373 F.3d 100
    , 102 (2d Cir. 2004).
    For the reasons set forth in the district court’s order, Show-
    alter’s belief that the government had a weaker case than he
    originally thought does not constitute a fair and just reason to
    withdraw his guilty plea.
    d.     New Fact
    [5] Lastly, Showalter mentions a “new fact,” which appears
    to be related to his “changed circumstances” argument. He
    asserts that, after he pleaded guilty, the properties that he rep-
    resented would be improved were developed and sold, reduc-
    ing the amount of the previously anticipated loss. He
    characterizes this as a “material change in circumstances.”
    The government addresses this argument accurately:
    [Showalter] is mistaken, however, that this ‘new
    fact’ constitutes a material change in circumstances.
    [Showalter] was charged with and pled guilty to wire
    fraud for misappropriating investors’ money. That
    properties he used to lure people to ‘invest’ their
    money in High Park Investments may have sold is in
    no way connected to whether [Showalter] defrauded
    investors and whether he intended to defraud them.
    UNITED STATES v. SHOWALTER               8139
    [6] Even if Showalter were correct in asserting that the loss
    amount turned out to be less than it was anticipated to be, the
    only possible impact from that would be to decrease the appli-
    cable Guideline range, and potentially lessen his sentence.
    But, a defendant may not withdraw a guilty plea because his
    sentence may be different from that which was originally
    anticipated. See Nostratis, 321 F.3d at 1211.
    [7] The district court adequately considered and correctly
    resolved all of Showalter’s arguments pertaining to his motion
    to withdraw his guilty plea.
    2.    Application of Correct Legal Standard
    Showalter also argues the district court applied the wrong
    legal standard in determining whether he offered newly dis-
    covered evidence. He contends the evidence should have been
    deemed “new” because (1) “he had no way of knowing that
    [the investors he was alleged to have defrauded] would later
    be willing to swear under oath that they did not feel defrauded
    by him,” (2) he “was not in a position to compel the ‘victims’
    in this case to favorably testify on his behalf,” and (3) he
    “could not foresee that these ‘victims’ would one day come
    forward to provide exonerating evidence.” According to
    Showalter, the district court adopted a heightened legal stan-
    dard for what constitutes new evidence, improperly relying on
    law applicable to motions for a new trial, which motions are
    granted only in exceptional cases.
    [8] Showalter’s argument lacks merit. The district court
    applied the proper legal standard as to what constitutes newly
    discovered evidence justifying a defendant’s withdrawal of a
    guilty plea. Indeed, the district court demonstrated that it
    understood the applicable standard by setting forth the very
    standard that Showalter alleges it failed to apply:
    “A defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo
    contendere after the court accepts the plea, but
    8140             UNITED STATES v. SHOWALTER
    before it imposes sentence if the defendant can show
    a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.”
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). “The decision to allow
    withdrawal of a plea is solely within the discretion
    of the district court.” United States v. Ortega-
    Ascanio, 
    376 F.3d 879
    , 883 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting
    United States v. Nostratis, 
    321 F.3d 1206
    , 1208 (9th
    Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit has held that fair and
    just reasons for withdrawal include “inadequate Rule
    11 plea colloquies, newly discovered evidence, inter-
    vening circumstances, or any other reason for with-
    drawing the plea that did not exist when the
    defendant entered his plea.” Ortega-Ascanio, 
    376 F.3d at 883
    .
    If, as Showalter argues, the district court believed that it
    should apply the legal standard applicable to a motion for a
    new trial, the court presumably would have stated that the
    motion should be granted “only in exceptional cases in which
    the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.”
    United States v. Pimental, 
    654 F.2d 538
    , 545 (9th Cir. 1981).
    It did not do so.
    The district court’s analysis itself demonstrates that the
    court used the appropriate standard. The court followed
    United States v. Garcia, 
    401 F.3d 1008
    , 1010-11 (9th Cir.
    2005), in which we considered the question of when a wit-
    ness’s declaration will constitute “newly discovered evi-
    dence” sufficient to justify the withdrawal of a defendant’s
    guilty plea.
    In Garcia, after pleading guilty to a charge of manufacture
    of methamphetamine and a firearm charge, the defendant
    moved to withdraw his guilty plea because he found a witness
    who stated in a declaration that the defendant did not live in
    the house where methamphetamine was manufactured, she
    did not believe the firearms found in the house belonged to
    the defendant, and she had never seen firearms in the defen-
    UNITED STATES v. SHOWALTER                   8141
    dant’s possession. 
    Id. at 1009-10
    . We explained that a defen-
    dant claiming to have new evidence provides a “fair and just
    reason” for withdrawing his guilty plea if the evidence is both
    (1) newly discovered, and (2) plausibly could have motivated
    a reasonable person in the defendant’s position to not plead
    guilty had he known about the evidence before pleading. 
    Id. at 1011-12
    . We determined that the subject declaration consti-
    tuted “newly discovered evidence” because the witness was
    unknown to the defendant when he entered his guilty plea. 
    Id.
    at 1010 n.2. The declaration also directly contradicted the tes-
    timony of another witness, distancing the defendant from the
    house where firearms and drug paraphernalia were seized. 
    Id. at 1010
    . The declaration, thus was evidence that could have
    “at least plausibly motivated a reasonable person in [the
    defendant’s] position” not to have pleaded guilty had he
    known about it. 
    Id.
    [9] Applying Garcia, the district court in this case
    explained:
    In contrast [with Garcia], here [Showalter] knew
    each of the declarants before he pleaded guilty.
    Thus, he was also aware of the potential evidence
    they could supply through declarations before he
    pleaded guilty. Further, [Showalter] was fully aware
    that he could have not pleaded guilty and compelled
    these same witnesses to testify on his behalf at trial.
    [10] The record supports the district court’s reasoning. One
    declarant worked for Showalter as a construction worker, then
    a foreman, and finally a project manager. Showalter knew
    him before the government filed its criminal charge. Another
    declarant was a large investor who gave Showalter approxi-
    mately $900,000. Showalter had met him three times before
    he made his investment. Showalter also knew the third declar-
    ant, an investor since 2003 who had a business relationship
    with Showalter for approximately three years.
    8142              UNITED STATES v. SHOWALTER
    Showalter does not dispute he knew of these three declar-
    ants before he pleaded guilty. However, he contends that the
    declarants were not available before he pleaded guilty because
    he could not compel them to testify favorably for him and he
    could not foresee that they would later come forward with
    exonerating testimony. The record does not support these con-
    tentions.
    At Showalter’s change of plea hearing, the district court
    advised him of his ability to compel these witnesses to testify,
    and all three of them stated their current testimony would be
    the same as it would have been before he pleaded guilty.
    Although Showalter attempted to rebut this evidence with
    statements in the declarations, the statements do not refute the
    notion that the declarants would have been willing to testify
    consistently with their declarations. The witnesses stated that
    they “only recently agreed to sign” the declarations and had
    not made a “commitment to sign” the declarations earlier.
    This does not constitute an admission that they were unavail-
    able to Showalter earlier.
    3.   Reaching the Merits
    Showalter argues that, in denying his motion to withdraw
    his guilty plea, the district court improperly reached the merits
    of his proffered defense. He contends the district court’s nega-
    tive characterization of his position and the court’s assertion
    of an improper motive for him moving to withdraw his guilty
    plea prove that the court actually ruled on the merits of his
    case. He bases his argument on the district court’s use of
    phrases such as “investors allegedly,” “defendant contends,”
    “defendant claims,” “defendant has merely shown,” and “de-
    fendant’s mere reevaluation of his tactical strength.”
    This language was used in the context of the district court’s
    summary of the arguments presented by the parties, not an
    evaluation of the merits of the case or Showalter’s defense.
    What Showalter calls “negative characterization” is actually
    UNITED STATES v. SHOWALTER                8143
    common language used by attorneys and the court to discuss
    legal claims. It would be difficult for a court to discuss a case
    without using words such as “allegedly,” “contends,” and
    “claims.” As correctly stated by the government, “[t]he
    court’s qualifying language was merely a method of recount-
    ing the facts and arguments as alleged or asserted by the par-
    ties without making unnecessary factual findings.”
    4.   United States v. McTiernan
    On October 21, 2008, after Showalter filed his opening
    brief in this appeal, but before the government filed its
    answering brief, we issued an opinion in United States v.
    McTiernan, 
    546 F.3d 1160
     (9th Cir. 2008). Showalter devoted
    his entire reply brief to arguing that McTiernan is dispositive
    of this appeal in his favor. We disagree.
    In McTiernan, we stated that bad legal advice can consti-
    tute a fair and just reason justifying withdrawal of a defen-
    dant’s guilty plea. See McTiernan, 
    546 F.3d at 1167
    (“[e]rroneous or inadequate legal advice may also constitute
    a fair and just reason for plea withdrawal” (citing Davis, 
    428 F.3d at 806
    )). We remanded the case to the district court for
    an evidentiary hearing because the declaration submitted con-
    cerning whether McTiernan was advised properly lacked suf-
    ficient clarity and precision that would allow a conclusion that
    the defendant was properly and adequately advised. Id. at
    1168.
    While a factual question remained in McTiernan as to
    whether the defendant in fact had been adequately advised of
    his right to bring a motion to suppress before he pleaded
    guilty, no factual question exists in this case. The issue before
    this court is whether the district court abused its discretion
    when it determined the declarations proffered by Showalter
    did not constitute “newly discovered evidence” under Garcia.
    
    401 F.3d at 1008
    . McTiernan does not overrule or change
    8144             UNITED STATES v. SHOWALTER
    Garcia, the case upon which the district court primarily relied
    in its decision.
    B.   Sentencing
    We next consider whether the district court abused its dis-
    cretion in sentencing Showalter to 151 months of imprison-
    ment. In the plea agreement, Showalter stipulated that he: (1)
    owned High Park Investments which “took in over $15 mil-
    lion in investors[‘] money;” and (2) “victimized at least 10
    people an[d] caused a loss of at least $1 million but not more
    than $20 million.” The plea agreement contained a provision
    that allowed Showalter and the government to argue for sen-
    tence adjustments outside of the facts stipulated to in the plea
    agreement.
    The probation office submitted a pre-sentence report
    (“PSR”). The PSR stated that Showalter victimized 117 inves-
    tors. The basis for this figure was a phone conversation
    between a probation officer and the bankruptcy trustee of
    Showalter’s now defunct business, High Park. The PSR also
    included as an attachment a list of victims that showed a “loss
    amount” next to each victim’s name. The total amount of the
    loss was $15,418,500. The PSR also included narratives
    describing the circumstances of seventeen of the victims.
    Showalter objected to the PSR’s statements that there were
    fifty or more victims and that the loss amount was in excess
    of $7 million, claiming that “the government has not produced
    any of the documents upon which the PSR’s loss calculation
    is based.”
    Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(A) provides
    that at sentencing, the court “may accept any undisputed por-
    tion of the presentence report as a finding of fact.” Addition-
    ally, Rule 32(f) states that “[w]ithin 14 days after receiving
    the presentence report, the parties must state in writing any
    objection.” Although Showalter submitted no objections to
    UNITED STATES v. SHOWALTER                8145
    the original PSR, he filed timely objections to the addendum
    to the PSR, containing the list of alleged victims, by filing
    “Additional Materials for Sentencing and for Bail Pending
    Appeal” on February 27, 2008. Specifically, Showalter con-
    tended that “there is insufficient evidence for [the district
    court] to impose four levels, rather than two for the number
    of victims.” The factual allegations of the PSR regarding the
    number of victims and loss calculation thus were disputed.
    Solely on the basis of the factual statements in the PSR, the
    district court imposed two sentence enhancements that are at
    issue in this appeal. The district court imposed: (1) a 4-level
    enhancement for “50 or more victims;” and (2) a 20-level
    enhancement for a loss of “more than $7 Million.” See
    U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K) (20-level enhancement for loss of
    more than $7 Million); U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) (4-level
    enhancement if offense involved “50 or more victims”). As a
    result of these enhancements, the district court determined
    that Showalter’s total offense level was 33 and his Criminal
    History Category was 1. These determinations resulted in an
    advisory guideline range of 135-168 months imprisonment.
    The district court’s sentence of 151 months was in the middle
    of this range.
    We review for clear error a district court’s factual findings
    supporting a sentence enhancement. United States v. Zolp,
    
    479 F.3d 715
    , 718-19 (9th Cir. 2007). “If the district court
    makes a material miscalculation in the advisory guidelines
    range, even after Booker, we must vacate the sentence and
    remand for resentencing.” Zolp, 
    479 F.3d at
    721 (citing
    United States v. Cantrell, 
    433 F.3d 1269
    , 1280 (9th Cir.
    2006)).
    [11] “[T]he government bears the burden of proving, by a
    preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to enhance
    a defendant’s offense level under the Guidelines.” United
    States v. Burnett, 
    16 F.3d 358
    , 361 (9th Cir. 1994). District
    courts have broad discretion to “consider information relevant
    8146              UNITED STATES v. SHOWALTER
    to the sentencing determination . . . provided that the informa-
    tion has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable
    accuracy.’ ” United States v. Berry, 
    258 F.3d 971
    , 976 (9th
    Cir. 2001) (quoting USSG § 6A1.3(a)). Additionally, “the dis-
    trict court may rely on undisputed statements in the PSR at
    sentencing . . . . However, when a defendant raises objections
    to the PSR, the district court is obligated to resolve the factual
    dispute, and the government bears the burden of proof . . . .
    The court may not simply rely on the factual statements in the
    PSR.” United States v. Ameline, 
    409 F.3d 1073
    , 1085-86 (9th
    Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B)
    (requiring court to rule on disputed matters at sentencing).
    [12] The Guidelines provide that a sentence enhancement
    under § 2B1.1(b)(1) (enhancement for “monetary loss”), may
    be based on an “estimate” of the monetary loss. U.S.S.G.
    § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(C). The Guidelines do not, however, allow
    a district court to “estimate” the number of victims to enhance
    a sentence under § 2B1.1(b)(2). See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2).
    Relying upon on Zolp, the government argues that it need
    not “prove every victim.” However, Zolp does not stand for
    the proposition that the number of victims may be estimated.
    While Zolp supports the government’s argument that the
    enhancement for the estimated monetary loss under
    § 2B1.1(b)(1) was reasonable, Zolp does not address sentence
    enhancements for the number of victims under § 2B1.1(b)(2).
    In allowing estimates of monetary loss, the Guidelines note
    expressly the difficulty of calculating monetary loss accu-
    rately and specifically list various factors that sentencing
    courts should take into consideration when estimating mone-
    tary loss. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(C)(i-v). The difficul-
    ties inherent in calculating monetary loss, however, do not
    exist when determining the number of victims.
    UNITED STATES v. SHOWALTER               8147
    1.   The District Court Erred in Determining There Were
    50 Or More Victims
    [13] The district court erred in applying a 4-level enhance-
    ment for “50 or more victims,” rather than applying the two-
    level enhancement for “10 or more victims.” The court’s addi-
    tional two-level enhancement raised the advisory guideline
    range from 108-135 months to 135-168 months and resulted
    in a sentence that was at least sixteen months longer than
    should have been imposed. Because the district court imposed
    a sentence at the mid-point of an inappropriate Guideline
    range, we may not presume that it would have imposed the
    same sentence had the Guideline range been determined cor-
    rectly.
    [14] Although Showalter stipulated in his plea agreement
    that there were at least 10 victims, he objected to the PSR’s
    statement that there were fifty or more victims. After Show-
    alter objected to this statement, the district court was obli-
    gated to do more than simply adopt it. Ameline, 
    409 F.3d at 1086
    . Rather, Showalter’s timely objection to the PSR
    required the government to produce at least some evidence to
    support its contention that there were fifty or more victims.
    See Burnett, 
    16 F.3d at 361
     (“[T]he government bears the bur-
    den of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts
    necessary to enhance a defendant’s offense level under the
    Guidelines.”). The district court did not require the govern-
    ment to meet this burden.
    [15] The record reveals that the only basis for the district
    court’s finding that there were fifty or more victims was: (1)
    the PSR’s statement regarding a phone call to the bankruptcy
    trustee; and (2) the list of victims attached to the PSR. The
    district court did hear from roughly a dozen victims at Show-
    alter’s sentencing. However, this testimony was insufficient to
    establish that there were fifty or more victims.
    [16] The PSR did not provide any details of the probation
    officer’s conversation with the bankruptcy trustee, nor did it
    8148              UNITED STATES v. SHOWALTER
    offer any explanation of how the bankruptcy trustee deter-
    mined the total number of victims or indicate the source of the
    list of victims attached to the PSR. It is impossible to deter-
    mine from the record whether the probation office ever
    inquired into the accuracy of the victim list or of the individ-
    ual dollar amounts associated with the names on the list.
    Essentially, it appears that the probation office said there were
    117 victims because the bankruptcy trustee said so, without
    any explanation as to how the trustee came up with this num-
    ber. This does not justify a conclusion that the government
    met its burden of establishing that there were “50 or more vic-
    tims.” Accordingly, while Showalter’s stipulation in the plea
    agreement that there were “10 or more victims” provided a
    sufficient basis for a 2-level enhancement, there was insuffi-
    cient evidence to support a 4-level enhancement for “50 or
    more victims.”
    2.   The District Court Committed No Error In Finding The
    Loss More Than $7 Million
    [17] A sentence enhancement for the amount of loss under
    § 2B1.1(b)(1) involves a fundamentally different calculation
    than a sentence enhancement for the number of victims under
    § 2B1.1(b)(2). The commentary to the Guidelines allows the
    district court to “estimate” the monetary loss. U.S.S.G.
    § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(C). In calculating monetary loss under the
    Guidelines, the court may consider both “actual loss” and “in-
    tended loss.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(A). The Guidelines,
    however, define “victim,” in relevant part, to include only
    those people who suffered part of the “actual loss” deter-
    mined under U.S.S.G. § 2B 1.1(b)(1). See U.S.S.G. 2B 1.1
    cmt. n.1. (emphasis added).
    [18] The court’s estimate of monetary loss can be based on
    “[t]he approximate number of victims multiplied by the aver-
    age loss to each victim” or “[m]ore general factors, such as
    the scope and duration of the offense and revenues generated
    by similar operations.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(C)(iii) &
    UNITED STATES v. SHOWALTER                8149
    (v). Moreover, the calculation of monetary loss may be based
    on the amount put at risk or the actual loss. United States v.
    Munoz, 
    233 F.3d 1117
    , 1126 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, a district
    court has a number of permissible methods for determining
    monetary loss, and “need not make its loss calculation with
    absolute precision.” Zolp, 
    479 F.3d at 719
    .
    [19] Given the number of permissible methods for estimat-
    ing loss, the district court’s loss estimate of “more than $7
    million” was not clearly erroneous. Showalter acknowledged
    in his plea agreement that High Park “took in over $15 mil-
    lion in investors[’] money” and that he “caused a loss of at
    least $1 million but not more than $20 million.” These admis-
    sions provided a sufficient basis for a finding that the “actual”
    or “intended” losses exceeded $7 million.
    III.   Conclusion
    [20] We affirm the denial of Showalter’s motion to with-
    draw his guilty plea, but we vacate the sentence imposed upon
    him and remand for resentencing.
    AFFIRMED IN PART; SENTENCE VACATED and
    REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.