United States v. Ricardo Fraire ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •                   FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                  No. 08-10448
    Plaintiff-Appellee,          D.C. No.
    v.                        1:08-MJ-00006-
    RICARDO FRAIRE,                                 SMS
    Defendant-Appellant.
          OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    July 14, 2009—San Francisco, California
    Filed August 4, 2009
    Before: Barry G. Silverman, Richard R. Clifton and
    Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Silverman
    10213
    UNITED STATES v. FRAIRE             10215
    COUNSEL
    Daniel J. Broderick, Federal Defender, Douglas J. Beevers,
    Assistant Federal Defender (argued), Fresno, California, for
    the appellant.
    10216               UNITED STATES v. FRAIRE
    Larry G. Brown, Acting United States Attorney, Mark J.
    McKeon, Assistant United States Attorney (argued), Fresno,
    California, for the appellee.
    OPINION
    SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge:
    Park rangers set up a vehicle checkpoint at the entrance to
    the Kings Canyon National Park to “mitigate the illegal taking
    of animals in the park” due to hunting, which is prohibited in
    the park. All vehicles were stopped for about 15 to 25 sec-
    onds, and their drivers asked about hunting. When Appellant
    Ricardo Fraire’s vehicle was stopped at the checkpoint, a
    ranger noted a strong odor of alcohol on Fraire’s breath. He
    subsequently was charged with driving under the influence
    and related offenses. In a motion to suppress, Fraire argued
    that the suspicionless stop of his vehicle was unconstitutional.
    We agree with the district court that it was not. We hold today
    that a momentary checkpoint stop of all vehicles at the
    entrance of a national park, aimed at preventing illegal hunt-
    ing — which is minimally intrusive, justified by a legitimate
    concern for the preservation of park wildlife and the preven-
    tion of irreparable harm, directly related to the operation of
    the park, and confined to the park gate where visitors would
    expect to briefly stop — is reasonable under the Fourth
    Amendment.
    I.   Factual and Procedural Background
    The facts pertinent to this appeal are drawn primarily from
    the testimony of Park Ranger David Schifsky, who testified
    at an evidentiary hearing about the background and operation
    of the checkpoint at issue in this case.
    According to Schifsky, rangers at the Sequoia & Kings
    Canyon National Park instituted a vehicle checkpoint in 2007
    UNITED STATES v. FRAIRE               10217
    to “mitigate the illegal taking of animals in the park.” Hunting
    in the park is illegal. The checkpoint was implemented near
    one of the multiple park entrances and stopped all vehicles
    entering and exiting the park at that point. Rangers posted
    signs prior to the checkpoint instructing drivers to prepare to
    stop, concluding with stop signs, a cone pattern, a ranger sta-
    tion, and a ranger in a reflective jacket directing traffic. All
    rangers participating in the checkpoint were uniformed.
    After a vehicle was stopped at the checkpoint, a ranger
    would approach the vehicle, identify himself or herself as a
    park ranger, state that he or she was conducting a hunting
    checkpoint, and then ask the driver, “have you been hunting”
    or “are you hunting?” If the driver responded that he or she
    was not hunting, the ranger would not search the vehicle’s
    trunk. Questioning the drivers typically lasted about 15 to 25
    seconds, and drivers sometimes had to wait in line for about
    one minute before being questioned by a ranger.
    On October 13, 2007, Fraire was stopped at the checkpoint.
    Ranger Ernesto Felix approached Fraire’s vehicle, smelled the
    odor of alcohol, and observed that Fraire’s eyes were “blood-
    shot and glassy.” Felix asked Fraire if he had been hunting
    and Fraire stated that he had not. Felix then asked Fraire if he
    had been drinking and Fraire stated that he had a couple of
    beers about an hour or two beforehand. Felix then conducted
    field sobriety tests on Fraire, which identified ten signs of
    intoxication. Fraire consented to a search of his vehicle,
    whereupon Felix found several open alcohol containers in the
    rear passenger compartment just behind the driver’s seat.
    Fraire was charged by information with operating a vehicle
    under the influence of alcohol, driving while under the influ-
    ence of alcohol with a blood alcohol content in excess of .08,
    and possession of an open container of alcohol in a motor
    vehicle. See 
    36 C.F.R. §§ 4.23
    (a)(1), 4.23(a)(2), 4.14(b). After
    conducting the evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge ren-
    dered an oral ruling denying Fraire’s motion to suppress.
    10218               UNITED STATES v. FRAIRE
    Fraire appealed the ruling to the district court, which affirmed
    the magistrate judge.
    II.   Standard of Review
    A district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence
    is reviewed de novo. United States v. Bynum, 
    362 F.3d 574
    ,
    578 (9th Cir. 2004). “Factual findings underlying the denial
    of the motion are reviewed for clear error.” 
    Id.
    III.   Analysis
    [1] The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable
    searches and seizures.” Here, Fraire endured a “seizure” when
    his vehicle was forced to stop at the checkpoint. See United
    States v. Faulkner, 
    450 F.3d 466
    , 469-70 (9th Cir. 2006).
    [2] “A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the
    absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.” City of
    Indianapolis v. Edmond, 
    531 U.S. 32
    , 37 (2000) (citing Chan-
    dler v. Miller, 
    520 U.S. 305
    , 308 (1997)). The Supreme Court
    has recognized limited circumstances in which suspicion is
    not required, such as where a program is designed to serve
    “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”
    
    Id.
     The Court has upheld suspicionless seizures in two vehicle
    checkpoint cases. 
    Id.
    [3] There is a two-step analysis applicable to Fourth
    Amendment checkpoint cases. First, the court must “deter-
    mine whether the primary purpose of the [checkpoint] was to
    advance ‘the general interest in crime control.’ ” See Faulk-
    ner, 
    450 F.3d at 470
     (quoting Edmond, 
    531 U.S. at 48
    ). “If so,
    then the stop . . . is per se invalid under the Fourth Amend-
    ment.” Id.; see also Illinois v. Lidster, 
    540 U.S. 419
    , 426
    (2004) (describing this as the “presumptive rule of unconstitu-
    tionality”).
    [4] If the checkpoint is not per se invalid as a crime control
    device, then the court must “judge [the checkpoint’s] reason-
    UNITED STATES v. FRAIRE                10219
    ableness, hence, its constitutionality, on the basis of the indi-
    vidual circumstances.” Lidster, 
    540 U.S. at 426
    . This requires
    consideration of “the gravity of the public concerns served by
    the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the pub-
    lic interest, and the severity of the interference with individual
    liberty.” 
    Id. at 427
     (quoting Brown v. Texas, 
    443 U.S. 47
    , 51
    (1979)); see also Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 
    496 U.S. 444
    , 450-55 (1990) (balancing these factors in determining
    the reasonableness of a checkpoint stop); United States v.
    Martinez-Fuerte, 
    428 U.S. 543
    , 561 (1976) (same).
    We first address whether the checkpoint was unconstitu-
    tional as a general crime control device. In Edmond, the city
    of Indianapolis operated vehicle checkpoints on city streets in
    an effort to discover and interdict illegal drugs. 
    531 U.S. at 34
    . The Court held that the checkpoint program violated the
    Fourth Amendment because the “primary purpose” was to
    “uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” 
    Id. at 41-42
    . The Court distinguished two prior cases permitting
    checkpoints, Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, on the grounds that the
    checkpoints in those cases served purposes other than ordi-
    nary crime control. 
    Id. at 37-42
    . In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court
    upheld the constitutionality of an immigration checkpoint
    near the U.S.-Mexico border. 
    428 U.S. at 545
    . In Sitz, the
    Court upheld the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint
    that examined all drivers passing through for signs of intoxi-
    cation. 
    496 U.S. at 447
    . In Edmond, the Court explained why
    the primary purpose of the checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte
    and Sitz were not the detection of ordinary criminal wrongdo-
    ing. The Court acknowledged that “[s]ecuring the border and
    apprehending drunk drivers are, of course, law enforcement
    activities, and law enforcement officers employ arrests and
    criminal prosecutions in pursuit of these goals.” 
    531 U.S. at 42
    . However, the checkpoint program in Sitz “was clearly
    aimed at reducing the immediate hazard posed by the pres-
    ence of drunk drivers on the highways, and there was an obvi-
    ous connection between the imperative of highway safety and
    the law enforcement practice at issue.” 
    Id. at 39
    ; see also 
    id.
    10220              UNITED STATES v. FRAIRE
    at 43. As for Martinez-Fuerte, the objective there was to “in-
    tercept illegal aliens” and “to serve purposes closely related
    to the problems of policing the border[.]” 
    Id. at 37, 41
    .
    [5] We must now determine whether the checkpoint in this
    case is a general crime control device, as in Edmond, or
    whether it serves a different purpose, as in Sitz or Martinez-
    Fuerte. The district court found that the checkpoint’s pur-
    poses included “catching violators, . . . deterrence, education
    and in turn wildlife protection.” This finding is supported by
    Ranger Schifsky’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing, who
    testified that the checkpoint was aimed at mitigating the
    effects of the illegal taking of animals in the park. That the
    checkpoint accomplished this goal through the use of law
    enforcement techniques does not automatically transform it
    into a crime control device for Fourth Amendment purposes.
    See Edmond, 
    531 U.S. at 42
    .
    [6] The checkpoint in this case is analogous to the check-
    point upheld in Sitz and is distinguishable from the check-
    point in Edmond. A critical factor in Sitz was the close
    connection between the checkpoint and the harm it was seek-
    ing to prevent. 
    Id. at 39
     (describing the “obvious connection
    between the imperative of highway safety and the law
    enforcement practice at issue” in Sitz); 
    id. at 43
     (emphasizing
    the “close connection to roadway safety”). Likewise, here, the
    checkpoint was situated at an entrance to the park and sought
    to counter illegal hunting within that park. Unlike the drug
    crimes addressed by the Edmond checkpoint, which occur
    throughout the nation, the wildlife offenses here are specific
    to national parks. Further, just as the Sitz checkpoint pre-
    vented an immediate harm to motorists, the checkpoint here
    prevents hunters from destroying a precious natural resource.
    It does so by catching poachers before they can kill additional
    animals, by deterring would-be poachers, and by educating
    the park-going public about the hunting prohibition. The goal
    was prevention, not arrests.
    UNITED STATES v. FRAIRE               10221
    [7] Because the primary purpose of the checkpoint is distin-
    guishable from the general interest in crime control, the
    checkpoint is not per se unconstitutional under Edmond. We
    must therefore determine its “reasonableness, hence, its con-
    stitutionality, on the basis of the individual circumstances.”
    Lidster, 
    540 U.S. at 426
    . Our first consideration is “the grav-
    ity of the public concerns served by the seizure[.]” 
    Id. at 427
    (quoting Brown, 
    443 U.S. at 51
    ). In Faulkner, we described
    the gravity of the public concerns served by an informational
    checkpoint in a national park (preventing litter, promoting fire
    safety, reducing incidents of driving under the influence,
    eliminating property destruction and gang activity, and pro-
    tecting the environment) as high. 
    450 F.3d at 472
    . Here, the
    public concerns, including the protection of wildlife and
    ensuring the safety of park visitors, are equally pressing.
    [8] The second consideration is “the degree to which the
    seizure advances the public interest[.]” Lidster, 
    540 U.S. at 426
     (quoting Brown, 
    443 U.S. at 51
    ). Fraire contends that the
    checkpoint cannot be upheld without some empirical data
    demonstrating its effectiveness. He notes that the Court in Sitz
    relied on empirical data showing a 1.5% arrest rate in uphold-
    ing that checkpoint. 
    496 U.S. at 454
    . The Court also con-
    trasted Delaware v. Prouse, 
    440 U.S. 648
     (1979), which held
    a program of suspicionless stops unconstitutional, where there
    was no empirical evidence of effectiveness. 
    496 U.S. at
    454
    (citing Prouse, 
    440 U.S. at 659-60
    ). But there is nothing to
    suggest that the absence of empirical data was a dispositive
    factor in Prouse; rather, the lack of empirical data of effec-
    tiveness meant there was nothing to overcome the presump-
    tion of ineffectiveness derived from “common sense.” See
    Prouse, 
    440 U.S. at 659-60
     (stating that “common sense” sug-
    gested the “contribution to highway safety made by the dis-
    cretionary stops” would be “marginal at best”); 
    id. at 659
    (“[A]bsent some empirical data to the contrary, it must be
    assumed that finding an unlicensed driver among those who
    commit traffic violations is a much more likely event than
    finding an unlicensed driver by choosing randomly from the
    10222              UNITED STATES v. FRAIRE
    entire universe of drivers.”). Here, common sense suggests
    the opposite — that the checkpoint would be a reasonably
    efficient tool at preventing poaching given the significant
    poaching problem and the targeted nature of the checkpoint.
    Finally, we have previously observed that in certain cases
    effectiveness may be measured “by the relationship of the
    checkpoint to its objective, rather than by any measureable
    results, or by any results period.” Faulkner, 
    450 F.3d at
    472-
    73.
    [9] Here, Ranger Schifsky’s testimony established there
    was a significant poaching problem within the park. The
    checkpoint was closely related to addressing this problem
    because it was structured to catch poachers, to deter would-be
    poachers, and to educate park visitors about the hunting prohi-
    bition. Even if Fraire is correct that some poachers might
    avoid detection by falsely claiming that they were not hunting
    when questioned by rangers, it is equally true that most hunt-
    ers seek to obey the law if they know what it is. Overall, we
    believe the checkpoint advanced the public interest to a sig-
    nificant degree.
    The third and final consideration is “the severity of the
    interference with individual liberty.” Lidster, 
    540 U.S. at 427
    (quoting Brown, 
    443 U.S. at 51
    ). This factor is “gauged by the
    objective intrusion, measured by the duration of the seizure
    and the intensity of the investigation, and by the subjective
    intrusion, measured by the fear and surprise engendered in
    law-abiding motorists by the nature of the stop.” Faulkner,
    
    450 F.3d at 473
     (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
    ted).
    [10] The objective intrusion here was slight. Contact
    between drivers and rangers often lasted only about 15 to 25
    seconds, drivers would wait in line at most about one minute,
    and the rangers merely asked the drivers whether they had
    been hunting but did not search the vehicles or use carcass-
    sniffing dogs. See Lidster, 
    540 U.S. at 427
     (finding minimal
    UNITED STATES v. FRAIRE                10223
    objective intrusion because “each stop required only a brief
    wait in line-a very few minutes at most[,]” the contact with
    police lasted “only a few seconds[,]” and the “[p]olice contact
    consisted simply of a request for information and the distribu-
    tion of a flyer”); Faulkner, 
    450 F.3d at 473
     (vehicle stop of
    approximately 20 seconds to impart information resulted in
    minimal objective intrusion).
    [11] The severity of the subjective intrusion is “measured
    by the amount of concern and fright that is generated on the
    part of lawful travelers.” Faulkner, 
    450 F.3d at 473
    . The sub-
    jective intrusion from a checkpoint stop is significantly less
    than other types of seizures, such as random stops. Martinez-
    Fuerte, 
    428 U.S. at 558
    . Here, the subjective intrusion was
    minimal. The checkpoint was accompanied by signs announc-
    ing it, the rangers operating it were uniformed, and all
    approaching vehicles were stopped. See Lidster, 
    540 U.S. at 428
     (little reason for anxiety or alarm where police stopped all
    vehicles systematically); Sitz, 
    496 U.S. at 453
     (noting the fact
    that uniformed officers stopped every approaching vehicle as
    showing a minimal intrusion); Faulkner, 
    450 F.3d at 473-74
    .
    Although not a dispositive point, we also note that the stops
    occurred at the park gate, where park visitors expect to stop
    anyway (to receive a map, to be informed of park rules, to ask
    questions of the rangers, etc.). This is not a situation in which
    an encounter with a park ranger would be unexpected, as it
    might be if a ranger were to search campers’ tents or detain
    hikers on a mountain trail.
    IV. Conclusion
    [12] The gravity of the public concerns served by the
    checkpoint was high, the checkpoint was reasonably related to
    these concerns, and the severity of the interference with indi-
    vidual liberty was minimal. It follows that the checkpoint was
    reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the district
    court correctly denied Fraire’s motion to suppress.
    AFFIRMED.