Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation ( 2010 )


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  •                   FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,               
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE
    COLVILLE INDIAN RESERVATION,
    Respondent-Appellee,
    No. 08-35961
    and
           D.C. No.
    STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF                   3:68-cv-00513-KI
    WASHINGTON,
    Defendants,
    v.
    CONFEDERATED TRIBES AND BANDS
    OF THE YAKAMA INDIAN NATION,
    Plaintiff-intervenor-Appellant.
    
    7621
    7622         UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE
    COLVILLE INDIAN RESERVATION,
    Respondent-Appellant,
    No. 08-35963
    and
    STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF                       D.C. No.
    3:68-cv-00513-KI
    WASHINGTON,
    OPINION
    Defendants,
    v.
    CONFEDERATED TRIBES AND
    BANDS OF THE YAKAMA INDIAN
    NATION,
    Plaintiff-intervenor-Appellee.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Garr M. King, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    March 2, 2010—Portland, Oregon
    Filed May 27, 2010
    Before: Richard A. Paez, Richard C. Tallman, and
    Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Tallman
    7626         UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES
    COUNSEL
    Thomas Zeilman, Esq., (argued) Law Offices of Thomas Zeil-
    man, Yakima, Washington, for plaintiff-intervenor-appellant,
    Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation.
    Robert Lundman, Esq., (argued) United States Department of
    Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division, Wash-
    ington, D.C., for plaintiff United States of America.
    Donald J. Simon, Esq., (argued) Sonosky Chambers Sachse
    Endreson & Perry, Washington, D.C., for respondent-appellee
    Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation.
    OPINION
    TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:
    This appeal is the latest chapter in the saga of Pacific
    Northwest Native American treaty fishing rights; a saga that
    has spanned many generations and over forty years of federal
    litigation. If history is our guide, it will not be the last chapter
    written. After a 2006 remand from this court, the district court
    conducted a trial primarily based on expert anthropological
    opinions, century-old documents, and reliable hearsay. The
    Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation
    UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES                   7627
    (“Yakama”) appeal, and the Confederated Tribes of the Col-
    ville Indian Reservation (“Colville”) cross-appeal on behalf of
    their Wenatchi Constituent Tribe (“Wenatchi”), the district
    court’s finding that they share joint fishing rights at the
    “Wenatshapam Fishery” on Icicle Creek—a tributary to the
    Wenatchee River which flows into the Columbia River—
    under an 1894 agreement between the United States and the
    Yakama. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    For over a century—as the result of broken and forgotten
    promises—the Wenatchi’s fishing rights at their aboriginal
    home and fishing station have been in doubt. We hold that the
    district court’s ruling is supported by historical evidence
    establishing that it was the intent of the 1894 negotiators to
    grant the Wenatchi fishing rights at Wenatshapam, that the
    Yakama did not sell all of their fishing rights at Wenatsha-
    pam, and that both tribes’ fishing rights are non-exclusive.
    We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
    I
    A
    Before the arrival of Anglo-American settlers, the
    Wenatshapam Fishery was the aboriginal salmon fishing
    ground of the Wenatchi.1 More than any other place, the
    Wenatshapam Fishery was the hub around which the
    Wenatchi’s cycle of life rotated. The center of the Wenatsha-
    pam Fishery was the confluence of Icicle Creek and the
    Wenatchee River in north central Washington State near the
    modern-day town of Leavenworth.
    1
    The Wenatchi have also been referred to as “Wenatchee” and
    “Wenatshapam Indians.” The facts recited in this opinion are adopted
    from our prior opinions addressing this dispute or adopted from the district
    court’s findings of fact, which we hold to be plausible in light of the
    record viewed in its entirety and not clearly erroneous. See Husain v.
    Olympic Airways, 
    316 F.3d 829
    , 835 (9th Cir. 2002).
    7628           UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES
    In 1855, the United States began “a hasty effort to clear
    land occupied by Indians for development by settlers” in
    Washington Territory. United States v. Oregon, 
    29 F.3d 481
    ,
    484 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Oregon I”), as amended, 
    43 F.3d 1284
    (9th Cir. 1994). Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens, “under
    pressure to extinguish Indian title to all lands, consolidated
    small tribes or bands into larger tribal entities for the purposes
    of the treaties.” 
    Id.
     “The Wenatchi Tribe was one of the four-
    teen tribes represented at the negotiation of the Yakama
    Treaty. The treaty specified that tribes for the purposes of this
    treaty, are to be considered as one nation, under the name of
    Yakama.”2 United States v. Oregon, 
    470 F.3d 809
    , 811 (9th
    Cir. 2006) (“Oregon II”) (quoting Treaty with the Yakamas,
    June 9, 1855, 
    12 Stat. 951
     (1855) [hereinafter 1855 Treaty])
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Under the 1855 Treaty “the tribes gave up most of their
    lands in return for a specific reservation with set boundaries.”
    Oregon II, 
    470 F.3d at 811
    . The land for the reservation was
    subsequently surveyed and “set apart as provided in the trea-
    ty.” 
    Id.
     With regard to fishing rights, Article III of the Treaty
    provided,
    The exclusive right of taking fish in all the streams,
    where running through or bordering said reservation,
    is further secured to said confederated tribes and
    bands of Indians, as also the right of taking fish at all
    usual and accustomed places, in common with citi-
    zens of the Territory, and of erecting temporary
    buildings for curing them; together with the privilege
    of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing
    their horses and cattle upon open and unclaimed
    land.
    2
    The spelling of the name was changed from “Yakima” to “Yakama”
    in 1994 to reflect the native pronunciation. “Yakama” is used in this opin-
    ion, except where historical accuracy requires that “Yakima” be used.
    UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES           7629
    1855 Treaty at 953. In addition, tribal leader Kamiakin—the
    spokesman for the fourteen tribes that would constitute the
    Yakama Nation—insisted on a reservation at Wenatshapam
    “where the Indians take many fish.” This was done at the
    request of—among others—the Wenatchi leader Tecolekun.
    Accordingly, Article X of the 1855 Treaty set aside a second
    reservation, providing,
    That there is also reserved and set apart from the
    lands ceded by this treaty, for the use and benefit of
    the aforesaid confederated tribes and bands, a tract
    of land not exceeding in quantity one township of six
    miles square, situated at the forks of the Pisquouse
    or Wenatshapam River, and known as the
    “Wenatshapam Fishery,” which said reservation
    shall be surveyed and marked out whenever the Pres-
    ident may direct, and be subject to the same provi-
    sions and restrictions as other Indian reservations.
    
    Id. at 954
    .
    B
    Despite the promise made in Article X of the 1855 Treaty,
    “no attempt was made by the United States to survey the six-
    square-mile reservation for almost forty years. The Wenatchi
    remained at this Wenatshapam Fishery Reservation and fished
    there during this time, firmly believing that a survey would be
    made and they would be secure in this reservation.” Oregon
    II, 
    470 F.3d at 811
    .
    The Wenatchee Valley remained difficult to reach by set-
    tlers for much of the late 1800s, but by 1892, the Great North-
    ern Railroad reached the area, laying tracks up the Wenatchee
    River and through the Wenatshapam Fishery—which had
    never been taken out of the public domain—to Leavenworth,
    a townsite developed by the railroad.
    7630         UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES
    In July 1892, Yakama Reservation Indian Agent Jay Lynch
    contacted the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, D.M. Brow-
    ning, inquiring as to whether or not the Wenatshapam Fishery
    Reservation had “ever been definitely located and what dispo-
    sition ha[d] ever been made of it, if any.” Letter of July 11,
    1892, from Jay Lynch to Comm’r of Indian Affairs, reprinted
    in S. Exec. Doc. No. 67 at 5 (1894) [hereinafter Senate Doc.
    67]. As a result of this letter, the Acting Secretary of the Inte-
    rior, William H. Sims, authorized a survey of the reservation
    in 1893. Senate Doc. 67 at 6-7. However, before the survey
    commenced, Agent Lynch was removed from his post.
    The survey went forward, slowly setting out an area at the
    confluence of the Wenatchee River and Icicle Creek. Oregon
    II, 
    470 F.3d at 812
    . This prompted several settlers in the
    Wenatchee Valley to complain that “to form a new reserva-
    tion across this valley from mountain to mountain, as is pro-
    posed, it not only embraces the Great Northern Railway, but
    many settlers.” Senate Doc. 67 at 8. Commissioner Browning
    responded,
    In reply you are advised that the Wenatchee is not
    established as a new reservation, but as the fulfill-
    ment of a treaty obligation, which had been hereto-
    fore overlooked or neglected by the Government
    since the ratification of the Yakima treaty in 1869.
    It is now as much Indian land as the Yakima Indian
    Reservation itself, the only difference being that the
    one had distinct boundaries named and described in
    the treaty, while the other was referred to as a tract
    of land not exceeding in quantity one township of 6
    miles square, situated at the forks of the Pisquause
    or Wenatchapam River, which the Government stip-
    ulated and agreed should be surveyed and marked
    out whenever the President might direct. This was
    not done until last fall when the President ordered
    the survey and the location of this tract, which is
    now being made.
    UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES           7631
    
    Id.
     Commissioner Browning suggested that the settlers peti-
    tion the President to enter into negotiations with “the Indians”
    for the purchase of the Article X reservation, which they did.
    
    Id.
    Before the survey could be completed, “the newly
    appointed Yakima Indian Agent, Lewis T. Erwin, ordered [the
    surveyor] to stop the surveying and [to] destroy all the monu-
    ments and trees that had markings. Instead, he directed the
    surveyor to survey an area some distance away in the moun-
    tains next to a lake, but not near the river.” Oregon II, 
    470 F.3d at 812
    . Shortly thereafter, settler James H. Chase, Esq.,
    contacted Commissioner Browning. Significantly, he
    observed,
    I am convinced there are quite a number of Indians
    old in years who were born and have always lived on
    the Wenatchee River, and on the very land which
    they now claim should be the reservation, and who
    at the time helped build and owned a part in all the
    fisheries on the Wenatchee River . . . .
    Senate Doc. 67 at 11. He concluded, “There is no doubt in my
    mind but what the intention was to secure the reserve to the
    Indians who owned the fisheries and that while the contract
    or treaty of 1855 mentioned the Yakimas it really intended to
    give the land to the Indians who owned the fisheries . . . .” Id.
    at 11-12.
    Once former Agent Lynch learned that the proposed loca-
    tion of the Wenatshapam Fishery Reservation had now been
    moved far above the confluence, he wrote a letter decrying “a
    great injustice done to the Yakima Indians by reason of a
    recent survey of the boundary line of a reservation . . . known
    as the Wenatchapam fishery.” Id. at 20. In the letter he quoted
    an “old Indian” who protested,
    Does our Great Father at Washington think a salmon
    is an eagle that lives on top of a mountain, or does
    7632          UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES
    he think a salmon is a deer that lives in the woods
    and hills, or does he think a salmon is a mountain
    goat that lives among the rocks of the snow covered
    mountains?
    Tell our Great Father the Indian does not care for the
    little trout in the lake, but wants the salmon that lives
    in the rocky places in the river where the Indian can
    find him. Our fishery is in the river where you saw
    it, and was destroyed by white men and the Indians
    driven away. We want our fishery in the river where
    Governor Stephens gave it to us a long time ago.
    Id.
    Secretary Sims subsequently authorized Commissioner
    Browning to enter into negotiations to purchase the
    Wenatshapam reservation, specifically noting, “It seems from
    letters submitted with your communication that there are Indi-
    ans other than the Yakimas living in the neighborhood of this
    reservation who have, or claim, some rights therein. The
    rights of such Indians in land or fishing privileges should be
    taken into consideration and protected.” Id. at 15.
    On October 13, 1893, Commissioner Browning authorized
    Agent Erwin to enter into negotiations. Id. He reiterated Sec-
    retary Sims’ observation that “Indians other than the Yaki-
    mas” were living at Wenatshapam and the Secretary’s express
    instruction that “the rights of such Indians in lands or fishing
    privileges should be taken into consideration and protected.”
    Id. at 16. He also instructed Agent Erwin to take great care in
    recording the proceedings, which prompted the agent in 1893
    to hire a stenographer to produce a transcript of the negotia-
    tions. The district court heavily relied on that transcript in ren-
    dering its factual findings supporting the decision we review
    here.
    UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES           7633
    C
    Agent Erwin convened a tribal council at the Yakama Res-
    ervation on December 18, 1893, to open negotiations for the
    purchase of the Article X reservation. Id. at 24. Four
    Wenatchi leaders, including Chief John Harmelt, made the
    150 mile journey from Wenatshapam to attend. Agent Erwin
    began the negotiations by reading Commissioner Browning’s
    letter offering to purchase the land, but promising not to
    deprive “the Indians” of the use of the fisheries. Id.
    Agent Erwin proposed that the council sell the incorrectly
    located mountain reservation and that the Wenatchi take allot-
    ments in the Wenatchee Valley where they resided. Id. Impor-
    tantly, he stated, “I have something further that I want to say
    about the fishery privilege and that is that even if you should
    agree to sell, the Department says that you shall have the law-
    ful use of the fisheries in common with the white people.” Id.
    Chief Harmelt did not initially agree to the sale. He stated,
    “I myself alone have heard what you said; and if all the Indi-
    ans over at Wenatchee would hear what you said, then they
    would decide on this land. I think those people out [ought] to
    know about this matter, then let the decision come after-
    wards.” Id. at 30 (alteration in original). Chief Harmelt sug-
    gested he return to Wenatshapam to inform the Wenatchi of
    the proposal. Id. After the Yakama proposed a price of $1.50
    per acre, however, Chief Harmelt stated, “I am well satisfied
    between you two. Whatever they ask for the land that is my
    same price.” Id. at 32.
    On December 20, 1893, Special Agent John Lane informed
    the council that he would telegraph the Department of the
    Interior to see if the price was agreeable, and would recon-
    vene the council when he received a reply. He then stated, “If
    the Wenatchee Indians are not here then we will send a letter
    over there to notify them of the condition of affairs.” Id. The
    7634        UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES
    council adjourned. Id. The Wenatchi representatives returned
    to their homes.
    The agents reconvened the council at the Yakama Reserva-
    tion on January 6, 1894, without Wenatchi representatives
    present. Id. at 33. The agents rejected the Yakama proposal of
    $1.50 per acre and proposed a lump sum of “$10,000 or
    $15,000.” Id. Yakama members protested the fact that the
    Wenatchi were not present. Charley Skummit said,
    I will not sell this piece of land away from the
    Wenatchee Indians that owns the land. We all heard
    what you said when these Indians said they would
    sell; you said you would allot them other lands.
    These Wenatchee Indians said they wanted land
    where they lived. It was the land of his fathers and
    he wanted to stay there . . . . We are having another
    council here to-day and I feel that I have no right to
    take this land away from the Indians because they
    are the right owners of it.
    Id. Agent Erwin promised in reply, “Just what we said to
    those Wenatchee Indians we will carry out.” Id.
    Tom Simpson, speaking for the Yakama, then counter-
    offered, “All the headmen agree to finishing this matter up
    . . . . We will relinquish all our rights to the Wenatshapam
    fishery for $20,000 . . . .” Id. at 34.
    D
    The 1894 Agreement was ultimately signed by 246 mem-
    bers of the Yakama Nation in person, and seven by proxy. Id.
    at 3. In relevant part, the agreement provided,
    Article I.
    The said Indians hereby cede and relinquish to the
    United States all their right, title, interest, claim, and
    UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES                 7635
    demand of whatsoever name or nature of[,] in, and
    to all their right of fishery, as set forth in article 10
    of said treaty aforesaid, and also all their right, title,
    interest, claim, or demand of, in, and to said land
    above described, or any corrected description thereof
    and known as the Wenatshapam fishery.
    Article II.
    In consideration of the foregoing cession and
    relinquishment the United States hereby agrees to
    pay or expend through their Indian Agent, Yakima
    Agency, twenty thousand dollars, which said sum is
    to be deposited in a United States depository for
    their use and benefit as soon as approved by Con-
    gress, and subject to their order, the Indians reserv-
    ing the right to dispose of said money as they may
    decide in general council to be held by them and for
    that purpose. After the ratification of this agreement
    by Congress and the further consideration that the
    Indians known as the Wenatshapam Indians, residing
    on the Wenatchee River, State of Washington, shall
    have land allotted to them in severalty in the vicinity
    of where they now reside, or elsewhere, as they may
    select, in accordance with article 4 of the general
    allotment law.3
    Agreement with the Yakama Nation of Indians in Washing-
    ton, Act of Aug. 15, 1894, ch. 290, § 13, 
    28 Stat. 320
    , 320-21
    (1894) [hereinafter 1894 Agreement].
    Despite the promise in the 1894 Agreement to provide
    allotments to the members of the Wenatchi still living at the
    fishery, “the government again failed to fulfill its promise, as
    it never made the allotments available to the Wenatchi.” Ore-
    3
    “The Wenatshapam Indians referred to in the 1894 Agreement are the
    same as the Wenatchi Indians.” Oregon II, 
    470 F.3d at
    813 n.4.
    7636         UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES
    gon II, 
    470 F.3d at 813
    . “The Wenatchi remained and fished
    on their aboriginal lands at the Wenatshapam Fishery until
    they were moved by the federal government in 1902 and 1903
    to the Colville Reservation.” 
    Id. at 811
    . Chief Harmelt never
    enrolled at the Colville Reservation, located some 150 miles
    east of Wenatshapam, although he attended several Wenatchi
    enrollment hearings. He continued to reside in the Wenatchee
    Valley and advocated for Wenatchi rights at Wenatshapam by
    traveling to Washington, D.C., twice before his death.
    II
    A
    “The United States initiated the underlying litigation in
    1968 on behalf of certain Indian tribes in Oregon and against
    the State of Oregon to define, at least in part, the Indians’
    treaty rights to take fish at ‘all usual and accustomed places’
    on the Columbia River and its tributaries.” Oregon I, 
    29 F.3d at
    482-83 (citing Sohappy v. Smith, 
    302 F. Supp. 899
    , 903-04
    (D. Or. 1969)).
    Originally, four tribes asserted treaty fishing rights: The
    Yakama Indian Nation, The Confederated Tribes and Bands
    of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, The Confeder-
    ated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation, and The Nez Perce
    Tribe of Idaho. Id. at 483. In 1969, the district court ruled that
    the tribes were entitled to treaty rights providing them a “fair
    share” of the Columbia River salmon. Sohappy, 
    302 F. Supp. at 911
    .
    In 1974 and 1983, the states of Washington and Idaho
    intervened. Oregon I, 
    29 F.3d at 483
    . In 1988, the District of
    Oregon adopted a “comprehensive fish management plan.” 
    Id.
    In 1989, the Colville sought to intervene on behalf of five
    constituent tribes that they maintained were parties to the
    Yakama Treaty of 1855: the Wenatchi, the Entiat, the Chelan,
    UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES            7637
    the Columbia, and the Palus. 
    Id.
     Colville has never “explained
    why it waited over twenty years after United States v. Oregon
    was initiated and why it did not seek to intervene while the
    district court was considering the comprehensive management
    plan adopted in 1988.” 
    Id.
     “After considering voluminous
    exhibits, stipulations and evidence presented during a three-
    day court trial, the district court denied Colville’s intervention
    motion, finding that Colville could not assert treaty fishing
    rights reserved to its constituent tribes.” 
    Id. at 482
    .
    In 1994, we affirmed the district court’s denial of Colville’s
    motion to intervene and as a result foreclosed the Wenatchi
    from exercising 1855 Treaty fishing rights at the Wenatsha-
    pam Fishery. See 
    id. at 486
    . We reasoned, “[r]ights under a
    treaty vest with the tribe at the time of the signing of the trea-
    ty,” 
    id.
     at 484 (citing United States v. Washington, 
    384 F. Supp. 312
     (W.D. Wash. 1974) (Boldt, J.), aff’d, 
    520 F.2d 676
    ,
    692 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Washington I”), cert. denied, 
    423 U.S. 1086
     (1976)), but “Indians later asserting treaty rights must
    establish that their group has preserved its tribal status,” Ore-
    gon I, 
    29 F.3d at
    484 (citing United States v. Washington, 
    641 F.2d 1368
    , 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Washington II”), cert.
    denied, 
    454 U.S. 1143
     (1982)).
    We ruled that the constituent tribes—including the
    Wenatchi—had not “maintained political cohesion with the
    tribal entities created by the [1855] treaties and receiving fish-
    ing rights.” Oregon I, 
    29 F.3d at 485
    . We relied upon the dis-
    trict court’s factual “findings relating to the history of the
    bands who [sought] to trace their cultural and political lineage
    to the tribes that signed the 1855 treaty,” and we concluded
    that “the tribes, prior to being subsumed in the Colville Con-
    federacy, were separate bands who disengaged from the Yak-
    ima Nation by refusing to relocate to the reservation
    established by the 1855 treaty.” 
    Id. at 486
    .
    We subsequently amended our opinion to note that the
    “[f]ailure to move onto [a] reservation is not the determinative
    7638         UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES
    factor in deciding whether a group has retained treaty rights.”
    United States v. Oregon, 
    43 F.3d 1284
     (9th Cir. 1994).
    Instead, we reasoned, “it is only one consideration relevant to
    an essentially factual inquiry—i.e., whether a group claiming
    treaty rights has maintained sufficient political continuity with
    those who signed the treaty that it may fairly be called the
    same tribe.” 
    Id.
    B
    Throughout this litigation, whether they were permitted or
    not by the terms of any treaty, descendants of the Wenatchi
    have fished at their aboriginal Wenatshapam Fishery. In 2003,
    the Yakama Nation sought and obtained an injunction pre-
    venting these Wenatchi from fishing at Wenatshapam. The
    Wenatchi opposed the injunction by arguing that they had the
    right to fish at Wenatshapam under the 1894 Agreement. The
    district court concluded res judicata prevented the Wenatchi
    from asserting this claim. The Wenatchi appealed.
    In 2006 we reversed, concluding, “Through unfulfilled
    promises and procedural rulings, [the Wenatchi] would, under
    [the district court’s] ruling, lose both the land they were guar-
    anteed adjacent to the fishery and their fishing rights.” Ore-
    gon II, 
    470 F.3d at 813
    . We further reasoned,
    The 1894 Agreement was not set forth as an amend-
    ment to the 1855 Treaty. Rather, it was an agreement
    for the sale of the Wenatshapam Fishery that had
    been given to the tribes of the Yakama Nation by the
    1855 Treaty, with specific benefits being reserved
    for the Wenatchi Tribe, which had continued to
    reside and fish there.
    
    Id. at 816
    . We then held, “Colville is not precluded by res
    judicata from asserting the claim of the Wenatchi Tribe to
    fishing rights at the Wenatshapam Fishery based on the 1894
    UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES              7639
    Agreement.” 
    Id. at 818
    . We remanded for a trial on the merits
    to determine fishing rights under that agreement. 
    Id.
    C
    Following a three-day bench trial primarily relying on
    expert testimony and the transcript of the 1893 and 1894
    negotiations, both parties submitted extensive post-trial brief-
    ing. The United States also filed a post-trial brief addressing
    only one issue: the government argued that the 1894 Agree-
    ment did not in any way limit Yakama from taking fish at
    usual and accustomed places under Article III of the 1855
    Treaty. The United States took no position on whether the
    Wenatshapam Fishery is a usual and accustomed fishing place
    of the Yakama, or whether the Wenatchi obtained fishing
    rights at Wenatshapam under the 1894 Agreement. The dis-
    trict court found,
    The events leading up to the 1894 Agreement, and
    the negotiations themselves, demonstrate that
    Yakama tribal members were concerned about pro-
    tecting the Wenatchi right to the fishery. As a result,
    the agents promised Yakama that the government
    would provide fishing rights and land to the
    Wenatchi in exchange for the sale of the Article X
    reservation.
    United States v. Oregon, No. 68-513-KI, 
    2008 WL 3834169
    ,
    at *12 (D. Or. Aug. 13, 2008). It cited the letter exchange
    between the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner of
    Indian Affairs, Agent Erwin, Special Agent Lane, and the set-
    tlers living at Wenatshapam, as well as the statements made
    during the negotiations, as evidencing a conscious effort to
    protect Wenatchi fishing rights at the Wenatshapam Fishery.
    
    Id.
    The court found the evidence “establishes an agreement
    that the Wenatchi were to have the right to fish at the
    7640         UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES
    Wenatshapam Fishery.” 
    Id. at *14
    . It reasoned that the
    Yakama are entitled to usual and accustomed Article III fish-
    ing rights at Wenatshapam under the 1855 Treaty, because the
    tribe only sold its exclusive on-reservation fishing rights at
    that location. 
    Id. at *18
    . Finally, the court determined that
    Wenatchi fishing rights at Wenatshapam are not superior to
    those of the Yakama, but are instead of the same character. 
    Id. at *22
    . In effect, the district court’s ruling formally recog-
    nized that the Wenatchi have the legal right to fish at their
    aboriginal home and fishing station.
    Yakama now argues that the district court erred in finding
    an “implied agreement” to provide the Wenatchi with fishing
    rights at Wenatshapam. On cross-appeal, the Wenatchi argue
    the district court erred in finding that Yakama has fishing
    rights at Wenatshapam, and, in the alternative, erred in failing
    to find Wenatchi fishing rights superior to Yakama fishing
    rights.
    III
    We review the district court’s interpretation of treaties, stat-
    utes, and executive orders de novo. United States v. Idaho,
    
    210 F.3d 1067
    , 1072 (9th Cir. 2000). “Findings of historical
    fact, including the district court’s findings regarding treaty
    negotiators’ intentions, are reviewed for clear error.” 
    Id. at 1072-73
    . “We therefore review for clear error all of the dis-
    trict court’s findings of historical fact, including its findings
    regarding the treaty negotiators’ intentions. We then review
    de novo whether the district court reached the proper conclu-
    sion as to the meaning of the [1894 Agreement] given those
    findings.” United States v. Washington, 
    157 F.3d 630
    , 642
    (9th Cir. 1998).
    IV
    A
    As a preliminary matter, we consider whether our analysis
    should be limited to the four corners of the 1894 Agreement
    UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES             7641
    itself—as Yakama suggests—or whether we should also con-
    sider the document introduced in the Senate prior to ratifica-
    tion that contains the transcript of the negotiations and the
    letters exchanged regarding the agreement. See Senate Doc.
    67.
    The 1894 Agreement contains two articles relevant to our
    inquiry. As we noted in our 2006 opinion,
    Both provisions appear to be ambiguous in light of
    the context in which the agreement took place, the
    statements of the parties concerning the meaning of
    the terms of the agreement, and the recognition that
    this was an agreement drafted by the Government to
    reflect the understanding of the Indians, who had a
    lesser familiarity with the legal technicalities
    involved.
    Oregon II, 
    470 F.3d at 817
    .
    The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed us that when
    interpreting a treaty or agreement between the United States
    and Native Americans, it must always be borne in mind,
    that the negotiations for the treaty [were] conducted,
    on the part of the United States . . . by representa-
    tives skilled in diplomacy . . . , understanding the
    modes and forms of creating the various technical
    estates known to their law, and assisted by an inter-
    preter employed by themselves; that the treaty [was]
    drawn up by them and in their own language; that
    the Indians, on the other hand . . . [were] wholly
    unfamiliar with all the forms of [Anglo-American]
    legal expression, and whose only knowledge of the
    terms in which the treaty [was] framed [was] that
    imparted to them by the interpreter employed by the
    United States; and that the treaty must therefore be
    construed, not according to the technical meaning of
    7642         UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES
    its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in
    which they would naturally be understood by the
    Indians.
    Jones v. Meehan, 
    175 U.S. 1
    , 11 (1899). With regard to trea-
    ties negotiated between the United States and the Yakama, we
    have observed, “[t]he inadequacy of the treaties is further
    exacerbated by the fact that the Indians signing the treaties
    generally did not speak English, and the Indian argot into
    which the treaty provisions were translated was inadequate to
    convey the meaning of the treaties.” Oregon I, 
    29 F.3d at
    484
    (citing Washington I, 
    520 F.2d at 683
    ).
    [1] The Supreme Court “has often held that treaties with
    the Indians must be interpreted as they would have under-
    stood them, and any doubtful expressions in them should be
    resolved in the Indians’ favor.” Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma,
    
    397 U.S. 620
    , 631 (1970) (internal citation omitted). This
    principle has been applied to treaties, agreements, and execu-
    tive orders negotiated with Native Americans. See United
    States v. Washington, 
    235 F.3d 438
    , 442 (9th Cir. 2000) (not-
    ing that the “time-honored principle that ambiguities in agree-
    ments and treaties with Native Americans are to be resolved
    from the native standpoint . . . extends to executive orders”).
    [2] In determining the sense in which treaties would natu-
    rally be understood by Native Americans, the Supreme Court
    has looked “beyond the written words to the larger context
    that frames the Treaty, including ‘the history of the treaty, the
    negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the
    parties.’ ” Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indi-
    ans, 
    526 U.S. 172
    , 196 (1999) (quoting Choctaw Nation v.
    United States, 
    318 U.S. 423
    , 432 (1943)); see also South
    Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 
    522 U.S. 329
    , 351-52 (1998)
    (considering the “manner in which the transaction was negoti-
    ated,” the “negotiations themselves,” and the “tenor of legisla-
    tive Reports presented to Congress” (internal quotation marks
    omitted)); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 
    430 U.S. 584
    , 587
    UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES              7643
    (1977) (considering “the face of the Act, the surrounding cir-
    cumstances, and the legislative history” (internal quotation
    and citation omitted)).
    [3] The 1894 Agreement is silent as to the Wenatchi’s fish-
    ing rights. As previously noted, “[b]oth provisions [of the
    1894 Agreement] appear to be ambiguous.” Oregon II, 
    470 F.3d at 817
    . Given the 1894 Agreement’s ambiguity as to the
    fishing rights of the Wenatchi and the Supreme Court’s direc-
    tion to construe Native American treaties in the “sense in
    which they would naturally be understood by” the Native
    Americans, we consider the transcript of the agreement nego-
    tiations in order to ascertain how those present at the council
    understood the agreement. Jones, 
    175 U.S. at 11
    .
    B
    The district court found that the Native Americans present
    at the negotiations understood the 1894 Agreement as provid-
    ing the Wenatchi with non-exclusive fishing rights at
    Wenatshapam. The record supports that finding.
    The Wenatchi and Yakama disagree as to whether the dis-
    trict court’s determination is a finding of fact reviewed for
    clear error, or a conclusion of law reviewed de novo. A find-
    ing as to what a negotiator understood involves the same kind
    of factual analysis as a finding of intent—including for exam-
    ple the consideration of the events leading up to a negotiation,
    statements made during a negotiation, and the overall context
    of the negotiation—which is entitled to deferential clear error
    review. See Idaho, 
    210 F.3d at 1072-73
    . We accordingly
    review for clear error the district court’s findings as to the
    understanding of the Native Americans present at the negotia-
    tions.4
    4
    We add, however, that even reviewing the record de novo, we would
    reach the same conclusion as the district court.
    7644         UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES
    [4] The transcript of the 1893 and 1894 negotiations is
    helpful in discerning the motivations and understandings of
    those present. It is evident from the transcript that, as the dis-
    trict court found, the Yakama were concerned about protect-
    ing Wenatchi rights over Wenatshapam. Captain Eneas, a
    Yakama, said,
    I am not going over to my friends house and throw
    him off his place and tell him I would get rich and
    fat off of his place. It is for the Government to treat
    these Wenatchee Indians right. You talk to these
    Wenatchee Indians and ask them what they want for
    that land, but not the Yakimas.
    Senate Doc. 67 at 25. Joe Stwire, a Yakama, said, “There are
    [four] men here from Wenatchee. Whatever the [four] men
    from Wenatchee decide, the Yakimas will decide as soon as
    we know what they say.” Id. at 26. Thomas Simpson said, “It
    is true you all know that I am not fit to talk about the Wenat-
    chee lands. My desire is not to throw the Wenatchee out of
    this land so that I may fill up myself out of it.” Id. at 28.
    [5] In addition, the transcript reveals a desire on the part of
    the United States to negotiate not only with the Yakama, but
    with the Wenatchi as well. Agent Erwin specifically
    addressed Chief Harmelt and asked, “Can we arrive at any
    agreement by which your lands are to be allotted to you and
    you relinquish your claims in the Wenatshapam fishery for
    ten or fifteen thousand dollars?” Id. at 25. The agents also
    expressed to both parties—in accordance with their instruc-
    tions from Commissioner Browning—that the rights of the
    Wenatchi in their land and fishery were to be protected. Agent
    Erwin explicitly stated,
    There is one thing I want to impress on these Indians
    from the Wenatchee, and this is that they are not to
    be robbed of an acre of land, but on the contrary, the
    Government proposes to give them land where they
    UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES              7645
    now are. The selling of this fishery does not interfere
    with their rights at all.
    Id. at 15. Agent Erwin repeatedly read the letter from Com-
    missioner Browning and Secretary Sims providing that the
    “rights of such Indians [living near Wenatshapam] in land or
    fishing privileges should be taken into consideration and pro-
    tected.” Id. Most importantly, Agent Erwin promised, “you
    shall have the lawful use of the fisheries in common with the
    white people.” Id. at 28.
    Finally, the district court correctly observed that after the
    agents reconvened the negotiations in January 1894 without
    the Wenatchi present, the Yakama were hesitant to consum-
    mate an agreement. Charley Skummit said, “We are having
    another council here to-day and I feel that I have no right to
    take this land away from the [Wenatchi] Indians because they
    are the right owners of it.” Id. at 33. When the Yakama were
    uncomfortable proceeding without the Wenatchi, Agent
    Erwin reassured them, stating, “Just what we said to those
    Wenatchee Indians we will carry out.” Id. Only then did the
    Yakama agree to sell their rights in the Article X reservation.
    [6] In sum, the Yakama instructed the agents, “It is for the
    Government to treat these Wenatchee Indians right,” id. at 25,
    Agent Erwin promised the Wenatchi, “you shall have the law-
    ful use of the fisheries in common with the white people,” id.
    at 28, and the Yakama would only agree to the sale after
    Agent Erwin reiterated his promises to the Wenatchi. Based
    on this record, the district court correctly held that the evi-
    dence establishes the Native Americans present at the negotia-
    tions understood the 1894 Agreement to provide the Wenatchi
    with the right to fish at their aboriginal home and fishing
    station—the Wenatshapam Fishery—as consideration for the
    Yakama’s sale of the Article X reservation.
    [7] Although the written 1894 Agreement is ambiguous as
    to the fishing rights of the Wenatchi, agreements “with the
    7646           UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES
    Indians must be interpreted as they would have understood
    them,” and applying that principle, we must interpret the 1894
    Agreement as securing the non-exclusive rights of the
    Wenatchi to fish at Wenatshapam.5 Choctaw Nation, 
    397 U.S. at 631
    ; see also Iowa Tribe of Indians v. United States, 
    68 Ct. Cl. 585
    , 17 (1929) (“[T]he evidence taken in connection with
    the circumstances of the case clearly establishes the existence
    of an agreement, the terms of which are not expressed in the
    written contract.”).
    C
    On cross-appeal, the Wenatchi do not challenge the district
    court’s conclusion that Wenatshapam can be considered a
    “usual and accustomed” fishing station of the Yakama under
    Article III of the 1855 Treaty. Instead, the Wenatchi contend
    that—from 1855 to 1894—the only fishing rights the Yakama
    possessed at Wenatshapam were exclusive on-reservation
    fishing rights through Article X of the 1855 Treaty, and that
    when the Yakama signed the 1894 Agreement ceding “all
    their right of fishery, as set forth in article 10,” they relin-
    quished every fishing right they possessed at Wenatshapam.
    We disagree.
    1
    The Wenatchi correctly note that Yakama derives all of its
    fishing rights at Wenatshapam from Article III of the 1855
    Treaty. Contrary to the Wenatchi’s assertions, however, that
    Article reserved to the Yakama two distinct fishing rights at
    Wenatshapam.
    [8] First, the Yakama had the “exclusive right of taking
    5
    Because we interpret the negotiations in conjunction with the 1894
    Agreement as providing the Wenatchi with fishing rights at Wenatshapam,
    we decline to address Colville’s argument that the provision of allotments
    in the agreement carried with it an implied promise of fishing rights.
    UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES           7647
    fish in all the streams, where running through or bordering”
    reservations. 1855 Treaty at 953. This Article III right entitled
    the Yakama to exclusive fishing rights at the reservation
    established in Article X. Second, the Yakama had the “right
    of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common
    with citizens of the Territory.” 
    Id.
     This Article III right enti-
    tled the Yakama to an in-common share of fish at all usual
    and accustomed fishing stations. The exclusive Article III
    fishing right depended on the existence of the Article X reser-
    vation, whereas the non-exclusive fishing right existed inde-
    pendently of Article X and depended on whether or not
    Wenatshapam could be considered a “usual and accustomed”
    fishing ground.
    [9] Evidence in the record indicates that two 1855 Treaty
    signatory tribes—the Wenatchi and the Kittitas—customarily
    fished at Wenatshapam both at and before treaty time. It is
    well established that,
    every fishing location where members of a tribe cus-
    tomarily fished from time to time at and before
    treaty times, however distant from the then usual
    habitat of the tribe, and whether or not other tribes
    then also fished in the same waters, is a usual and
    accustomed ground or station at which the treaty
    tribe reserved, and its members presently have, the
    right to take fish.
    Washington I, 
    384 F. Supp. at 332
    . As the Yakama Nation
    communally possesses the fishing rights of the Kittitas, see
    Oregon I, 
    29 F.3d at 484
    , Wenatshapam can be considered a
    usual and accustomed fishing ground of the Yakama for the
    purposes of Article III fishing rights.
    The Wenatchi’s argument—that from 1855 to 1894, the
    only fishing rights that Yakama possessed at Wenatshapam
    were exclusive Article III fishing rights dependent on the
    existence of the Article X reservation—presupposes that a
    7648         UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES
    tribe cannot possess both exclusive fishing rights and in-
    common usual and accustomed fishing rights at the same
    location, at the same time. When the Yakama entered the
    1893 negotiations, the Wenatchi argue, any cession of their
    exclusive right to fish at Wenatshapam would have consti-
    tuted a cession of all their rights to fish at Wenatshapam, as
    they were incapable of reserving a distinct non-exclusive fish-
    ing right that could not exist “at the same time” as their exclu-
    sive right.
    While we recognize that the existence of both exclusive
    and non-exclusive fishing rights at the same location, at the
    same time, could be construed as redundant or unnecessary,
    we cannot conclude that the Yakama’s reservation of an
    exclusive Article III right to fish at Wenatshapam renders
    inoperable their separate and distinct reservation of a non-
    exclusive Article III right to fish at the same location. One
    need only consider the present scenario—in which the
    Yakama subsequently ceded their exclusive right to fish at
    Wenatshapam—in order to ascertain the utility of reserving
    such a separate and distinct non-exclusive fishing right.
    Ultimately, we need not—and do not—resolve the question
    inherent to Wenatchi’s presupposition, because whether or not
    Yakama possessed both exclusive and non-exclusive Article
    III rights at Wenatshapam “at the same time,” we agree with
    the district court’s conclusion that non-exclusive fishing
    rights can and do exist on former reservations. Indeed, courts
    have observed that a tribe’s fishing rights on a former reserva-
    tion “cannot be exclusive when that reservation no longer
    exists, but such fishing must be ‘in common with’ non-treaty
    right fishermen.” Washington I, 
    384 F. Supp. at 339
    . That is,
    once an 1855 Treaty tribe sells a reservation—and with it the
    exclusive right to fish at that location—it is free to exercise
    non-exclusive fishing rights at its usual and accustomed fish-
    ing grounds pursuant to Article III, absent an agreement to
    extinguish those rights. See id.; see also Mille Lacs Band of
    Chippewa Indians, 
    526 U.S. at 200-01
     (holding that non-
    UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES                 7649
    exclusive usufructuary rights survived the sale of a reserva-
    tion where the instrument terminating the reservation was
    silent as to those rights).
    [10] The cession of a reservation does not change the fact
    that the rivers, streams, and lakes on the reservation may have
    been where a tribe “customarily fished from time to time at
    and before treaty times.” Washington I, 
    384 F. Supp. at 332
    .
    It follows that while the 1894 Agreement’s provision for the
    sale of the Article X reservation may have terminated Yaka-
    ma’s right to exclude others from fishing there, the Agree-
    ment did not change Yakama’s non-exclusive Article III usual
    and accustomed fishing rights at that location unless it
    expressly provided for a cession of those rights.
    2
    [11] No such provision exists in the 1894 Agreement.
    Yakama’s cession—with regard to fishing rights—is limited
    to its rights under Article X of the 1855 Treaty. Article I of
    the 1894 Agreement provides,
    The said Indians hereby cede and relinquish to the
    United States all their right, title, interest, claim, and
    demand of whatsoever name or nature of[,] in, and
    to all their right of fishery, as set forth in article 10
    of said treaty aforesaid and also all their right, title,
    interest, claim, or demand of, in, and to said land
    above described, or any corrected description thereof
    and known as the Wenatshapam fishery.
    1894 Agreement at 320. The Yakama therefore expressly sold
    “all their right of fishery, as set forth in article 10” of the
    1855 Treaty. 
    Id.
     (emphasis added). The Agreement does not
    implicate or extinguish the Yakama’s non-exclusive Article
    III fishing rights under the 1855 Treaty, but rather references
    fishing rights derived from Article X. See 
    id.
     As the only
    Yakama fishing rights derived from Article X are exclusive
    7650         UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES
    rights under Article III, those are the only rights Yakama
    ceded.
    Nevertheless, the Wenatchi would have us interpret the lan-
    guage ceding Yakama’s “right, title, interest, claim, or
    demand of, in, and to said land above described” as impliedly
    ceding Yakama’s on-reservation fishing rights. The Wenatchi
    argue that such an interpretation would render the qualifying
    language “as set forth in article 10 of said treaty aforesaid”
    mere surplusage if it were construed as limiting the cession of
    fishing rights to on-reservation rights—a disfavored reading.
    See United States v. Bendtzen, 
    542 F.3d 722
    , 727 (9th Cir.
    2008) (“legislative enactments should not be construed to ren-
    der their provisions mere surplusage” (citation and internal
    quotation omitted)). The Wentachi therefore urge us to view
    the language “as set forth in article 10” as a description of the
    location of the fishery instead of a limitation on the fishing
    rights sold by the Yakama.
    We decline to adopt such a strained interpretation. A plain
    reading of the language, “and to all their right of fishery, as
    set forth in article 10 of said treaty aforesaid,” indicates that
    the qualifying language, “as set forth in article 10,” identifies
    what “right of fishery” is being ceded, not the location of the
    fishery itself. The only right of fishery derived from Article
    X is an exclusive right pursuant to Article III. The Wenatchi’s
    suggestion that we employ the rule of construction disfavor-
    ing surplusage depends on an implied cession of fishing rights
    supplementing the plainly worded express cession, which
    contravenes our obligation to refrain from interpreting the
    agreement “according to the technical meaning of its words to
    learned lawyers.” Jones, 
    175 U.S. at 11
    .
    [12] We must interpret the words of the 1894 Agreement
    “in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by
    the Indians.” 
    Id.
     We cannot conclude that the Native Ameri-
    cans present throughout the negotiations would somehow dis-
    cern an implied cession of exclusive on-reservation fishing
    UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES            7651
    rights accompanying their cession of land, therefore rendering
    their separate express cession of “all their right of fishery” a
    cession of non-exclusive Article III fishing rights at their
    usual and accustomed fishing places, despite the qualifying
    language, “as set forth in article 10.” We instead reason that
    the language, “all their right of fishery, as set forth in article
    10,” does not implicate the Yakama’s non-exclusive Article
    III rights.
    [13] Where a Native American tribe cedes a right through
    a treaty or agreement, courts must be mindful that the instru-
    ment is “not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of
    rights from them—a reservation of those not granted.” United
    States v. Winans, 
    198 U.S. 371
    , 381 (1905). The 1894 Agree-
    ment sold all exclusive fishing rights reserved by the Yakama
    through the establishment of the Article X reservation. How-
    ever, because the Yakama did not agree to sell their non-
    exclusive Article III fishing rights—as evidenced by the tran-
    script of the negotiations and the 1894 Agreement itself—the
    Yakama reserved them. See 
    id.
    [14] We accordingly decline to construe the 1894 Agree-
    ment as ceding the Yakama’s non-exclusive Article III fishing
    rights at Wenatshapam. See Choctaw Nation, 
    397 U.S. at 631
    .
    D
    [15] The Wenatchi argue that, should we conclude the
    Yakama retain non-exclusive fishing rights at Wenatshapam,
    Wenatchi fishing rights should be “primary” rights. “A pri-
    mary right is the power to regulate or prohibit fishing by
    members of other treaty tribes.” United States v. Skokomish
    Indian Tribe, 
    764 F.2d 670
    , 671 (9th Cir. 1985). We have
    held that when two tribes claim “usual and accustomed” fish-
    ing rights at the same location under two separate treaties
    signed with the United States at a common “treaty time,” the
    tribe that controlled the fishing ground at treaty time—to the
    exclusion of other tribes—enjoys primary rights there. United
    7652           UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES
    States v. Lower Elwha Tribe, 
    642 F.2d 1141
    , 1143 (9th Cir.
    1981). We conclude the Wenatchi do not have primary rights
    at Wenatshapam because we find the “primary” rights analy-
    sis contained in Skokomish Indian Tribe and Lower Elwha
    inapplicable to the present dispute.
    [16] Our cases addressing primary fishing rights have ana-
    lyzed pre-treaty “control” over a fishing ground because the
    treaties in those cases were intended to preserve fishing rights
    as they existed at and before “treaty time.” See Skokomish
    Indian Tribe, 
    764 F.2d at 671
     (“The treaties reserved to the
    signatory tribes their pre-treaty fishing rights in relation to
    one another.”); Lower Elwha, 
    642 F.2d at 1144
     (“[T]he tribes
    reasonably understood themselves to be retaining no more and
    no less of a right vis-a-vis one another than they possessed
    prior to the treaty.”). Thus, if one tribe had the right to
    exclude another tribe from fishing at a particular fishing
    ground at “treaty time,” the applicable treaty reserved that
    “primary” right. Skokomish Indian Tribe, 
    764 F.2d at 673
    ;
    Lower Elwha, 
    642 F.2d at 1144
    .
    [17] Importantly, Lower Elwha determined fishing rights
    arising under two treaties signed at virtually the same time.
    
    642 F.2d at 1142
    . The Elwha Indians signed the Treaty of
    Point No Point on January 26, 1855, and the Makah Indians
    signed the Treaty with the Makah five days later on January
    31, 1855. 
    Id.
     When both tribes claimed the same location as
    a usual and accustomed fishing station under treaties signed
    at the same “treaty time,” we considered four factors to deter-
    mine which tribe controlled the location “at treaty time.”6 
    Id.
    6
    Four factors were presented by an expert witness to determine
    “whether a tribe legitimately controlled an area: (1) proximity of the area
    to tribal population centers, (2) frequency of use and relative importance
    to the tribe, (3) contemporary conceptions of control or territory, and (4)
    evidence of behavior consistent with control.” Lower Elwha, 
    642 F.2d at
    1143 n.4. We subsequently noted that our opinion in Lower Elwha did not
    consider these factors “a rigid formula or test, but rather, indicated they
    were useful as an analytical tool.” Skokomish Indian Tribe, 
    764 F.2d at 673
    .
    UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES                     7653
    In Skokomish Indian Tribe, we applied the same analysis to
    determine fishing rights between two tribes that also signed
    treaties with the United States in 1855. 
    764 F.2d at 673
    . Here,
    however, the Wenatchi’s fishing rights exist pursuant to the
    1894 Agreement and the Yakama’s rights exist pursuant to
    the 1855 Treaty. Thus, unlike in Lower Elwha and Skokomish
    Indian Tribe, we are presented with a treaty and an agreement
    signed almost forty years apart. As a result, there is no com-
    mon “treaty time” at which to determine control over
    Wenatshapam.
    [18] Moreover, the 1894 Agreement did not reserve the
    pre-1855 Treaty fishing rights of the Wenatchi, but instead
    granted them new fishing rights independent of the 1855
    Treaty. See Oregon II, 
    470 F.3d at 816
     (“The 1894 Agree-
    ment was not set forth as an amendment to the 1855 Treaty.”).
    While the Wenatchi’s traditional presence at Wenatshapam
    undoubtedly played a large part in the decisions of the
    Yakama and the United States to convey these rights, the con-
    veyance itself was not a preservation of fishing rights as they
    existed in 1855. Whether or not the Wenatchi can establish
    that they controlled Wenatshapam in 1855, they do not have
    1855 Treaty fishing rights. See Oregon I, 
    29 F.3d at 486
    . We
    therefore conclude the Wenatchi do not have primary fishing
    rights at Wenatshapam.7
    7
    We note that, were the Wenatchi able to establish they controlled
    Wenatshapam at “treaty time,” applying the primary rights analysis would
    potentially prejudice their present fishing rights. We have held that the
    Wenatchi do not possess 1855 Treaty fishing rights, and that the “treaty
    time” fishing rights of all 1855 Treaty signatories—including the
    Wenatchi—vested in the Yakama Nation at the time of signing the treaty.
    See Oregon I, 
    29 F.3d at 486
    . If the Wenatchi were able to demonstrate
    that they controlled Wenatshapam in 1855, their primary rights would the-
    oretically be vested in the Yakama Nation through the 1855 Treaty. See
    id.; Lower Elwha, 
    642 F.2d at 1143
    . The Yakama could then exclude the
    Wenatchi from fishing at Wenatshapam using the very rights gained as a
    result of the Wenatchi’s aboriginal control of the fishery. See Oregon I,
    
    29 F.3d at 486
    . The possibility of such an inequitable result further per-
    suades us that the primary rights analysis is inapplicable to the present dis-
    pute.
    7654        UNITED STATES v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES
    V
    [19] In sum, both the Yakama and the Wenatchi retain
    non-exclusive federal fishing rights at Wenatshapam. Article
    III of the 1855 Treaty reserves to the Yakama the right of tak-
    ing fish at Wenatshapam “in common with citizens of the Ter-
    ritory.” 1855 Treaty at 953. In 1894, as consideration for
    Yakama’s sale of the Article X reservation, the United States
    promised—and conveyed to—the Wenatchi the right of tak-
    ing fish at Wenatshapam “in common with the white people”
    and assured them of their right to fish at Wenatshapam “in
    common with the white people of the State.” Senate Doc. 67
    at 28. We accordingly construe the 1855 Treaty and the 1894
    Agreement as conferring on the parties similar non-exclusive
    fishing rights at Wenatshapam that they share “in common
    with” non-treaty and non-agreement fishermen.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-35961

Filed Date: 5/27/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/14/2015

Authorities (20)

Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians , 119 S. Ct. 1187 ( 1999 )

United States v. Winans , 25 S. Ct. 662 ( 1905 )

united-states-of-america-in-re-suit-to-quiet-title-to-that-portion-of-the , 210 F.3d 1067 ( 2000 )

united-states-of-america-and-the-confederated-tribes-of-the-warm-springs , 29 F.3d 481 ( 1994 )

98-cal-daily-op-serv-7417-98-daily-journal-dar-10299-united-states , 157 F.3d 630 ( 1998 )

united-states-of-america-and-the-confederated-tribes-of-the-warm-springs , 43 F.3d 1284 ( 1994 )

Jones v. Meehan , 20 S. Ct. 1 ( 1899 )

united-states-of-america-and-quinault-indian-tribe , 764 F.2d 670 ( 1985 )

united-states-of-america-and-samish-snohomish-snoqualmie-and-steilacoom , 641 F.2d 1368 ( 1981 )

Choctaw Nation v. United States , 63 S. Ct. 672 ( 1943 )

united-states-of-america-and-makah-indian-tribe , 642 F.2d 1141 ( 1981 )

united-states-v-state-of-oregon-state-of-washington-confederated-tribes , 470 F.3d 809 ( 2006 )

United States v. Bendtzen , 542 F.3d 722 ( 2008 )

United States v. State of Washington , 384 F. Supp. 312 ( 1974 )

united-states-of-america-quinault-tribe-of-indians-intervenors-plaintiffs , 520 F.2d 676 ( 1975 )

rubina-husain-individually-and-as-personal-representative-of-the-estate-of , 316 F.3d 829 ( 2002 )

Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma , 90 S. Ct. 1328 ( 1970 )

Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip , 97 S. Ct. 1361 ( 1977 )

South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe , 118 S. Ct. 789 ( 1998 )

Sohappy v. Smith , 302 F. Supp. 899 ( 1969 )

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