Muhammad Chaudhry v. Janet Napolitano , 542 F. App'x 570 ( 2013 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 11 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MUHAMMAD ZAHID CHAUDHRY, No. 10-36156
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-03097-LRS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JANET A. NAPOLITANO, Secretary of
the United States Department of Homeland
Security; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Lonny R. Suko, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 26, 2013
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Muhammad Zahid Chaudhry sought review of the USCIS’s denial
of his application for naturalization based on his active-duty service in the United
States armed forces. See 8 U.S.C. § 1440(a). The district court granted summary
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
judgment in favor of the Government, concluding that Chaudhry could not
demonstrate the requisite “good moral character,” 8 C.F.R. § 329.2(d), to be
eligible for naturalization because he had given false testimony to obtain
immigration benefits, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6). Reviewing de novo, we affirm. See,
e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We
review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment.”).
1. Chaudhry failed to establish a “genuine issue of material fact” regarding
whether he gave false statements. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). Drawing all inferences in favor of Chaudhry, we conclude that a
reasonable factfinder would have insufficient evidence to find that Chaudhry
lacked a “subjective intent to deceive.” United States v. Hovsepian, 422 F.3d 883,
887 (9th Cir. 2005); see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (“If the evidence is merely
colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.”
(citations omitted)). It was Chaudhry’s burden to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he was eligible for naturalization, Berenyi v. Dist. Dir., Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 630, 637 (1967), but the evidence in the record
did not meet that burden of proof. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (“[T]he inquiry
involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment . . . necessarily implicates
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the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the
merits.”).
2. It was not improper for the district court to consider the events that were the
subject of the false testimony at issue, even though those events occurred outside
the statutory period.
AFFIRMED.
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