Rancho De Calistoga v. City of Calistoga , 800 F.3d 1083 ( 2015 )

FILED
FOR PUBLICATION SEP 03 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RANCHO DE CALISTOGA, a California No. 12-17749
General Partnership,
D.C. No. 3:11-cv-05015-JSW
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. OPINION
CITY OF CALISTOGA; W. SCOTT
SNOWDEN, Hearing Officer, The City of
Calistoga,
Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 13, 2015
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN, W. FLETCHER, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
Fifth Amendment takings challenges to mobile home rent control laws are
ubiquitous in this and other circuits. Quoting Yogi Berra, we have previously
1
characterized these claims as “deja vu all over again.” MHC Fin. Ltd. P’ship v.
City of San Rafael, 714 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). Each time a court closes
one legal avenue to mobile home park owners seeking to escape rent control
regimes, the owners, undaunted, attempt to forge a new path via another novel
legal theory. This time, it is in the form of an “as-applied private takings claim” as
a claim separate and independent from the owner’s regulatory takings claim. Alas,
it is also deja vu again with respect to the result; we decline to open the door to
using this so-called “private takings claim” as an end-run around established
regulatory-takings jurisprudence. We hold that no regulatory taking occurred here
and that Rancho de Calistoga’s self-styled “private takings claim” is not a
separately cognizable claim. Similarly, we are not persuaded by the related due
process and equal protection claims. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the
case.
BACKGROUND
Rancho de Calistoga (“the Park”) is a mobile home park located in
Calistoga, California. The Park, which encompasses 26.5 acres, was originally
developed by Hal C. Aguirre and R. C. Roberts. When the Roberts and Aguirre
partnership dissolved in the mid-1970’s, one of the parcels was transferred to
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Aguirre, who formed Rancho de Calistoga (“Rancho”), the California general
partnership that now owns and operates the Park of the same name. Rancho
describes the Park as having been developed as “an alternative form of housing for
those who desired and could afford that alternative form of housing,” and not as
“low cost or low income housing.” Zoning for the Park was approved in October
1970.
The City of Calistoga (“the City”) had no form of mobile home rent control
until 1984, when the City adopted an ordinance that enabled mobile home park
tenants to challenge rent increases. The ordinance was amended several times, and
in 2007, the City adopted Ordinance No. 644, entitled “Mobile Home Park Rent
Stabilization.” Calistoga, Cal., Municipal Code ch. 2.22 (2007) (“Ordinance
644”). The purpose of the ordinance is to “stabilize mobile home park space rents”
to, among other things, “[p]revent exploitation of the shortage of vacant mobile
home park spaces,” “[p]revent excessive and unreasonable . . . rent increases,” and
“[r]ectify the disparity of bargaining power” between park owners and mobile
home owners. Id. § 2.22.010.D.
The City based the ordinance in part on the findings that: (1) “[r]esidents of
mobile home parks, unlike apartment tenants or residents of other rental properties,
3
are in a unique position in that they have made a substantial investment in a
residence for which space is rented or leased”; (2) “relocation of a mobile home
from a park space is generally accomplished at substantial cost” and comes with
risk of damaging the home; and (3) rent increases could “cause a hardship to a
substantial number” of mobile home park residents, “most of whom are elderly, on
fixed incomes, or persons of low income.” Id. § 2.22.010.B. The City also found
it “necessary to protect mobile home homeowners . . . from unreasonable rent
increases and at the same time recognize the rights of mobile home park owners to
maintain their property and to receive just and reasonable return on their
investments.” Id. § 2.22.010.B.4.
The ordinance authorizes a yearly rent increase equal to the lesser of 100%
of the percent change in the Consumer Price Index or 6% of the base rent. Id. §
2.22.070.A. It also establishes an administrative mechanism for park owners to
seek to increase rent above this amount. Id. § 2.22.080. This process exists to
“insur[e] mobile home park owners a fair, just, and reasonable rate of return on
their parks in cases where the annual space rent increase provided by [the
ordinance] proves insufficient.” Id. § 2.22.010.D.5.
4
In September 2010, Rancho asked the City Council to establish a public
subsidy program to provide mobile home park tenants with a monthly stipend
equal to the difference between the market rate and the rent control rate, regardless
of need. The City Council did not act on the request.
In 2010, Rancho decided to notice a rent increase from $471.39 to $625 per
month, which an economist retained by Rancho deemed to be “not excessive but . .
. slightly below market.” An administrative hearing officer, W. Scott Snowden,
conducted evidentiary hearings. In July 2011, Snowden issued a decision in which
he rejected Rancho’s request and instead allowed a rent increase to a total of
$537.59 per space per month. Snowden declined to rule on Rancho’s
constitutional claims, noting that “it would be premature to consider an ‘as-
applied’ constitutional challenge to the ordinance as such an inquiry would be best
left to the courts.”
Following the ruling, Rancho filed a Petition for Writ of Administrative
Mandamus in the Napa County Superior Court. That same day, it filed suit in
federal court against the City of Calistoga and Snowden (collectively referred to as
“The City”), asserting claims for, among other things, violations of the Takings,
Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. It
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also filed with the district court a notice regarding the pendency of the state
petition. The City successfully moved to dismiss. The district court found that any
facial challenge to Ordinance 644 was time barred, that Rancho failed to state
claims for private takings, due process, and equal protection violations, and that the
regulatory takings claim was not ripe. The court granted Rancho leave to amend
its as-applied claims.
Rancho then filed a First Amended Petition that included the same due
process and equal protection claims and a revised private takings claim. Rancho
did not challenge the court’s conclusions with respect to the facial challenges or
regulatory taking claim, but reserved “any right it may have to seek reconsideration
and/or appellate review of any” of the court’s rulings. The district court granted a
second motion to dismiss and entered judgment for the City. The court again
found that Rancho failed to state a private takings claim, and that the due process
and equal protection claims were “subsumed by the purported takings claim.”
In the related state litigation, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the
trial court’s denial of Rancho’s petition in July 2015. Rancho de Calistoga v. City
of Calistoga, No. A138301, 2015 WL 4099027 (Cal. Ct. App. July 7, 2015).
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Rancho then appealed to the California Supreme Court, where the case remains
pending.
ANALYSIS
I. TAKINGS CLAIM
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528,
536 (2005), provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V.
The law on condemnations and physical takings, which the Supreme Court
has described as “as old as the Republic,” is governed by the simple rule that
“[w]hen the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for
some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner.”
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
322 (2002). Thus, in physical takings cases, the analysis inevitably focuses on the
public use and just compensation requirements.
In contrast to a physical taking, a regulatory taking occurs where
“government regulation of private property [is] so onerous that its effect is
tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537.
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Regulatory takings claims, such as the one here, are “of more recent vintage.”1
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322. These claims are “characterized by essentially ad
hoc, factual inquiries, designed to allow careful examination and weighing of all
the relevant circumstances” to determine whether a taking has occurred in the first
place. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The factors to be
considered in this type of factual inquiry are laid out in Penn Central
Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Only
after it has been determined that a taking has occurred do the issues of public use
and just compensation become relevant. We therefore begin our analysis with this
first step—whether a regulatory taking has occurred—and conclude that it has not.
A. Regulatory Takings Analysis
At the outset, we consider whether Rancho’s claims are ripe. The Supreme
Court has articulated “two independent prudential hurdles” that apply to federal
regulatory takings claims. Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S.
725, 733-34 (1997). First, there is a finality requirement—a claim “is not ripe until
1
The Supreme Court laid to rest any argument that a mobile home rent
control ordinance constitutes a physical taking in Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal.,
503 U.S. 519, 532 (1992) (holding that such a rent control ordinance “is a
regulation of petitioners’ use of their property” and not “an unwanted physical
occupation of [the] property”) (emphasis omitted).
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the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a
final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.”
Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U.S. 172, 186 (1985). The hearing examiner’s decision satisfies the requisite
finality.
Exhaustion is the second requirement—“the owner [must have]
unsuccessfully attempted to obtain just compensation through the procedures
provided by the State for obtaining such compensation.” Id. at 195. Rancho
appropriately proceeded in state court to obtain just compensation, but lost at both
the trial and intermediate appellate stages.2 The California Court of Appeal’s
opinion includes extensive analysis, including a rejection of the takings claim
under the Penn Central factors: “We reject Rancho’s claim under the takings
clause, which, like the due process clause, protects a property owner’s right to earn
a fair return on its investment.” Rancho de Calistoga, 2015 WL 4099027, at *5.
Rancho’s petition to the California Supreme Court remains pending.
2
We note that this court has determined that California’s compensation
procedures are constitutionally adequate. Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Cnty. of
San Luis Obispo, 548 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2008).
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Echoing the Court’s decision in Suitum, we previously determined that the
Williamson ripeness requirements are prudential rather than jurisdictional, meaning
that they are formulated by the court rather than stemming from Article III. See
Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Here, Rancho sufficiently “utilized” the available judicial procedures laid out in
Williamson. 473 U.S. at 197. As a consequence, “it would be a waste of the
parties’ and the courts’ resources to bounce the case through more rounds of
litigation.” Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at 1117.
We now turn to the merits of the as-applied regulatory takings claim. In
essence, Rancho claims that even if the taking is for a public purpose, the rent
subsidy should be paid by the government if the rent is neither excessive nor the
result of monopoly power. This characterization of the claim—taken directly from
Rancho’s brief—is just another formulation of a facial attack on the ordinance. In
other words, Rancho is saying that the rent adjustment scheme is invalid on its face
if it does not accommodate these principles. Of course, the district court
foreclosed a facial challenge as time barred.
Even if the claim were cognizable through an as-applied attack, it fails. The
Supreme Court “has consistently affirmed that States have broad power to regulate
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housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant relationship in particular
without paying compensation for all economic injuries that such regulation
entails.” Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1992) (internal quotation
mark omitted). “However, under Penn Central . . . a regulatory taking may
occur—and just compensation is required—when ‘regulatory actions [occur] that
are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly
appropriates private property or ousts the owner’ with the inquiry ‘focus[ing]
directly upon the severity of the burden that government imposes upon private
property rights.’” MHC, 714 F.3d at 1127 (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539)
(alteration in original).
Penn Central “identif[ies] several factors, not a set formula,” to determine
whether this functional equivalence exists. Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at 1120. Chief
among the factors to be considered are “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations” and “the character of the governmental
action—for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely
affects property interests through some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at
11
538-39 (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alteration in original). Applied here, these factors counsel in favor of the City.
The economic impact factor favors the City because Supreme Court cases
“have long established that mere diminution in the value of property, however
serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking.” Concrete Pipe & Products of
California, Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. California, 508 U.S. 602,
645 (1993) (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384
(1926) (approximately 75% diminution in value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394, 405 (1915) (92.5% diminution)); see also MHC, 714 F.3d at 1127-28
(81% diminution). Rancho claims diminution in market value (from $16,580,000
to $11,850,000 under rent control, or 28.53%), as well as lost income. This
economic impact is an inevitable consequence of the rent-control scheme but not
an unconstitutional one.
We pay particular attention to Rancho’s distinct investment-backed
expectations. This principle “implies reasonable probability, like expecting rent to
be paid, not starry eyed hope of winning the jackpot.” Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at
1120. Because Rancho cannot reasonably expect that its property will be
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continually unencumbered by government regulation, this factor also favors the
City.
Rancho argues that because, unlike in Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at 1120-21,
and MHC, 714 F.3d at 1128, it has owned the Park since before the City imposed a
rent control ordinance, it had an investment-backed expectation to be free from
rent control. This temporal difference does not give Rancho a valid investment-
backed expectation of owning a mobile home park unencumbered by government
regulation. Simply put, when buying a piece of property, one cannot reasonably
expect that property to be free of government regulation such as zoning, tax
assessments, or, as here, rent control. Rancho’s argument is tantamount to saying
that a homeowner can reasonably expect that the tax assessment or rate of taxation
on her home will not increase from the time of purchase. Just as “[t]hose who do
business in [a] regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed
by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end,” those who buy into a
regulated field such as the mobile home park industry cannot object when
regulation is later imposed. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645 (alteration in original).
Like the California Court of Appeal, “[w]e decline to hold that a landlord whose
building or park existed before the enactment of rent control necessarily suffers a
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taking when rent control is implemented.” Rancho de Calistoga, 2015 WL
4099027, at *5.
Rancho’s argument that it has an investment-backed expectation to earn a
“fair return” fares no better. In fact, this argument proves the City’s point.
Ordinance 644 authorizes a specified yearly rent increase and establishes an
administrative mechanism for park owners to seek to increase rent above this
amount. Ordinance 644 §§ 2.22.070.A, 2.22.080. Under the ordinance, “[a] park
owner may seek an adjustment to the initial base rent” so that the owner is assured
of “receiving a fair and reasonable return.” Id. § 2.22.040.B. Rancho did just that
and obtained a $50 upward adjustment in 1995. Rancho de Calistoga, 2015 WL
4099027, at *5. Then, the Ordinance provides for automatic annual increases that
Rancho in fact received. Id. § 2.22.070. And, finally, the ordinance permits the
owner to propose an additional rent increase, as Rancho did here. Id. § 2.22.080.
We assume for purposes of Rancho’s argument that its proposed rent
increase is neither excessive (in some undefined sense) nor monopolistic.
Significantly, as the California Court of Appeal observed, “Rancho’s true quarrel
appears to be with the whole idea of rent control, not with how [the] City
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administered its duly enacted rent control ordinance in this case.” Rancho de
Calistoga, 2015 WL 4099027, at *5.
The City has designed a system aimed at giving park owners a fair return
while still furthering the goals of rent control. Rancho may disagree with the
specific rent prices authorized by the ordinance, but this disagreement does not
give rise to a constitutional taking nor is a mobile home park owner entitled to
unilaterally impose its own formulation of “excessive” or “monopolistic” as the
standard necessary for a taking.
We last address the character of the governmental action. We have
consistently given our imprimatur to the underlying public purpose of mobile home
rent control ordinances and have characterized them as “much more an
‘adjust[ment of] the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good’ than . . . a physical invasion of property.” MHC, 714 F.3d at 1128 (quoting
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124) (alteration in original). The same holds true of
Ordinance 644 and its application to Rancho. Accordingly, there has been no
regulatory taking.
B. Self-Styled “Private Takings Claim”
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Perhaps seeing the writing on the wall with respect to its regulatory takings
claim, Rancho devotes the majority of its briefing to what it presents as a separate
“private takings claim,” arguing that the application of Ordinance 644 to rent
increases constitutes an unconstitutional private taking because any purported
“public use” is pretextual. Two years ago, in MHC, we noted that we were “aware
of no court that has ever recognized a regulatory private taking,” but because we
concluded that the claim failed on the merits, we “assume[d] without deciding that
such a claim is possible.” 714 F.3d at 1129 n.5. Today we pick up where MHC
left off, holding that under the circumstances here, Rancho’s so-called “private
takings claim” cannot serve as an independent means to challenge an alleged
regulatory taking. Rather, such a public-use challenge must function as part of the
larger regulatory takings claim. As explained below, viewed in this context,
Rancho’s claim fails for multiple reasons.
Putting the “private as-applied takings” moniker on Rancho’s claim is both
confusing and misleading. A short history of the terminology is in order. True
private takings—those effected by non-governmental actors—such as the power
granted to the railroads to take private lands to expand the rails “have a long and
distinguished pedigree in our legal system.” Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U.
16
CHI. L. REV. 517, 585 (2009). Another variation, as Bell notes, is the
“government-mediated private taking[]” in which the government “simply acts as a
middleman who transfers the property from one set of private hands to another.”
Id. at 520. And finally, when used as the basis of a takings claim such as
Rancho’s, “the term ‘private takings’ more narrowly refer[s] to public takings
motivated by a ‘private purpose.’” Id. at 519 n.6.
This third approach, as Rancho is attempting to use it here, is simply a
renaming of the regulatory takings claim, which seeks to determine whether a
property regulation is “functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which
government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his
domain.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. Of course, the Constitution requires that the
government’s taking must be for a public use.
Tellingly, in making its private takings argument, Rancho relies
predominantly on condemnation cases, running afoul of the Supreme Court’s
teaching that the “longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for
public use, on the one hand, and regulations prohibiting private uses, on the other,
makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving physical takings as controlling
precedents for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a ‘regulatory taking,’
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and vice versa.” Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323 (footnote omitted). Accordingly,
as a general matter, “we do not apply our precedent from the physical takings
context to regulatory takings claims.” Id. at 323-24.
Yet Rancho’s private takings argument is rooted in the Supreme Court’s
statement in the condemnation case Kelo that the state may not “take property
under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose [is] to bestow a
private benefit.” Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005). The crux
of Rancho’s argument is that because none of the purposes enumerated in
Ordinance 644 apply here, its application is pretextual. According to Rancho, the
real purpose behind the application of Ordinance 644 here is to “provide each and
every one of the 184 tenants with a significant monthly subsidy, whether they need
it or not.” This “subsidy,” Rancho argues, violates the principle “that the sovereign
may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another
private party B.” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477. This argument fails because it is simply a
reframing of a facial challenge to the ordinance through an attack on the stated
purposes of the rent-control scheme. Other related arguments fail for the same
reason. As noted before, the district court dismissed the facial challenge as time
barred and Rancho did not appeal this issue. Rancho cannot resuscitate this claim
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by re-labeling it and claiming to challenge “the real purpose” of the ordinance
through an “as-applied” attack on the validity of the ordinance.
Rancho offers up a number of additional arguments. To the extent those
arguments seek to challenge the public purpose of the ordinance as applied, they
merge the cart and the horse. Because we determined that there has been no taking
in the first place, it is unnecessary to address whether the public use requirement is
met.
Rancho raises two final, though unrelated, points. In 2010 Rancho proposed
legislation to the City Council requiring the City to provide rent subsidies to
mobile home park tenants “without regard to need, equal to the difference between
the rent control rate and the fair market rate.” The rent control administrator
apparently said the proposal was “unreasonable.” This statement, however, proves
nothing. As Rancho acknowledges, it had no right to have the proposal adopted;
indeed, no claim is made that the Council acted improperly. Rancho’s theory that
the reaction of the administrator is evidence of “as-applied” pretext is pure
speculation and is not tethered to the City’s enforcement of the actual ordinance.
Finally, Rancho claims that the rent subsidy violates the California
Constitution’s prohibition against gifts of public funds, while at the same time
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admitting that the City has not made an illegal gift. Cal. Const. art. XVI, § 6 (“The
Legislature shall have no power . . . to make any gift or authorize the making of
any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual . . . .”). This
concession is not surprising as the City has not made a transfer or gift of any
“public money” to any mobile home park tenant, nor can it be said that the
ordinance amounts to an indirect gift as urged by Rancho.
In sum, Rancho’s self-styled “private takings claim” cannot serve as a means
to evade Penn Central scrutiny. And in any event, as articulated here, such claim
fails because it is a thinly veiled facial challenge, which is both time barred and
lacks merit.
II. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS
Rancho’s due process and equal protection claims rest on the same
grounds—that Snowden’s rejection of its application was arbitrary.
Here, Rancho’s theory of its due process claim—that “it is not possible to
exploit a tenant unless and until the rent is above market”—relates to conduct
squarely covered by the Takings Clause. Such an overlapping theory dooms the
substantive due process claim. See Colony Cove Properties, LLC v. City Of
Carson, 640 F.3d 948, 960 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a due process claim was
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“subsumed by the Takings Clause” where a plaintiff sought a rental rate increase
that would give it a fair return on its investment). Although Lingle left open the
possibility of an independent claim where “a [property] regulation that fails to
serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it
runs afoul of the Due Process Clause,” 544 U.S. at 542, we later clarified that “the
Fifth Amendment . . . preclude[s] a due process challenge . . . if the alleged
conduct is actually covered by the Takings Clause.” Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City
of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, the alleged conduct is
covered by the Takings Clause.
We evaluate Rancho’s “equal protection challenge . . . under rational basis
review because mobile [] home park owners are not a suspect class.” Equity
Lifestyle Properties, Inc. v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 548 F.3d 1184, 1195 (9th
Cir. 2008). Accordingly, “[u]nder rational-basis review, where a group possesses
distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to
implement, a State’s decision to act on the basis of those differences does not give
rise to a constitutional violation.” Id.
Here, as in Equity Lifestyle, the ordinance articulates just such distinguishing
characteristics, including the potential hardship posed by rent increases and the fact
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that mobile home park residents “are in a unique position in that they have made a
substantial investment in a residence for which space is rented or leased” and the
associated relocation costs. See Ordinance 644 § 2.22.010.B; Guggenheim, 638
F.3d at 1123 (noting that this court is “bound by precedent establishing that such
laws do have a rational basis”). Rancho offers no legitimate claim that Snowden’s
decision was politically motivated or otherwise arbitrary. We therefore affirm the
district court’s dismissal of Rancho’s due process and equal protection claims.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Rancho’s claims, albeit on slightly
different grounds.
AFFIRMED.
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COUNSEL LISTING
Anthony C. Rodriguez (argued), Law Office of Anthony C. Rodriguez, Oakland,
California, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Amy E. Hoyt (argued), Burke, Williams & Sorenson, Oakland, California;
Michelle Marchetta Kenyon, City Attorney, Calistoga, California, for
Respondents-Appellees.
Michael John von Loewenfeldt, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, San Francisco, California,
for Amicus Curiae League of California Cities.
R. S. Radford, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California, for Amicus
Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation.
Robert H. Thomas and Bethany C.K. Ace, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert,
Honolulu, Hawaii, for Amicus Curiae Western Manufactured Housing
Communities Association.
23