J. T. v. Edu-Hi ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AUG 14 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
J. T., by and through his parents Renee and No. 14-16143
Floyd T.,
D.C. No.
Plaintiff-Appellant, 1:11-cv-00612-LEK-BMK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
STATE OF HAWAII,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 16, 2017
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: FISHER, PAEZ, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Through his parents, J.T. appeals the district court’s orders affirming in part
and reversing in part the administrative hearing officer’s rulings on his due process
hearing request (the “Request”), which sought reimbursement of private school
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
tuition at Loveland Academy (“Loveland”) under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions, including whether a
special education placement is proper, see Cty. of San Diego v. Cal. Special Educ.
Hearing Office, 93 F.3d 1458, 1466 (9th Cir. 1996), but we review a district
court’s factual findings for clear error, see Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Wartenberg ex rel. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1995). We review for
abuse of discretion a district court’s ruling denying reimbursement. See Forest
Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 557 U.S. 230
(2009).
1. As a threshold matter, the district court erred when it concluded that the
Request was not timely. Hawaii requires parents or guardians to file a
reimbursement request “within one hundred and eighty calendar days of a
unilateral special education placement, where the request is for reimbursement of
the costs of the placement.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 302A-443(a)(2). We have defined
“placement” as “occur[ing] when one party unilaterally (i.e., without consent or
agreement of the other party) enrolls the student in a special education program.”
K.D. ex rel. C.L. v. Dep’t of Educ., Haw., 665 F.3d 1110, 1122 (9th Cir. 2011)
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(emphasis added) (quoting Makiko D. v. Hawaii, No. 06-00189, 2007 WL
1153811, at *7 (D. Haw. 2007)). Although J.T. began attending Loveland for
assessment in July 2010, he did not officially enroll until November 2010.
Measured from the time of enrollment, J.T.’s March 2, 2011 request was timely.
2. Turning to the merits, we conclude that the district court abused its
discretion when it held that Loveland was not a proper placement. A placement is
proper if it is “specially designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child,
supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from
instruction.” C.B. ex rel. Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 635 F.3d
1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2011). Once the parents have established a denial of a free
appropriate public education and a proper placement, “the district court then must
exercise its ‘broad discretion’ and weigh ‘equitable considerations’ to determine
whether, and how much, reimbursement is appropriate.” Id. (emphasis added)
(quoting Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 16 (1993)).
Here, the district court collapsed the inquiry into whether a placement is
“proper” with its subsequent duty to weigh “equitable considerations.” The district
court concluded that Loveland was not designed to meet J.T.’s needs because he
“regressed in a number of areas” while a student there. While a student’s lack of
progress is an equitable consideration the district court has discretion to weigh, it is
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not a suitable basis for determining whether a placement was proper. Cf. Adams v.
Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999) (determining that the “design[] and
implement[ation]” of a program is a “more pertinent question” than a student’s
progress or lack thereof).
At the “proper placement” stage, the district court need only consider
whether, at the time of enrollment, the unilateral placement was “reasonably
calculated” to meet the student’s needs. Id. For this inquiry, relying on hindsight
is inappropriate. See id. We therefore remand for the district court to reconsider
whether J.T. has demonstrated that Loveland was a “proper placement,” before
exercising its “broad discretion,” C.B., 635 F.3d at 1159, to consider “all relevant
factors,” Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at 247, when determining if reimbursement is
appropriate.
Because we reverse the district court’s May 31, 2012 order denying
reimbursement on this ground, we also vacate its March 24, 2014 order denying
attorneys’ fees. We need not address any other arguments raised by J.T.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
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