United States v. Laron Carter ( 2018 )


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  •                        FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                     No. 16-50271
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                      2:14-cr-00297-VAP-1
    LARON DARRELL CARTER,
    AKA Birdd, AKA Gardena                          OPINION
    Pimpin Birdd, AKA Garr
    Birdd, AKA Pi Birdd, AKA Pi
    Pimpin Birdd,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Virginia A. Phillips, Chief Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted August 27, 2018
    Pasadena, California
    Filed November 2, 2018
    Before: Ronald M. Gould and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit
    Judges, and Marco A. Hernandez,* District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge Bybee
    *
    The Honorable Marco A. Hernandez, United States District Judge
    for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
    2                   UNITED STATES V. CARTER
    SUMMARY**
    Criminal Law
    The panel vacated the defendant’s convictions on one
    count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (sex trafficking of a
    minor or by force, fraud, or coercion) and one count of
    violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (transportation of a minor in
    interstate commerce to engage in prostitution), and remanded
    for resentencing on remaining counts as to which the panel
    affirmed the defendant’s convictions in a concurrently-filed
    memorandum disposition.
    The panel held that a defendant’s right to physically
    confront an adverse witness (whether child or adult) cannot
    be compromised by permitting the witness to testify by video
    (whether one-way or two-way) unless use of the remote video
    procedure is necessary and the reliability of the testimony is
    otherwise assured. Because alternatives were available for
    obtaining a victim-witness’s testimony that would have
    preserved the defendant’s right to physical confrontation, the
    use of a remote video was not necessary in this case, and
    violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront
    the witnesses against him.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    UNITED STATES V. CARTER                      3
    COUNSEL
    Benjamin L. Coleman (argued), Coleman & Balogh LLP, San
    Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Jeffrey Chemerinsky (argued) and Jeff Mitchell (argued),
    Assistant United States Attorneys, Violent & Organized
    Crime Section; Lawrence S. Middleton, Chief, Criminal
    Division; Nicola T. Hanna, United States Attorney; United
    States Attorney’s Office, Los Angeles, California; for
    Plaintiff-Appellee.
    OPINION
    BYBEE, Circuit Judge:
    Laron Carter was tried and convicted on seven counts of
    violating 18 U.S.C. § 1591, and seven counts of violating
    18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), based on his trafficking and prostitution
    of seven minor girls. During Carter’s trial, one of the
    victims, J.C., testified against him from Minnesota by two-
    way video, as she was seven months pregnant and unable to
    travel. Carter contends that permitting J.C. to testify against
    him remotely by two-way video, rather than in person,
    violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses
    against him.
    We agree. Criminal defendants have a right to “physical,
    face-to-face confrontation at trial,” and that right cannot be
    compromised by the use of a remote video procedure unless
    it is “necessary” to do so and “the reliability of the testimony
    is otherwise assured.” Maryland v. Craig, 
    497 U.S. 836
    , 850
    (1990). Because alternatives were available for obtaining
    4                  UNITED STATES V. CARTER
    J.C.’s testimony that would have preserved Carter’s right to
    physical confrontation, the use of a remote video procedure
    was not necessary in this case. We therefore vacate Carter’s
    convictions on the two counts involving J.C. and remand to
    the district court for resentencing on the remaining counts.1
    I
    Carter was convicted of forcing seven minor girls into
    prostitution and trafficking them across state lines. The
    crimes took place over a ten-year period from 2003 to 2013.
    For each of the seven victims, Carter was charged with one
    count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (sex trafficking of a
    minor or by force, fraud, or coercion), and one count of
    violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (transportation of a minor in
    interstate commerce to engage in prostitution), for a total of
    fourteen counts.
    One week before Carter’s April 2016 trial, the
    government filed an ex parte application regarding the
    anticipated testimony of J.C., the victim for Counts 13 and
    14. J.C., who was by then an adult living in Minnesota, was
    seven months pregnant with a due date in June. The
    government explained that J.C. had been hospitalized for
    complications with her pregnancy and that her doctor had
    instructed her not to travel from Minnesota to California.
    Accordingly, the government sought either to take J.C.’s
    deposition in Minnesota pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 15, or to have her testify during trial from
    Minnesota via live two-way video conference. With respect
    to the out-of-court deposition, the government proposed that
    1
    In a concurrently-filed memorandum disposition, we affirm Carter’s
    convictions on the remaining counts.
    UNITED STATES V. CARTER                     5
    the parties would fly to Minnesota in the middle of trial and
    suggested that it would try to secure, but could not guarantee,
    Carter’s physical attendance.
    Carter opposed both options on Confrontation Clause
    grounds. He objected to the deposition because the logistics
    for securing his attendance at the deposition could not be
    arranged on such short notice, and because counsel would
    have to forgo preparation for trial to attend the deposition.
    He objected to the live two-way video procedure based on his
    “constitutional rights to personally confront his accuser at
    trial.” He concluded by noting that, if he were forced to
    select one of the two alternatives, he would choose the two-
    way video procedure. The district court granted the
    government’s application to use two-way video, and the case
    proceeded to trial.
    On the second day of trial, Carter again objected to the
    two-way video procedure. He argued that under Craig,
    permitting J.C. to testify by two-way video would violate his
    right to confrontation unless the court found that J.C.’s
    absence was “necessary to further an important public
    policy.” The district court overruled Carter’s objection.
    Despite the government’s failure to provide any “direct
    evidence from [J.C.’s] physician,” the court concluded that
    J.C. was “unavailable” because “she had been advised by her
    doctor not to travel, given the advanced state of her
    pregnancy.” The court also concluded that J.C.’s “testimony
    [was] necessary” to the government’s case, and that the two-
    way video procedure would “satisfy all the requirements of
    the Confrontation Clause”—J.C. would testify under oath, she
    would be subject to cross-examination, and the jury would be
    able to observe her demeanor.
    6                UNITED STATES V. CARTER
    J.C. testified by two-way video at trial. At the start of her
    testimony, the court instructed the jurors that, although J.C.
    was testifying “via live video feed,” they were “to treat the
    testimony the same as a witness who is physically present in
    the courtroom.” J.C. was then sworn in by the courtroom
    deputy and asked to identify Carter while the camera scanned
    the courtroom. She responded: “Um, is that him right there
    next to – I can’t really see that well on you guy’s thing, but I
    believe that’s him next to these two gentlemen right there. I
    can’t really see that well.” After she described Carter’s
    clothing, the court “note[d] that the witness has identified the
    defendant.”
    J.C. proceeded to testify about her relationship with
    Carter. She stated that she met Carter in 2013, when she was
    16 years old. She was living in Minnesota at the time, and
    Carter bought her a bus ticket to Los Angeles under an alias
    because she was underage. When she arrived in Los Angeles,
    Carter picked her up and took her to a motel room. There, he
    photographed her in lingerie and used the photographs in an
    advertisement on Backpage, a website used to advertise
    sexual services. She then worked as a prostitute for Carter for
    approximately two weeks. She testified that Carter kept all
    of her earnings, dictated how much she should charge and
    what she should wear, and threatened to beat her if she did
    not comply.
    In addition to J.C.’s testimony, the government introduced
    as evidence her birth certificate, which confirmed that she
    was 16 years old when the conduct took place, as well as a
    record of the bus ticket J.C. used to get to Los Angeles, which
    confirmed that Carter purchased it. The government also
    introduced the Backpage advertisement, evidence showing
    that the credit card used to pay for this advertisement was the
    UNITED STATES V. CARTER                                7
    same credit card used to pay for an advertisement of another
    prostitute who worked for Carter, and evidence showing that
    the Internet Protocol (“IP”) address used to access Carter’s
    Facebook account matched the IP address used to create the
    Backpage advertisement. That IP address was traced to a
    Travelodge motel, the decor of which matched the
    background in the Backpage advertisements featuring J.C.
    Aside from J.C., five of the other victims testified in
    person at trial, and one of the victims did not testify at all.
    Carter was ultimately convicted on all fourteen counts and
    sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. Because the group of
    counts involving J.C. (Counts 13 and 14) carried the highest
    offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
    (“U.S.S.G.”), those counts served as the base for calculating
    his final sentencing range. See U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.2, 3D1.4.
    II
    Carter argues that permitting J.C. to testify by two-way
    video violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment’s
    Confrontation Clause. “We review claims of a violation of
    the Confrontation Clause de novo.” United States v. Nguyen,
    
    565 F.3d 668
    , 673 (9th Cir. 2009).2
    2
    The government argues that this claim should be reviewed under the
    plain error standard because Carter did not “request[] either a continuance
    or severance” of Counts 13 and 14 in the district court. The argument has
    no merit. Both before and during trial, Carter specifically objected to the
    use of two-way video testimony on Confrontation Clause grounds. These
    objections, which brought Carter’s “Confrontation Clause claim to the
    attention of both the district court and the government,” were sufficient “to
    avoid the plain error standard” on appeal. 
    Nguyen, 565 F.3d at 673
    n.2.
    Carter was not obligated to suggest other strategies for how the
    government could introduce evidence against him.
    8                UNITED STATES V. CARTER
    A
    The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
    guarantees a criminal defendant the right “to be confronted
    with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
    “[T]he Confrontation Clause provides two types of
    protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to
    face those who testify against him, and the right to conduct
    cross-examination.” Coy v. Iowa, 
    487 U.S. 1012
    , 1017
    (1988) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 
    480 U.S. 39
    , 51
    (1987) (plurality opinion)). As the Supreme Court observed
    in Coy, most Confrontation Clause cases concern the second
    of these protections and its implications for using out-of-court
    statements by witnesses who do not testify at trial. 
    Id. at 1016.
    That remains true today. See, e.g., Ohio v. Clark,
    
    135 S. Ct. 2173
    (2015); Michigan v. Bryant, 
    562 U.S. 344
    (2011); Giles v. California, 
    554 U.S. 353
    (2008); Crawford
    v. Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    (2004). But at its core, “the
    Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face
    meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.”
    
    Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016
    ; see California v. Green, 
    399 U.S. 149
    ,
    157 (1970) (explaining that the “literal right to ‘confront’ the
    witness at the time of trial . . . forms the core of the values
    furthered by the Confrontation Clause”).
    The Supreme Court has twice addressed the right to face-
    to-face confrontation. In Coy, the Court held that the
    placement of a screen between the defendant and two child
    witnesses, which allowed the “witnesses to avoid viewing
    [the defendant] as they gave their testimony,” constituted an
    “obvious . . . violation of the defendant’s right to a face-to-
    face 
    encounter.” 487 U.S. at 1020
    . In reaching that
    conclusion, the Court illustrated “the profound effect upon a
    witness of standing in the presence of the person the witness
    UNITED STATES V. CARTER                      9
    accuses,” explaining that a physically-confronted “witness
    ‘may feel quite differently when he has to repeat his story
    looking at the man whom he will harm greatly by distorting
    or mistaking the facts.’” 
    Id. at 1019–20
    (quoting Zechariah
    Chafee, The Blessings of Liberty 35 (1956)). The “right to
    face-to-face confrontation” thus serves to “ensure the
    integrity of the fact-finding process.” 
    Id. (citation and
    internal alteration omitted). Accordingly, the Court held that
    the Confrontation Clause’s “irreducible literal meaning”
    guarantees “a right to meet face to face all those who appear
    and give evidence at trial.” 
    Id. at 1021
    (emphasis omitted)
    (quoting 
    Green, 399 U.S. at 175
    (Harlan, J., concurring)).
    Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that “face-to-face
    presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or
    abused child; but by the same token it may confound and
    undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a
    malevolent adult. It is a truism that constitutional protections
    have costs.” 
    Id. at 1020.
    The Court “le[ft] for another day”
    the question whether there were exceptions to the right to
    face-to-face confrontation, observing that any exception
    “would surely be allowed only when necessary to further an
    important public policy.” 
    Id. at 1021
    .
    That day came two years later in Craig. There, the Court
    upheld a Maryland statute permitting child victims of abuse
    to testify from outside the courtroom by one-way closed
    circuit 
    television. 497 U.S. at 840
    –41, 860. This procedure
    could be invoked only if the trial judge found “that testimony
    by the child victim in the courtroom will result in the child
    suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot
    reasonably communicate.” 
    Id. at 840–41
    (citation omitted).
    The prosecutor and defense counsel could examine and cross-
    examine the child witness in a separate room. 
    Id. at 841.
    The
    defendant and jury could see the testifying child witness on
    10               UNITED STATES V. CARTER
    a monitor in the courtroom, but the witness could not see the
    defendant. 
    Id. at 841–42.
    The Court declared that, while “the Confrontation Clause
    reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation,”
    defendants do not have an “absolute right to a face-to-face
    meeting with witnesses against them at trial.” 
    Id. at 844,
    849
    (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 
    448 U.S. 56
    , 63 (1980)). But the
    Court cautioned that “the face-to-face confrontation
    requirement” should not “easily be dispensed with.” 
    Id. at 850.
    Thus, the Court held that “a defendant’s right to
    confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a
    physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where”
    (1) the “denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an
    important public policy,” and (2) “the reliability of the
    testimony is otherwise assured.” 
    Id. at 850.
    Armed with this two-part test, the Court turned to
    Maryland’s video procedure. The Court first concluded that
    the procedure adequately ensured the “reliability and
    adversariness” of the testimony, as it “preserve[d] all of the
    other elements of the confrontation right”—the child witness
    had to be competent to testify under oath, the defendant could
    conduct live cross-examination, and everyone in the
    courtroom could observe the witness’s demeanor. 
    Id. at 851.
    The Court further concluded that “a State’s interest in the
    physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims
    may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some
    cases, a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in court.”
    
    Id. at 853.
    But such cases would require a “case-specific
    finding” that the procedure is “necessary to protect a child
    witness from trauma that would be caused by testifying in the
    physical presence of the defendant” when “such trauma
    would impair the child’s ability to communicate.” 
    Id. at UNITED
    STATES V. CARTER                             11
    857–58. The Court explained that the trial court would need
    to find that the witness would be traumatized by the
    defendant’s presence in the courtroom, not from the
    courtroom generally, and that the trauma would rise to a level
    that is “more than de minimis.” 
    Id. at 856.
    B
    Craig involved one-way video testimony by a child
    witness, while this case involves two-way video testimony by
    an adult witness. The Supreme Court has not decided
    whether Craig’s standard applies in these circumstances,3 and
    until now we have applied Craig only in the context of
    18 U.S.C. § 3509, a statute enacted in direct response to
    Craig that permits child witnesses to testify by two-way
    video. See United States v. Etimani, 
    328 F.3d 493
    , 499 (9th
    Cir. 2003); United States v. Quintero, 
    21 F.3d 885
    , 892 (9th
    Cir. 1994); United States v. Garcia, 
    7 F.3d 885
    , 888–89 (9th
    Cir. 1993). We now make clear that a defendant’s right to
    physically confront an adverse witness (whether child or
    adult) cannot be compromised by permitting the witness to
    testify by video (whether one-way or two-way) unless
    3
    The vitality of Craig itself is questionable in light of the Supreme
    Court’s later decision in Crawford, which abrogated Roberts, a case relied
    upon heavily in Craig that permitted “open-ended exceptions from the
    confrontation requirement” based on “judicial determination[s] of
    reliability.” 
    Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54
    , 62 (abrogating Roberts, 
    448 U.S. 56
    ); see 
    Craig, 497 U.S. at 847
    –52. But while Craig and Crawford stand
    in “marked contrast” in several respects, “Crawford did not overturn
    Craig.” United States v. Cox, 
    871 F.3d 479
    , 492–95 (6th Cir. 2017)
    (Sutton, J., concurring), cert. denied, 
    138 S. Ct. 754
    (2018). We thus
    remain bound by Craig until the Supreme Court “see[s] fit to reconsider
    [it], regardless of whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about [its]
    continuing vitality.” Bosse v. Oklahoma, 
    137 S. Ct. 1
    , 2 (2016) (per
    curiam) (citation omitted).
    12                UNITED STATES V. CARTER
    Craig’s standard is satisfied. And that standard is a stringent
    one; the use of a remote video procedure must be reserved for
    rare cases in which it is “necessary.” 
    Craig, 497 U.S. at 850
    .
    Our conclusion follows directly from the “core” of the
    Confrontation Clause guarantee—providing the accused an
    “opportunity to challenge his accuser in a face-to-face
    encounter in front of the trier of fact.” 
    Green, 399 U.S. at 156
    –57. Not only does physical confrontation at trial serve
    as a symbol of fairness, but it also promotes reliability, for
    “[i]t is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person ‘to his
    face’ than ‘behind his back.’” 
    Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019
    .
    Compelling “adverse witnesses at trial to testify in the
    accused’s presence” thus “enhances the accuracy of
    factfinding” at trial. 
    Craig, 497 U.S. at 846
    –47. So too does
    “compelling [witnesses] to stand face to face with the jury”
    as they tell their side of the story. 
    Green, 399 U.S. at 158
    (quoting Mattox v. United States, 
    156 U.S. 237
    , 242 (1895)).
    These important components of confrontation are lost when
    the witness is not testifying in court, regardless of the
    witness’s age or ability to see the defendant on a screen from
    a distant location. Any procedure that allows an adverse
    witness to testify remotely necessarily diminishes “the
    profound [truth-inducing] effect upon a witness of standing
    in the presence of the person the witness accuses.” 
    Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020
    (emphasis added).
    There are also important practical differences between
    face-to-face confrontation and virtual confrontation. From
    the remote witness’s point of view, the courtroom will
    necessarily be defined by the angle and quality of the
    courtroom camera as well as the size and quality of the screen
    on which the video is projected. These variables can distort
    any effort to approximate in-person testimony. The record in
    UNITED STATES V. CARTER                    13
    this case bears this out. When asked to identify Carter in the
    courtroom, J.C. hesitantly did so after testifying that she
    “c[ould]n’t really see that well.” Moreover, unless the
    defendant has multiple attorneys, such that one could travel
    to the witness’s remote location while the other remains in
    the courtroom, the defendant would be unable to ensure that,
    for example, “the witness is not being coached or influenced
    during testimony, and that the witness is not improperly
    referring to documents.” United States v. Hamilton, 
    107 F.3d 499
    , 503 (7th Cir. 1997). There is no suggestion of such
    misconduct in this case; we point this out only to show that
    physical confrontation serves purposes other than permitting
    cross-examination and allowing the jury to see the witness’s
    face.
    It also bears noting that no procedural mechanism exists
    for employing a video procedure in the manner it was
    employed here. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26
    requires that, absent certain circumstances, “[i]n every trial
    the testimony of witnesses must be taken in open court.” The
    Judicial Conference once suggested a revision to Rule 26 that
    would have allowed testimony by two-way video in special
    circumstances, but the Supreme Court declined to transmit
    the proposed revision to Congress. Order of the Supreme
    Court, 
    207 F.R.D. 89
    , 91–92 (2002). Justice Scalia filed a
    statement explaining that he “share[d] the majority’s view”
    that the proposal was “of dubious validity under the
    Confrontation Clause,” as it failed to “limit the use of
    testimony via video transmission to instances where there has
    been a ‘case-specific finding’ that it is ‘necessary to further
    an important public policy.’” 
    Id. at 93
    (statement of Scalia,
    J.) (citing 
    Craig, 497 U.S. at 850
    , 857–58). Although Justice
    Scalia’s statement is not controlling, his reasoning supports
    our conclusion that Craig supplies the governing standard
    14                  UNITED STATES V. CARTER
    when the defendant is deprived of “a physical, face-to-face
    confrontation at 
    trial,” 497 U.S. at 850
    .
    Further support for our view comes from other circuits
    addressing this issue, which have held that Craig’s two-part
    test applies to the use of two-way video testimony. See
    United States v. Yates, 
    438 F.3d 1307
    , 1313–15 (11th Cir.
    2006) (en banc); United States v. Bordeaux, 
    400 F.3d 548
    ,
    554–55 (8th Cir. 2005); see also State v. Rogerson,
    
    855 N.W.2d 495
    , 502–03 (Iowa 2014) (collecting decisions
    from several state courts holding that “Craig [provides] the
    standard for assessing the constitutionality of two-way video
    testimony”).4 We now join them and expressly hold that a
    defendant’s right to “physical, face-to-face confrontation at
    trial” may be compromised by the use of a remote video
    procedure only upon a “case-specific finding” that (1) the
    denial of physical confrontation “is necessary to further an
    4
    The Second Circuit has held that “the Craig standard” does not
    apply to two-way video procedures, reasoning that, unlike the one-way
    video in Craig, two-way video “preserve[s] the face-to-face
    confrontation” required by the Confrontation Clause. United States v.
    Gigante, 
    166 F.3d 75
    , 81 (2d Cir. 1999). Instead of applying Craig, the
    Second Circuit thought the “more profitable comparison” was to Federal
    Rule of Criminal Procedure 15, which permits the taking of an out-of-
    court deposition for use in trial in “exceptional circumstances . . . in the
    interest of justice.” 
    Id. (quoting Fed.
    R. Crim. P. 15(a)). We agree with
    the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits that Gigante is an outlier and that the
    proper test is Craig. See 
    Yates, 438 F.3d at 1313
    ; 
    Bordeaux, 400 F.3d at 555
    . Regardless of whether the video procedure is one-way or two-way,
    the defendant is being denied “a physical, face-to-face confrontation at
    trial.” 
    Craig, 497 U.S. at 850
    . And equating a two-way video procedure
    with face-to-face confrontation necessarily neglects the “intangible
    elements” of confrontation that, as even the Gigante court admits, may be
    “reduced or even eliminated by remote 
    testimony.” 166 F.3d at 81
    .
    UNITED STATES V. CARTER                    15
    important public policy,” and (2) “the reliability of the
    testimony is otherwise assured.” 
    Craig, 497 U.S. at 850
    , 857.
    C
    Craig’s requirement of necessity was not met here.
    Although the district court concluded that J.C. was
    “unavailable to travel to be physically present” at trial, all
    agree that J.C.’s inability to travel was due to her
    pregnancy—a temporary disability. There were alternatives
    available to preserve Carter’s right to physical face-to-face
    confrontation, meaning that denying him that right was not
    necessary.
    The most obvious alternative would have been to continue
    the trial in anticipation of J.C.’s recovery. See United States
    v. Jacobs, 
    97 F.3d 275
    , 281 (8th Cir. 1996); Peterson v.
    United States, 
    344 F.2d 419
    , 425 (5th Cir. 1965). As the
    government acknowledges in its brief, J.C. was unable to
    travel “for the duration of her pregnancy (which was two
    months).” Continuances have been granted in similar
    circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 
    218 F.3d 556
    , 562–63 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming a four-month
    “continuance requested by the government on the ground that
    [a prosecution witness] had been hospitalized after going into
    premature labor and was therefore unavailable to testify”).
    Another alternative would have been to sever the two counts
    involving J.C. while maintaining the scheduled trial date for
    the remaining counts. See, e.g., Garris v. United States,
    
    418 F.2d 467
    , 468–70 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (affirming severance
    of counts at the government’s request when “the necessary
    witnesses” for the various counts “could not be available at
    the same time”). Although some of the government’s
    evidence may have overlapped among the counts, the charges
    16                  UNITED STATES V. CARTER
    were not inseparable. To the contrary, the jury was
    specifically instructed that the “verdict on one count should
    not control [the] verdict on any other count.” Either of these
    alternatives would have allowed Carter to confront J.C. face-
    to-face, without screens, cables, and thousands of miles
    between them.
    We are mindful that having to make these adjustments on
    the eve of trial is not ideal. But a criminal defendant’s
    constitutional rights cannot be neglected merely to avoid
    “added expense or inconvenience.” 
    Green, 399 U.S. at 189
    n.22 (Harlan, J., concurring). We also realize that there may
    be some cases in which it is truly necessary to forgo physical
    confrontation at trial due to a witness’s medical condition.
    See, e.g., Horn v. Quarterman, 
    508 F.3d 306
    , 310, 320 (5th
    Cir. 2007) (finding Craig’s “necessity-based exception”
    satisfied on habeas review when the witness was “terminally
    ill with cancer and being treated in [another state]”). But in
    this case, the government did not even attempt to continue the
    trial, sever the counts, or both before resorting to a procedure
    that prevented Carter from confronting his accuser in person.
    “The right of confrontation may not be dispensed with so
    lightly.” Barber v. Page, 
    390 U.S. 719
    , 725 (1968).
    The government did suggest another possible
    alternative—deposing J.C. in Minnesota.5 Although live, in-
    person testimony would be preferable to out-of-court
    5
    The government proposed taking J.C.’s deposition under Rule 15,
    and offered two-way video as an alternative. Carter objected to both
    proposals, expressing doubts that the deposition could be scheduled
    without interfering with the trial schedule. The district court rejected the
    proposed deposition without comment and granted the government’s
    application to proceed by video.
    UNITED STATES V. CARTER                            17
    testimony, a deposition would have at least preserved Carter’s
    right to physical confrontation. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(a),
    (c)(1). Indeed, Craig itself notes that the “denial of face-to-
    face confrontation would be unnecessary” if the witness could
    testify elsewhere “with the defendant 
    present.” 497 U.S. at 856
    ; see 
    Yates, 438 F.3d at 1317
    (finding no necessity where
    the defendants and witnesses could “be placed in the same
    room for the taking of pre-trial deposition testimony pursuant
    to Rule 15”). And if logistics prevented the government from
    securing Carter’s physical presence at J.C.’s deposition while
    also maintaining the trial schedule, the court could have
    granted a brief continuance to allow the deposition to be
    completed with Carter present.6 Given these various
    alternatives, forgoing physical confrontation in favor of a
    two-way video procedure was not “necessary.” 
    Craig, 497 U.S. at 850
    .
    The government tries to overcome this conclusion by
    pointing to Federal Rule of Evidence 804, which permits the
    introduction of certain hearsay statements made prior to trial
    when the declarant is “unavailable” to testify in court because
    of “a then-existing infirmity, physical illness, or mental
    illness.” Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(4), (b). As the government
    correctly observes, we have held that “risks in late pregnancy,
    when attested to by a physician, are an ‘infirmity’ within the
    6
    We express no opinion on whether the government could have
    satisfied the Confrontation Clause by deposing J.C. without Carter
    physically present, other than to note that the government is generally
    required to “secure the defendant’s actual, physical presence” at a Rule 15
    deposition and that we have excused this requirement only when fulfilling
    it would be “impossibl[e].” United States v. Medjuck, 
    156 F.3d 916
    , 920
    (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Christian v. Rhode, 
    41 F.3d 461
    , 467 n.8 (9th Cir.
    1994)); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(c)(1).
    18               UNITED STATES V. CARTER
    meaning of [Rule 804(a)(4)].” United States v. McGuire,
    
    307 F.3d 1192
    , 1205 (9th Cir. 2002).
    This argument suffers from two flaws. First, this case
    does not involve hearsay statements made prior to trial; J.C.
    gave live testimony during trial, albeit remotely. As a
    constitutional matter, the test for admitting out-of-court
    testimony is “quite separate from” the test adopted in Craig,
    which governs “what in-court procedures are constitutionally
    required to guarantee a defendant’s confrontation right once
    a witness is testifying.” White v. Illinois, 
    502 U.S. 346
    , 358
    (1992). If anything, our decision in McGuire only sharpens
    the point, as the hearsay testimony introduced in that case
    was videotaped testimony from the defendant’s first 
    trial. 307 F.3d at 1196
    ; see Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). The defendant
    thus had the opportunity to physically confront the witness at
    the time the testimony was given. Carter, by contrast, never
    had that opportunity with respect to J.C.
    Second, Rule 804 is a rule of evidence, and the
    Confrontation Clause’s protections do not turn on “the
    vagaries of the rules of evidence.” 
    Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61
    ;
    see Idaho v. Wright, 
    497 U.S. 805
    , 814 (1990) (“[W]e have
    . . . been careful not to equate the Confrontation Clause’s
    prohibitions with the general rule prohibiting the admission
    of hearsay statements.”). Indeed, the right to confrontation is
    a rule of procedure, not evidence. See 
    Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60
    –61. When testimony is being introduced against a
    defendant in a criminal case, the Confrontation Clause’s
    guarantees do not simply “evaporate when [the] testimony
    happens to fall within some broad, modern hearsay exception,
    even if that exception might be justifiable in other
    circumstances.” 
    Id. at 56
    n.7. We therefore find the
    government’s reliance on Rule 804 unpersuasive.
    UNITED STATES V. CARTER                     19
    The government also points out that the two-way video
    procedure in this case preserved “all other elements of the
    confrontation right,” 
    Craig, 497 U.S. at 851
    , as J.C. was
    required to be competent, to testify under oath, to undergo
    contemporaneous cross-examination, and to be viewable by
    the judge, jury, and defendant. But that is not sufficient.
    Dispensing with physical confrontation must be “necessary.”
    
    Id. at 850.
    And a finding that J.C. was temporarily unable to
    come to court is not the sort of “requisite finding of
    necessity” that justifies depriving Carter of his constitutional
    right to physical, face-to-face confrontation. 
    Id. at 855.
    D
    Having found a Confrontation Clause violation, Carter’s
    convictions on Counts 13 and 14 cannot stand unless “the
    error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
    States v. Larson, 
    495 F.3d 1094
    , 1107 (9th Cir. 2007) (en
    banc). “The government bears the burden of proving that the
    error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and we assess
    this issue by considering ‘the importance of the witness’
    testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony
    was cumulative, and, of course, the overall strength of the
    prosecution’s case.’” United States v. Esparza, 
    791 F.3d 1067
    , 1074 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal alteration omitted)
    (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 
    475 U.S. 673
    , 684 (1986)).
    The “assessment of harmlessness cannot include
    consideration of whether the witness’ testimony would have
    been unchanged, or the jury’s assessment unaltered, had there
    been confrontation”; rather, harmlessness must “be
    determined on the basis of the remaining evidence.” 
    Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021
    –22; see 
    Nguyen, 565 F.3d at 675
    .
    20               UNITED STATES V. CARTER
    The government has not carried its burden of showing
    that the Confrontation Clause violation was harmless beyond
    a reasonable doubt. J.C. was not merely a witness, but the
    alleged victim of Carter’s crimes, and she was the most recent
    of Carter’s alleged victims. Her testimony was clearly
    critical evidence with respect to Counts 13 and 14. The
    government acknowledged as much in the district court,
    arguing that “J.C.’s testimony [was] especially central to the
    government’s case.” The remaining evidence for those
    counts consisted of “documentary evidence” indicating that
    Carter paid for J.C.’s bus ticket to Los Angeles and for a
    Backpage ad that included a photograph of J.C. But this
    evidence does not, standing alone, establish beyond a
    reasonable doubt that Carter violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591 and
    2423. The documents do not establish, for example, Carter’s
    “intent that [J.C.] engage in prostitution.” 18 U.S.C.
    § 2423(a). Nor do they establish Carter’s knowledge that
    “force, threats of force, fraud, [or] coercion . . . would be used
    to cause [J.C.] to engage in a commercial sex act.” 
    Id. § 1591(a).
    Only J.C. could fill in those gaps. And she
    testified that she was 16 when Carter first contacted her, that
    she told him she was 16, and that he purchased a bus ticket
    because she was underage and could not get on a plane. J.C.
    described how Carter put her up in motels, bought her
    provocative clothes, and forced her onto the streets. She
    testified that he coerced her into prostitution and maintained
    control over her by collecting all of her earnings and by
    threatening and beating her if she failed to follow his “rules.”
    Her testimony was thus central to the government’s case on
    Counts 13 and 14, which “strongly supports a finding that the
    error was not harmless.” Fowler v. Sacramento Cty. Sheriff’s
    Dep’t, 
    421 F.3d 1027
    , 1042 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Olden v.
    Kentucky, 
    488 U.S. 227
    , 232–33 (1988)).
    UNITED STATES V. CARTER                     21
    In any event, “[e]ven when the government’s case is
    ‘strong,’ a Confrontation Clause violation is not harmless
    where the erroneously admitted evidence could have
    ‘significantly altered the evidentiary picture.’” 
    Esparza, 791 F.3d at 1074
    (quoting United States v. Bustamante,
    
    687 F.3d 1190
    , 1195 (9th Cir. 2012)). There is no question
    that J.C.’s testimony significantly altered the evidentiary
    picture with respect to Counts 13 and 14. The government’s
    essential argument at closing—that J.C. “worked for [Carter]
    out on the track, having sex with adult men in cheap motels,
    and giving all the money to [Carter]”—hinged entirely on
    J.C.’s testimony. The government has not met its burden to
    show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Counts 13
    and 14 must be vacated.
    III
    Because we vacate Carter’s convictions on Counts 13 and
    14, the sentencing package imposed by the district court has
    become “unbundled.” United States v. Christensen, 
    828 F.3d 763
    , 821 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Ruiz-
    Alvarez, 
    211 F.3d 1181
    , 1184 (9th Cir. 2000)). Indeed,
    Carter’s sentence was based on Counts 13 and 14, the group
    of counts with the highest offense level. See U.S.S.G.
    §§ 3D1.2, 3D1.4. We therefore follow “our customary
    practice” of remanding for the district court “to put together
    a new package reflecting its considered judgment as to the
    punishment the defendant deserve[s] for the crimes of which
    he [i]s still convicted.” 
    Christensen, 828 F.3d at 821
    (internal
    alterations omitted) (quoting 
    Ruiz-Alvarez, 211 F.3d at 1184
    ).
    We decline to address Carter’s additional challenges to his
    sentence, which he may raise to the extent appropriate on
    remand.
    22              UNITED STATES V. CARTER
    IV
    Permitting J.C. to testify against Carter by two-way video
    violated Carter’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation,
    and that error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
    For these reasons and those given in the accompanying
    memorandum disposition, we affirm Carter’s convictions on
    Counts 1–12, vacate his convictions on Counts 13 and 14, and
    remand to the district court for resentencing.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
    REMANDED.