United States v. Olaf Juda ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                          FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FEB 22 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No. 11-10298
    Plaintiff - Appellee,             D.C. No. 3:91-cr-00324-WHA-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    OLAF PETER JUDA, pro se,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted February 11, 2013
    San Francisco, California
    Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    Olaf Peter Juda (“Juda”) appeals the modification of his conditions of
    supervised release and order dismissing his motion to dismiss the supervised release
    revocation proceedings. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we
    affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    I.
    We review de novo the district court’s authority to modify Juda’s terms of
    supervised release, United States v. Miller, 
    205 F.3d 1098
    , 1100 (9th Cir. 2000), and
    determine that, having properly considered the statutorily enumerated factors, there
    was full authority to modify Juda’s conditions of supervised release under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(2). See United States v. Gross, 
    307 F.3d 1043
    , 1044 (2002). Changed
    circumstances were not required to modify those conditions. See Miller, 
    205 F.3d at 1100
    ; see also, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Espinosa, 
    30 F.3d 1169
    , 1171 (9th Cir.
    1994).
    Reviewing for abuse of discretion, United States v. Napulou, 
    593 F.3d 1041
    ,
    1044 (9th Cir. 2010), we hold that the imposition of these particular conditions was
    not an abuse of discretion in light of the nature of Juda’s original offense and post-
    release behavior. See United States v. King, 
    608 F.3d 1122
    , 1131 (9th Cir. 2010).
    II.
    While we may consider whether district courts have authority to revoke a term
    of supervised release under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    , see, e.g., United States v. Wing, 
    682 F.3d 861
    , 863 (9th Cir. 2012), the validity of a conviction may not be collaterally
    attacked in, or on appeal from, a supervised release revocation proceeding. United
    States v. Simmons, 
    812 F.2d 561
    , 563 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Lustig,
    2
    
    555 F.2d 751
    , 753 (9th Cir. 1977)) (“[A] conviction may be collaterally attacked only
    in a separate proceeding under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    , and a court should consider the
    petition for probation revocation as if the underlying conviction was unquestioned.”).
    Thus, Juda may not challenge the district court’s jurisdiction over the revocation
    proceedings based on a claim that his underlying sentence is invalid. See, e.g., United
    States v. Ruiz-Camarena, 141 F. App’x 580, 581 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Simmons, 
    812 F.2d at 563
    ) (rejecting a similar challenge to a district court’s jurisdiction to consider
    a petition for revocation of supervised release).
    AFFIRMED.
    3