Alex Montejo Ake v. Merrick Garland ( 2023 )


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  •                           NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
    FEB 27 2023
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ALEX RANGEL MONTEJO AKE,
    No.   20-70294
    AKA Alex Montejo-Rangel,
    Petitioner,                 Agency No. A200-823-530
    v.                                     MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted December 6, 2022**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: NGUYEN and KOH, Circuit Judges, and BATAILLON*** District Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
    oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    **
    The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the
    District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.
    1
    Alex Rangel Montejo Ake (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen of Mexico,
    petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”). As
    relevant here, the Board denied Petitioner’s motion to terminate proceedings
    pursuant to Pereira v. Sessions, 
    138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018)
    , and denied Petitioner’s
    motion to reconsider and remand for consideration of a cancellation of removal
    claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).1 We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , and
    we deny the petition.2
    We review the Board’s denial of a motion to reconsider and remand for abuse
    of discretion. See Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 
    383 F.3d 968
    , 972 (9th Cir. 2004);
    Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 
    395 F.3d 1095
    , 1098 (9th Cir. 2005). The Board abuses its
    discretion if its decision is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Lopez-Galarza
    v. I.N.S., 
    99 F.3d 954
    , 960 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The agency’s “findings
    of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
    conclude to the contrary.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B). Thus, in order to reverse the
    Board, “we must determine that the evidence not only supports a contrary
    1
    Petitioner does not appeal the Board’s decision to dismiss his appeal of the
    Immigration Judge’s denial of withholding of removal and protection under the
    Convention Against Torture, nor the Board’s refusal to reopen proceedings sua
    sponte.
    2
    As Petitioner concedes, our precedent forecloses his argument that a defective
    notice to appear (“NTA”) deprives the immigration court of jurisdiction. See United
    States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 
    39 F.4th 1187
    , 1190–94 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc); see
    also Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 
    958 F.3d 887
    , 895 (9th Cir. 2020).
    2
    conclusion, but compels it—and also compels the further conclusion that the
    petitioner meets the requisite standard for obtaining relief.” Ling Huang v. Holder,
    
    744 F.3d 1149
    , 1152 (9th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). “Where, as here, the [Board]
    adopts the [Immigration Judge’s] decision while adding its own reasons, this court
    reviews both decisions.” Vahora v. Holder, 
    641 F.3d 1038
    , 1042 (9th Cir. 2011).
    To qualify for cancellation of removal, a person must demonstrate (1)
    continuous physical presence in the United States for ten years immediately prior to
    being served with a NTA; (2) good moral character; (3) that he is not subject to any
    other bar to eligibility on account of having certain criminal convictions; and (4) the
    existence of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, or child who
    would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if the person were
    removed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The bar for cancellation of removal is high.
    See In re Gonzalez Recinas, 
    23 I. & N. Dec. 467
    , 469–72 (BIA 2002).
    The parties focus on the fourth requirement under § 1229b(b)(1). The Board
    found that Petitioner failed to produce sufficient evidence to make a prima facie
    showing that he could satisfy the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship
    requirement. On appeal, Petitioner argues that his two U.S.-citizen children would
    face violence when they accompany him to Mexico. But Petitioner cites only to
    evidence that he may face persecution upon return, not evidence of potential harm
    to his children. See Partap v. Holder, 
    603 F.3d 1173
    , 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (per
    3
    curiam) (no abuse of discretion where petitioner fails to present sufficient evidence
    demonstrating the requisite hardship).        Moreover, Petitioner’s cancellation
    application indicates that his children would not accompany him to Mexico if his
    application were denied. Accordingly, the Board did not abuse its discretion in
    finding that Petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing of hardship.
    PETITION DENIED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-70294

Filed Date: 2/27/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/27/2023