United States v. Eduardo Padilla ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 17 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 21-50070
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:20-cr-02805-AJB-1
v.
EDUARDO PADILLA, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 13, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: WATFORD and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and AMON,*** District
Judge.
Eduardo Padilla challenges his convictions for importing methamphetamine
under 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960 and for conspiracy to launder money under 18
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
Page 2 of 4
U.S.C. § 1956. We affirm.
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing expert testimony
on drug courier modus operandi. Our court has explained that drug courier modus
operandi evidence is admissible “when relevant, probative of a defendant’s
knowledge, and not unfairly prejudicial.” United States v. Sepulveda-Barraza, 645
F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Valencia-Lopez, 971
F.3d 891, 901 (9th Cir. 2020). At trial, Padilla raised a “blind mule” defense by
denying knowledge of the methamphetamine found in his vehicle and by
introducing evidence on cross-examination in support of that theory. Given this
defense theory, expert testimony explaining the ways that Padilla’s conduct
conformed to the modus operandi of a typical drug courier transporting drugs from
Mexico was relevant, probative of knowledge, and not unfairly prejudicial. See
Sepulveda-Barraza, 645 F.3d at 1072.
2. To the extent the district court erred in allowing brief testimony on drug
organization structure, any such error was harmless. In light of the brevity of the
testimony, the prosecution’s decision not to reference it in closing argument, and
the strength of the other evidence, it is not “more probable than not that” the brief
foray into drug organization structure “materially affected the jurors’ verdict.”
United States v. Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 605 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting United
States v. Bettencourt, 614 F.2d 214, 218 (9th Cir. 1980)).
Page 3 of 4
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecution
to introduce evidence of Padilla’s prior entries into the United States under Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b). The prosecution did not argue that the prior crossings
themselves constituted a crime and instead relied upon the evidence for the non-
propensity purpose of proving knowledge and preparation. Moreover, the district
court provided a limiting instruction to the jury. Because the evidence was
relevant to at least the non-propensity purpose of demonstrating Padilla’s
knowledge and preparation, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence of Padilla’s prior entries into the United States. See United
States v. Verduzco, 373 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2004); Evans v. United States,
257 F.2d 121, 128 (9th Cir. 1958).
Even if Padilla preserved a separate objection to this evidence under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403, the district court permissibly concluded that the probative
value of the prior-crossing evidence outweighed any unfair prejudice. The district
court was not required to make express Rule 403 findings in this circumstance, as
the required balancing can be inferred from the record. United States v. Johnson,
820 F.2d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 1987). The government argued the issue in its
motions in limine, and because there is nothing inherently inflammatory about the
evidence, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude the
evidence under Rule 403.
Page 4 of 4
4. The district court did not abuse its discretion by giving a deliberate
ignorance instruction. A party is entitled to a particular jury instruction if it is
“supported by law and has foundation in the evidence,” viewed in the light most
favorable to the party requesting the instruction. United States v. Heredia, 483
F.3d 913, 922 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (quoting Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930,
934 (9th Cir. 2002)). Here, both criteria were met.
First, with respect to the legal basis for the instruction, our case law provides
that if “the jury could rationally find willful blindness even though it has rejected
the government’s evidence of actual knowledge,” the district court may give a
deliberate ignorance instruction in addition to the actual knowledge instruction. Id.Second, with respect to the factual basis for the instruction, Padilla himself stated
that he (1) purchased a car from known drug smugglers for a suspiciously low
price, (2) told the smugglers that he would not protect them if any illegal conduct
was discovered, (3) was asked numerous times to smuggle drugs, and (4) called the
smugglers to offer to pick up money across the border the day prior to his arrest.
On the basis of this evidence, the jury could rationally find willful blindness.
AFFIRMED.